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T H E POLITICS OF POLICY 
Participatory Irrigation Management in Andhra 
Pradesh 
BALA RAJU NIKKII 
Propositions 
1. Participatory Irrigation Management in Andhra Pradesh is designed 
to transfer irrigation management functions including the financing 
of irrigation works from irrigation agency to the users. Its 
proponents stress that this aspect has to be made very clear when 
the process of transfer is introduced. This is precisely what is not 
being informed to users under the Andhra Pradesh irrigation 
reforms. (This Thesis) 
2. The critical thing to understand is not where the seed comes from, 
but what makes the soil fertile. (John Kingdon, 2002, Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies. John "Wiley). The critical thing to 
understand is not only where a policy comes from, but also what 
makes this policy translate on the ground in what ways and in which 
directions. {This Thesis) 
3. There can be no one definition of policy analysis (Aaron Wildavsky, 
1979:15, Speaking Truth to Power The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis, 
Little Brown) 
4. Policy analysis is where the daily concerns of ordinary people 
interface with the most fundamental questions about the nature of 
reality and knowledge. (Goktug Morcol, 2002. A New Mind for Policy 
Analysis, Greenwood Publishing Housej 
5. Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) cannot become a reality 
nor can it become self-sustaining without restructuring of the state 
irrigation departments, and the bureaucracy is unlikely to initiate 
such change. (K.JLSingh,2000. Participatory Irrigation Management: 
Paradigm for the 21st Century, Rawat Publications). 
Reform should be neither too fast nor too slow. In some cases, 
reforms have been more successful on paper than on the ground. 
Hasty handover and speedy reforms, as in Andhra Pradesh, tend to 
deny new institutions the time they need to mature and become 
sustainable. (Asian Development Bank, Final Synthesis Report 2005: 
31-32). 
Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood 
phenomena on earth. 
(James Macgregor Burns, leadership, 1978, 
Harper and Row Publishers) 
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Andhra Pradesh is known as the rice bowl o f India. 1 The state has 
been a leading participant in the Green Revolution in the country. 
T h e state also has been benefited by the development o f irrigation 
infrastructure, which took place during both pre and postcolonial 
governments. However, decline in public investment and lack o f 
users' participation in irrigation system management has led to 
deterioration o f irrigation infrastructure. T o address the issue 
Andhra Pradesh (AP) has adopted the route o f irrigation 
management reforms. The reforms, which have come to be known 
as participatory irrigation management programme (PIM) has been 
labelled as the 'AP model' o f irrigation reforms. 
This study investigates the process o f irrigation reform policy 
implemented since 1997 in the state o f Andhra Pradesh. The 
objective is to understand the nature o f the policy process i.e. the 
role o f different actors such as water users, water users' association 
leaders, politicians, irrigation bureaucrats, and their contestation o f 
policy and shaping o f courses o f action and outcomes. The study 
thus aims to contribute to the general debate on reform policies 
and particularly irrigation reform policy in the state o f Andhra 
Pradesh. A primary research was conducted on Nagarjuna Sagar, a 
multipurpose major irrigation project i.e. for use o f drinking water, 
irrigation and power constructed on the river Krishna. The project 
is located in Nalgonda district in Andhra Pradesh. 
The reform initiatives especially under the Chandra B a b u Naidu 
led Telugu Desham Party (TDP) government, have earned a name 
for Andhra Pradesh as a fast growing state in the forefront o f 
economic reforms. The A P state is often referred to as the 
1 
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'champion of reforms' in the country. Mr Naidu was chosen by 
Time magazine as South Asian of the Year in 1999 and the New 
York Times described the state of Andhra Pradesh as an 
'international model'.2 In addition to media statements regarding 
AP reforms, institutions and individual researchers involved in 
water sector state that 
Indian discussion on irrigation reform is abuzz with Andhra 
Pradesh Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu's statewide program of 
transferring management of surface irrigation systems to Water 
User Associations (WUAs). The scale and speed with which these 
changes have been implemented have attracted worldwide attention 
(IWMI, 2000:7) 
Water sector reforms are underway in many countries of the world 
today. Mexico, Turkey and Philippines are some of the countries 
where the concept of PIM has been tried and tested In India, 
Andhra Pradesh is the first state to have gone in with the *big bang' 
approach of uniform and simultaneous introduction of PIM 
throughout the state. Today, the Andhra 'Pradesh model is being 
watched with great interest and is being replicated in other states of 
India as well (Italics mine) - quotes a book tided Users in Water 
Management The Andhra Model and its RepScabiSly in India, 2002 edited 
by Rakesh Hoo ja, Ganesh Pangare and K.V. Raju 
According to a press note issued by the Chief Minister's Office here 
[Andhra Pradesh], the Chief Ministers of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, 
Kamataka, Haiyana, Assam, Uttaranchal, Tripura and Punjab 
besides Lok Dal leader Ajit Singh and social activist Swami 
Agnivesh were present [in National Integration Council meeting in 
Delhi on Wednesday, 31 s t August 2005]. Assam Chief Minister 
Tarun Gogoi told Dr. Reddy that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
had advised him to study the Andhra Pradesh irrigation models. They 
enquired how Andhra Pradesh embarked on taking up so many 
projects when other States were not in a position to complete two 
or three, the note said (Italics mine. The Hindu dated 1 s t September 
2005). 
As evident from the above statements the reform initiatives raised 
high expectations both within India and abroad about its 
performance. The irrigation reform •was supported by the highest 
political executive (the chief minister), and state bureaucrats have 
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earned national and international recognition very quickly after its 
initiation. However 'models' offer easy solutions and promote 
replications that are often likely to fail so there is a need to study 
the A P model critically. 
Andhra Pradesh was the first state in the country to enact 
legislation known as the Andhra Pradesh Farmers Management o f 
Irrigation Systems Act (APEMIS Act) in 1997. 3 The Act legalised 
the formation o f W U A s and their mandatory participation in the 
management o f irrigation systems. A s a result more than 10,200 
W U A s were democratically elected as part o f the reform 
programme; covering 4.8 million ha o f irrigated areas in the state. 
T h e state government could raise financial resources both from 
internal and external sources. A s an external funding agency, the 
World Bank played a crucial role in the design and implementation 
o f the reform. 
/. / Focus of the Thesis 
There is abundant literature available on the main issues affecting 
irrigation sector performance in many countries, often described as 
a vicious circle caused by low budgets, lack o f maintenance, poor 
irrigation services, lack o f users' participation, and p o o r fee 
collection. T o break this cycle, governments, donor agencies and 
non-governmental agencies have begun new forms o f management 
by introducing institutional and financial reforms. Against this 
backdrop, the need for irrigation reforms seems to b e well 
understood. What is less understood are the process dynamics o f 
implementation o f these reforms. Research on irrigation has 
traditionally focused on technological and management problems 
and solutions for them, but not focused on the policy process. T h e 
focus o f this thesis is the irrigation management reform process in 
Andhra Pradesh, a south Indian state. 
The thesis focuses on the main actors in the irrigation reform 
programme and their reshaping o f implementation process and 
outcomes envisaged in the reform policies. The main outcomes 
and implementation arenas investigated are those o f the policy 
itself-finance mechanisms for better operation and maintenance, 
improved water delivery and irrigated area, and more accountable 
and realistic local irrigation revenue collection. The main focus is 
on actors within the irrigation system: they are the water users or 
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mainly the irrigators, W U A representatives, political leaders and the 
irrigation and revenue bureaucrats. T h e relationships among these 
various actors and how they contested the policy within the 
irrigation reform policy space, forms the subject o f the thesis. The 
socio-political embeddedness o f these actors is studied across both 
village and system bureaucracy domains. The field research was 
focused on Madhira Branch Canal (MBC) located on the Nagarjuna 
Sagar Left Bank Canal (see M a p l . l ) . The following sections 
introduce the research concerns, methodology and research area. 
MAP 1.1 Location of NzgzqmizsagacDzm onRjgegKfwhTTa 
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1.3 Choice of Research Site 
T h e choice to study a major irrigation system was based on four 
reasons. First is the vital contribution to irrigated agriculture by 
major irrigation systems. 4 About 40 percent o f the state gross 
cropped area is irrigated and the irrigation contribution to state 
agricultural production is about 60 p e r c e n t 5 Secondly, the study o f 
a major irrigation system network offered the opportunity to study 
dimensions o f horizontal and vertical linkages. Major irrigation 
systems in the state represent a hierarchical bureaucracy. Only 
under the major irrigation systems, we find the formation o f a three 
tier institutional structure Le. W U A , distributary and project 
committees. Thirdly, the focus o f the reforms was largely on the 
major irrigation sector. The government stated that as a result o f 
reforms, the gap command area under major irrigation systems was 
considerably reduced. 6 Fourthly, the major irrigation projects 
received a major share o f budgets under reforms for irrigation 
works. 
Selection of Research Location 
The Nagarjuna Sagar irrigation project (NSP) was selected for the 
study. The N S P is one o f the major multipurpose River Valley 
Projects in A P , built across the river Krishna at Nandikonda 
village, Pedavoora mandal o f Nalgonda district It is the highest 
stone masonry dam built in India. Built across the river Krishna, it 
has one o f the largest networks o f canal systems irrigating over 
0.9mha o f land in Guntur, Prakasam, Nalgonda, K h a m m a m and 
Krishna districts. The project produces seasonal power o f 
960MegaWatts. The project comprises o f a dam with two main 
canals taking off, one on either side, namely Nagarjuna Sagar Left 
Main Canal (named as Lai Bahadur Canal) and Nagarjuna Sagar 
Right Main Canal (named as Jawahar Canal) (see chapter 4 for 
more details). 
The irrigation reports o f 2000 stated that the N S P recorded a 
better performance in bridging the gap oyacut or command area 
among other major irrigation systems in the state as a result o f the 
reforms. Out o f ten major irrigation systems, N S P reported the 
highest bridged gap command a total o f 70,040 ha . 7 
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The N S P left canal was selected for two reasons. Firsdy, the 
canal has claimed a total o f 36,438 ha as bridged command, which 
is more than the right canal Secondly, the left canal represents 
three distinct cropping patterns i.e. a wet cropping pattern with rice 
in Nalgonda, a mixed cropping pattern in K h a m m a m and part o f 
Krishna, and an irrigated dry (ED) cropping in Krishna district. 8 
The location with highest gap command bridged within the left 
canal was identified from secondary data analysis. Out o f four 
branch canals 9 in Tekulapally irrigation circle 1 0 , Madhira branch 
canal (MBC) in Kalluru irrigation division registered the highest 
(Le. 95 percent) development o f command area, compared to other 
branch canals in the year 2000-2001. 1 1 M B C in addition, reported 
the highest non-localised command area development Le. 800 ha o f 
wet and 653 ha o f irrigation dry in the year 2000-01 . 1 2 Thus M B C 
was selected for in-depth study. 
The total localised command o f the M B C is 39,387 ha, with 
15,653 ha o f wet and 23,734 ha o f irrigated dry command 
according to the localisation schedule. T h e command o f M B C falls 
in three irrigation subdivisions: Kalluru, Tiruvuru and Madhira 
under the Kalluru irrigation division (see Map 1.2). The M B C 
traverses two districts namely K h a m m a m and Krishna Districts. A 
total o f nineteen W U A s have been demarcated under the M B C 
command area (see chapter 4 for detailed discussion). 
1A Methodology 
T o address the concerns outlined above, an intensive case study 
was conducted in the Madhira Branch Canal (MBC) located on the 
Nagarjuna Sagar Left Bank Canal (NSLQ. The research adopted an 
interdisciplinary approach, using a combination o f qualitative 
research tools such as participant observation at the village and 
W U A level semi-structured interviews with irrigation bureaucrats 
and W U A leaders; and group and key informant discussions with 
W U A members. Field research was conducted during March 2001 
to July 2002. Additional fieldwork was conducted at different 
intervals during 2002-2004. 
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MAP 1.2: Location of Major Canals on Madhira Branch Canal 
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Miles and Huberman (1994) discuss that qualitative analysis 
deals well with the complex network o f events and processes in a 
situation. It can sort out the temporal dimension, showing clearly 
what preceded what, either through direct observation or 
retrospection. It is well equipped to cycle back and forth between 
variables and processes- showing that 'stories' are not capricious, but 
include underlying variables, and that variables are not 
disembodied, but have connections over time (1994:147 cited by 
Punch 2005:53.also see Punch 2003; Hammersley 1992). 
The case study method offers an opportunity to gain insights 
and can derive understanding o f wider implications from 
investigation o f an individual case. Denscombe (1999) defines a 
case study as a 'study that focuses on one instance or a few 
instances o f a particular phenomenon with a view to providing an 
in-depth account o f events, relationships, experiences or processes 
occurring in that particular instance'. A case study is used to 'paint 
a portrait o f particular social phenomenon' (Hakim 1987,1982) . 
Yin (1984:23) stresses that a case study is 'an empirical enquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources o f evidence 
are used'. The case study method gives a unitary character to the 
data being studied by inter-relating a variety o f facts to a single 
case. It also provides an opportunity for the analysis o f many 
specific details that are often overlooked with other methods. 
Choosing the case study as the method o f research provided an 
opportunity to draw data from different sources. These included 
secondary sources such as newspaper statements, published 
articles, government gazetteers and official correspondence notes, 
and primary data from semi structured interviews and focus group 
discussions. 
I conducted focus group and individual interviews with W U A 
leaders and irrigation bureaucrats. Focus group discussions are 
carefully planned and conducted in order to obtain information on 
the perceptions o f the W U A leaders, implementation o f P I M and 
later amendments made to the A P F M I S A c t 
Observation is another tool that has been an important method 
o f inquiry in this research. Observations provide a systematic 
description o f events or behaviours in the social setting chosen for 
study. Using the tool o f participant observation required the 
researcher to see everyday life activities, probing the values, beliefs 
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and day-to-day practices o f the individuals and organisations for 
the purpose o f this study. 1 3 Bogdan and Taylor define participant 
observation as immersing oneself in an alien way o f life in order to 
gain knowledge, an understanding, o f that way o f life. It is an 
intense social interaction between researcher and the subjects, in 
the milieu o f the latter (Bogdan and Taylor 1975:5). 
Geer (1969) defines the participant observation method as the 
'method in which the observer participates in the daily life o f the 
people under study, either openly in the role o f researcher or 
covertly in some disguised role, observing things that happen, 
listening to what is said, and questioning people, over some length 
o f time'. During the fieldwork, I had short periods o f stay in 
Madhira, Utukuru and Kalluru villages. The idea was to be in 
constant touch with the water users, leaders and irrigation staff 
members all along the M B C . In Kalluru, I had the opportunity to 
stay in the irrigation housing colony along with other irrigation 
staff. This gave m e an opportunity to observe the day-to-day 
practices o f work and life o f the irrigation staff members. 
The fieldwork was carried out at two levels. The day-to-day 
management o f irrigation activities at the loca l within-system level 
was studied first For this purpose, I discussed with bureaucrats 
from irrigation and revenue departments. I had an opportunity to 
participate as an observer in the W U A meetings held occasionally. I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with W U A leaders, different 
categories o f farmers, community leaders and political party 
representatives in command area villages. The second level was the 
state leveL Discussions at this level were carried out with higher-
level irrigation bureaucrats, consultants, researchers, and members 
o f the political executive and N G O representatives. 
The qualitative research method provided an opportunity to 
reflect on the data collected and making preliminary analysis 
simultaneously. Coffey and Atkinson (1996:2) suggest that in 
qualitative research we should never collect data without substantial 
analysis going on simultaneously. In qualitative research, doing data 
analysis while collecting data is called the 'principle o f interaction' 
between data collection and analysis (Erlandson et al 1993:114) . 
A s a member o f the Matching Institutions and Technology 
(MTT) program, I had the opportunity to present my research work 
in the regional workshops. These workshops were conducted every 
six months as part o f the program at different locations in India 
and Nepal and provided an opportunity to present the research 
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findings as field research progressed. T h e faculty supervisors and 
fellow researchers commented and provided the feedback on the 
work presented. The process helped m e to reflect and analyze the 
data simultaneously. 
1.5 Limitations and Ethics of the Research 
T h e field research started in March 2001 with a reconnaissance 
survey o f irrigation systems and W U A activities in the state. This 
was about four years after start-up o f irrigation reforms in the state. 
After finalising the research location for in-depth study, I focused 
o n the study o f W U A activities and moved to distributary 
committee (DC) level At the state level, the project committees as 
the highest decision making bodies were not formed. The study is 
therefore limited to W U A and D C level A t the start o f my field 
research the Rahi season (2000-2001) faced acute shortages o f 
irrigation water supplies due to the low rainfall and drought 
conditions. Though unfortunate, the situation actually enhanced 
opportunities to study social relations reshaped by the reforms 
through local actions to get water, and to investigate questions 
about the process o f the irrigation reform. 
The study draws its conclusions from one major irrigation 
system but recognises the variation o f irrigation systems in 
different regions. The regional variations and their influence on 
policy were beyond the scope o f the present study. D u e to the 
restricted access to information in policy corridors, to senior 
bureaucrats and heads o f the political offices, the data to analyze 
the macro scenario was not sufficient I could not conduct 
interviews with the Chief Minister who is considered the main 
architect o f the irrigation reform, or with irrigation ministers who 
served during the reform period. 
I have used the real names o f the canals where the study is 
located. I am aware that the findings o f the research might become 
a reference to individual water users associations, irrigation, 
revenue staff and their functioning. I have changed the names o f 
the people who did not want to be identified at certain places, but 
they are always traceable with some effort I have left no 
opportunity unused to explain about the research objectives. I 
hope this research results will not have any negative consequences 
on the key informants. The research objective is not to criticize or 
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1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
T h e thesis contains nine chapters and an epilogue. After this 
introductory chapter, chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework 
used for the analysis. The literature review focuses on 
conceptualisations o f policy processes and analysis o f 
implementation o f irrigation reform policies in different countries. 
T h e review o f country case studies on the implementation o f 
irrigation reform programmes offered possible themes arid issues 
for analysis in the context o f Andhra Pradesh. The chapter 
concludes with the main research question. The subsequent 
empirical chapters set out to study the key means o f policy 
implementation and related irrigation management policy process 
arenas. 
Chapter 3 discusses the emergence o f P I M policy in the state o f 
Andhra Pradesh. In order to provide a historical perspective, a 
brief discussion on the colonial and postcolonial irrigation policies 
is presented. A detailed discussion on the A P F M I S Act o f 1997 
and resulting new local institutions is the main component o f the 
chapter. 
Chapter 4 introduces the details o f the irrigation and social 
organisation o f Madhira Branch Canal (MBQ. The chapter shows 
how irrigation organisation is linked with local social organisation. 
It also opens the study o f social embeddedness o f actors with a 
study o f village level relations. Chapters 5 , 6, 7 and 8 are based on 
empirical analysis. Together, the chapters answer the main research 
question. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the first management arena studied that is 
the irrigation works. It analyses the process o f carrying out physical 
works (operation and maintenance and minimum rehabilitation 
works) after the introduction o f the P I M programme in the state, 
and the key actors reshaping outcomes. The WUAs were given 
power to implement the works with funds sanctioned by the 
government. The reform policy aimed to strengthen the user 
associations by transferring duties that were traditionally under the 
control o f the irrigation department. The shift in roles, duties and 
powers o f the irrigation department, and their day-to-day 
run down a particular government policy, but to contribute to 
deeper understanding o f the reform policy process in the state. 
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engagement with the policy world is analysed. The chapter 
discusses how W U A s have performed their functions in the 
contest o f reform policy. T h e chapter analyses the emergence o f 
new relationships, the process o f alliance building among different 
actors, and the implications for local water distribution and access 
to canal water. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the second irrigation management arena o f 
irrigation expansion and government claims on bridging the gap 
command. T h e government claimed that more than 0.45 million ha 
gap command area that existed earlier was bridged in the first two 
years o f implementation o f reforms. B y analysing the irrigation 
department and published data sources and local water distribution 
practices at secondary and tertiary level canals, I show the 
contradictory nature o f the government claims. The role o f water 
users associations and how decisions o f irrigation staff at different 
levels have influenced water distribution is discussed. The chapter 
shows that the irrigation department retained its control over 
allocation and distribution o f irrigation water, rather than becoming 
a service provider for W U A and Distributary Committee. 
Chapter 7 discusses the third irrigation management arena o f 
reform in joint irrigation supervision and revenue collection (Joint 
Azamoish). It examines the role and participation o f the Irrigation, 
Revenue, Agriculture departments and the W U A in a new process 
created under the reforms through which the extent o f area that 
received canal irrigation in a crop season will be jointly finalised. 
T h e reform policy empowered WUAs to participate in this process. 
Jo int Azamoish as a policy tool or mechanism was emphasised to 
check the underreporting practices on irrigated area and to facilitate 
inter-agency coordination. A s an incentive mechanism government 
issued orders, authorizing W U A s to receive a share o f the cess 
collected from their command area. But the power to collect this 
cess remained with the Reva lue Department rather than the water 
users associations. The chapter discusses the different practices and 
politics o f the participating departments and shows how they 
engaged with the policy. 
Chapter 8 returns to the issue o f socio-political embeddedness 
as it reshapes reforms, looking this time at the system-bureaucracy 
domain and irrigation bureaucrats, especially the field level staff. 
The lower level staff members who are in direct contact with the 
irrigators often determine the policy outcome. The chapter analyses 
the everyday activities o f the field level bureaucrats, especially the 
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assistant engineer who is the competent authority for the WUAs , 
and subordinates. T h e field level bureaucrats give shape to their 
daily work in the context o f departmental orders, users 
associations' needs and political demands. Furthermore, the 
chapter analyses how policy decisions were changed and 
manoeuvred by irrigation staff within the given policy space. The 
chapter shows how different networks o f the irrigation bureaucracy 
lobbied with the state in a move to protect their identity and 
interests. 
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter and summarises the key 
findings o f the research. T h e chapter first discusses the policy 
process and how policy outcomes were influenced by the 
interrelationships o f different actors. This chapter is a summary 
answer to the central research question. The chapter concludes 
with an agenda for future research. 
Many changes have taken place in irrigation sector since 2002. 
T h e Naidu government that introduced the irrigation reforms 
stalled the elections for W U A s after the completion o f their first 
term in the office. A Congress government came into power in 
2004. A s a result there were many changes in the course o f 
irrigation reform policy. I discuss these changes as a brief epilogue 
to the book. I discuss the process and the content o f the 
amendments made to the A P F M I S Act in the second half o f 2002. 
I present views and perceptions o f the W U A leaders, irrigation 
bureaucrats regarding the amendments and conclude how these 
amendments and change in the policy influence the irrigation 
reform policy processes in the state. 
Notes 
1 Andhra Pradesh is normally a surplus state in rice production and 
contributes a major share of food grains annually to the central pool. Of 
the total 25 district in the state, rice is grown in 22 districts. Out of the 22, 
fourteen districts fell under the high productivity area (more than 2500 
kg/ha). These districts together accounted for 3.3 million ha. About 78 
percent area is concentrated in the high productivity zone, which accounts 
for nearly 84 percent of total rice production in the state. The total 
production of rice in the state is about 11.7 million tonnes resulting 
productivity of 2782 kg/ha. Despite occasional slowdowns of rice 
production in 1970s and 80s, it continues to increase up to the present, 
placing the state in second place after West Bengal. 
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2 Time magazine declared Chandrababu Naidu as 'South Asian of The 
Year' in 1999 (Time Asia, December 30, 1999). The Wall Street Journal 
saw him as a model for fellow state leaders. The Chief Minister Mr. Naidu 
was also earlier awarded The Business Person of the Year' award in the 
year 1998, by the Economic Times. The award winning investigative 
journalist of The New York Times, Mr. Bradsher wrote that Andhra 
Pradesh was on its way to being an International model' for certain public 
policies, dated December 27, 2002. Similarly, The Financial Times 
reported on May 2, 2003 that in a country where lower caste women are 
locked out of decision-making, the government of Andhra Pradesh is 
sponsoring a social revolution. This was said to be happening in 
'thousands of villages' in the state. 
3 Following Andhra Pradesh, other states in India Le. Karnataka, Tamil 
Nadu, Kerala, Maharashtra, Goa, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and 
Orissa have enacted similar legislation. 
4 According to the Andhra Pradesh Farmers Management of Irrigation 
Systems Act 1997, systems were classified on the basis of irrigated area 
into three categories Le. major, medium. and minor systems. Major 
irrigation schemes have command areas of more than 10,000 ha. Medium 
irrigation projects have command areas ranging from 2,000 ha to 10,000 
ha. Minor irrigation projects have command areas less than 2,000 ha and 
include smaller irrigation schemes such as lift irrigation or gravity schemes 
from water sources such as tanks, diversion weirs, and open head 
channels. In AP the minor irrigation and groundwater projects are under 
the guidance of the Minor Irrigation Department, while the major and 
medium irrigation projects are under the Major Irrigation Department At 
present AP has 15 major irrigation projects, 75 medium irrigation projects, 
and approximately 12,264 tanks in addition to 60,000 tanks managed by 
Gram Panchayats. 
5 A Wodd Bank study reports that the composition of the net area under 
canals, tanks, wells and other sources was about 43, 18, 35 and 4 percent 
respectively (1997:3). 
^The gap command can be explained in simple terms as the gap or 
difference between the irrigation potential created and area utilized 
7The total area reported under gap bridged was 408,000 ha in the state in 
1997. Out of the total gap, the major irrigation projects reported 71 
percent (Le. 290,434 ha) followed by minor irrigation with 22.2 percent 
and medium irrigation with 6.6 percent In terms of gap command 
bridged, the NSP reported 70,040 ha (24%). The Sriramsagar Project 
(SRSP) reported 131,983 ha Le. (45%). Though SRSP reported higher 
than thé NSP, I did not select SRSP for the study. The decision was based 
on preliminary field work carried out in March-April 2001. The 
construction and lining of the canal works under SRSP is still continuing. 
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The stated huge bridged command under SRSP is due to the completion 
of the secondary canal network. Thus, a new area was brought under 
irrigation but the command was not actually bridged due to the reform 
programme. In other hand, construction was completed in NSP and the 
area reported can be actually taken as the gap command bridged by the 
implementation of the reform programme. 
8 India has a wide range of soil and climate. Cropping pattern vary widely 
from region to region and to a lesser extent from one year to another year. 
Crops like cotton or sorghum are grown in canal commands with less 
number of water wettings called an irrigated dry (ID) cropping pattern. 
The main distinction between irrigated wet and dry cropping pattern is 
that the irrigated dry crops receive much less water than the wet crops. In 
AP, rice is grown in irrigated wet zones and cotton, chillies, maize are 
grown in ID zones. The irrigation systems designed and constructed by 
British in India are mainly mean t to grow irrigated dry crop s. 
9 An irrigation system is a composite of canals, laterals, structures, and 
equipment involved in the transport of water from where it is available to 
where it is required. The irrigation canals can be further classified on the 
basis of size and function as main, secondary or branch canal and tertiary 
canals (major and minors). 
1 0 The irrigation department has divided the total command area into 
circle, divisions, sub-divisions, irrigation blocks and beats for 
administrative purpose. Each irrigation circle consists of four or more 
irrigation divisions and each division is further divided into four sub-
divisions. 
1 1 According to the department records, 2000-01, the Bonakal branch 
canal, Mylavaram branch canal and Nuzvid branch canal showed 87 
percent, 81 percent, and 73 percent irrigation development respecti vely. 
1 2 Localisation is a government water control strategy in protective 
irrigation systems in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (see 
Mollinga 2003). The plots outside the localisation area are called non-
localised and it is not mandatory to supply irrigation water to these plots. 
Farmers are formally not allowed to take the canal water for these plots. 
In contrast to the rules, supply of irrigation water to non-localised plots 
suggests that either there was additional irrigation water available or it was 
illegally diverted to these plots. The understanding of water distribution to 
localised and non-localised plots provides further insights into irrigation 
management realities. 
1 3 For a description of phenomenological and empirical approaches to 
participant observation method see Bruyn (1966) and Zelditch (1962). 
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A conceptual framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conceptual basis for understanding and 
analysis. o f policy processes for irrigation management reform. 
After briefly discussing the approaches to irrigation studies, in 
section 2.2, I present an analytical review o f the literature on 
participatory irrigation management (PIM) and irrigation 
management transfer (TMT). In section 2.3, a brief review o f policy 
process literature focuses on studies that have generated conceptual 
frameworks to study irrigation management and irrigation 
bureaucracy, which complement the policy as process approach. 
Then in 2.4 I discuss the analytical framework for the present 
study. The chapter concludes in section 2.5 with a discussion on 
the main research question o f the thesis. 
The available irrigation literature can be classified according to 
time periods. Each time period can be seen in terms o f a central 
approach to the study o f irrigation. The technical approach in the 
1950s and 1960s, the sociological approach 1 in the 1960s and 
1970s and since the 1980s the sodo-technical approach 2 (see 
Uphof f 1986, Ramamurthy 1995, Mollinga 2003). Mollinga (1998) 
classifies the intellectual work on irrigation into three bodies: the 
irrigation engineering, irrigation economics and irrigation 
management literature 3 (see also Jurriens and J o n g 1989). 
Literature published in the early 1970s focused on the 
disappointing experiences o f irrigation systems, 4 trying to 
document and analyse the causes o f poor performance o f irrigation 
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systems and speculating on the need for greater attention to 
management In the 1980s there followed an emphasis on irrigation 
organisation and farmers' participation in irrigation systems 
management (Pant and Verma, 1983). In the 1990s the focus on 
studying self-governing irrigation institutions and reform o f 
management systems was much more evident (see Ostrom 1992; 
Wade 1988, 1995). During the same period, the failure o f the state 
in managing irrigation systems was strongly emphasised (Repetto, 
1986) and neo-liberal reforms were suggested. The introduction o f 
irrigation reforms in many countries led to the production o f a vast 
literature on implementation and impacts o f irrigation management 
transfer (IMr) or participatory irrigation management (PIM) 
policies. This set o f literature focused on the irrigation reform 
policy, programme and its impacts. In this time period, we also find 
irrigation studies conducted using social anthropology and legal 
pluralist approaches (see Pradhan etal. 1996; Roth 2003). 
2.2 Irrigation Management Transfer: A Global Phenomenon 
In this section, I review the current concept o f I M T / P I M and its 
justification. The objective is to make an analysis o f approaches 
used in the selected I M T / P I M case studies and draw possible 
directions for the present study. 
Irrigation management transfer, or turnover, has become a 
widespread strategy in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In more 
than twenty five countries governments are reducing their roles in 
irrigation management while farmer groups or private organisations 
are taking them over (see Vermillion 1992). Most often, 
governments pursue management transfer programs to reduce their 
expenditures on irrigation, improve productivity, and stabilize 
deteriorating irrigation systems (Vermillion 1997: 1). The idea o f 
autonomy-with-accountability seems the core idea o f irrigation 
management turnover policy formulations (see Kloezen and Samad 
1995). 
In this review, I focused on the reform experiments 
implemented in Mexico, Colombia, Turkey, Philippines and India. 
The reason for selecting these countries is that all together they 
represent three basic approaches o f turnover. First, the *big-bang' 
approach where water user organisations are made entirely 
responsible for irrigation management activities in a relatively short 
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time period (e.g. Mexico and Columbia). Second, the bottom-up 
gradual approach (e.g. the Philippines) with a strong focus o n 
organising and consensus building; and third a hybrid approach, 
which adopts a moderate pace adopted by Turkey and India. The 
selected country cases also represent various levels o f transferring 
functions and responsibilities o f irrigation system management to 
water users. 5 
Definition o f I M T / P I M 
Irrigation Management Transfer (fMT) or turnover has been 
defined variously in different countries. This process has been 
referred to as Turnover m. Indonesia and the Philippines, Management 
Transfer in Mexico and Turkey, Privatisation in Bangladesh, 
Disengagement in Senegal, Post-responsibility System in China, 
Participatory Management in India and Sri Lanka, Commercia&^ation in 
Nigeria, and Self-management in Niger (Vermillion 1997:2 italics 
mine). 
The terms suggest the salient feature o f the turnover policy o f a 
country. Some definitions highlight users' control, and financial 
and organisational aspects, others highlight the role o f a state and 
bureaucrats, and differences between I M T and PIM. In addition, 
the degree and level o f transfer o f management responsibilities, 
control o f irrigation resources and motivation to transfer varied 
from country to country. I now look further at definitions by 
different researchers: 
Almost all irrigation systems have some involvement by water users 
in system management When people speak of introducing PIM, 
they are usually referring to a change in the level, mode, or intensity 
of user participation that would increase farmer responsibility and 
authority in management processes. IMT is a more specialized term 
that refers to a process of shifting basic irrigation management 
functions from a public agency to a private sector entity, a 
nongovernmental organization (NGO), a local government, or a 
local organization with farmers at its base. The most common form 
of IMT moves management responsibility from a centralized 
government irrigation agency to a financially autonomous local 
non-profit organization in which water users have a substantial 
voice in the control process or control the irrigation system 
altogether (Svendsen etaL Chapter 6,2000:139). 
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The participants o f the F A O and U M I expert consultation in 
1995 defined I M T as 'the expansion o f the role o f farmers and 
the private sector and the reduction o f the role o f government 
in irrigation management'. They made a distinction between the 
I M T and PIM. They define: 
IMT is 'the replacement of government agencies with farmer 
organisations or other private sector entities in managing irrigation 
systems, either at subsystem or system wide levels'; whereas PIM is 
defined as 'the involvement of farmer organisations as full partners 
with government agencies in managing irrigation systems'. The 
latter definition explains the expected role of the user organisations 
in managing the irrigation systems. It does not talk about the 
transfer but recognises the equal role of farmer organisations along 
with government agencies in managing the irrigation systems 
(GajetetaL 1996). 
F r o m the. above definitions, it is apparent that participatory 
irrigation management (PIM) is only an augmentation o f existing 
agency management with additional farmer participation. 6 The 
rights to irrigation infrastructure are still with the government 
Instead o f rights to property, governments are trying to transfer 
responsibility for the property, while retaining the fundamental 
ownership rights (see Groenfeldt 1997); whereas I M T represents 
the replacement o f existing agency management with management 
by a users' organisation. In this process the water users take control 
from the state, leading to a formal, legal handling over o f 
management functions from a state irrigation authority to 
associations o f water users. I briefly discuss the main motivations 
stated in the literature for implementation o f turnover policies. 
Motivations for Turnover 
There are various motivations or reasons for governments to 
implement a turnover programme. The mos t commonly mentioned 
reason in the literature is 'to reduce the cost o f operation and 
maintenance o f irrigation systems'. By doing so governments are 
relieved o f their huge budget commitments for the irrigation 
sector. From the literature it is also clear that I M T was introduced 
to increase users' participation and hence to achieve higher cost 
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recovery leading to better system performance and productivity. 
Other motivations to implement turnover policies have been 
support from international and bilateral funding agencies and 
political gains. Describing the global trend towards devolution, 
Vermillion and Garces-Restrepo (1998) discussed that 
Largely driven by government fiscal shortages and a common 
inability to raise sufficient revenues from collection of water 
charges, since the 1970s, governments around the world have 
adopted programs one after another to devolve responsibility for 
irrigation management to WUAs Consistent with overall structural 
adjustment programs, irrigation management transfer has been 
supported by the major international development banks (Wodd 
Bank 1993; E D I 1996; Aniens et aL 1996). The reforms generally 
include efforts to organize WUAs, train future managers, make 
essential structural repairs, and negotiate and formalize agreements 
between the government and the water users (Vermillion and 
Garces-Restrepo 1998:1) 
The Government o f India has supported the various policy 
initiatives towards implementation o f P I M policies in various states 
since mid 1980s. Concrete support was extended for 
implementation o f P I M through the central sponsored Command 
Area Development ( C A D ) Programme. 
Demand for reform 
This section looks first at where such demand for reform comes 
from and then what key means o f implementation are presented. 
The brief case studies below show that the demand for turnover 
policies can come from different sources and be implemented with 
different approaches. 
Colombia 
In Colombia, the'transfer o f administration o f land development 
districts (LDDs) to -water users' associations (WUAs) began as a 
result o f an isolated initiative by a group o f farmers rather than as a 
specific land development policy or program. The farmers from 
Tol ima Valley demanded the transfer o f irrigation districts to them. 
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The farmers asked the government i f they themselves could 
administer the L D D s , because the Colombian Institute o f Agrarian 
Reform (ENCORA), the governmental agency responsible for their 
administration at that time, was expensive and inefficient 
(Quintero-Pinto 2000 :90) . 
In 1975, farmers in the Coello and Saldana irrigation districts in the 
Tolima Valley, Colombia, petitioned the government for the light 
to fake over management of the districts. They based their 
argument on the fact that, over the previous 20 years, they had 
already repaid their agreed 90 percent share of the cost of 
construction. They were also paying water fees to the government 
and were dissatisfied with the cost and quality of management that 
the government was providing. The farmers argued that they could 
manage the systems more cost-effectively than the government 
(Vermillion and Restrepo 1996: 1). The government finally agreed 
to their petition and in October 1976, handed over the 
administration to the WUAs, but not the ownership of the 
irrigation infrastructure (Quintero-Pinto 2000: 90). 
In this case o f Colombia, the demand for turnover came from 
the farmers. This is known as the bot tom up approach to I M T . In 
contrast, we find a top-down approach to I M T in the case o f 
Mexico. 
I M T has been a top-down process motivated by international 
development banks and implemented by the Government o f 
Mexico (Kloezen et al. 1997: 3). In 1989, a Presidential decree 
facilitated creation o f the National Water Commission (CNA) and 
granted the status o f a national agency. The C N A was made 
responsible to define water policies for the country. The 
organisation was also provided with the power to allocate -water to 
users through licenses and permits. The new policy created 
autonomous and self-financing water utilities to provide water 
services in cities and in irrigation districts. The policy also 
encouraged -water reuse and water quality conservation, and aimed 
to promote a new water culture based on the efficient use o f 
resources. A s o f 3 1 s t December 1994, a total area o f 2,458,366 ha 
had been transferred to 319,451 farmers organised into 316 water 
users' organizations (WUOs). Each W U O operates and manages a 
modulo, an irrigation subsystem ranging from 5,000 to 20,000 ha in 
size. O f the total number o f irrigation districts, management 
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responsibilities have been transferred completely in 38 and partially 
in 16 irrigation districts (Gorriz etaL 1996: 7). 
Turkey 
Turkey has a legal framework allowing the transfer o f management 
responsibility for publicly constructed irrigation schemes to local 
control since 1954. The Turkish General Directorate o f State 
Hydraulic Works was established in 1954 and by 1960, it had a 
programme to transfer operation and maintenance (O&M) 
responsibility for secondary and tertiary distribution networks to 
irrigation associations (see Svendsen et al. 2000). The D S I is the 
main executive agency o f the government for overall water 
resources planning, execution and operation in the country. A 
budgetary crisis led to a squeeze on financial allocations to the state 
•water resources agency and provided the initial impetus. Turkey 
began an accelerated programme o f transferring management 
responsibility for large irrigation systems to locally controlled 
organisations in 1993. Svendsen and N o t t document that 
Within three years, the national irrigation agency, the Turkish 
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI), had succeeded 
in transferring neady one million hectares or 61 percent of the 
publicly managed irrigation in the country, to local government 
units or to special-purpose irrigation associations created at the 
local level. Important motives driving this fast-paced 
implementation were (a) the rapidly escalating labour costs, (b) a 
hiring freeze in government agencies and (c) the consequent 
concern over the agency's ability to operate and maintain systems 
serving the expanding irrigated area for which it was responsible. 
Also, World Bank pressure for improved cost recovery provided 
added impetus for change. Bank-funded study tours to Mexico and 
elsewhere gave DSI managers a vision of what could be 
accomplished through a program of management transfer to locally 
controlled organizations (Svendsen and Nott 2000:27). 
Philippines 
In the case o f the Philippines, the participatory approach was 
developed initially during 1976 for communal irrigation systems, 
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where the local community legally owned the irifrastructure. 
Operation and maintenance was also a local function (see 
Groenfeldt 1997). Beginning 1984, the Marcos government 
introduced the turnover policy in the country, including the 
national irrigation systems. The Philippines has used the gradual, 
learning process ' approach, with intensive use o f institutional 
development mechanisms. Institutional development officers and 
community organisers were employed as catalysts to work with the 
local organisations and to build capacities (see Svendsen et aL 
2000). These associations then entered into contracts with the 
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) to perform various 
management functions such as system maintenance and fee 
collection within their portion o f the larger system. A driving 
incentive for the program was the need t o increase cost recovery by 
the government, and, in particular NLA's need to fulfill its mandate 
to be financially self-reliant (Raby 2000:113) . 
India 
In the case o f India, the present forms o f turnover policies have 
evolved over a period o f time (see Maloney and Raju 1994; 
Sivamohan and Scott 1994; Brewer et aL\999; Joshi and Hooja 
2000). The Government o f India, since the mid-1980s has induced 
various moves toward P I M programs to be implemented by 
different states. 7 However, the progress has been far from 
satisfactory. The 9 * Five Year Plan document noted that: 
Amongst the major reasons considered to be responsible for the 
tardy progress in the implementation of the PIM, are (a) the 
prolonged prevalence of government-managed systems has sapped 
the initiative of the farmers and made them dependent on the 
Government; (b) non-availability of funds for PIM. At present 
funds are available to a small extent under the CAD programme as 
one-time subsidy to the WUAs. (c) the farmers are reluctant to 
adopt the participatory approach unless deliveries of water can be 
made flexible, practical and responsive to their need; (d) there are 
apprehensions in the minds of farmers that under the new system 
they might have to incur expenditure on operation and maintenance 
in addition to increased water rates; (e) there is often a lack of 
homogeneity in the composition of farmer population and they are 
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reluctant to come together, because of differences of castes and 
classes, to form an association; (f) the present institutional 
arrangements are not conducive to the introduction of PIM. 
Properly oriented, trained and motivated officials to implement this 
programme are lacking and there is no dedicated wing for this 
purpose; (g) lack of an enabling law for the establishment of WLJAs 
is an important impediment in the introduction of PIM (GOI, 9 * 
Five Year Plan, VoL 2) . 8 
Naik and Karlo (1998) discuss that in India, too, increasing user 
participation in the management o f irrigation systems is being tried 
as a means to reduce pressures on government finances, improve 
performance o f irrigated agriculture, and ensure sustainability o f 
irrigation systems. 
Permitting farmers to play a greater role in India represents a major 
shift away from the idea that the government is responsible for 
taking care of farmers. This change is consistent with other changes 
being carried out in management of natural resources such as the 
proposed changes in forest policy to enable joint management of 
forests ( Naik and Karlo 1998:1). 
A concrete support was visualised for P I M through the central 
C A D programme. 9 In 1985, the C A D programme requested each 
Command Area Development Authority (CADA) o f respective 
states to take up aspects o f P IM in at least one small part o f each 
command area as an experiment and funds were made available for 
this purpose (MOWR 1991). The Ninth five-year plan 1997-2002 
highlighted the urgent need to ensure further implementation o f 
P I M and adequate allocation o f funds. 
T o create awareness and implementation o f P I M programmes, 
the Union Ministry o f Water Resources organised and supported 
various conferences in the country. A national seminar held in N e w 
Delhi from J u n e 19-23, 1995, adopted a plan o f action envisaging 
conferences at state level for creation o f awareness and 
understanding o f issues involved in PIM. This marked the 
beginning o f a new phase o f P I M activities in India . 1 0 Assistance 
came from external agencies like the World Bank, U S A I D and 
international non-governmental funding agencies like the Ford 
Foundation for implementing P I M programs. 1 1 The Planning 
Commission set up a Working Group on P I M for the Ninth Plan 
and many state governments set up high-level groups. In 1995 
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Legislation and Political Will 
In the case o f Mexico and the Philippines, the governments first 
enacted a legislation or national water law before initiating the 
transfer programme. In 1974, the Philippine President Marcos 
amended the charter o f the N I A to enhance its financial separation 
from the central treasury. The N I A was charged with keeping its 
own accounts, and becoming financially autonomous over the 
long-term. T h e financial pressures to keep administrative costs low 
encouraged the N I A to shift management control o f irrigation 
systems to the users (see Groenfeldt 2004). 
Similarly in Mexico, the President Salinas de Gortari issued a 
Presidential decree in 1989 that facilitated creation o f C N A and 
granted it the status o f a national agency. The decree also granted 
the agency the responsibility to: a) define the country's water 
policies and b) allocate water to users through licenses and permits. 
T w o Presidential decrees passed in October 1995 and October 
1996 simplified requirements, granted additional benefits and 
waived sanctions for users who had been without concessions. The 
political will at the highest level o f the government played a crucial 
role and was a main component in Mexico's I M T program. The 
Presidential decrees were key instruments in accelerating the 
regularization process (see Svendsen etaL 1997; Velasco 2001). 
In the case o f Turkey, the turnover program was introduced on 
an existing legislation. Though there was no law enacted in the case 
o f Colombia before the turnover, a new land development law was 
enacted in the year 1993 to strengthen the role o f farmers 
associations. The objective o f the law was to grant full control over 
irrigation district management to farmers' associations (Ministerio 
D e Agricultur 1993, cf. Vermillion and Restrepo 1996). 
A m o n g the Indian states, Andhra Pradesh was the first state to 
enact legislation in 1997 to facilitate institutional reforms in the 
irrigation sector (see chapter 3). T o implement the PIM, the 
Andhra Pradesh Farmers' Management o f Irrigation Systems Act 
was enacted in 1997 (see Nikku and Bhushan 2004; Raju 2000, 
Andhra Pradesh has initiated the P I M programme but in 1997, the 
A P F M I S act was enacted to implement P I M programme in the 
state . 1 2 In the following, I briefly explain selected features o f the 
reforms introduced in the above selected countries. 
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2001; ObEtas and Peter 1999). Other states Eke Madhya Pradesh 
and Tamil N a d u also enacted legislation facilitated by political 
support to introduce irrigation reforms in 1999 and 2000 
respectively. 1 3 
Institutional Arrangements 
N e w institutional arrangements are bound to emerge when 
turnover policies are implemented. The success o f the programme 
depends on the efficacy o f these new arrangements. In the case o f 
Mexico the process o f election o f leaders and their role in 
performing W U A activities regularly and without conflicts is 
evident A W U A consists o f a general assembly, executive council 
and office bearers. A s the membership ranges from 500 to 5,000 
farmers, the general assembly selects a few members known as the 
representative assembly and delegates power to make decisions. 
T h e representative assembly functions to make routine decisions 
without calling for the general assembly. T o address leadership 
conflicts, the users decided to form mixed boards. I f the W U A 
board is headed by a big landowner as a President, it will have a 
small landowner or ejidatarioH as the treasurer and vice versa (see 
Svendsen etal 1997). 
In the case o f Turkey, the Irrigators Association is composed o f 
30 to 70 persons. The general assembly is made up o f 
representatives o f the local administrative units and not 
representatives o f water users in an irrigation scheme. Individual 
water users participate in the general electoral process to elect 
members for the management committee. The committee includes 
a chairman, secretary, accountant and four general members. The 
committee meets once every 15 days whereas the general body 
meeting is conducted twice a year. The chairman is elected for five 
years and in almost all cases the chairman is concurrently a village 
head or mayor o f a member municipality (see Gupta and Srivastava 
1999). In the case o f the Philippines, Kikuchi a aL (2005) refer to 
the danger in hastily handing over systems from state to 
community management without considering the limits o f local 
communities' organisational capacity. T h e mismatch between the 
state and local community priorities leading to an institutional 
failure and vice versa, illustrate the causes for deterioration o f 
irrigation systems. 
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Resource Management 
In the case o f Mexico, the I M T was part o f series o f changes in the 
economy including reduction in subsidies for agricultural credit and 
inputs, elimination o f guaranteed support for agricultural crops, 
and increases in the energy and fuel prices and transfer o f O & M 
responsibilities to irrigators associations (see Svendsen etal 1997). 
The financial aspects o f I M T in Turkey are similar to Mexico. 
T h e policy is designed to shift the burden o f O & M costs from the 
government to users. However, the government continues to 
subsidise maintenance, which is not the case in Mexico and the 
Philippines. 
In 1974, President Marcos approved the NIA' s request to 
increase the irrigation service fees. T h e fee can be paid in kind or in 
cash equivalent based on the National F o o d Authority support 
price. The National Economic and Development Authority 
allowed NLA to impose charges to cover O & M costs. The 
intention is to recover the capital costs over fifty years (Panefla 
1999). In the early 1980s streamlining policies forced NLA to 
downsize its staff. Under the pressure to become financially 
autonomous organisation, N I A was forced to induce cost cutting 
policies. Different measures to increase the income o f N I A were 
explored. A s a result, management tasks were contracted out to 
irrigation associations and to their federations. A s a result o f the 
policy changes, the functioning o f N I A was based on mainly two 
types o f budgets Le. Capital and O & M revenues. The pressures for 
self-sustenance o f N I A led to expansion o f activities. The N I A 
invested heavily in the expansion o f new irrigation facilities. The 
N I A model o f concentrating resources at centre and redistributing 
them to local associations has been faced with difficulties. 
In the case o f India, some states have increased the water 
charges but they are far below the required level to meet the full 
cost o f operation and maintenance. A s a result, there is a continued 
need for government funding to implement O & M and minimum 
rehabilitation works. 
Conclusion 
T h e above analysis o f I M T / P I M case studies shows that various 
political, social, economic and institutional motivations influenced 
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the emergence and implementation o f the turnover policies. The 
policies and programmes have been evolved according to the 
country specific situations. The legislation, political support, 
devolution o f powers, institutional arrangement and resource 
management are important features to study to understand the 
process o f turnover programmes implemented in different 
countries. 
It was also evident from the literature that the studies largely 
focused on the end product o f the reform policy implementation 
rather than answering how and why such outcomes occur (the 
process questions). There was not much emphasis on the process 
dynamics. The operational and technical components have been 
given priority. The emphasis was on outcomes, impacts and 
quantification o f transfer programme results, than the process. 
Oorthuizen (2003) f-1q«ns that 'policy studies in irrigation 
management tend to be rather function alistic. They often look at 
what goes in -the policies-and what comes out- the results( 2003:1). 
These studies do not focus on the process elements. Recognising 
the gap, a few studies have attempted to study the policy processes 
in turn-over programmes. Below, I present a brief review o f 
literature that focuses on turnover policy processes. 
2.3 Studies on Turnover Po/icy Processes 
Research studies focusing on I M T policy processes are few 
compared to impact studies. One can even ask why policy process 
oriented I M T studies are essential. The answer lies in the fact that 
the majority o f literature on I M T adopts a neo-liberal standpoint 
arguing for less state and more market-based solutions (see Repetto 
1986; Svendsen 1993). Policy makers who believe in less state 
approach as a solution will tend to have an impression that I M T is 
an irreversible, efficient, unproblematic and will lead to 
participatory management o f resources (Rap2004:7). This approach 
to I M T is bound to have imitations as neo-liberal approaches argue 
for less state but to implement reforms a strong state is needed. 
Secondly, transfer policies aimed to bring decentralisation o f 
power. L o n g and van der Ploeg (1989) show that neo-liberal 
models are problematic, because transfer interventions enter into 
the existing lifeworlds and affect the interests o f social groups such 
as water users, state bureaucrats and local leaders and are therefore 
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contested and transformed in some quite unexpected ways. 
The institutional literature is inadequate to account for the 
concrete social intricacies and conflicts between different social 
actors in everyday organisational life (Rap 2004). The legal 
literature assumes that the legal instruments (acts) once formed 
could facilitate the emergence o f institutions and their ftmcrioriing. 
Evidence is available that legal mechanisms do not necessarily lead 
to formation o f robust local institutions and management o f 
natural resources (see Kurian 2003; Roth 2003). 
Rap (2004) argues that policy and management literature is 
based on a system analysis that de-politicises policy implementation 
and irrigation management In his thesis on I M T in Mexico, Rap 
made a comprehensive analysis o f the entire cycle o f the I M T 
policy and shows that the Mexican I M T policy has a fascinating 
political history and bureaucratic struggle. H e argues that 'policy is 
political throughout its life cycle and that policy making is a 
continuous and profoundly cultural undertaking' (2004:349). 
Experience worldwide clearly demonstrates that long-term 
reforms do not proceed automatically or in a linear way and a 
'jump start' push is not enough. Policy implementation is an 
ongoing, non-linear process that must be managed (see Grindle 
and Thomas 1991, Brinkerhoff 1996). Policies are embedded in 
social relations, power structures, negotiation and cooperation 
practices that exist in society. This makes the policy process a 
complex phenomenon. 
Policy Actors 
Understanding o f policy actors and their dynamics has emerged as 
an important theme in policy processes studies. Politicians, 
bureaucrats and funding agencies are important policy actors. The 
politicians at different level (state leaders, members o f legislative 
assembly (MLAs), local politicians) influence policy formulation at 
various levels. They promote a particular policy agenda to achieve 
specific gains and interfere frequently in the day-to-day 
implementation (see Mooij 2003). Similarly, policies often change 
as they move through bureaucracies to local level where they are 
implemented. Bureaucrats charged with responsibility for 
implementing reforms face: changes in their roles; severe 
institutional constraints; new interaction patterns with other public 
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agencies and civil society; and pressure for showing results. Hence 
to explain the implementation process "business as usual' or linear 
approaches will fall short (Brinkerhoff 1996). 
PaneHa (1999) shows the interplay o f interests among domestic 
politicians, foreign donors and N I A in the case o f the Philippine 
reform programme. Within the Philippines different social, 
economic and political contexts have dictated the content o f 
irrigation policy and its reform. F o r example, the World Bank and 
USATD stated in 1966 that N I A needed to reorganise, improve its 
capacity and have a continuity o f leadership before they would 
provide assistance or lend. The N I A responded positively to the 
World Bank desires and tried to meet the loan conditions. D o n o r 
influence is strengthened through loan conditions. The total level 
o f investment in the irrigation sector in the country was influenced 
by the availability o f external funding (see Panella 1999,2004) . 
T h e World Bank made Mexico's 'speedy-Gonzales' style o f 
management reforms a global example o f the twenty first century. 
Though there might be validity in the bank's approach, it is not a 
very helpful; neither to the Philippines nor for many other Asian 
countries where the Asian model o f P I M is still to become a reality 
rather than the American-Mexican model o f irrigation management 
transfer (see Meinzen Dick et a/1994, 1997). A World Bank report 
states that: 
The Operation and Evaluation Department of the Wodd Bank 
revealed in its first irrigation sector study in 1981 that the Bank's 
right hand pressed Turkey hard to get water charges up from 85 
percent to 100 percent of O&M costs, while its left hand was 
making repeated irrigation loans to Indonesia, where water charges 
recovered 15 percent of O&M and there were no serious efforts to 
reform the system Clearly, forces other than the policy rules and 
statements are shaping the policy (Wodd Bank 1995:38). 
Similarly, Reddy (2003) argues that Andhra Pradesh reform 
policies are also influenced by World Bank lending policies. 1 5 
Reddy claims that instead o f opposing conditions, politicians 
seeking peoples' mandate, have used statements o f reforms and 
associated funding as a sign o f their political credibility. 
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2.4 Understanding the Bureaucracy 
In this section, I briefly discuss scholarly work available on the 
nature o f bureaucracy and its role in the policy process. The 
classical sociological view o f bureaucracy, as promoted by Max 
Weber is essentially o f bureaucrats are selfless purveyors and 
enforcers o f the policies o f elected governments. The conception 
o f bureaucracy is that it is neutral and rational At the same time, 
Weber attacked the pretensions o f the Prussian bureaucracy to be 
an objective and neutral servant o f society, above politics, and 
emphasized that every bureaucracy has interests o f its own, and 
connections with other social strata, especially among the upper 
classes (see Weber 1947). Weber's classic model o f bureaucracy and 
especially its implication for the relationship between politicians 
and bureaucrats or administrators has been an issue o f enduring 
theoretical interest (see Wright 1999; Hansen and Ejersbo 2002; 
Wilson and Barker 2003; Huque 2003). 
The notion that the bureaucracy can be used as a neutral 
instrument o f service to act on and change society is challenged 1 6 
(see Toye 1981). Scholars argued that the characteristics o f 
bureaucratic rationality have profound implications in democratic 
reforms. 1 7 V r o o m (1980) showed that bureaucratic rationality is 
much more complex and ambiguous than assumed. In a critical 
analysis o f the Weberian ideal type o f bureaucracy he writes that 
the perception o f m o d e m organizations as 'instruments' o f the 
authorities is incorrect (cited from Quarles van Ufford 1988: 77). 
"Bureaucracy itself is not an instrument o f policy; Quarles van 
Ufford goes onto point out, "because bureaucracy is an 
independent generator o f ideas, goals and interests' (Quarles van 
Ufford 1988; cited from Mosse 2005 :103) . 
A s du Gay argues 'the reform of bureaucratic organisations 
important to government policy and purpose needs more attention 
and understanding than a perfunctory reference within the 
contemporary rhetoric o f organisational efficiency and 
privatisation. This requires attention to complex work processes 
within these public institutions, the way they discharge their 
executive duties and the ethos and accountability o f the 
organisation concerned' ( du Gay 2000 cited from Makwarimba 
and Vincent 2004:241). Makwarimba and Vincent showed how job 
satisfaction o f extension workers was shaped by the structures and 
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processes o f their work organisation and the field realities o f the 
work environment (2004:241). 
Bureaucracies may or will have interests or values that differ 
from those o f elected politicians (see Wilson and Barker 2003). 
Thus while following government policies, bureaucrats generate 
their own ideas and power which do not necessarily coincide with 
the official goals. They deal with different goals at the same time 
(see Mintzberg 1983). Bureaucracy tries to bend, change and 
interpret these official goals to protect its own survival goals. T h e 
balance o f power between the political executive and bureaucracy 
will determine the direction o f policy process. 
Thomas and Grindle (1990) present that the success o f policy 
implementation depends on the capacity o f the bureaucracy and 
their support to policy implementation. The resistance or 
opposition to policy changes vary according to the position o f a 
bureaucrat in the hierarchy. Bardhan (1997) argues that for 
government policies to be effective, bureaucrats need to perceive 
positively the programmes implemented by them. Implementation 
suffers i f regulations and bureaucratic allocation o f scarce public 
resources breed corruption. 1 8 
Smith (1988) approaches bureaucracy as the study o f political 
power. Accommodation o f interests will take place during policy 
formulation as well as in implementation. The outcome o f policy is 
determined by the actions o f participating actors. Allison and 
Halperin's bureaucratic politics model also see no unitary actor but 
rather many actors as players. 1 9 These players make governmental 
decisions not by single rational choice, but by pulling and hauling 
(see Allison and Halperin 1972). 
Bureaucrats as Policy Actors 
T h e work o f Uphof f et ol (1991) and Wade (1982, 1984) has 
contributed to our understanding o f the functioning o f the 
irrigation bureaucracy in India. They have analysed the 
performance o f bureaucracies and suggested strategies to improve 
its performance. 2 0 
The Philippine experience has documented in the 1980s as a 
successful case o f bureaucratic transformation (Korten and Siy 
1988). By the mid 1990s the weaknesses o f the Philippine PUM 
experiment were evident The bureaucracy was highly centralised 
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and aumoritarian. T h e World Bank, as one o f the important 
stakeholder tightened its policies for the consideration o f further 
funding. The lower-level staff and their morale were affected by the 
frequent changes in the leadership. The staff also did not like non-
engineering people as heads o f the N I A (see Sun and Groenfeldt 
1995; Panella 1999). 
Oorthuizen's (2003) research on irrigation reform in the 
Philippines highlighted that the capacity o f N I A to transforms into 
an autonomous organisation needs to be questioned. H e further 
shows how boundaries between the 'political' and the 
'administrative' are blurred and give way to alliances brought 
together by interpersonal relations based on political patronage and 
friendship. H e puts forward the view that frontline workers (lower 
level irrigation bureaucrats) become accountable and committed 
actors under certain circumstances. They can be committed to their 
jobs; play important roles in making the system work represent 
farmer interests within the agency and give meaning to the reform 
policies. 2 1 
Donor, Research and Academic Community as Actors 
In the case o f the Philippines, the role o f academic, research and 
non-governmental organisations was visible in policy formulation 
and implementation. The N I A , to develop the PLM programme, 
had representatives from the Ford Foundation, the Institute o f 
Philippines Culture from Ateneo de Manila University, the Asian 
Institute o f Management, the International Rice Research Institute, 
U P L O s Banos Economic Development Foundation and Central 
Luzon State University formed the Communal Irrigation 
Committee. The committee members became important 
stakeholders in the programme through the investment o f their 
own research efforts. They were drawn from engineering, 
agriculture, sociology, economics; anthropology, institutional 
management and training disciplinary backgrounds (see Panella 
1999). In addition, the civil service bureaucracy has played a major 
active role in influencing the policy. The strategy o f using the 
services o f the academic and research communities to document 
and disseminate the PLM experience added to the legitimacy and 
credibility o f the Philippine PLM experiment. These actors played a 
crucial role in shaping the policy and its midcourse corrections. 
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From the process literature it is clear that analysis o f policy 
processes from different conceptual lenses shows the continuous 
interplay o f institutions, multiple actors and their interests. 2 2 Policy 
actors do play an important role and we cannot discount their 
influence in the policy process. Drawing from the above literature 
reviews, in the following section, I present the analytical framework 
for the present research study. 
2.5 Analytical Framework for this Study 
This research aims to contribute to the pohcy process literature in 
irrigation. The objective is to study the irrigation reform policy 
process in the state o f Andhra Pradesh. I will incorporate a number 
o f concepts from the 'policy as process ' framework in the analytical 
framework. I focus on the political nature o f irrigation reform 
policy. I investigate how different actors mobilise support and 
lobby for their own interests, form alliances and gain control over 
resources. I am particularly interested in the functioning o f water 
users associations as newly crafted institutions by the state and the 
role o f W U A leaders who are elected to the W U A positions. I am 
also concerned regarding the changed roles o f the irrigation 
bureaucracy under reforms and the actions o f the political 
executive. 
Conceptualising Policy 
Policy is a process o f 'becoming' rather than heing' (Dye 2001) . 2 3 
H a m and Hill (1984:12) note 'policy is dynamic rather than static 
and that we need to be aware o f shifting definitions o f issues'. 
Policy is a contested resource being shaped by different 
stakeholders participating in the policy process (Mollinga 2001). 
Conceptualising 'policy as a process ' means an explicit 
acknowledgement o f the importance o f the social and historical 
context in which policy is shaped and implemented (Mooij 2003). 
Mooij and de V o s (2003) argue that the idea o f policy process does 
not assume that policies are 'natural phenomena' or 'automatic 
solutions'. A policy is never fixed but is always evolving and 
changing. Policies are embedded in social relations, power 
structures, negotiation and cooperation practices that exist in 
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society. 2 4 This makes the policy process a complex phenomenon. 
A s we see there are different ways or approaches to study the 
policy process. The approaches can be broadly grouped into two: 
policy as arenas and bargaining, and policy as a discourse. The 
literature on policy as arenas and bargaining can be further grouped 
into: public choice, pluralism, interface theory and policy networks, 
subsystems and advocacy coalitions. In this thesis, I use 'policy" as 
a process o f consultation, contestation, translation and 
implementation o f courses o f action rather than prescription. 
The available frameworks also diverge significantly in analysing 
policy actors involved in the process. The rational choice 
framework treats the individual actor as rational, self-interested and 
actively searching for best outcomes. N o attention is paid to the 
internal belief systems o f mdividuals, or to how they gather, 
process and synthesize information (Schlager and Blomquist 1996). 
S o m e scholars see policy as essentially a process o f bargaining 
and competition between different groups in society (Dahl 1961). 
T h e recognition o f roles played by individuals and groups o f 
individuals in policy space led to the construction o f actor-centred 
models. Policy actors can be individuals or a collective influencing 
the policy to achieve their own or collective material and non-
material interests. T h e interaction between the actors and policy 
has been explained with the concepts o f policy networks, pluralist 
interest groups or policy pressure g r o u p s 2 5 (Keeley 1997). 
State and Society Centred Models 
T h e 'society centred approach' can be explained in both Marxist 
and pluralist beliefs. The interest group having belief in the Marxist 
approach (class analytical model) argues that the policy process is 
influenced by opinions o f bourgeoisie (middle classes), dominating 
the process and acting against those o f other classes. They d o not 
believe in the argument that the policy is primarily reflecting the 
interests o f groups within society. In contrast, the pluralists argue 
that the role o f the government is to provide a playing field for the 
expression o f social interests, and allow these to shape policy. 
According to the pluralists, policy change simply reflects changes in 
the balance o f power between interest groups in society (see Sutton 
1999; Keeley and Scoones 1999; Turner and Hulme 1997). 
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Smith (1990) criticises the pluralists' interpretations to the 
understanding o f the policy making process. The interpretations by 
pluralists are: they see all pressure groups as being o f equal 
influence; they discount the importance o f economic resources; 
and they regard the state as neutral. According to Smith, the 
pluralists placed over emphasis on pressure groups (interest 
groups) and under-emphasised the role o f the state in the policy 
process. The common characteristic o f all pluralist theories is that 
pressure groups are supposed to exercise a major influence over 
the political process. B u t the fact is that not all the interest groups 
exert the same pressure or power to the policy making process. 
Hence the shortcoming o f the pluralist model is in i f s over reliance 
on pressure groups to explain change in the policy process. 
The failure o f pluralist approaches has led to the construction o f 
'state centred approaches'. Through this approach, an effort was 
made to bring the state back in. Within this approach the 
'bureaucratic politics model ' focuses on conflict and negotiation 
between actors within the state machinery.- The contests are driven 
by individual career incentives and for control over policy arenas. 
Different players or actors compete over preferred options and use 
the resources available to them through their positions-hierarchy, 
control over information and access to key decision makers to 
achieve their goals (see Grindle and T h o m a s 1991). 
The proponents o f 'state interests approach' argue that the state 
has specific interests in the policy outcomes, such as the interests 
o f regime authorities to remain in power and the maintenance o f its 
own hegemony vis a vis societal actors (Turner and Hulme 1997). 
These interests may or may not correspond to the interests o f 
particular classes or groups in society. I n this model the 'state' is 
significantly more than an arena for societal conflict nor it is an 
instrument o f domination employed by the dominant class or class 
alliance. It is potentially a powerful actor in its own right (Grindle 
and Thomas 1991). The interests within the state may be diverse 
and conflicting. T h e state also exercises considerable influence on 
the policy process . 
The strength o f the 'state interests approach' is that although its 
analytical focus is the state, the nature o f state-society relations is 
also o f concern as this will determine the degree o f autonomy of 
policy elites in the state (Turner and Hulme 1997). The criticism of 
the state-centred approach is that in some cases, the states are weak 
and are dominated by societal interests. The state would not have 
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the authority to make decisions that reflect their own interests 
(Sutton 1999). With this background review, below I discuss the 
'politics o f policy' approach to study policy processes. 
Politics o f Policy 
The politics o f policy framework provides a broader perspective to 
analyse individuals' actions in different policy arenas. By choosing 
this approach, I go beyond the discussed shortcomings o f state and 
society centred models by treating state, bureaucrats and other 
actors as equally important actors in the policy space. In this case 
the state's interests may or may not correspond to the interests o f 
other actors. In some cases the state politicians and bureaucrats 
may align to seek benefits from the state policies. 
Grindle (1977) sees 'the politics o f policy* as mduding 'politics 
o f implementation', referring to the political nature o f the policy 
formulation and implementation process. Different interest groups 
and individual actors contest policy, at all stages o f its existence and 
try to shape it in particular ways. In this study I specifically focus 
on the execution o f the irrigation reform policy at (within system) 
local level The day-to-day implementation is seen as an arena in 
which actors responsible for allocating resources (politicians and 
bureaucrats especially at the state level and implementing 
bureaucracy at local level) and those who recdve (water users at 
local level) engage in infhiendng the allocation decisions. 
Mollinga and Bolding (2004) suggest that 'the word 'polities' is 
virtually absent in the formal policy discourse on irrigation 
reform. 2 6 It sometimes appears in euphemistic terms and 
sometimes appears as a black box. Exp l id t analysis o f the political 
dimensions o f irrigation and irrigation reform is rare' (2004:4). In 
this thesis 'politics' does not refer to the party politics but is used as 
'everyday polities', which is about the debates, conflicts, dedsions, 
and co-operation among individuals, groups and organisations 
regarding the control, allocation and use o f resources, and the 
values and ideas underlying these activities (see Kerkvliet 1990; 
Mollinga and Van Straaten 1996; Oorthuizen 2003). Mollinga and 
Bolding suggest that: 
when reform processes are conceptualised as social processes in 
which different interest groups negotiate institutional 
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transformation through a variety of strategies, using an array of 
resources, resulting in intended and unintended consequences and 
with other issues than strictly institutional ones implicated, it 
becomes crucial to understand, particularly for advocates of reform, 
how all these differences come together (or fail to come together), 
at different levels and stages of the reform process(2004:291-92). 
I use the theoretical notion o f power (political and social), a 
multi-layered concept to explain the process o f policy 
contestation. 2 7 The concept o f power is essentially contested. 
LassweH and Kaplan (1950:75) note, 'the concept o f power is 
perhaps the most fundamental in the whole o f political science: the 
political process is the shaping, distribution, and exercise o f power'. 
Agreeing with Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), Arts and Van 
Tatenhove (2004) consider that 'the concept o f power is o f the 
utmost importance to understand and explain policy practices' 
(2004:340). They put forward the policy arrangements approach 
referring to 'the way in which a policy domain is shaped, in terms, 
o f organisation and substance, in a bounded context* (2004:341). 
The understanding o f social power is that o f politics as negotiation, 
struggle and contest (Moflinga and Bolding 2004). The change in 
policy is attributed to the changes in the balance o f power between 
interest groups participating in a policy arena. 2 8 
Policy contestation is a form o f collective and individual actions 
in space and t ime. 2 9 It involves the notions o f socio-economic and 
political power sharing, and resource distribution. Policy actors 
mobilise individual and collective resources, networks and location 
in order to be able to intervene and influence the policy process. I f 
power is always constituted and exercised in social relationships the 
policy contestation by the actors is directly proportional to the 
ability to use and mobilise power. 
Merging these concepts into a workable framework, I study 
irrigation reform policy process in the context o f local rural power 
relationships. Using this framework, I distinguish that the policy 
change is a function o f sum o f actions o f participating actors in the 
given policy space. The framework is helpful to address some o f 
the weaknesses o f earlier research by enlarging it to the analysis o f 
intersection o f political, bureaucratic and institutional boundaries. 
Figure: 2.1 Analytical Framework 
Policy Contestation 
• Self-interest 
• Location 
• Lobbying 
• Advocacy 
• Networking 
Alliance buflding 
I action 
Social Power 
AP Irrigation Reform Policy 
(Courses of Action, 
Management Arenas) 
Irrigation works 
Bridging the Gap Command 
Joint Azmoish 
IB- Irrigation Bureaucrats, RB- Revenue Bureaucrats FA- Funding agency, 
WUA- Water Users Association, NGO- Nongovernmental organisation 
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2.5 Central Research Question 
Instead o f taking for granted the role o f the state and the impact o f 
PLM, the present research aims to contribute to the existing 
knowledge on policy processes, specifically to the understanding o f 
irrigation reform policy processes. Analysing local and higher level 
activities, the thesis investigates the dynamics o f interest groups 
and their role in policy translation. 
The thesis analyses the articulation o f management transfer 
policies in the case o f a protective irrigation system named 
Nagarjuna Sagar, a major irrigation system in Andhra Pradesh, 
India. The focus o f analysis is summarised in the central research 
question for the case study o f the Madhira branch canal o f 
Nagarjuna Sagar Left main bank canal irrigation system in the state 
o f Andhra Pradesh. 
How and why are irrigation reform policy choices contested and mediated by 
different actors and what bave been the outcomes of this policy contestation in 
key arenas of irrigation management namely: irrigation works, irrigation 
expansion ( Le. bridging the gap command) and irrigation revenue assessment 
(known as Joint Aspioish) in Madhira branch canal? 
I analyse how irrigation reforms were initiated and implemented 
in Andhra Pradesh. Who are the important policy actors and what 
are their roles? The second part o f the question aims to answer the 
different ways o f policy shaping and transformation from the state 
centre to the local ground. The thesis thus identifies the interests, 
struggles and motivations o f the different policy actors and shows 
h o w they shaped the policy and vice versa. T o answer the main 
research question, I further divided it into sub research questions: 
1. H o w did the irrigation reform policy evolve and how was 
it implemented? 
2. What factors influenced policy translation? 
3. What were the key arenas o f irrigation management? What 
are the outcomes o f the policy aimed to decentralise the 
power relations and promotes participatory ways o f 
irrigation management? 
4. H o w did different actors react to and get engaged with the 
policy? Is the present irrigation policy an outcome o f 
contested interests and resources? 
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1 The sociological literature highlights the social processes, relations and 
conflicts between farmers and between the users and irrigation 
department and shows how these processes affected irrigation 
management Some of the earlier works (wittfogeL 1957; Leach, 1961; 
Hunt and Hunt 1976; Wade 1979; Eggink and Ubels 1984) contributed to 
sociological thinking on irrigation, 
2 The work of some of the research students and the staff at the Irrigation 
and Water Engineering group at Wageningen University has been 
strengthening the sodo-technical approach to irrigation (see Vincent 
1997,2001; Mollinga 1998; Narain 2003; Khanal 2003; Shah 2003). 
3 Since the 1970s scientists of various disciplines, particulady social 
scientists, started writing more about the performance, the problems 
involved and possible approaches for irrigation improvement This 
evoked a rapid growth of a new type of literature, which can be termed as 
'irrigation management literature' (furriens and De Jong 1989). This 
literature differed from the prevailing irrigation literature, which was 
largely contributed by engineers presenting technical and physical aspects 
of irrigation schemes. The emergence of management literature is useful 
as a wide variety of issues like organisational forms, structures, farmers' 
participation, user organisations, water distribution, control, water pricing, 
and legislation. 
4 Evidence can be observed from the reports of international funding 
agencies and research centres (see USAID 1980 and 1983; CGIAR 1982, 
OECD 1983). 
5 For example in Mexico the transfer programme started much later than 
the Philippines and was completed earlier (Le. it started in 1991 and by 
1997 eighty-nine percent of systems had been transferred). In Mexico, 
though farmers associations established with government assistance, 
assumed much deeper sets of management functions than their Philippine 
counter parts (see Groenfeldt 1997). Associations in Mexico employ their 
own technical and administrative staff and control much larger irrigated 
areas (3,000 to 80,000 ha) with memberships ranging from 500 to 5,000 
farmers. 
6 See Meinzen-Dick et at. (1994) for further discussion on the Asian model 
of P IM In brief, they characterise this model as having small holdings, 
socially cohesive, homogenous and multi-purpose organisations. 
7 A report by the Central Water Commission states that there seems to be 
a commitment of the Government of India to reform the basic character 
of irrigation management from a paternalistic, top-down system to a water 
user operated and managed system (CWC 1992). However, the policies 
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and programs that are adopted by the states, although influenced by 
national policies, differ considerably. Each state has adopted or is 
considering adoption of irrigation management transfer policies that are 
adapted to a) cultural traditions and prior policies in the state, b) physical 
and ecological conditions in the state, and c) the goals of the irrigation 
agencies (Brewer and Raj u 1996). 
8 The document accessed at htqV/planningcommission. nicin/plans/ 
planrd/frveyr/9m/vol2/v2c4-2.htm on Jan 21,2004. 
9 Brewer et aL (1999) argue that the change in the priority from irrigation 
-works to IMT or PIM in India is due to the change in the policy of 
foreign donors. The donors signalled that they would not continue to 
fund projects for system rehabilitation without this. 
1 0 The national seminar was held in Delhi in 1995. The Federal Ministry of 
Water Resources sponsored the seminar in collaboration with the 
Economic Development Institute of the Wodd Bank The seminar was a 
follow-up to the first national seminar on PIM held in June 1994 in 
Aurangabad in Maharashtra. The seminar provided a forum for detailed 
discussions about how to implement PIM in the various states (see India 
NPIM Newsletter no 2, 2004). Additional conferences were organised in 
1995, 1997 and 1999 in different states. The first of these was held in 
Jaipur, Rajasthan October 5 and 6, 1995. This seminar was primarily for 
Rajasthan, but also included Haryana and Gujarat, whose irrigation sectors 
share many similarities. The Rajasthan seminar was the first of thirteen 
state and regional PIM seminars planned during 1996 fiscal year, which 
began in July 1995. Five other seminars had already been hdd in Andhra 
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Orissa and Maharashtra. 
Representatives from G O , N G O , donor representatives and academidans 
partidpated. These workshops served the purpose of sharing of 
information and showed the commitment of the central government The 
creation of IndiaNPIM (Indian Network on Partidpatory Irrigation 
Management) a national N G O was another outcome of these 
deliberations. The mandate of IndiaNPIM is to work towards Irrigation 
Sector Reforms in India, through efforts outside of the Government, but 
working dosely with government; and influencing and supporting the 
appropriate policy decisions. Source : wwwjnpim.org/leftlinks/ 
Newsletters/N2/N ewsletters/N2/n2a. 
1 1 The creation of Water and Land Management Institutes (WALMIs) in 
several states in India was made possible by the financial support 
extended by the Wodd Bank The institutes have under taken experiments 
and studies in IMT in the respective states. The Ford Foundation also 
supported PIM initiatives in India. The experiments on tank management 
carried out by PRADAN, an N G O in Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Aga Khan 
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Rural Support Programme (India) in Gujarat and by Water Resources 
Centre at Anna University in Tamil Nadu are some of the outcomes of 
the support extended by the Ford Foundation. Other N G O s (ERDAS in 
Andhra Pradesh and SOPPECOM in Maharashtra) also carded out pilot 
studies on P I M SOPPECOM was started by retired irrigation department 
officials in 1980s and was the first to initiate a water users association in 
Ahmednagar district of Maharashtra in the command area of a major 
project the Mula minor 7, and the subsequent scaling up by setting up 
almost 15 such societies on another distributary. In Andhra Pradesh, 
IRDAS took up a Government sponsored Action Research Programme in 
the Sri Ram Sagar Project A pilot project for promoting farmers' 
participation in management of irrigation system through WUA was 
initiated in the distributaries D-51 and D-64 with a command area of 700 
acres and 14,800 acres respectively under SRSP. D-51 has 12 minors with 
90 oudets and 38 direct outlets. Under D-64 there are 13 minors with 170 
outlets and 67 direct oudets, along its length. For further information see 
Water Users Association, Pilot Project -SRSP, D-51 & D64, Annual 
Report - for the year ending June 1996, IRDAS, September, 1996. . 
1 2 In 1995, the Government of Andhra Pradesh laid down a policy for 
implementing PIM (Government Order number 101-PW (SRSP) II of I 
and CAD Department dated 19.7.1995) in the state. The broad features of 
this policy are 1. Irrigation system upto a minor or group of minors 
covering a command area of 750 ha or more (a hydraulic unit) will be 
placed under the management of a Water Users' Association. 2. WUA will 
be autonomous bodies which will function on democratic lines within the 
purview of AP Irrigation Utilisation and Command Area Development 
Act, which will be suitably amended so that these associations can 
function effectively and 3. A Memorandum of Understanding will be 
entered into between the WUA and the irrigation agency to enable 
independent functioning of the farmer. These features were incorporated 
later into the APFMIS Act enacted in 1997 in the state. 
l 3 The state of Gujarat passed government orders in 1995 to implement 
the PIM programme in the state (Parthasarathy 1998). In Rajasthan, 
legislation has been passed but rules are yet to be framed In the state of 
Karnataka, WUAs are formed and are registered under the Kamataka 
Cooperative Societies Act of 1959. 
1 4 The ejido, or communally farmed plot, emerged as a unique Mexican 
form of redistributing large landhol dings. Under this arrangement, a 
group of villagers could petition the government to seize private 
properties that exceeded certain specified sizes-inidally 150 hectares for 
irrigated land and 200 hectares for rain-fed holdings. Assuming a 
favourable review of the petition, the government then expropriated the 
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property and created an e/ido. The state retained tide to the land but 
granted the villagers, now known as ejidatarios, the right to farm the land, 
either in a collective manner or through the designation of individual 
parcels. EJidatarios could not sell or mortgage their land but could pass 
usufruct rights to their heirs. EJidatarios had to work their land regulady in 
order to maintain rights over i t Under the new law, an ejido can award its 
members individual titles to the land, not merely usufruct rights to their 
parcels. EJidatarios can, intum, choose to rent, sell, or mortgage their 
properties. EJidatarios do not need to work their lands to maintain 
ownership over them. They also may enter into partnerships with private 
entrepreneurs. The law also effectively ends the redistribution of land 
through government decree. Finally, the processing and resolution of land 
disputes are decentralized (source: http://www.photius.com/countries/ 
mexico/society/m exico_sodety_rural_sodety.html). 
1 5 Mr. Chandra Babu Naidu was known as a believer in reforms and 
market oriented approaches. His belief in reforms was dear when he 
submitted a defidt budget in March 1995 in his capacity as Finance 
Minister in the N.T. Rama Rao government Mr. Naidu argued that the. 
budget Would be a surplus one, if the subsidies on rice and power are 
induded together with the losses made due to the prohibition policy of 
the state. When Chandrababu Naidu became the Chief Minister of the 
state in September 1995, the ban was lifted on prohibition and the 
government reduced the subsidies on rice and power. The power sector is 
another sector along with irrigation undergoing reforms in the state (see 
Reddy 2003 for detailed explanation). 
1 6 Weber also noted the dysfunctions of bureaucracy. Weber (1968) 
proposed eight bureaucratic characteristics that pose problems for 
democracy and democratic reforms. They are: first, in a bureaucracy roles 
and responsibilities are defined and organised under different categories 
of specific function; and these functions are rigidly arranged in a 
hierarchical fashion. Individuals working in a bureaucracy are required to 
perform tasks that are already predetermined. Second, the relationships 
between people who work in a bureaucracy are defined strictly in terms of 
their roles and responsibilities. Third, in a bureaucracy the powers are 
centralised at the top of the hierarchy. Fourth, within a bureaucracy, the 
functional responsibilities and relationships, and the general working of 
the organisation, are dictated by prescribed rules and regulations. Fifth, 
bureaucracy attempts to maintain neutrality often run the risk of making 
bureaucracy irresponsive and intensive to the needs of the individual and 
the community. Sixth, bureaucracy is characterised by its own official 
language. It is unidirectional and authoritative, legitimised and used by its 
own self-assured authority. The language is instructive rather than 
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consultative. It does not permit open dialogue. Seventh, bureaucracies 
operate on the belief that administration is content free. It is assumed that 
administrative procedures are universal and therefore are relevant and 
applicable to any field Eighth, bureaucracies are believed to be value free, 
independent of particular moral or political concerns, bureaucracy itself is 
thought to be merely a technical instrument and not a cultural 
phenomenon. 
f For example, Rizvi views bureaucracy and its mode of thinking as a 
major barrier to democratic reform. Democratic reforms cannot become a 
reality unless we can rescue ourselves from the clutches of bureaucratic 
rationality. Rizvi argues that bureaucracy should be understood as both 
structure and process (see Rizvi 1986; 1989). 
1 8 Corruption, if defined very generally, would include all kinds of 
opportunistic behaviour, where a particular agent breaks certain rules in 
order to gain a private advantage. In a narrow sense corruption is 'the use 
of public office for private gain' (Bardhan 1996). 
1 9 The central metaphor of the Bureaucratic Politics Model, as stated by 
Freedman is that of the game. The different players occupy positions 
within the government Their perceptions and preferences stem both 
from individual characteristics and their particular positions. Differing 
interests lead the payers to see quite different facets of any particular 
issue. Their interests define their states in an issue and following from 
that, their stakes will determine their stands (Freedman 1976:437). 
2 0 The literature in the 1980s focused on the rent-seeking behaviour of the 
bureaucracy (Wade 1982, 1985; Repetto 1986). Much of the 
administration literature focused on the higher level bureaucrats. The 
upper levels are certainly important to understand but not to the exclusion 
of frontline workers in the field who daily confront the problems about 
which the upper officials make policy. For studies on the roles of lower 
level of bureaucrats refer to Tendler 1997; Lipsky 1980; Oorthuizen 2003 
and Rap 2004. 
2 1 Lipsky (1980) showed how the working conditions of street level 
bureaucrats influence policy implementation. He argues that the peculiar 
character of their work structures policy transformation. They are 
squeezed between the demands of their superiors and clients. Oorthuizen 
(2003) showed how understanding frontline workers and their social roles 
are crucial in understanding field level outcomes of irrigation reforms in 
the Philippines. 
2 2 Literature on the research-policy link is shifting away from the old 
assumptions towards a more dynamic and complex view. Garret and 
Islam (1998) suggest a two way process between research and policy, 
shaped by multiple relations and reservoirs of knowledge. Providing a 
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detailed description, Weiss (1977) describes a process of percolation in 
which research findings and concepts circulate and are gradually filtered 
through various policy networks and circles. As a result some of the 
recent research has been focused explicitly on types of policy networks, 
advocacy coalitions, pressure groups and policy communities. The 
question that needs to be addressed is how to make research useful for 
policy or how research can influence and shape the policy discourse? For 
an overview of policy research linkage see Keeley and Scoones (1999) and 
Sutton (1999). 
2 3 Dye (2001) criticises the pluralist argument that in a democracy, public 
policy is a response to the demands of the people. According to him, in 
reality policy is made from the top down. Dye proposes a top down 
policymaking model in which he distinguishes four different processes, 
namely the policy formulation process (dominated by think tanks, 
commissions, and task forces), the interest group process (dominated by 
organised interest groups and lawyers, lobbyists and consultants operating 
on their behalf), the political candidate selection process (driven by money 
criming from firms, media conglomerates, insurance companies etc), and 
the opinion making process (dominated by national mass media elites). 
Dye explains in his book how these four processes work in the context of 
USA. 
2 4 The tendency to separate policy-making and implementation is evident 
in linear models of analysis. There is a notion of a divided, dichotomous 
and linear sequence from policy to implementation (Clay and Schaffer 
1984). The dichotomy between policy formulation and implementation 
exists because of the notion that decision making is done by the political 
executives and implementation was seen as an administrative activity, 
implemented through the lower levels of bureaucracy (Grindle and 
Thomas 1990). 
2 5 A policy network is a group of individuals and organisations who share 
similar belief systems, codes of conduct and established patterns of 
behaviour. The system works on an open and flexible system of 
relationships. A policy or epistemic community is a more tighdy knit 
group of elite experts who have access to certain information and 
knowledge, which excludes those who do not have such access. 
2 6 Mollinga and Bolding (2004) emphasize that 'policy as process' and 
'politics of policy* are not synonyms. Tolicy as process' is the broader 
term whereas 'politics of policy* the narrower one. They do not claim that 
a 'politics of policy* as a specific perspective will uncover all elements or 
dimensions of policy processes (italics as in original). 
2 7 Power like Policy has many explanations. Russell (1938) defines power 
is the ability to produce intended effects. Weber introduces a pluralistic 
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notion in regard to the analysis of power in society. Although he agrees 
with Marx in crucial respects, he refines and extends Marx's analytical 
scheme. For Marx, power is always rooted, even only in the last analysis', 
in economic relations. Those who own the means of production exercise 
political power either directly or indirectly. Weber agreed that quite often, 
especially in the modem capitalist wodd, economic power is the 
predominant form But he objects that 'the emergence of economic 
power may be the consequence of power existing on other grounds'. For 
example, men who are able to command large-scale bureaucratic 
organizations may wield a great deal of economic power even though they 
are only salaried employees. Sourcethttp://www2.pfeiffer.edu/~lridener/ 
DSS/Weber/WEBERW7.HTML). 
2 8 For example the role of industrial group like Confederation of Indian 
Industries can be taken as an example to explain the role of interest group 
on the policy processes in India. The Confederation though the youngest 
business association with a social base in electronic, software and 
computer industries could establish a close rapport with concerned 
ministries especially with the Ministry of Finance and succeeded in 
influencing economic policies to its advantage.' It participates actively in 
public debates around the economic reform and had been able to 
influence the economic policy agenda (see Kochanek 1996; Mooij 2005). 
2 9 The term 'contestation' derives from the French word conteste. The 
meaning is to struggle, to argue, to compete, to call into question, to take 
an active stand against, to dispute and to challenge (Advanced Learner's 
Dictionary 1963). These meanings are found in the interactions of water 
users, bureaucrats and politicians. Reflection on policy contestation is 
required to understand the intellectual and policy trajectories that a reform 
policy has taken and will take in future (Bolding et al. 2000). 
3 
The Emergence of Participatory Irrigation 
Management 
The 1990s cm be called the Golden Decadefir the programmes of participatory 
management of natural resources. It was during this decade that three major 
programmes in the sectors of forestry, land management and water sector were 
launched 
AmlCSbab, March 2003 1 
3.11ntroduction 
In this chapter I discuss the emergence o f Participatory Irrigation 
Management (PLM) policy and legislation, in the state o f Andhra 
Pradesh- In the following sections, I discuss the evolution o f 
irrigation policies and programmes during colonial and postcolonial 
periods. I present a brief profile o f the state irrigation resources 
and discuss the emergence o f P I M policy and A P F M I S Act and its 
salient features in the main text All other references as much as 
possible have been relegated to footnotes. 
3.2 Colonial Irrigation Policies 
Farmer-owned and managed irrigation systems served most land 
area in south India during the pre-colonial period (Centre for Civil 
Society 2003: 4). In contrast, the large irrigation systems built 
during colonial rule in India were all government-controlled 
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systems. In India community managed irrigation systems had been 
largely neglected by the colonial administration until the early 
1800s. Later the British took an interest in the reconstruction and 
maintenance o f the irrigation infrastructure. 2 
The first renovation o f the Grand Anicut o f the Cauvery delta 
in Southern India, for example, initially consisted o f desiltation, and 
was only augmented with infrastructure in the 1830s through the 
efforts o f Colonel Arthur Cotton. Similarly, in northern India, 
restorations to an extensive Mogul canal network commenced in 
1817 and continued into thel830s. Having little capital expenditure 
costs, the British were able to bring in considerable revenue from 
the sale o f water and taxation on land brought under irrigation 
(Ebrahim2004) . 
In l840s the British initiated construction o f new irrigation 
systems. Under the administration o f the Madras Presidency, the 
dam on the Godavari at Dowleswaram in 1852 and the Prakasam 
barrage on river Krishna at Vijayawada (Krishna District) in 1855 
were constructed. These initiatives helped the farmers o f the delta 
areas, though they could not solve the problem of poverty that 
plagued the people at large. The massive Ganges canal was opened 
in 1854 measuring almost 900 miles and irrigating 1.5 million acres 
o f land. This was, however, the first o f India's canals to be built 
with borrowed money (from loans raised in London) and was a 
harbinger o f the increasing investments and decreasing profits that 
the government was t o reap from irrigation (see Ebrahim 2004). 
T h e British had a dilemma to resolve: H o w to derive as much 
revenue as possible without causing pauperisation, famine and/or 
revolt? Modernising Indian society along the principles o f English 
modernity was thought to be the ultimate solution to the dilemma 
(Bolding et al 1995). A s a result, the government appointed an 
irrigation bureaucracy to control the structures, so that the 
collection o f revenue (for the government) would remain within its 
control. 
During the early phase the British army engineers played a major 
role. It appears that there was no coherent British irrigation policy 
in the early phase, but this became visible when they created the 
federal Public Works Department in 1855. Irrigation policy making 
was in the hands o f civilians, while the army continued to be 
responsible for executing public works. From 1860, irrigation 
schemes, as one o f the central instruments o f colonial rule, were 
burdened with a load o f contradictory goals. In other words, the 
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fundamental duality in colonial policy was reproduced in irrigation 
policy: to increase revenues and promote cash cropping, and 
simultaneously maintain stability and ensure British rule, otherwise 
threatened by famines and social unrest (see Mollinga 1992; 
Bolding et al. 1995). The British government increased its 
commitment to large-scale irrigation after the 1860-61 famine in 
the north India considering the drought proof nature o f the 
irrigation. A s a result in 1880-1900 there was a sixty percent growth 
in terms o f command area that receives irrigation. The British by 
now adapted protective irrigation as their policy (see Mollinga 
2 0 0 3 , J u m e n s etal. 1996). 
Referring to the work o f L a Porta et aL (1998a; 1998b; 2000) 
Benerjee and Iyer (2003) argued that the historical fact o f being 
colonized by the British rather than any o f the other colonial 
powers had a strong effect on the legal system of India and 
through that on economic performance. The Northern India Canal 
and Drainage Act of 1873 was an important piece o f legislation that 
influenced the pattern o f irrigation development, enacted during 
the colonial India period. The British tried to foster the emergence 
o f middle-class-cultivators, who would be willing and able to invest 
capital in agriculture and raise productivity (Ambirajan, 1978 cited 
in Bolding et al. 1995). 
The first irrigation commission -was formed in 1900. It found 
that new construction was likely to prove remunerative only in 
certain northern regions such as Punjab, and that even the 
prospects o f famine protection were limited to specific areas. The 
Commission also recommended the government to provide loans 
for private agricultural improvements such as well irrigation. A 
series o f decentralisation reforms, introduced in 1919, led to the 
turnover o f irrigation to local governments. F rom 1912 to 1946, 
state and federal governments continued to invest in major 
irrigation works across the country, most notably in the south, 
where high rates o f return on major projects led to a doubling o f 
annual expenditure (Ebrahim 2004). 
3.3 Irrigation Policies in the Post Colonial Period 
Independent India inherited a significant number o f capital-
intensive large irrigation projects from the colonial period. The 
management o f these systems fell largely in the domain o f the 
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states and the national government. The construction orientation 
continued under successive governments. Irrigation acts like The 
Bengal Irrigation Act, The North Indian Irrigation Act, and The Bombay 
Irrigation Act further validated state control over the irrigation 
sector. 3 In view o f existence o f various facts with different 
objectives and rules a need was felt to introduce a uniform act to 
guide the irrigation development in the country. 
T h e Irrigation Cornmission in 1972 stated that 'there were 
several statutes, rules and orders in different parts o f the country 
covering different aspects o f irrigation management'. The 
commission recommended unification and simplification o f laws. 
In 1973, the Central Government issued instructions to the states 
to establish Command Area Development Authorities (CADA) for 
its irrigation schemes. The establishment o f C A D A in India was 
the result o f the recommendations o f the Irrigation Commission 
and the National Commission on Agriculture o f 1973 (see Moflinga 
2003). 
O n request- from the Ministry o f Irrigation and Power o f the 
G O I , the Indian L a w Institute studied the various laws and rules 
and came up with model legislation for the guidance o f the states. 
Consequently the Government o f India finalised the draft B i l l The 
bill called The Model Irrigation Bill 1976 was then circulated to the 
states for consideration and application with modifications i f 
needed. Independent states have adopted the Bill and enacted 
legislation with some modifications in respective states. In addition, 
a number o f centrally sponsored programmes have been designed 
and implemented by the states. 
The Command Area Development Programme 
The command area development (CAD) concept as perceived in 
1973 was viewed as an integrated area development programme. 
The concept was further emphasised by the National Commission 
on Agriculture (1976) regarding the need for the integrated 
development o f command areas. Irrigation and Agriculture being 
state subjects, command area development has to be implemented 
by the state governments. 
O n the advice o f the central government, the states went about 
creating C A D A s to suit their individual administrative traditions 
and preferences. B y and large, most states located the C A D A s 
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under the Department o f Agriculture (Sivamohan and Scott 1992). 
The primary responsibility o f C A D A was to implement the on-
farm development package. Later the focus was limited to the 
construction o f field channels alone rather than to the other items 
o f the package. When the central government took the decision to 
implement 'rotational water supph/ in the first half o f 1980s, it was 
included as a regular item o f the C A D programme. T o implement 
C A D activities, the states received central assistance. After a few 
years o f implementation, it was realised that without cooperation o f 
farmers it would be difficult to execute the rotational water supply 
plan. This has led to the initiation o f Pipe Committees, Kolaba Samitis, 
or organisations known as Pani Panchayats* in some states. These 
associations were based on the outlet and were highly vulnerable at 
times o f water scarcity. Subsequently, the need for designing new 
approaches to create farmer associations surfaced. Over a period o f 
time the C A D programme highlighted the various limitations o f 
different irrigation systems and their management 
The legal provisions and irrigation development programmes 
have not met with significant success. Probable reasons are that the 
irrigation department does not want to share its power, that is, 
control over irrigation system management, with the farmer 
community. Second, there is popular engineering belief that 
farmers cannot understand the technical features o f the system so 
as to manage the systems. Third, political interests, policy failures, 
and lack o f active farmer organisations have added to weak C A D 
programme implementation. However, through the C A D 
programme concrete support was visualised for implementation o f 
P I M in the country. The Government o f India supported various 
policy initiatives towards implementation o f P I M programme since 
the mid 1980s. 
When we see the C A D and P I M initiatives they were 
contradictory. The C A D approach is top down and centralised. A 
blueprint approach was designed and given to the states to 
implement Independent states announced their support with 
minor modifications. The PIM is visualised on the basis o f 
participatory approaches. Ironically, the C A D machinery was asked 
to implement the PEM programme. Subsequent to the C A D 
programme 5 , two other significant events took place in the form o f 
implementation o f the National Water Management Programme 
and formulation o f the National Water Policy in 1987. 
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National Water Management Programme 
In 1987, the National Water Management Project (NWMP) 
supported by an external credit was initially implemented in 
Andhra Pradesh, Kamataka and Tamil Nadu. T h e NWMP's 
premise was that substantial benefits could be obtained in existing 
irrigation schemes through a more reliable, predictable and 
equitable water delivery system. A s a strategy N W M P focused on 
preparation o f an 'operational plan' for each scheme to define the 
principles o f water distribution and allocate responsibilities for 
implementation. 
The approach o f N W M P can be summarized as 'providing a 
demand-scheduled supply by means o f an irrigation system which 
is structured in a manner and is manageable under present 
conditions'. T h e approach provided hope for a manageable system, 
which responded to evolving conditions and m a d e relatively 
efficient use o f highly variable and limited water supplies available 
to many o f the schemes o f south India (Berkoff 1994). But the 
objectives o f N W M P could not be achieved, due to the existing 
operational practices. In some cases the objectives o f the 
programme contrasted with the existing localisation approaches. 
National Water Policy 
T h e formulation o f the National Water Policy o f 1987 (amended in 
2002) was an important development in India's water sector 
management T h e policy recognises and stresses user participation 
in irrigation management Farmer participation as a policy 
prescription continued in the policy documents. T h e National 
Water Policy (2002) states: 
Management of water resources for diverse uses should incorporate 
a participatory approach; by involving not only the various 
governmental agencies but also the users and other stakeholders, in 
an effective and decisive manner, in various aspects of planning, 
design, development and management of the water resources 
schemes... Water Users' Associations and the local bodies such as 
Municipalities and Gram Fanchayats should particulady be involved 
in the operation, maintenance and management of water 
infrastructures/ facilities at appropriate levels progressively, with a 
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view to eventually transfer the management of such facilities to the 
user groups/local bodies (National Water Policy 2002). 
3.4 Andbra Pradesh: A Brief Profile 
O n the 1st o f October 1953, Andhra State came into existence. 6 
T h e creation o f Andhra State strengthened the general demand for 
linguistic states. Later, the Telugu speaking state o f Andhra 
Pradesh 7 was formed on 1st o f November 1956 on a linguistic 
basis, following the recommendations o f the States' Reorganisation 
Commission headed by Justice Fazal AH. 
Andhra Pradesh is the fifth largest s tate 8 with a population o f 
77.5 million people and a total surface area o f 2.76 lakh square 
kilometres, accounting for 8.4 percent o f India's territory. The State 
is bounded by Kamataka, Tamil Nadu , Orissa, Maharashtra, 
Chatdsgarh states and the Bay o f BengaL 
The State is conventionally classified into three broad regions 
namely Coastal Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana. 9 This 
classification is used to show agro-ecological differences and 
development challenges and compare the levels o f deve lopment 1 0 
The evidence is that there is significant heterogeneity within the 
regions and imbalances exist in terms o f development The 
Telangana region was part o f the erstwhile Nizam's Hyderabad 
State, whilst the Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema regions formed 
part o f the British-governed Madras Presidency. 1 1 
The State has the longest coastline (972 km) among all the States 
in India. The coastal region covers the coast along the Bay o f 
Bengal, comprising 41.7 percent o f the state population, the 
Rayalaseema region covers the southern part o f the state with 18 
percent o f the population and the Telangana region with 4 0 3 
percent o f the population comprises the northern part o f the state. 
T h e scheduled castes, schedules tribes and backward classes 
account for nearly 60 percent o f the total population o f the s ta te 1 2 
(Census o f India, Andhra Pradesh, 2001). 
Water Resources 
The state is endowed with rich water resources and is appropriately 
called a river state. Nearly 75 percent o f the total area is covered by 
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the rivet basins o f the Godavar i 1 3 , Kr i shna 1 4 , Pennar 1 5 , and their 
tributaries. There are 17 smaller rivers Eke the Sarada, NagavaE and 
Musi, as well as several streams. Godavari and Krishna are the two 
major perennial rivers, and with their extensive canal system, 
provide assured irrigation. The climate o f the state is described as a 
tropical monsoon. The water potential o f the state is estimated to 
be 2,746 thousand million cubic metres (TMQ. Out o f the total 
potential: surface run-off, evaporation and evapo-transpiration, soil 
moisture and groundwater recharge are calculated to be 40, 4 1 , 1 0 
and 9 percent respectively (A.P Water Conservation Mission, 
2000). 
Monsoons play an important role in deciding the agricultural 
performance o f the state. The state receives rainfall primarily from 
the South West monsoon starting from early June to end 
September, and the North Eas t monsoon from October to 
December. Average annual rainfall ranges from 740 millimetres in 
the south to 2000 m m in the north. Annual fluctuations in the 
rainfall are somet imes . so heavy that several districts are often 
subjected either to floods or drought 
Andhra Pradesh has been a leading participant in the Green 
Revolution 1 6 in the country, especially for rice. This has been 
greatly facilitated by the availabiEty o f irrigation infrastructure 
developed in the state. The anicuts (irrigation systems) across the 
Godavari, Krishna, and Pennar rivers were built more than a 
century ago. It was thanks to these irrigation projects that the 
Krishna-Godavari tracts o f Andhra experienced an 'agrarian 
revolution' in a manner quite unlike any other part o f the Madras 
Presidency in British India. The changes in the social and political 
organisation o f Andhra people that followed were immense. These 
early irrigation projects and agricultural development are 
responsible for the central coastal districts' economic, social and 
poEtical advancement 1 7 (see Rao 1985; Srinivasulu 2002; MoEinga 
2003). 
The ultimate irrigation potential in A P from all sources is 
estimated to be 9.50 mha. It includes 7.30 mha from surface water 
and 2.20 milEon ha from ground water (GoAP 1997). About 40 
percent o f the state's gross cropped area is irrigated, contributing 
60 percent o f agricultural production. Out o f the irrigated area 70 
percent is under cereal crops, mostly rice. Other food crops cover 
14 percent includes chilEes, fruits, and vegetables. Oilseeds cover 
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about 12 percent and the remaining 4 percent is made up o f non-
food crops such as tobacco, sugarcane, and cotton ( D E S 2001). 
However, the pvisting irrigation systems have deteriorated over 
time. In addition, nearly 35 percent o f ultimate irrigation potential 
from major and medium irrigation projects in the state is yet to be 
exploited. In the case o f minor irrigation about 40 percent o f the 
ultimate potential remains unutilised (Rao and D e v 2003:9). AH 
these contribute to the gap between potential and actual irrigated 
area, called the 'gap command'. In the following section, I further 
explain the irrigation laws and policies in the state. 
3.5 Irrigation Laws and Policies 
Legislation can be regarded as an important link between the policy 
and rights o f the users. A well-conceived law facilitate 
implementation o f policy decisions and sanctions obligations and 
tights o f the users'. In this section, I briefly present the legislation' 
and national policies that played an important role in irrigation 
development in the state. 
In the State o f Andhra Pradesh, there were different Acts 
enacted at different times. The foremost one was The Irrigation Cess 
Act in Andhra Region, 1865. The Act is only applicable to the 
districts o f Rayalaseema and the Coastal area based on the Old 
Madras Presidency A c t In the Telangana region, The Telangana 
Irrigation Act of 1948 (1357 fasli) was applicable to all the projects in 
the state except the Sriramsagar p r o j e c t 1 8 Later, the Andhra Pradesh 
Irrigation Utilisation and Command Area Development Act, 1984 and 
Rules (1985) were applicable to the specified major irrigation 
projects in the state. 1 9 The Act was prepared on the basis o f a 
model bill circulated by Government o f India in 1976. The projects 
covered under the Act were the Sriramsagar Project on the river 
Godavari, the Nagarjunasagar project on river Krishna, the 
Tungabhadra Project and the Delta systems o f Krishna and 
Godavari. 
The C A D Act was more comprehensive than the Irrigation Cess 
A c t Under the C A D Act, it was lawful for the government to levy 
at will a separate fee for water supplied for irrigation from a river, 
stream, channel or tank constructed by or on behalf o f the 
government The important sections o f the Act are: a) the 
construction and maintenance o f irrigation works (storage, 
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conveyance, and delivery systems controlled or maintained) by 
government, b) the supply or stoppage o f water and regulation o f 
water deliveries, c) water tax, and d) irrigation offences interfering 
with or damaging the irrigation system) and penalties. 
The C A D Act clearly prescribes the responsibilities o f the 
landholders for the maintenance o f the watercourses and field 
channels. T h e A c t also contains the penal actions and punishments 
for the violations. The issues that the C A D Act aimed to address 
were evident from the preamble and were stated as: 
To provide for an accelerated increase in agriculture and allied 
production in the state of Andhra Pradesh through a program of 
comprehensive and systematic development on scientific and 
modern lines of command areas, comprising measures for optimum 
use of lands and water, prevention of land erosion and water 
logging, improvement of soil fertility and regulation of cropping 
pattern and for proper maintenance and upkeep of irrigation 
systems in. the. state for ensuring maximum benefits for the 
cultivators under the command areas and for the matters connected 
therewith. 
In the initial years o f C A D , the state irrigation departments did 
not take an active interest In Andhra Pradesh, the Irrigation and 
C A D Act (enacted in the year 1984) imposed the creation o f C A D 
authorities 2 0 and 'pipe committees'. These pipe committees proved 
to be quite ^effective as delivery o f water at the outlet was quite 
unrealistic leaving no scope for pipe committees to effect any 
improvement in the distribution o f water (see box 3.1). Pipe 
committees had no role in maintenance and their responsibilities 
were not defined and hence they became non functional (see Jo sh i 
1997, Reddy and Reddy 2005). 
Recognising integration o f irrigation and agriculture departments 
as a problem in 1981, it was recommended that C A D A s in the 
states be brought under the irrigation departments. Irrigation 
utilisation (synonymous with C A D ) is viewed as an integrated 
problem from the reservoir or from the diversion point to the 
farmers' p l o t After the introduction o f the C A D programme 
guided by the C A D Act s , 2 1 the deterioration o f irrigation 
infrastructure has continued. T h e C A D policy and its process o f 
implementation in the state bring out several crucial points. 
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Sivamohan and Scott (1992) argue that the merger helped to 
improve water delivery but created peculiar problems o f its own. 
T h e agricultural function o f C A D was neglected. The officers o f 
the agriculture department working under C A D were withdrawn. 
The integrated approach to agriculture in irrigated areas has been 
abandoned. 
BOX 3.1 Pjfte committees under SRSP, Andhra Pradesh 
In Sriramsagar project (SRSP) command area, the concept of irrigation 
management was initiated in 1978-79. Under the CAD Act, pipe 
committees were formed on a pilot basis in SRSP commanding the 
Telangana region. For the first time an opportunity was created through 
the Act 'to transfer the management of the canal below the pipe oudet 
(not commanding more than 40 ha of command area) to users'. Formal 
elections were conducted and Pipe committees were formed on an 
experimental basis. The CAD department- took the initiative of 
implementation and the facilitation was carried out by two NGOs. 
Rao (1996) describes four stages of the experiment As the first stage, 
the formation of pipe committees took place in 1978. These committees 
were active till about 1982-83 and slowly declined The second stage was 
1984-87. During this period an attempt was made to revive the informal 
pipe committees and village irrigators' associations {ayacutdars sangham). The 
third stage (1987-91) marked the constitution of pipe committees (formal) as 
per the AP-I & CAD Act 1984 (Act N o 15). However, these major 
committees were kept in abeyance as per the decision taken in the 2 0 * 
CAD A board meeting held on 7.9.1987, and their function was thwarted 
The fourth stage (1990-92) marked the formation of minor committees 
under the action research programme. 
Source: Rao (1996) 
Mollinga (2003) argues that the CADA-based initiative for water 
management reform is a 'policy as prescription model ' o f planned 
intervention by government agencies. T h e striking characteristic o f 
the C A D approach is its degree o f standardisation. The policy was 
conceived at the central governmental level influenced by national 
and international policy makers and advisors. T h e State 
governments only made limited adaptations to the central modeL 
The recommendations o f C A D policy were highly directive. T h e 
government tells farmers and irrigation officials what to do and 
how to do i t It also defines the legal machinery o f fines and other 
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punishments to control non-adherence to the policy prescriptions, 
particularly as far as farmers are concerned. 
Investments in irrigation 
Initially, investments in the irrigation sector led to a substantial 
increase in agricultural growth, incomes and development, resulting 
in an increase in the Gross Domest ic Product Later, despite 
massive investments in the irrigation sector, irrigated area 
particularly in tail end areas declined in several major commands, 
due to insufficient maintenance o f irrigation schemes . 2 2 The state 
o f Andhra Pradesh was no exception to the above description. In 
the early 1980s the Irrigation Utilisation Committee ( IUC) 2 3 
constituted by the Government o f Andhra Pradesh produced a 
report that was highly critical o f canal system performance and 
management practices in the state ( G O A P 1982). According to the 
I U C report 
The dams and canals are splendid monuments, but they are crippled 
water distribution systems. They rarely are able to deliver water to 
more than half their service areas. The problem is engineering 
partly with leaky and undersized canals. But more fundamentally 
the problem is political; for the government is unable to prevent 
farmers at the upper reaches of the distributary systems from taking 
so much canal wat er that tail ends run dry. 
The budgets spent and irrigation potential (IP) created and 
utilised under different plan periods for major, medium and minor 
irrigation sectors are presented in table 3.1. F r o m the table it was 
evident that the plan investments have increased. The total gap by 
the end o f eight plan period was 0.32 million ha . 2 4 It was also 
evident that the gap command existed almost all years except 
during 1966-74. 
During the Sixth plan period (1980-85), the major and medium 
irrigation projects received the major share o f the budget The plan 
outlays on major, medium and minor irrigation projects totalled 
71,527 million rupees by the end o f the eighth plan period. The 
Government has approved 6 0 3 0 0 million rupees as plan outlay for 
the Ninth plan period for the irrigation sector. F rom table 3.1, it is 
clear that budget allocations have increased from one plan period 
60 The PoMcs of Policy 
to another. But the irrigation potential created and utilised does not 
show the same trend. 2 5 
Wallach (1984) who conducted research on irrigation 
development in the Krishna basin during the post-colonial period 
argues that 'despite decades o f efforts aimed at stopping this kind 
o f irrigation abuse, there is much pessimism'. Pessimism has been 
increasing as more and more tail end farmers were deprived o f 
their due share o f irrigation water to their plots (see for discussion 
on irrigation history Stone 1984; Attwood 1987; Whitcombe 1972; 
Wallach 2004). In the following section, I briefly discuss the issue 
o f irrigation disparity and its assumed significance in Andhra 
Pradesh state politics and policy. 
Irrigation disparity 
Regional disparities in terms o f irrigation development in the state 
are evident The reasons can be historical, economic, cultural and 
institutional or even geographical and. related to availability o f 
natural resources. 2 6 I present two possible reasons for the irrigation 
disparity in the state. First, historical reasons i.e. the land revenue 
systems that were in use during the British time. All cultivable land 
in British India fell under one o f three alternative systems: a 
landlord-based system (also known as %amindari or malguyari), an 
individual cultivator-based system (rajyatwari) and a village-based 
system known as mahalwari. According to Benerjee and Iyer (2003) 
almost all canals constructed by the British were in non-landlord 
areas. It was easier for the colonial government to raise rents in 
non-landlord areas. The state could capture some o f the 
productivity gains from these areas, and hence had more reason to 
invest in irrigation, railways, schools and other infrastructure in 
these areas during the colonial period. F o r example the practice o f 
ratyabvcui system in delta districts might have led to construction o f 
irrigation projects in those districts (see chapter 7 for further 
discussion). 
Second, the emergence o f caste based politics in the post-
colonial state (see Srinivasulu 2002): it is the control o f these castes 
over agrarian resources such as land and water that has been the 
most important source o f their economic and political power. 
Table 3.1: Plan Investments, Irrigation Potential Created and Irrigation Potential Utilised in AP 
Plan Inm istmentsMi 'Bon R r 
Irrigation 
1 
n Potential Created 
'million ba) 
hrigatioi 
( 
i Potential L 
' million ba) 
Ttiä%ed 
Total Gap 
Command 
Period 
Major <& 
Medium 
Minor Total 
Ma/or & 
Medium Minor Total 
Major & 
Médium 
Minor Total 
Prior to plan period 1 3 3 1 3 7 2 . 7 0 1 3 3 1 3 2 2 . 6 5 0 . 0 5 
I - P I a n ( 1 9 5 1 - 5 6 ) 3 7 4 . 7 3 5 . 2 4 0 9 . 9 0 .08 0 . 0 3 0 . 1 1 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 3 
I I - P l a n ( 1 9 5 6 - 6 1 ) 5 7 4 3 4 3 . 8 6 1 8 . 1 0 . 1 8 0 . 0 2 0 . 2 0 0 . 1 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 5 0 . 0 6 
Hi-Plan (1961-66) 9 1 5 . 2 186 .0 1 1 0 1 . 2 0 . 3 7 0 . 0 5 0 . 4 2 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 5 0 . 1 4 0 . 2 8 
3 Annual Plans 1 9 6 6 - 6 9 6 0 8 . 7 1 0 8 . 1 7 1 6 . 8 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 4 0 . 1 2 0 3 5 0 . 0 4 0 3 9 + 0 . 2 7 
IV-Plan ( 1 9 6 9 - 7 4 ) 1 1 8 7 . 1 1 8 1 . 5 1 3 6 8 . 6 0 . 1 9 0 . 0 6 0 . 2 5 0 2 2 0 . 0 6 0 . 2 8 + 0 . 0 3 
V - Plan ( 1 9 7 4 - 7 8 ) 2 6 9 1 . 1 3 8 8 . 2 3 0 7 9 3 0 . 2 1 0 . 0 9 0 3 0 0 . 1 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 2 7 0 . 0 3 
2 Annual Plans 1 9 7 8 - 8 0 2 5 7 6 . 9 2 3 7 . 9 2 8 1 4 . 8 0 . 1 5 0 . 0 6 O i l 0 . 1 5 0 . 0 6 O i l 0 . 0 1 
Vl-Plan ( 1 9 8 0 - 8 5 ) 7 2 9 5 . 9 5 0 7 . 3 7 8 0 3 . 2 0 3 1 0 . 0 8 0 3 9 0 . 1 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 2 5 0 . 1 4 
Vll-Plan ( 1 9 8 5 - 9 0 ) 1 3 0 6 4 1 3 1 4 1 4 3 7 8 0 . 0 9 o : o 7 0 . 1 6 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 6 0 . 1 4 0 . 0 2 
Annual Plan ( 1 9 9 0 - 9 1 ) 2 8 2 7 . 5 6 3 2 3 3 4 5 9 . 8 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 
Annual Plan ( 1 9 9 1 - 9 2 ) 3 3 3 9 . 2 5 7 . 9 3 3 9 1 8 . 5 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 
VHI-Plan ( 1 9 9 2 - 9 7 ) 2 7 5 4 3 . 5 4 3 1 5 . 6 3 1 8 5 9 . 1 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 2 
I X plan ( 1 9 9 7 - 0 2 ) 0 . 1 9 0 . 0 5 0 . 2 4 
Note: The above plan figures do not include expenditure on CADA up to the end of the Seventh Flan. 
Source. Peter (2001) and Sagumeü Sangham (December 2003- April 2004) Vol 5, N o 7-11. p35 
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The Reddys and Kammas, comprising 6.5 and 4.8 percent o f the state 
population respectively, are the two politically dominant 
communities in the state political arena. Although the Reddys are 
spread across the state, they are dominant in the Telangana and 
Rayalaseema regions. The Kammas, on the other hand, are 
traditionally dominant in the coastal districts o f Krishna, Guntur 
and Prakasham. Their presence in other regions is marginal. 
The discourse o f irrigation disparity in the state assumed 
significance as a result o f increased politicisation o f water issues. 
Agricultural wealth was generated during the post-independence 
period, and especially following the Green Revolution. Using the 
surplus wealth, the higher caste land owning groups expanded their 
activities into other spheres o f the economy, Le. business, 
transport, contracts and industry (Srinivasulu 2002; see Upadhya 
1988, 1997; Rao 1985). The main land-owning communities 
controlled village political life by occupying important positions. 
All CHef Ministers between 1956 and 1973 came from the 
Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema regions o f the state and belonged 
to the Congress Party (see table 3.2). In table 3.2, I could not 
discuss irrigation development by region; rather I tried to show 
irrigation development that took place under different party 
regimes. The Telangana politicians and sympathizers claim that the 
ruling elite representing Coastal Andhra favoured the region in 
terms o f irrigation development projects. What was evident was 
that the Congress Party in power influenced the policy process as 
there was no strong opposition. It was in 1984 with the emergence 
o f Telugu D e s a m Party, and its subsecjuent electoral victory, the 
Congress domination in policy making has diminished. 
Irrigation Administration 
T h e administration o f the irrigation sector is carried out at three 
levels. First, the highest level o f government supervision comes 
from the Minister o f Major & Medium Irrigation, and the Minister 
o f Minor Irrigation. Second, at bureaucratic level there is Principal 
Secretary o f I & C A D Department, and three to four secretaries, 
each o f whom are assisted by three to four deputy or joint 
secretaries. All o f them belong to the Indian Administrative 
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F I G U R E 3.1 Organisational Structure o f the Irrigation Department 
Principal Secretary 
Irrigation and Command Area 
Projects 
Secretary 
Command 
Secretary 
Irrigation 
Deputy Joint Secretary and Secretarial 
Commissioner Commissioner Engineer Director Director, 
Commissionerat CADA in Chief General, Groundwater 
e Walamtari Board 
C E C E C E C E C E C E C E 
Major Medium Minor Investigatio Design Mechanical Projects 
Executive 
Engineer 
Superintending Engineer 
D.E .E 
Executive 
Engineer 
D.E .E D.E .E 
I 
I I 
A E A E A E A E 
Work inspectors & lascars 
Executive 
Engineer 
D .E .E 
9 
o 
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p 
Service, These bureaucrats influence poHcymaking and 
implementation (see Figure 3.1). 
TABLE 3.2 Irrigation Potential Created under Different Plan Period in Andhra Pradesh 
CbüfAUimürTtnim Temn 
Minor Total 
Second plan period 1936-61 Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy 01-11-1956 to 11-01-1960 CON 0.18 0.02 O20 
Damodaram Sanjivayya 11-01-1960 toi 2-03-1962 CON 
Third Plan 1961-66 Damodatatn Sanjivayya 11-01-1960 to 12-03-1962 CON 
Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy 12-03-1962 to 29-02-1964 CON 0.37 0.05 0.42 
Kasu Bramhananda Reddy 29-02-1964 to30-09-1971 CON 
Three Annual Plans 1966-69 Kasu Bramhananda Reddy 29-02-1964 to30-09-1971 CON 0.08 0.04 0 1 2 
Fourth Plan 1969-74 Kasu Bramhananda Reddy 29-02-1964 to30-09-1971 CON 0.19 0.06 0 2 5 
Jalagam Vengala Rao 10-12-1973 to 06-03-1978 CON 
Fifth Plan 1974-78 Jalagam Vengala Rao 10-12-1973 to 06-03-1978 C O N 0 2 1 0.09 0 3 1 
Two Annual Plansl978-80 Marti Chenna Reddy 06-03-1978 to 11-10-1980 C O N 0.15 0.06 O i l 
Sixth Plan 1980-85 Tanguturi Anjaiah, 11-10-1980 to 2402-1982 CON 
Bhavanam Venkatatam 24-02-1982 to 204)9-1982 C O N 
rCVijaya Bhaskara Reddy 09-01-1982 to 09-01-1983 CON 0.31 0.08 0.39 
N.T.Rama Rao 09-01-1983 to 16-08-1984 T D P 
N.Bhaskara tao 16-08-1984 to 164)9-1984 TDP(N) 
Sri N.T.Rama Rao 16-09-1984 to 09-03-1985 T D P 
Seventh Planl985-90 N.T.Rama Rao 09-03-1985 to 03-12-1989 TDP 0.09 0.07 0.16 
Mam Chenna Reddy 03-12-1989 to 17-12-1990 C O N 
Annual Plan 1990-91 N.Janatdhana Reddy 17-12-1990 to 09-10-1992 C O N 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Annual Plan 1991-92 N.Janardhana Reddy 17-12-1990 to 09-10-1992 CON 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Eighth Plan 1992-1997 K-VijaraBhaskara Reddy 09-10-1992 to 12-12-1994 CON 
N.T.Rama Rao 12-12-1994 to 01-09-1995 T D P 0.04 0.04 0.08 
N. Chandra Babu Naidu 01-09-1995 to 1997 T D P 
Ninth Plan 1997-2002 N. Chandra Babu Naidu 1997 to 2002 T D P 0.19 0.05 0 2 4 
Tenth plan 2002-2007 N. Chandra Babu Naidu 2002 to 14-05-2004 T D P 
Y.S. Rajshekhara Reddy 14-05-2004 to CON 
Note: CON- Congress patty, TDP- Telugudesam party, TDP(N)- Telugudesam (Nadendla) Source. Compiled from various government resources 
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The second level is made up o f the heads o f several 
departments: the Engineer in Chief o f Irrigation and 
Administration, the Director General o f the Water and Land 
Management, Training, and Research Institute (WALAMTARI) , 
the Commissioner o f C A D A , and the Director o f the Groundwater 
Board. 
The third level is responsible for field operations at the system 
level The Chief Engineer (CE) is the head o f the system level 
operations. The C E assisted by S u p e r s e d i n g Engineers. One or 
more districts fall under an irrigation circle and are under the 
control o f a superintending engineer (SE). E a c h irrigation circle is 
divided into irrigation divisions headed by an Executive Engineer 
(EE) . A district may have one or more E E heading irrigation 
division. Traditionally each irrigation division has three to four 
irrigation sub-divisions, each is managed by a deputy executive 
engineer (DyEE) . 
Each sub-division is again divided into four sections headed by 
the assistant engineer (AE) . One or more work inspectors (Wi) and 
five to six laskars support an A E or section officer. The laskars are 
the lowest rung in the Irrigation Department who work as 
gatekeepers and assist in the distribution o f water below the outlet 
leveL 
3.6 Evolution of Irrigation Management Reform 
Several factors led to reforms in the state. Reforms in the irrigation 
sector are only a portion o f a series o f reforms initiated in other 
sectors like power and education over the last five years under the 
leadership o f Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu in the state. 
Reasons for Reforms 
In the state about 40 percent o f the gross cropped area is irrigated 
and contributes to 60 percent o f total agricultural production. 
Agricultural growth declined to less than two percent per annum 
during 1995. T h e declining performance o f existing irrigation 
systems in the state further led to the introduction o f reforms in 
the state. Rehabilitating and sustaining irrigation and enhancing its 
agricultural productivity are thus o f paramount importance to 
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Andhra Pradesh (GoAP 1996). Arguing the need for reforms, I 
quote Raymond Peter (2001): 
Despite major plan investments in irrigation by the Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, which have increased the irrigation potential, most 
systems are in disrepair and dilapidated due to inadequate 
maintenance. This has lead to the shrinkage of command areas. 
Irrigation systems are characterized by low irrigation efficiencies 
and tail-end deprivation. 
An anarchic situation existed in established commands, where 
head-enders appropriated most of the water for themselves. This 
situation was exacerbated by a lack of coordination among the 
various departments of Irrigation, Agriculture, and Revenue. The 
gap between the potential irrigated area created and the actual 
utilization, popularly known as the "gap area" has been estimated at 
about one half million hectares. 
Lack of established operation and maintenance (O&M) 
procedures, inadequate funds for O&M, and ad hoc expenditures 
by the Irrigation Department have compounded the unsatisfactory 
performance of the most systems. Most of the agency's O&M 
funds were being spent on staff salaries; very little was being spent 
on effective maintenance. This has lead to the siltation of major 
canals and drains and damage to their lined sections. 
In addition, dissatisfied farmers seeking more water, or water 
deliveries at the appropriate time, have tampered with irrigation 
structures causing further damage. Such unauthorized irrigation led 
to a low collection of water charges by the Revenue Department, as 
the measured water supplied was quite low. The situation in AP is 
representative of the prevailing conditions in other Indian states. 
Tie need for change and reform had become obvious (Peter 2001, italics 
mine). 
Others argued that the irrigation reforms in the state are an 
outcome o f an alliance between the ruling party political heads 2 7 
and international donor agencies like World Bank (Reddy 1999; 
Venkateswarulu 1999). Hence there was no single or convincing 
account o f explaining reasons behind the genesis o f and 
motivations for introduction o f reforms in the state. A s discussed 
in section 3.5, no single comprehensive irrigation act was available 
or applicable to the entire state o f A P . The enactment o f A P F M I S 
Act 11 o f 1997 is a first step in that direction. The reform policy 
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Political support 
The Chandrababu Naidu government issued a white paper 
outlining the performance o f the irrigation sector over the years in 
1996. T h e white paper was placed for discussion in the state 
assembly and subsequendy the irrigation sector policy paper was 
prepared to guide sectoral deve lopment 2 8 With this backdrop, 
A P F M I S Act was prepared and enacted in 1997. 
The government issued many orders to accomplish progress in 
implementation o f reforms. The political will was evident from the 
Chief Minister's letter addressed to all the District Collectors, 
Magistrate and other Government officials in 1996: 
As part of the package of reforms in various sectors my 
Government has initiated, with a view to bringing the human being 
to the core of the development process, we want to fulfil the public 
aspirations of distribution of water by peoples groups, formed at 
different levels with hydraulic unit as the base. I envisage a tight 
time frame for this peoples' movement to be given a concrete shape 
and the necessary legislative framework to be approved so that 
these elected organisations be in place as legal entity, within the 
next few months, I would like to have your whole hearted 
has three main objectives: achieving increased production, 
efficiency and equity. 
A s explained there is large irrigation bureaucracy representing 
12,000 engineers and 42,000 other staff in the state. A s a result, 80 
percent o f the total irrigation budget is going to staff salaries alone, 
raising the issue o f scaling down the size o f the bureaucracy under 
reforms. Capacity building and attitudlnal change o f irrigation 
bureaucracy is also given importance under the reform programme. 
F r o m the above discussion, I conclude that in the case o f A P , 
the evolution o f irrigation reform was a combination o f genuine 
need for reforms and a favourable political environment It was 
evident that the irrigation sector performance was deteriorating. At 
the same time, the T D P government headed by Naidu wanted to 
bring changes in the administration. The low level performance o f 
irrigation systems, political support coupled with timely availability 
o f external funds together led to the implementation o f irrigation 
reform in the state. 
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involvement with the this process" Along with the letter a 
discussion paper titled 'Tarticipatory Irrigation Management 
Programme; A Framework for User's Organization'' was also sent 
(source: D.O Lr No 37601/CAD IV- (H)/96) dated August 28,1996). 
T o achieve the stated vision, the Naidu government introduced the 
concept o f Janmabhoomi. 29 It is designed as a people centered 
development process launched in the state in January 1997. 
Janmabhoomi created an enabling environment to launch several 
innovative approaches to ensure people's participation in 
development through WUAs , Vana Samrakshana Samitis (VSS), 
Development o f Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) 
and Chief Minister's Employment Youth (CMEY) groups. 
Public consultations 
The public consultations aimed to elicit the viewpoints o f the 
farmers and staff o f Irrigation Department Retired senior level 
engineers from the department were hired by the state as 
consultants. They conducted the public consultation meetings. 
Peter (2001) reports that beginning in April 1996, a series o f public 
consultations were held in centrally located places in command 
areas o f major projects. These informal discussions gave a 
tremendous amount o f input to the government in designing a 
suitable plan o f action. The first round o f public consultations was 
used to elicit the viewpoints o f the farmers and the staff o f the 
department Subsequent rounds employed a more structured 
framework for discussion. Initially, the consultations were met with 
severe cynicism and indifference by both farmers and agency staff. 
Farmers approached the public consultations with a rnixture o f 
curiosity and cynicism (see chapter 8 for further discussion) 
Pilot projects 
The Government, in addition to the consultations, also 
commissioned pilot projects to formulate the policy. In 1996, two 
N G O s , I R D A S and S O N A R , conducted separate pilot projects in 
the Sriramsagar project in Karimnagar District. A key result o f the 
projects was the finding that substantial improvement in the 
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operation o f the irrigation system could be realised when farmers in 
the head, middle, and tail-end o f the command came together to 
consult and negotiate with each other. The pilot projects also 
revealed that small interventions, such as removal o f accumulated 
silt, weeds and minor repairs to structures could yield dramatic 
results. 
Financial resources 
In this section, I briefly discuss the strategies and criticism in 
raising resources for the reform. A series o f meetings held between 
the Worid Bank and state representatives led to financial support 
for the reform initiative. The meetings and the outcomes were 
covered substantially in the media. One such occasion was a 
meeting that was held between the Chief Minister N . Chandrababu 
Naidu and Mr. Edwin Lim, Resident Representative o f the World 
Bank on 4 th J u n e 1997. The meeting assumed importance, as there 
was an indication for the six components 3 0 o f the A P Economic 
Restructuring project (APERP) . Worid Bank considered a total o f 
U S $ 550 million (19,000 million rupees) as assistance. 3 1 
Accordingly, the respective state departments in consultation with 
the Worid Bank staff and consultants prepared sectoral plans for 
the implementation o f the various components . 3 2 
The state government also secured loan assistance from other 
agencies in addition to the World Bank. They were from: RLDF 
( N A B A R D ) 10,470 million rupees, ATOP (Government o f India) 
10,950 million, Irrigation bonds o f 3070 million and J B I C Qapan) 
5,550 million rupees. A total o f 49,040 million rupees have been 
raised for the reforms in the irrigation sector alone. 
The reforms in the irrigation and other sectors led by the Naidu 
government were criticised by the Leftist parties, the Congress 
Party, academicians and activists. Mr. Naidu dealt directly with the 
World Bank and negotiated huge loans that have been 
controversial All the key aspects o f the classical liberal agenda are 
in place in A P (Frontline, J u n e 18, 1999). The Congress Party 
accused Naidu o f taking the state into a vicious debt trap, and the 
leftist parties criticised Naidu as an agent o f the World Bank. T o 
the criticism, the Naidu government argued that the government 
was considered worthy to procure the loan assistance by the World 
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Bank while other agencies among many other states that had 
applied for loans had been turned down by the agencies. 3 3 
T h e process suggests that the state government made efforts to 
raise resources and initiating reform activities parallel -way. For 
example, increase in irrigation charges and public consultations 
took place in 1996. The A P F M S Act was enacted and elections o f 
W U A s took place in 1997. 3 * 
Enactment o f legislation 
T h e A P F M I S Act was introduced by the T D P government and was 
passed in the Legislative Assembly on 2 7 * o f March 1997. A state-
wide election for W U A s was organised on 17 t h J u n e 1997. A total 
o f 10,292 W U A s have been constituted. The crux o f the reform 
was to decentralise irrigation management, transferring 
management responsibilities to users' associations. In November 
1997, elections for the Distributary Committees Le. the second 
management tier o f the WUAs were held. 3 5 The government 
launched a massive campaign to make the W U A s functional The 
Chief Minister explained the concept o f W U A s in every public 
meeting that he addressed during that time. The government's will 
to implement reform is evident through more than 100 
government orders and memos that were issued in the initial years 
to create the W U A s and t o make them functional 
The Approach 
T h e preparation o f the A P F M I S Act, 1997 seems based on the 
experience o f the implementation o f earlier Acts in the state. The 
preparation o f the Act and inclusion o f certain legal provisions 
were drawn from participatory irrigation experiments that have 
been carried out on a pilot scale in other states. The A P F M I S Act 
was prepared as comprehensive as possible and applicable for the 
entire state. In the State Gazette it was published- "An act to provide 
for farmers' participation in the management of irrigation systems and for 
matters connected there with or incidental thereto. " T h e Act recognises: 
Scientific and systematic development and maintenance of 
irrigation infrastructure is considered best possible through farmers' 
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organizations". The Act also empowers that "such farmers' 
organisations have to be given an effective role in the management 
and maintenance of the irrigation system for effective and reliable 
supply and distribution of water (APFMIS Act, 1997). 
The programme intended to achieve improvements in quality 
and cost efficiency o f irrigation management With the pooled 
resources the government decided to carry out minimum 
rehabilitation activities envisaged at an amount o f Rs . 1,350/ha Le. 
$30/ha. T h e users' associations were empowered to carry out the 
activities under the overall guidance o f the irrigation department 
officials (see chapters 5 and 6). The government adopted a 
comprehensive or a big-bang reform agenda and decided not to 
take incremental or gradual approaches in implementation o f the 
programme. A t a time 10,292 W U A s were formed and made 
functional with a uniform legal back up. T h e entire irrigated area 
(except some tribal pockets) in the state was brought under the 
management o f users' associations. The WUAs are local level 
organisations empowered to do operation, maintenance, water 
management, distribution and conflict-resolution. 
3J Institutional Arrangements under the APFMIS Act 
In this section, I discuss briefly the salient features o f the A P F M I S 
Act, 1997. 3 6 Under the Act, each W U A has a right to receive 
irrigation •water in bulk and information related to water supplies 
(periods and quantity) and canal opening and closing dates. The 
members enjoy a right to receive water as per specified quota for use 
and also have the freedom o f growing any crop, other than those 
prohibited by law, adjusting the areas within the water allocated to 
t h e m The members are also ensured with the right to sell or transfer 
the water share to any other water user within the operational area o f 
W U A (see Rule 5 and 7 o f A P F M I S Act, 1997). These are crucial 
provisions for W U A and users especially when the irrigation 
management is in the hands o f irrigation bureaucrats. N o n e o f the 
earlier Irrigation Acts in the state had these provisions. 
The reform policy envisages a change in the attitudes o f the 
irrigation bureaucracy. Its role has been defined as a facilitator 
rather than as a traditional provider. The Act provided additional 
powers to irrigation bureaucrats to approve financial and technical 
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matters. The Act also believes that the collective role o f the water 
users makes the Irrigation Department more sensitive to the 
service role it should be playing than the provider role. One o f the 
main intentions o f the Act is to facilitate collective action by users 
so that they exert the pressure at times o f need that makes the 
department service-oriented and accountable to users. 
FIGURE 3.2: The channels of communication 
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(Irrigation project) 
t -
Superintending Engineer 
(Irrigation Circle) 
t 
Executive Engineer 
(Irrigation Division) 
Project Committee (hat yet 
formed) 
(Svstem level works') 
t 
Deputy Executive Engineer 
(Irrigation Sub division) 
Distributary Cornrnittee 
(Secondary canals) 
t 
Assistant Engineer 
(Irrigation section) 
Work Inspectors 
(Section level) 
Water Users Association 
(Tertiary canals) 
Luskars 
(Minor canals/ pipe outlets) Farmers/ users 
The Act aims to forge linkages between the different levels o f 
farmer organisations. F o r example in the case o f major irrigation 
systems, WUAs are responsible at tertiary canal level, a distributary 
committee at the secondary canal level, a project committee at the 
system level, and an apex committee at the state leveL 
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The representation o f W U A leaders at each level was viewed as 
a strategy to strengthen the decision-making process. Another 
important feature is, that the Act authorises the W U A to manage 
the conflicts and can order fines if found guilty. The Act provides 
scope for creation o f incentives and rewards for individuals and 
institutions leading to the better management o f the irrigation 
systems. The Act also envisaged two-way communications between 
the users' organisations and irrigation agency at all levels (see figure 
3 .Z 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have summarised the history o f irrigation 
legislation and the evolution o f PEM policy in the state. The 
content o f the P I M policy is very much benefited by the past 
policies and their performance. In the case o f A P , favourable 
conditions like political will and external financial support have 
facilitated the initial implementation o f the policy. 
Unlike the past policies the reform policy empowered the users 
to participate in the management o f their irrigation systems. The 
reform policy sought to address the technical, economical, 
organizational issues o f irrigation sector. The APFIvflS Act is 
distinctive in the country, as it proposes not only forming users' 
associations, also federating them. It has also cleady intended to 
bring an attitudinal change in the irrigation bureaucracy. A s we see 
in chapter 2, the implementation o f policy is not always easy. The 
day-to-day engagement o f different policy actors with the reform 
policy and the outcomes are discussed in the following chapters. 
Notes 
1 Shah Anil C (2003) "Fading Shine of the Golden Decade: The 
Establishment Strikes Back'. Paper accessed on January 10, 2006 at 
www.ccsindia.org/Decade.pdf. 
2 Different views exist for the reasons behind the British (dis) interest in 
irrigation development in India. Protection against famine was an 
important objective of colonial irrigation policy. Some have argued that 
this objective was litde more than window dressing for the real, surplus 
extraction, objectives of colonial irrigation (Whitcombe 1972 has this 
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flavour). Colonial irrigation policy was also seen as the combination of 
charity and commerce (Ramamurthy 1988:5). The imperial desire to 
provide famine protection is not primarily informed by charitable feelings 
(though this is definitely part of the discourse), but by cost and political 
considerations (Mollinga 2003). Another view was that the British wanted 
to keep India as a producer of raw materials and hence harnessed the 
rivers by constructing dams. For an analysis of colonial revenue and other 
policies as a cause of famine, see Dutt (1900) and B.M. Bhatia (1991). 
Some others claim that the British wanted to raise revenues and 
professional development of the British engineers. A further discussion is 
not possible here. Whatever were the motives of the British; the end result 
was the state's control over water resources and management (see for 
different views Ebrahim 2004; Jurriens et aL 1996; Bolding et al 1995). 
3 Initiatives like Warabandbi in Northern India evolved as an answer to 
management of the scarce canal water resource. In Bombay the Phad 
system was adopted into the block system but proved not successful 
(Kullcarni and Patil 1984). In 1947, the then Bombay state introduced the 
concept of a 'canal advisory committee' at canal level, Panchayat 
committee and Bagqyatdar Sangb. In 1976 the Maharashtra Irrigation Act 
provisioned for water users' committees where more than 50 percent of 
the irrigators come together. 
4 Formation of Pant Panchayat in irrigation systems is visible in the state of 
Orissa. The Government of Orissa states that there is a shift in its 
approach through Pani Panchayat, as the most appropriate institute for 
efficient water management and agricultural development The 
Government enacted the Orissa Pani Panchayat Act in 2002 
(www.orissawater.com/P.Panchayatl.htm). For a critique Sainath (2002) 
at www.indiatogether.org/opinions/p sainath/ panipanchayatl .h tm. 
5 Currently, at the Central level the CAD has been renamed as Command 
Area Development an d Water Management programme (CADWM). 
6 It consisted of the districts of Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam, East 
Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna, Guntur, Nellore, Chittoor, Cuddapah, 
Anantapur and KumooL and the taluks of Rayadurg, Adoni and Alur of 
the Bellary district. 
7 The state formed with 20 districts and later three more districts 
Prakasam, Ranga Reddy and Vizianagarm were added in 1970, 1978 and 
1979 respectively. The state presently has 23 districts (9 districts 
representing Coastal Andhra, Telangana region with 10 districts and four 
districts forming Rayalaseems region). 
8 According to the 1991 census data, the estimate suggests that population 
has crossed the 70 million level but registered less population growth rate 
when compared to other Indian states. 
9 Coastal Andhra consists of nine districts i.e. Srikakulam, Vizianagaram, 
Visakhapatnam, East Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna, Guntur, 
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Prakasam and Nellore. Rayalaseema (the land of kings) region consists of 
four districts Le. Chittoor, Cuddapah, Anantapur and Kurnool and the 
•Rayalaseema' and Telengana' (the land of Telugus) consists of ten 
districts Le. Mahabubnagar, Ranga Reddy, Hyderabad, Medak, 
Nizamabad, Adilabad, Karimnagar, Warangal, Khammam and Nalgonda. 
1 0 The chronicle of development in AP can be divided into five different 
periods. The first period (1950-1969) is characterised by key institutional 
changes like the abolition of Jamindari system and implementation of 
tenancy reforms. In the same period, the creation of the Panchayati Raj 
Institutions took place at the village level for mobilisation of people to 
participate in the development programs. From 1969 to 1972, AP was 
rocked by riots, first in Telengana, and then in Andhra on the question of 
bifurcation of the state. The period (1970-1980) can be characterized by 
the spread of the green revolution, an increased priority to physical 
infrastructure, particularly irrigation and power. The third period (1980-
1990) is represented by a drastic change of priorities in favour of welfare 
schemes both centrally and state sponsored programmes. The Pancbqyat 
Samitis (330) were abolished and Mandal Parisbads (1104) were introduced 
in the entire state. During the fourth stage (1991-98) the government has 
adopted the central government's privatisation policy, 1991. The state 
started withdrawing its responsibilities and transferring them to self-help 
groups. The fifth stage (1998-2004) relates to the second stage of 
economic reforms and emphasis on application of information 
technology for good govern ance (Bala Ramulu 2002). 
1 1 Srinivasulu (2002) discusses that 'this historical background is crucial to 
an understanding of the political economy of development and the 
trajectory of social and political processes in each of these regions. 
Further, these historical differences continue to inform the socio-political 
processes in modem AP- the articulation of social forces, caste-class 
dynamics, the nature of social movements, patterns of social mobilisation, 
and so on'. 
1 2 In India according to the 1991 census, there were 138 million scheduled 
caste members that are approximately 16 percent of the total population. 
1 3 Godavari, the second largest river in India, is often referred to as the 
Vriddb (Old) Ganga or the Dakshin (South) Ganga. The Godavari 
originates near Triambak in the Nasik district of Maharashtra, and flows 
through the states of Madhya Pradesh, Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh and 
Orissa. Although its point of origin is just 80 kms away from the Arabian 
Sea, its journeys..1,465 kms to tall into the Bay of Bengal. Some of its 
tributaries include Indravati, Manjira, Bindusara and Sarbari. Some 
important urban centres on its banks include Nasik, Aurangabad, Nagpur, 
Nizamabad, Rajahmundry and Balaghat Source: www.rainwpreTharvestincr 
•org/Crisis/river-godavarihtm. 
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1 4 Originating from the western flanks of the Western Ghats near 
Mahabaleshwar, the Krishna is the fourth largest river basin in the 
country. The Krishna River is the most important river on the Deccan for 
irrigation. The basin extends over an area of 258,948 sq.kms that is nearly 
8 percent of total geographical area of the country. The basin lies in the 
states of Maharashtra (69,425 sq.kms), Karnataka (113,271 sq.kms) and 
Andhra Pradesh (76,252 sq.kms). It flows 1,440 km through the states of 
Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh before flowing into the Bay 
of Bengal The rivers Koyna, Vasna, Panchganga, Dudhganga, 
Ghataprabha, Malaprabha and Tungabhadra join the Krishna from the 
right bank; while the Yarla, Musi, Maneru and Bhirna rivers join the 
Krishna from the left bank 
(http://www.rainwaterharvestirig.org/ Crisis/river-krishna.htm). 
1 5 The Pennar basin extends over an area of 55,213 sq. kms. That is nearly 
1.7 percent of the total geographical area of the country. The basin lies in 
the states of AP (48,276 sq. kms) and Karnataka (6,937 sq. kms). The river 
rises from Chenna Kesava hills of the Nandi ranges of Karnataka and 
flows for about 597 kms before out falling into Bay of Bengal, source: 
www.wrmin .nir. in / riverbasin. 
1 6 Delivering a speech at the 93rd Indian Science Congress on Jan 03, 
2006, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh said that the nation needs a 
second Green Revolution as the technologies and strategies unleashed by 
the first Green Revolution have ran their course. He said the focus should 
now be on non-food crops, horticulture and new plant varieties. "There 
are three challenges that science and technology must address to promote 
rural development - agricultural productivity, affordable technologies for 
energy and water, and efficient and relevant farm and non-farm 
technologies," He referred candidly to the two main criticisms against the 
Green Revolution- that it did not benefit dry land agriculture and that it 
benefited only large farms and big farmers. "While evidence shows that 
this was not always the case, we must ensure that second Green 
Revolution technologies have a special focus on dry land agriculture and 
does benefit small and marginal farmers" (source: www.thestatesman.net 
/page.arcview.php?date=2006-01-04tosrsess=l&did=2&id=129665). 
1 7 In terms of agricultural development, the south coastal Andhra region 
ranks first, north Telangana the second position, while north coastal 
Andhra, Rayalaseema and south Telangana occupy third, fourth and fifth 
positions respectively. The positions of the regions will vary as changes 
bound to happen in land productivity, land use, cropping intensity, access 
to technology etc For example rapid groundwater overexploitation in 
certain pockets may result in changes in crop productivity. Agricultural 
development and growth in the coming years will depend on the efficient 
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use of water as tank irrigation is declining and well irrigation proving 
economically unviable (Rao and Dev 2003:30). 
1 8 Sriramsagar Project is a relatively recent project and is covered under 
the CAD Act 
1 9 It was during 1974-78 that the central government introduced the 
command area approach. The CAD programme was started in 1974 
envisaged the participation of farmer organisations below outlet The 
Irrigation Enquiry Committee, known as Vtsvesmaraya Committee had 
recommended farmers' participation as early as 1938. The committee 
recommended entrusting of irrigation to a village or group of villages, if 
the farmers are willing to take up co-operative irrigation. The second 
irrigation commission (1972) reported a wide gap between the irrigation 
creation and potential and also suggested farmers' participation in 
irrigation management 
2 0 A separate CAD department was created under the Ministry of 
Agriculture to integrate irrigation development with agriculture. The 
department was headed by a separate secretary to the Government who 
was later appointed as the Agricultural Production Commissioner. The 
integration of Irrigation and Agriculture ran into major difficulties (see 
Sivamohan and Scott 1992). 
2 IKarnataka enacted the CAD Act in 1965, where as Andhra Pradesh and 
Kerala states enacted the act only in 1984 and 1985 respectively. 
2 2 During the implementation of the first five-year plan (1951-56) the total 
amount spent on major and medium irrigation; and minor irrigation was 
374.7 and 35.2 million rupees respectively. The IP created during that 
period was 0.079 mha under major and medium and 0.025mha under 
minor irrigation. By the time the seventh plan was implemented the 
budget allocations were as high as 13064.0 million rupees to the major and 
medium system and 1314.0 million rupees for medium irrigation. The 
potential created during the same plan period was 0.089 mha under major 
and medium and 0.067mha under minor irrigation schemes. The total 
irrigation potential both under major and medium and minor irrigation in 
the state was increased to 4.96 mha at the end of the eighth plan period 
(1992-97). The above figures do not include expenditure on CADA up to 
the end of the seventh plan. The above figures are adopted from the 
eighth Five-Year Plan (1990-95), AP-F&P (PLG) Department, Volume 
11, and October 1990. 
2 3 Personal communication with Y. Ranga Reddy, Kalluru D C President 
in 2001. Reddy shared that Congress (I) was ruling the state at that time. 
Jalagam Vengalarao served as a Chief Minister from 1973 to 1978. The 
recommendations of the irrigation utilisation committee could not be 
implemented with vigour between 1978 and 1983 due to the political 
instability in the state. 
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2 4 At the national level to address the gap issue, the seventh five-year plan 
(1985-90) envisaged to stop the construction of new major and medium 
projects. It gave importance to minor irrigation projects, which can be 
completed within a short time frame. The pattern of budget allocation in 
this plan period shows that huge amounts were spent on maintenance and 
repairs of the existing irrigation systems. 
2 5 The irrigation staff from Madhira irrigation sub-division stated that 
considering the changes in canal designs, the past and present budget 
allocations were not appropriate. For example in NSP, the planning, 
design and operation of the canal network/systems were based on the 
method of continuous flow throughout the crop period The canal design 
does not allow for any flexibility in supply of water. The Assistant 
Engineer from the Madhira sub-division expressed that the physical 
controls like cross regulators for regulating the discharges of canal water 
would be inadequate as the farmers continue to tamper irrigation 
infrastructure The Engineer further explained that 1) the carrying capacity 
of the canals is inadequate with the existing cropping pattern in the 
second zone of the NSP (left canal). The canal system is designed to 
support the cultivation of Kbarif crops. Instead, Rabi cultivation has 
increased, leading to water shortages. The localisation is no longer 
relevant 2) large areas consisting of porous soils have been localised for 
wet cultivation. N o separate outlets or canal exist for irrigated dry 
designated plots. Hence, the headreach wet cropping farmers tap water 
when water is released specially for the irrigated dry crops. 3) in many 
places separate field channels are dug by farmers to suit their individual 
needs. As a result, the implementation of a rotational scheme or 
WarabancB is not feasible under the present conditions. 
2 6 Mainstream economics treat regional disparities as a problem in 
development Neoclassical economist typically predicts that markets 
correct such disparities. Regional disparities are inherent in the process of 
development Myrdal (1957) discusses in his theory of cumulative causation 
that market forces create regional inequalities and this tendency is more 
dominant in poor countries. Economists argue that free movement of 
goods through trade and capital would lead to convergence of incomes 
across countries and regions of the world For the discussion on irrigation 
disparity in Andhra Pradesh refer to Rao and Subrahmanyam (2002). 
2 7 Following a popular upsurge in the TDP, Mr. Naidu was unanimously 
elected as the Chief Minister of AP on 1 September 1995 dislodging 
Mr.N.T.Rama Rao. Following the elections to the State Assembly wherein 
the TDP led by Mr. Naidu emerged as a winner; he was sworn in on 11 
October 1999 as the Chief Minister for the second term. The critics said 
that he did not have charm and a mass base like the former chief minister 
N.T.Rama Rao and hence wanted to create his own image and strong-
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hold on the party by revamping the aormnistration and hence chose the 
path of reforms. 
2 8 The irrigation policy articulates the state's vision for the irrigation sector 
and sets out the reform agenda and is published in 1999. The Vision 2020 
document states the vision of the state in 14 key areas that is identified as 
growth engines. The document is the basic document for the planning 
process. 
2 9 This process has evolved out of the experience gained through the 
implementation of Prajala Vaddaku Paalana (taking administration to the 
door steps of the people) launched in November 1995 and Sramadanam 
(contribution of labour) launched in January 1996. It aims at establishing 
an ideal society, which embodies and cherishes the principles of people's 
participation, equality, transparency and accountability leading to 
sustained economic development and excellence in all walks of life. The 
goal is, an enhanced quality of life for every man, woman and child in the 
State. The following are the five core areas of Janmabhoomr. Community 
Works, Primary Education, Primary Health and Family Welfare, 
Environment Conservation and Responsive Governance (source: 
www.manage.gov. m/RRSites/EVillage/jaruuabhoomi_programme.htm). 
3 0 The six components are: primary education (Rs 140 million), irrigation 
(Rs. 120 million), nutrition (Rs 90 million), roads (Rs. 80 million), public 
enterprise reform mainly the voluntary retirement schemes (Rs. 80 
million) and primary health (Rs. 40 million). 
3 1 AP has been a laboratory for testing state-level reforms in India under 
the watchful eyes of the Wodd Bank Between 1998 and 2002, the state 
government signed three structural adjustment loan agreements with the 
Wodd Bank, totalling $1.14 billion. The World Bank loan for APERP 
initiated far-reaching reforms in almost every sector of economic and 
social activity in the state (source: Vol 21, Issue 08, URL: 
htto://www.flc>nnetcom/fl2108/stories/20040423004902900.htm). 
3 2 The APERP aims to rehabilitate 2.45 mha under various irrigation 
projects in the state. Minimum rehabilitation is envisaged at an amount of 
Rsl350/ha. The irrigation component of the APERP provides support 
totalling Rs.12,986 million to irrigation sector reform program of AP. For 
the development of the WUAs, $141 million budget was spent initially 
according to the Government reports. The main irrigation components 
under APERP : a)irrigation performance improvement which consists of: 
® minimum rehabilitation of major and medium irrigation schemes (Z45 
million ha) with a fund allocation of Rs. 4,549 millions and recurrent 
maintenance on major, medium and minor schemes (3.7 million ha) to 
ensure their sustainable functioning with a total of Rs.6, 518 rnillion, b) 
scheme improvement/ modernization and farmer turnover by 
implementing pilot projects to test more intensive modernization on 
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selected projects with a funding outlay of Rs 1,202 millions, c). agricultural 
intensification program by intensification of agricultural extension services 
to farmers' organizations , training and skills development of Agriculture 
Department staff, dissemination of information and productivity 
enhancement for increasing the irrigated agriculture productivity and 
water use efficiency, agriculture technologies, and on-farm 
demonstrations. The total budget allocated under this program is Rs.113 
millions, d) institutional development of farmers' organisation and 
government departments by making newly formed farmers' organisation, 
fully functional and improving management capabilities through training 
for farmers, government staff and NGOs. The budget allocated is Rs.603 
millions. The expected outcome of these measures would be: a) full 
recovery of water charges, b) full financing of irrigation O&M, c) 
improved performance of irrigation schemes and d) increased crop 
production. 
3 3 The then Finance Minister under the Naidu government, Mr. Ashok 
Gajapathi Raju defended the criticism by explaining the rationality behind 
raising loans from the Wodd Bank According to him, if we have a 
seriously ill patient at home, the ambulance has to be at your doorstep. 
The World Bank almost performed the role of an ambulance as stated in 
the local newspapers. 
3 4 The initial farmers' resistance to increase in water cess was not 
sustained The lack of continued resistance can be attributed to: farmers 
understood the rationale behind the increase Le. they anticipated better 
services. Another reason could be the lack of organised farmers' 
organisations that can facilitate farmers to participate in the public policy 
process. In the past, the mobilisation and resistance of farmers against the 
betterment levy was evident in the command of Bhakra Canal. The mass 
mobilisation during 1958-59 was known as Anti-Betterment Levy Agitation 
led by the Kisan Sabba of United Communist Party of India. The 
movement succeeded in the withdrawal of the betterment levy by the 
Punjab government (see Sucha 2004). 
3 5 The total expenditure towards elections was reported as Rs. 110 million 
Le. $2.5 million. 
3 6 To strengthen the irrigation reforms, many administrative reforms were 
introduced so as to increase the efficiency of the irrigation department 
They are: 1. re-organisation and counselling for transfers of irrigation 
officials, 2. appointment of project administrators duly delegated with the 
powers of Chief Engineers, to ensure speedy execution of works, 3. 
creation of the posts of district coordinators in all the districts to liaise 
between the irrigation department and the WUAs, 4. enhancement of 
powers of Executive Engineers and Superintending Engineers to accord 
"Legislation and Policy 81 
technical sanctions to finalize tenders, 5. delegation of powers of 
Comrnissionerate o f Tenders to the Chief Engineers to finalise tenders for 
works up to one crore rupees (lOrtuTHons), 6. permission to project 
administrators to engage private agencies for carrying out investigation to 
expedite technical sanctions, 7. disposal of surplus land, machinery and to 
restructure the mechanical workshops, which have become un-
economical, 8. appointment of an adviser on quality control to enforce 
prescribed standards of quality in the execution of works by all the public 
works departments of the government, 9. constitution of Krishna Water 
Management Board to establish proper system for the management of 
flood and integrated operation of reservoirs and barrages located on 
Krishna River in Andhra Pradesh 
4 
The Social Organisation of an Irrigation 
System 
The early evidence that ancient Egyptian basin irrigation depended upon the 
social organisation that created and exploited it. 
Hoben Richard Pierce 1976:16 
4.11ntroduction 
In this chapter I discuss the details o f the irrigation network and 
social organisation o f villages under Madhira Branch Canal (MBC) 
on which field research was conducted. I show that irrigation 
organisation is linked with the village level socio-political 
organisations and that W U A organisation intertwines with the 
village political organisations to shape policy implementation 
process. The purpose o f this chapter is to provide a detailed 
introduction to understand the social context in which the Andhra 
Pradesh irrigation reform policy has been implemented. 
WittfogeTs general propositions about the relationships between 
irrigation and social organisation are concerned primarily with the 
relationship between a political centre and the sub-ordinate local 
systems 1 (Hunt and Hunt 1976). Wittfogel's hydraulic hypothesis 
received criticism but raised important discussions on irrigation 
organisation, 2 It is not possible to understand irrigation 
management without understanding some structural and ideational 
features o f social organisation, which regulates access to and 
management o f both land and water (Patrick 1985). 
Water (irrigation) management is inextricably embedded within 
the social relationships o f community (Mosse 1997; Bruns and 
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Meizen Dick 2000). Kelly further discusses irrigation as a pohtically 
significant source o f power and leverage in local, regional, and 
national political arenas; and it is o f considerable social 
consequence because it defines patterns o f cooperation and 
conflict in irrigated agricultural regions (Kelly 1983:800). Hunt and 
Hunt define that canal irrigation is a significant aspect o f local 
production and social organisation (1976:390). They further discuss 
that 'there can be no doubt that where there is irrigated agriculture 
there is social stratification and that the stratification is importandy 
linked to differential decision-making power over the tasks o f 
irrigation system (1976:396). I conclude from the literature that 
irrigation organisation is shaped by the social organisation and vice 
versa. Together they reinforce power relationships that regulate the 
access to resources like irrigation water (see Pradhan 1989 ,1987 ; de 
los Reyes 1982; Duncan 1980). 
The study focused on the Madhira branch canal (MBQ, a 
secondary canal located in Kalluru irrigation division under 
Nagarjunasagar Left Bank Canal (NSLC) . I present the formation 
o f WUAs on M B C and socio-political organisation o f command 
villages. B y discussing these processes I aim to provide a detailed 
description o f the research location and socio-political setting o f 
the research study area. 
4.2 Irrigation Organisation 
In this section I discuss in brief the irrigation organisation in the 
state. Then I present the irrigation network o f Nagarjuna Sagar 
irrigation project, specially the Left canal on which the study was 
conducted. The command o f the Left canal system covers three 
districts namely Nalgonda, Kahammam and Krishna The right 
canal provides irrigation to Guntur and Prakasam districts. I also 
discuss the W U A s formed on Madhira Branch Canal 
Nagarjunasagar Left Main Bank Canal (NSLC) 
T h e Nagarjunasagar Left Main Bank Canal (NSLC) takes off from 
the foreshore o f the Nagarjunasagar reservoir through an 
independent head regulator. It runs for a length o f 178km, and 
extends as the 21st Main Branch Canal for further length o f 
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117km. This contour canal crosses three major rivers Le. Halia, 
Musi and Munneru, by means o f aqueducts and also passes through 
deep-cuts. The command area o f N S L C covers portions o f four 
adjacent districts, i e . the eastern part o f the Nalgonda district, 
south and south-eastern part o f K h a m m a m district and north and 
north-eastern part o f Krishna district and canal excavation is under 
way in West Godavari district 
F o r the purpose o f irrigation administration the N S L C is divided 
into three zones and further divided into 32 irrigation blocks. E a c h 
zone is further classified as irrigation blocks. According to this 
classification, Nalgonda district falls under the first zone covering 
irrigation block numbers 1 to 15 up to Palair, all under wet crop 
cultivation. Z o n e two comprises blocks 16 to 2 1 / 7 , covering both 
Khammam and Krishna districts with a mixed cropping pattern. 
T h e third zone covers blocks 2 1 / 8 to 2 1 / 1 1 with an irrigated dry 
cropping pattern in K h a m m a m and Krishna districts. 
The Left Canal is designed with a carrying capacity o f 
l l ,000cusecs to irrigate a total o f 295,000ha in Nalgonda, 
Khammam, Krishna and West Godavari districts. The localised 
command area is 0.151 mha in Nalgonda, 0.093 mha in K h a m m a m , 
and 0.153 mha in Krishna with the remaining 0.023 mha to be 
created within the West Godavari district 
In the command under N S L C , while delineating lands for the 
purpose o f irrigation, certain areas were removed, such as those 
near villages upto about 400 meters as anti-malarial zones and high 
spots. S o m e lands were left out for future inclusion. However, in 
practice, once irrigation water started flowing, local farmers made 
their own channels to draw water into all these excluded areas. 
Technically, their lands were not included in the command, they 
take -water and it is called unauthorized irrigation. The net outcome 
o f these practices is that the flows are reduced and designed flows 
never reach the lower half o f the system (see IWMI2004) . 
The Madhira Branch Canal 
Madhira branch canal (MBC) is a secondary canal under the N S L C 
(see map. 1.2). Adrninisteatively, the M B C command area covers the 
jurisdictions o f Kalluru and Madhira irrigation sub-divisions 
including a small area o f Tiruvuru irrigation sub-division office. 
The M B C command area covers about forty villages o f both 
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K h a m m a m district (Telangana region) and Krishna district (Coastal 
Andhra region). The M B C command area represents a mixed 
cropping pattern. The total length o f the M B C is 33km and it is 
extended as the Nidanapuram major for about another 24km. The 
total command area o f M B C is 38,259ha with a localised 16,822ha 
o f wet and 21,437ha o f irrigated dry cropping pattern. A total o f 
nineteen W U A s have been demarcated under the M B C command 
area. 
KaHuru Irrigation Division OfEce 
Ac(»rrling to the departmental records o f 2001, the total command 
area o f the Kalluru irrigation division was 620.000ha, A total o f 29 
W U A s were formed under the Kalluru irrigation division. The field 
study covered two irrigation sub-divisions o f Kalluru irrigation 
division namely Kalluru and Madbira. The Kalluru.and Madhira 
subdivisions represent 17,769ha- and 20,326ha o f command area 
respectively. Nine WUAs are formed under each subdivision. 
T h e Kalluru irrigation sub-division represents W U A s 169 to 176 
located in upper reach o f M B C Le. starting from 0 km to 22 km o f 
the M B C and W U A s 177 to 185 falls under Madhira Irrigation 
subdivision. T h e command area o f W U A s under Kalluru 
subdivision represents higher wet paddy cultivation and less 
irrigated dry crops. 
In contrast, irrigated dry crops are grown in large areas in WUAs 
under Madhira sub-division. The variation in cropping patterns 
resulted in changes in labour contribution, -water distribution and 
income levels o f the farmers. 
4.3 The Water Users Associations (WUAs) 
In this section, I discuss the institutional arrangement and salient 
features o f W U A s formed under the A P F M I S A c t The Act was 
passed in the State Legislative Assembly on 27 March 1997. WUAs 
are visualised as primary organisational units under the A P F M I S 
Act, 1997. Depending upon the type o f irrigation scheme Le. 
major, medium and minor a single, two or three tier systems were 
formed. Under major irrigation systems the W U A s are federated as 
a three-tier system o f Water Users ' Association, Distributary 
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Committee and Project Committee. A t the state level an Apex 
committee function as a highest decision making body, chaired by 
the Minister for major and medium irrigation projects. 
Distributary Committee (DC) 
A group o f W U A s under a Distributary canal or under a group o f 
small distributaries comprises a D C . All the W U A presidents 
within the D C will be the members o f the D C . Together they elect 
the Chairman o f the D C . 
Project Committee (PC) 
These are apex bodies concerned with the management and 
distribution o f irrigation water in the command o f major and 
medium projects. All the D C presidents will be the members o f the 
P C committee. The P C committee will elect a chairman and seven 
to eleven managing committee members. 
Water Users'Associations (WUAs) 
E a c h irrigation scheme may comprise one or more WUAs . The 
total command o f operation o f a W U A is divided into four to ten 
territorial constituencies. Farmers from each constituency elect or 
nominate their representative called a Territorial Committee (TQ 
member, (see Figure. 4.1). Elections were held for W U A positions 
across the state on 1 7 * June 1997 and about 10,000 W U A were 
formed. 3 
Table 4.1 Abstract of WUAs formed in the State (1997) 
mi 4s Actually Foi •med WUAs to 
be elected 
Total Projects Unanimous Elected Total 
Major 649(37) 1077(613) 1726(98.3) 30(0.7) 1756(100) 
Medium 118(27) 317(72) 435(98) 7(2) 442(100) 
Minor 4714(58.2) 3110(38.4) 7824(96.6) 270(3.4) 8094(100) 
Total 5489(533) 4504(43.7) 9985(97) 307(3) 10292(100) 
Note: Percentage in parenthesis 
Source: Modified from Jairalh (2001:23). 
Out o f the total WUAs-elected fifty three percent o f W U A s were 
elected unanimously. Under major irrigation projects thirty seven 
percent o f W U A s projects were unanimously elected. 4 The data 
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suggests that the competition for W U A positions was high in major 
and medium irrigation systems compared to W U A s formed under 
minor irrigation systems. 
FIGURE 4.1 W U A structure 
General Body o f WUA 
Managing Committee 
0 
President 
$ 
Territorial Constituency Members 
4-10 depending on the command area o f the WUA 
0 ~ 
Farmers 
Any person using water for the purpose of irrigation and paying water tax a 
recorded in the revenue records 
The delineation o f W U A s was based on the watershed principle 
rather than on revenue boundaries i.e. on hydraulic concerns rather 
than administrative ones. A s a result the W U A boundaries do not 
coincide with the village revenue boundaries. E a c h W U A 
represents an irrigated area o f minimally 1620 ha. The total 
command area under each W U A represents an area that belongs to 
more than one revenue village. O n an average each W U A 
command area belongs to four revenue villages (see Table 4.2). 
A large portion o f the irrigated area i.e.73 percent o f the total 
falls under the supervision o f 2,100 major and medium irrigation 
WUAs, t e . 20 percent o f the total number o f W U A s formed in the 
state. 
The leadership o f the WUAs at the state level shows interesting 
features. Out o f 9,100 W U A presidents covered under a survey, 94 
percent t e . 8,544 presidents reported farming as their main 
occupation. The remaining 6 percent hold occupations in sectors 
like contracting, industry, public representation and services 
( IRDAS 2000) . 5 
Table 4.2: WUA Jurisdiction and Command Villages under Madhira irrigation sub-division 
WUA Mandai District Command Ana in ba Revenue Villages 
No. of 
milages 
China-konduru Kalluru and 
Khammam 2107 
Velaganrm.Talhiru, ChinaKorukondi, P.korukondi, 
WUA 177 Gampala Gudem Nemali, UmmadadevarapalH, Konijerk 7 
Utukuru; Gampala Gudem Krishna 
2943 
Konijerla, Nemali, Utukuru, Dundiralapadu, Jalumudi, 
8 
WUA 178 And Madhira Khammam Rompirnalla, Mallaram, Yendapalli 
Siripuram 
Madhira Khammam 1547 
Rompimalla, EndapalH, Siripuram, Vangaveedu, 7 
WUA 179 Nakkalagaruvu, DuncHralapadu, Tunikipadu 
Penagolanu-I 
WUA 180 
Gampala Gudem Krishna 2020 
Utukuru, Penugolanu, Dundiralapdu, 
Tunikipadu, Rajavaram 5 
Maturu-1 
WUA 181 
Madhira Khammam 1985 
Maturu, Atukuru, Munagala, Dudugupadu, 
Nakkalagarvu, Gudem, T.padu 
6 
PenagoIanu-II 
WUA 182 Gampala Gudem 
Krishna 2040 
Penugolanu, Chennavaram, KottapaHi, 
Peddakomeeta, Gosaveedu 
5 
Maturu-II Madhira Khammam 2815 Siddinenigudem, Nagavorappadu, Maturu, Madhira 8 
WUA 183 Ambatupeta, Dendukuru, Illendulapalem, Nidanapuram 
Dendukuru Madhira Khammam 2536 Gosaveedu, Inagala, Mulugumadu, Dendukuru aturu, 9 
WUA 184 Yetrupalem Sakunaveedu, Takkelapadu, Meenavolu, Nidanapuram 
Meenavolu Yerrupalem 
Madhira 
Veetulapadu 
Khammam 
2460 
Meenavolu, Nidanapuram, Dendukuru, Turlapadu, 7 
WUA 185 Krishna Chilakaluru, Ammavaram, Doddadevara / 
Source: Compiled from Madhira irrigation sub-division records, 2001 
Madeira Branch Canal 89 
One o f the limitations o f the Act is on membership criteria. T o 
become a member o f the W U A one need not to be a farmer or 
engaged in cultivation, but one should own a piece o f land in the 
command on his /her name. Initial research evidence reveals that 
many W U A positions were therefore captured by the socio-
economically high caste members (MoDinga et al2001). 
W U A s formed on N S L C 
The total number o f W U A s constituted along the N S L C was 256 
in 1997. Out o f the total only 235 W U A s were declared formally 
elected. The rest were not functioning formally due to legal cases 
and technical reasons. More litigation cases were found in Krishna 
district (see Table 4.3). The reason behind litigation varies but 
shows evidence for the political nature o f the W U A management 
TABLE 4.3 Formation of WUA per district under NSLC 
Distria Distribue 
Formed 
vyComuUeg 
Dedand 
WatB 
Fonsed 
r Users Association 
Dectand 
CszgtBasd 
Artafiorla) 
Nalgonda 6 6 91 91 149474 
K h a m m a m 7 7 51 50 96559 
Krishna 9 8 112 92 113846 
W.Godavari N F N F 2 2 N A 
Total 22 21 256 235 359879 
Source: Khammam Irrigation Circle Office reports 2002 
4.4 Village Organisation 
The village is the focus for a variety o f economic, political and 
cultural activities in Indian society. Villages in India are still serving 
as the basic unit o f political organisation in rural areas. The villages 
are connected and characterised by caste and kinship. The common 
resources o f the village are supposed to be shared by all villagers. 
However, a few dominant groups enjoy better access and control 
over the natural resources like water, land and forest This 
dominance is connected with accumulation o f resources leading to 
economic wealth and power (for studies on Indian village see 
Vidyarthi 1961; Lewis 1965; Breman 1997; Epstein et al 1998; 
Sahay 2001). The villages under the M B C also showed these 
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general characteristics. The irrigation facilities came into these 
villages during 1975-80. Consequently, the social organisation o f 
these villages underwent rapid change. In box 4 .1 ,1 briefly present 
Rangam Banjara village in KaHuru irrigation sub-division and its 
setdement pattern. 
Box 4.1 Rangam Banjara Village 
Rangam Banjara village is a hamlet of Nutakkala revenue village (Tallada 
Mandal Khammam district). The total number of households is about 
500 with a voting population of 1350. The village caste composition 
represents a mosaic of different castes. About 200 households belong to 
schedule tribe communities, 50 belong to scheduled caste, 50 are Muslim 
and 20 families belong to the Chowdary caste group, considered as high 
caste. The houses of Banqfara and the scheduled community are located at 
a distance from the main habitation. The Muslim households are located 
in one street The Chowdary own about fifty percent of the total irrigated 
land within the village. The irrigation water is supplied through Rangam 
Banjara sub minor to this village. The total localised irrigated land is 147ha 
with 100 percent wet paddy cultivation. According to the villagers about 
75ha under this minor is owned by the Chowdary families. They influence 
village political decisions more than others. From this village, two 
territorial committee members (TC members) got elected to the 
management commit* ee of the WUA169 formed on Punyapuram major. 
Source: Field notes on WUA169, June 2001. 
Governance and Political Institutions 
The gram panchayat is an important Panchayat Raj Institution (PRT) 
to exercise grassroots democracy at the village level. The G r a m 
Panchayat is a statutory organ o f self government, 6 It is the basic 
unit o f the three-tier system of government in the state. The other 
two tiers are Mandal and Zilla Panchayat The Mandal Prqja Parisbad 
and Zilla Prqja Parisbad ate. the elected bodies. The Mandal 
President is an elected position. The Mandal Revenue Officer is a 
government officer responsible for implementation o f decisions 
taken by the Mandal Prqja Parisbad 1 
The elections for the panchayat are conducted once in five years 
and are not elected/competed on a party basis. The PRI bodies are 
expected to implement perspective development plans for the 
creation o f infrastmcture, to manage natural resources, and to 
increase production and employment generation at the village 
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level. 8 The state governments are responsible to strengthen the 
functioning o f PRIs by granting autonomy and powers through the 
process o f decentralisation. 9 
There are similarities between the gram panchyat and WUA. In 
both cases the elections are supposed to be held on non-party 
basis. However, in reality the elections o f both the Panchyat and 
W U A were competed on party basis. Elections for the W U A s were 
conducted in 1997. After much delay and several postponements, 
elections for the Panchayat bodies were held in two phases in July-
August 2001. The voters knew about the party affiliations o f the 
candidates. This was a crucial factor in deciding the results. Caste, 
political affiliations and money played an important role in winning 
the positions. In my field area, I observed that some o f the W U A 
leaders campaigned for their own party candidates in the panchayat 
elections held in 2001. This suggests the role o f party politics in 
both water and village governance issues. 
Including W U A s as many as eleven types o f village level 
institutions known as self-help groups (SHGs) were formed during 
the Naidu government. 1 0 The total number o f members covered 
under the S H G s is about 17 million in the state. The financial 
needs o f all these groups are estimated about Rs. 28.8 billion (Bala 
Ramulu 2002). 
Formation o f multiple resource-based S H G s by the Naidu 
government was criticised. Naidu wanted to build a T D P cadre at 
the village level on the lines o f the leftist governments by forming 
S H G s . Second, he has tried to weaken the PRIs on which the 
Congress party has a stronghold, 1 1 The formation o f S H G s and the 
process o f decentralisation in the state is argued as top-down and 
politically motivated (see O D I 2 0 0 1 ; Sitaram 2002; Powis 2003). 
I view that the formation o f S H G s under the Naidu led T D P 
government is part o f a larger political project The formation o f 
these S H G s provided opportunity and space for the emergence o f 
new leadership in the villages. Discussions with Panchayat 
Presidents in Kalluru and Madhira Mandals revealed that they did 
not regard leaders o f S H G s like women self-help groups, D W C R A 
or C M E Y groups as a threat to their positions. However, a few o f 
them responded that they see the W U A President as a possible 
competitor if he / she happens to be from the same village. 1 2 
Theoretically the convergence o f S H G s and village Panchqyats 
should lead to better decision-making and resource management at 
the village leveL 1 3 In the study villages, I did not find convergence 
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o f these bodies. Whenever there was an election for any o f these 
positions there were clear attempts between political parties to 
capture these positions. In a few villages the Panchayat President 
and the local political party president both belonging to the same 
party nominated their party members to positions o f S H G s . In 
villages dominated by a single political party, there is only 
nomination rather than contestation for the positions in S H G s . 
T h e process suggests that each political party tries to capture as 
many positions as it can, so that the party can enjoy a larger say in 
the decision-making process at village level I conclude that the 
multiplicity o f village-based institutions brought a political 
dimension to the social organisation and management o f natural 
resources at village leveL 
Caste, Landownership and Politics 
T h e institution o f caste has long existed in Indian villages. 1 4 Blair 
(1972) writes that 'students o f comparative development have 
found the Indian caste system of great interest as a social structure 
o f salience in the modernization process. Indeed it has served as an 
institution o f upward social mobility, political mobilization and 
participation, and interest aggregation in recent decades' 
(1972:107). The social organisation o f a village shows that the 
individuals are not only ranked in terms o f wealth but also by caste 
affiliation. 1 5 Caste and kinship acquaintance influences the attitude 
o f a person towards the others. E a c h village is represented by a 
composition o f caste groups belonging to higher and subordinate 
castes. 
The Kshatriya, Brahmin and Vaishya are treated as superior castes 
in the hierarchy. 1 6 These caste members own land but usually do 
not do the farming o n their own. The Reday, Cbowdary, Kapu and 
Naidu caste groups practice agriculture and enjoy a privileged status 
than other lower castes in the society. 1 7 The carpenters, the 
barbers, the washer men and the blacksmith households help the 
landowners with services necessary for daily life and agricultural 
operations. They are paid in kind and in cash. There are a 
significant number o f scheduled castes and tr ibes 1 8 , which 
constitute an integral part o f the village labour economy. 
The irony o f the Indian political democracy is that it has 
strengthened caste divisions than reducing. Caste politics are crucial 
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in dedding the fate o f the political parties struggling for power (see 
Kothari 1970). Part o f the explanation for this development is the 
partisan pol ides that political parties have introduced to win the 
support and maintain their vote base. Historically weaker sections 
and lower caste groups have been suppressed and expressed 
political subordination to upper cas tes . 1 9 
In the study villages, the Hindus are the dominant group and 
Christian and Muslims communities are in the minority. The caste 
affiliations play a dominant role in the village day-to-day life. Caste 
status is reinforced by economic wealth and wealth creation is 
based on the exploitation o f resources. The villages under Kalluru 
and Madhira Mandals in K h a m m a m district show a slightly 
different caste composition than the Krishna district The Chowdary 
caste group dominates villages in Krishna district, whereas Kapu 
and Reddy families are dominant in the villages in K h a m m a m 
district 
Caste and Leadership Pattern in a WUA 
The dominant groups derive power from their caste, land-
ownership and access to the political institutions. The analysis o f 
the leadership pattern that existed within the W U A shows 
evidences that the upper caste, village elite, big farmers, and active 
party workers represent the leadership o f the WUAs (see Nikku 
2003:350; Mollinga eta/2004: 249). 
I present the case o f WUA174, selected randomly out o f nine 
W U A s in Kalluru irrigation subdivision to show the caste and 
landownership pattern. Table 4.4 reveals that all the W U A leaders 
belong to higher caste groups. The majority o f them b d o n g to 
Chowdary and Reddy caste groups. The total command area o f the 
W U A is 2549ha. The total number o f W U A members declared is 
1080 from six villages in K h a m m a m and Krishna districts. 
The leaders who are dected in W U A committee reported that 
they came to know about W U A formation-through newspapers 
and television; and some o f them were asked to file nomination 
papers by their senior party leaders. Majority o f the W U A leaders 
b d o n g e d to the ruling T D P government, followed by the Congress 
and the Communist party. W U A leaders from Madhira irrigation 
sub-division shows that four o f them b d o n g to the T D P , two each 
b d o n g to the Congress and the Communist parties. T h e reform 
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programme in the state claims to be 'apolitical or non-political' but 
there were evidences to show the political linkages o f the elected 
W U A leaders. Often their caste affiliations helped them to win the 
political positions. 
TABLE 4.4: Leadership and Caste Representation in WUA174 (2002) 
WUA 
174 Age Caste 
Edu-
cation 
Mode of 
election Village 
Distria 
Presid 
ent 
35 H C SSC C O N Vennavalli Khammam 
T C I 50 H C PR C O N VennavaBi Khammam 
TC2 40 H C SSC U N S PKomkandi Khammam 
TC3 30 H C SSC U N S Telagaram K T i a m m a m 
TC4 35 H C UPR U N S Vennavalli KTiarrunam 
TC5 52 H C PR U N S Erramadn Krishna 
TC6 60 H C P R U N S Hrramadn Krishna 
TC7 VA V A V A VA VA VA 
TC8 40 H C P R U N S Mustikuntla Krishna 
TC9 60 H C PR U N S Erramadu Krishna 
TC10 30 H C SSC U N S Gollaperi Krishna 
Note: H C -higher caste, VA - vacant, SSC- secondary school leaving certificate 
UPR- upper primary, PR- primary, TC-territorial constituency, CON- contested, 
UNS- unanimous. Source. Discussion with President, WUA174. 
Landawnersbip 
Land is the source o f rural wealth. The extent o f landownership 
provides prestige and status in the rural society. Landowners often 
wielded much power directly, and were hand in glove with slate 
authority (see Gibson and Blinkhom 1991). The dorrrinant caste 
households in the study villages owned big plots o f cultivated land. 
T h e average land holding size in these villages was found to be less 
than one hectare. Small and marginal farmers own more than half 
o f the irrigated area. According to the president o f WUA174, all 
the W U A representatives in the executive committee own 3ha o f 
land or more (see B o x 4.2). A study conducted by Mollinga e ta l 
(2004) confirms that 'in a distributary 85percent o f the Managing 
Committee members o f the W U A s had landholdings larger than 10 
acres (4ha). The presidents generally had much larger holdings, and 
many o f them had additional activities as businessman or politician' 
(2004:249). 
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B o x 4.2 Kesavaputam Village 
Kesavapuram village is a tail end village of Punyapuram major. The village 
is located at a distance of 30km from the Kalluru irrigation subdivision 
office. The village Panebqyat falls administratively under Tallada Mandal of 
Khammam district There are 300households. About lOOhouseholds 
belong to the Reddy and Cbowdary castes. The Cbonidary households in 
Kesavapuram are influential in deciding village development works. 
About 50households belong to the scheduled caste and out of them about 
20families own small pieces of land ie . less then 0.5 ha and cultivate wet 
paddy crop if water is available in the canal. These households and other 
landless supplement their incomes by working as manual labour during 
the agricultural operations in the village. 
The command area of the village falls under WUA171. Mr. Arjuna Rao 
is the president of this WUA. He hails from Kesavapuram village and won 
the election for presidential post He entered the election as a member of 
the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and defeated the member 
belonging to the ruling TDP. He belongs to the Cbopdary caste and owns 
more than 5ha of cultivable wet and dry lands. He is a big farmer in the 
village. Arjuna Rao says, "in addition to my caste, affiliation to the 
communist party of India helped me to win the position'. 
Similarly the immediate past Village Panchayat President also belongs 
to the Communist Party. 'Since the position has been reserved for a 
woman member this time, I could not contest for the position' said 
Purushottama Rao who plays an important role in village politics. He also 
belongs to the higher caste group in the village. The Kesavapuram village 
shows how caste, land ownership and politics are linked 
Source: Field Notes, November 2001 
Cropping pattern 
Before the irrigation in the area, farmers used to grow jowar 
(sorghum) and maize as rainfed crops. T h e area receives good 
rainfall during the southwest monsoon i.e. from June to September 
and relatively less during the northeast monsoon Le. from October 
to December. In a good monsoon year, the area receives about 
1000mm o f rainfall. 2 0 
After the introduction o f irrigation facilities in Kalluru and 
Madhira mandals o f Khammam district in 1970s the cropping 
pattern is now dominated by paddy cultivation in both Khanf and 
Rabi seasons due to availability o f canal water. Other crops like 
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maize, red-gram, green-gram, sesame and commercial crops like 
cotton and chillies are grown as irrigated dry crops. In Madhira 
sub-division, vast areas are turned to cultivate cash crops like 
cotton and chillies under irrigated dry cultivation. Villages show im-
migration o f labour from other villages during the harvest season. 
Similarly, during monsoon failures agricultural labour migrates to 
urban areas in search o f employment 
Currendy wet paddy crop is grown in the head reaches o f the 
canals, tank and well irrigation. Sugarcane is grown mainly where 
private irrigation sources are available. The irrigation staff in 
Madhira subdivision shared that the farmers in tail reaches have 
converted their field for commercial crops like cotton and chilli 
because they could earn money if the harvests are good and could 
grow them with less water. However, these farmers are under stress 
as the investments have increased due to the pests and increased 
water scarcity. In box 4 . 3 , 1 present the cropping pattern in a tail-
end WUA/vil lage located on a head-reach major canal. 
B o x 4.3: Cropping pattern in WUA171 
WUA171 is a tail-end WUA on Punyapurarn major. The major is located 
in the head-reach of MBC. The W UA covers an irrigated area that belongs 
to four villages. The total localised command of the WUA was originally 
1556ha with 1134ha of wet and 422ha of irrigated dry cropping pattern. 
However, the existing irrigation development pattern of the WUA shows 
the reverse. According to the WUA records the wet irrigated area is only 
550ha and 985ha of irrigated dry in the year 2000-01. Commercial crops 
like Chilli and Cotton are cultivated on the irrigated dry lands. The 
farmers did not leave the land uncultivated but tried to adjust the 
cropping pattern to the availability of irrigation water. The Assistant 
Engineer in-charge of the Punyapurarn canal said that in the original 
localisation design, wet cropping pattern was suggested in tail-end areas if 
the soils are suitable. He also stated that the wet cropping pattern has 
increased in the head reach of the canal due to the appropriation of water 
by the head end farmers. 
Kesavapuram village 
Kesavapuram village is a tail-end village of WUA171 on Punyapurarn 
major canal. The Kesavapuram minor originating at 13.63km of 
Punyapurarn major canal supplies water to Kesavapuram village. 
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Box 4.3 Continued 
Due to scarcity and non-reliable water supplies of canal water, the 
majority of Kesavaputam farmers changed their cropping pattern to 
irrigated dry crops. They are growing commercial crops like chilli and 
cotton since fifteen years. Only a few wealthy farmers are pumping water 
from the nearby river using electricity and diesel operated engines. They 
grow paddy for household consumption. About twenty economically 
well-off households invested in deep tube well irrigation. The rest of the 
households depend on canal water for their irrigated dry commercial 
crops. 
To face the uncertainty of irrigation water the farmers collectively 
prepared a rule on how to use canal water (even before introduction of 
WUA). If there is water available in the canal, the first preference to 
irrigate is for chilli fields and then for cotton fields. According to the 
farmers, the preference for chilli against cotton is due to higher 
investment made for chilli crop than for cotton. Also, the effect of water 
stress on chilly is higher than on cotton. Chilli can survive without water 
for fewer days as compared to the cotton. Though this arrangement 
seems rational to save the standing crops, the small and economically 
poor farmers suffer. They usually grow cotton because of the less 
investment than chilli. 
Thus the type of crop is decided not only on the basis of the 
availability of water and location of plot, but also by the economic status 
and access to credit (in some cases). The Kesavapuram village case shows 
the interdependence of factors that determine crop choice, household 
economics and access to water. 
Labour and Livelihood 
With the changing cropping pattern, the labour opportunities have 
also changed in the study villages. T h e introduction o f labour 
intensive crops like chilli and cotton in tail-end W U A command 
areas, opportunities for agriculture labour have increased. 
Distribution o f land holdings in the villages indicates that a large 
number o f cultivators own relatively small plots o f less than one 
hectare. The practice o f contract farming is also observed under 
Nidanapuram major canal command in Madhira irrigation sub-
division. According to the President o f Dendukuru WUA184: 
Farmers from Coastal Andhra region migrated to this area back in 
the 1980s. The migrant farmers bought some land and also took 
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land on tenancy from the local farmers. They introduced cultivation 
of cash crops like chillies and cotton in this area. Subsequendy 
realising the economic returns, the local farmers followed them 
cultivating these cash crops. As a result the area under cash crops 
increased dramatically placing higher demands on the canal water. 
In addition more water is tapped at the head reaches to grow wet 
paddy crops. As a result we have been facing increased water 
scarcity and unreliable supplies from the last ten years. There has 
been little change in the situation after introduction of the WUAs in 
this area. 
My discussions with the assistant engineers at Madhira irrigation 
sub-division gave m e the same picture. According to the 
localisation design, canal water is supposed to be supplied to 
1601ha o f wet and 934ha o f irrigated dry crops o f the WUA184. 
Currently the pattern is completely changed and there is no wet 
irrigation and about 1700ha is under irrigated dry crops. 
WUA184 is located in the tail reach o f the Nidanapuram major 
canal. The W U A president claims that due to the change to cash 
crops labour opportunities have increased, as they are labour 
intensive. But the revenue for the W U A will be less as the cess for 
the irrigated dry crops is less compared to the wet crops. There is 
in-migration to the area from neighbouring districts during the 
harvest time between December to March every year. Out-
migration by local people from the tail end villages in search o f 
livelihood is observed during monsoon failures. 
The W U A members o f WUA184 shared that they were facing 
heavy risks due to change to commercial farming that is capital and 
labour intensive. In the absence o f access to government credit 
institutions, most o f the farmers borrow from private 
moneylenders with high interest rates. D u e to the increase in the 
labour charges, cost o f pesticides and fertilizers, the total cost o f 
cultivation increased. The discussion with the farmers revealed that 
that most o f them are members o f the local agricultural cooperative 
society but cannot raise loans because they have already taken loans 
and are yet to repay them. 
In addition, farmers mentioned lack o f good variety o f seeds 
resulting in low yields and in some cases crop loss. In the event of 
crop failures, they are forced to sell their livelihood assets to repay 
the loan amounts. The increasing indebtedness, pressures from the 
private financiers and social prestige have lead to unrest among the 
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farmers. A s a result, some farmers committed suicide as a way out 
o f the problem. Such cases o f suicides have increased in the last 
seven years in the state. 2 1 The farmers argue that the successive 
governments only paid lip service to their problems. Hence they 
continue to face livelihood risks in the absence o f government 
support policies and programmes. They blame the Naidu 
government pol ic ies 2 2 for not providing assured prices for their 
products. Later I confirmed with the village secretary that the crop 
insurance schemes, though was promised by the government was 
not implemented in the area. 
Water Distribution 
Traditional institutions like Kalva Pedda and Neeruganti for water 
distribution are in use only in a few villages under tank irrigation 
systems. These institutions are not found under major canal 
irrigation systems in the study area. The irrigation department was 
the only agency responsible for supply and distribution o f canal 
water (for documentation o f actual water distribution practices in 
south India canal systems see Mollinga 2003; Ramamurthy 1995 
and Wade 1988). After the introduction o f irrigation reforms in 
1997, the newly crafted WUAs are not only expected to deliver the 
functions o f the Neeruganti, also to play an active role in carrying 
out repairs, rehabilitation o f the irrigation structures, supervision o f 
the water distribution and supply, settling conflicts and raising 
internal resources to sustain the activities o f the association 2 3 (see 
chapter 6). 
In the study villages, pressure on canal and well irrigation has 
increased with the decline o f tank irrigation. The water distribution 
in this context continued to be a major challenge for the WUAs . In 
a few tail-end villages, farmers have opted for private bore wells to 
resolve the water scarcity. A s an alternative, tail-end farmers 
demanded lift irrigation schemes from the government (Box 4 . 4 ) . 2 4 
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B O X 4.4: Utukuru Major Canal 
Three WUAs Le. WUA177, WUA178 and WUA179 are formed under 
Utukuru major canal in Madhira irrigation sub-division. Utukuru village is 
the headquarters of WUA178 and is headed by Mr. Cherukuri 
Radhakdshna Murthy. Utukuru is one of the revenue villages in Krishna 
district The village is located in the middle reaches of the Utukuru Major. 
Villages from Khammam district also fall under Utukuru major canal 
command 
According to the farmers of Utukuru village, they did not face any 
water shortages until 1982. There was enough water in the major canal 
and hence no problems in terms of water distribution. Water became 
scarce in later years due to upstream theft and illegal wet cultivation. The 
farmers used to raise a contribution of Rs.150 per acre (Rs.375 per ha) to 
employ or pay people for bringing water from upstream called canal gasti 
during the nights. Since many of them are small and marginal farmers, the 
Kbarif crop is the only source of income for many households. They 
cannot afford to raise a Rabi crop, which is usually a cash crop and 
demands higher financial investments. The farmers told that even some of 
the big farmers were not able to cultivate their holdings and moved to 
cities either by selling their lands or by renting their land in tenancy. As a 
result, the landless and a few lower caste people in the village could buy 
small pieces of land and some became tenants. 
The WUA president shared that this transformation brought a new 
dimension in the village politics. After the formation of the WUAs in 
1997 the responsibility of bringing or ensuring water to the members' 
fields has shifted to the WUA leaders. Mr. Murthy, the WUA president 
shares, T used to fight for my WUA share of water from the head reach 
WUA177, while the lower reach president of WUA179 used to blame me 
for not releasing water to his WUA members'. When water is available, 
life revolves around that and, of course, conflicts about water emerge (see 
chapter 6). 
Source: Field notes, September 2001. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a description o f social context in which the 
irrigation reform policy is implemented. Water relations are also 
social relations and vice versa. T h e evidence from M B C reinforces 
our understanding that irrigation and social organisations coexist 
and influence organisational patterns that are embedded within a 
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society. The Madhira Branch Canal is not just part o f an irrigation 
network but also influenced the social organisation in command 
villages. I further show how the irrigation reform policy is 
contested in the following chapters. 
Notes 
1 In irrigation literature there is considerable debate on the role of 
irrigation in the evolution of centralised political organisation. Wittfogel 
(1955, 1956) and Steward (1949, 1955) proposed that irrigation is a major 
cause of the emergence of centralised political authority and 
supracommunity political organisations and, as such, a major cause of the 
development of eady states and civilizations (cf. Mitchell 1973:532). 
2 Kad Wittfogel's "hydraulic hypothesis' is criticised by many scholars. For 
example see Mason (1968:39) and Tanning (1967:181-82). They argue that 
centralised government in Pern preceded extensive irrigation systems that 
were built Adams (1969) argued that in Mesopotamia and Mesoamerica 
the centralised state developed prior to large-scale irrigation activities. 
Similady Leach (1959) argues that although there were large irrigation 
works, there is no evidence that such irrigation works produced the 
hydraulic bureaucracy required by Wittfogel's thesis. 
3 The highest numbers of WUAs formed under major irrigation systems 
were in Guntur district with 245 WUAs. The highest number of WUAs 
formed under minor irrigation was in Nellore district with 695 WUAs 
followed by Warangal with 683 WUAs, Chittor with 644 WUAs and 
Cuddapah district with 644 WUAs. The number of WUAs shows the 
importance of minor irrigation in these districts. 
4 A unanimously elected WUA would receive Rs. 50,000 from the 
government as an incentive. It appears as if there is unity among the water 
users in choosing their leaders, but in some cases the local political leaders 
(MLAs) influenced the process and nominated party workers for the 
WUA positions. 
5 In order to assess the results of the study I have tried to understand the 
process of the survey conducted by IRDAS. The organisation has used 
government sources to analyse the data. The information about presidents 
was collected through a questionnaire sent to all WUAs in the state. Given 
the coverage and scale the scope for error is high 
6 In the literature there are different notions of village political 
institutions. The Gandhi an notion of self-rule or self-governance of rural 
institutions is influential Gandhi held the notion of a village community 
as a village republic, wherein the interdependent division of labour 
contributes to a self-sufficient village community. In contrast to the 
Gandhian notion, the Ambedkar notion of the village community 
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emphasised the iniquitous, hieraichal and oppressive nature of villages 
and communities. Ambedkar argues the village as a 'sink of localism, a 
den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism' (see Omvedt 
2000; Nataraj and Ananthpur 2004). 
7 Each Mandal serves a cluster of 10 to 25 villages, with a population 
ranging from 35,000 to 50,000. For example there are 22 Revenue 
Panchayats in Tallada Mandal. There are 46 Mandals, 772 Panchayats and 
1242 villages in Khammam district. There are 28,123 villages , 22 elected 
ZMa Parisbads or district councils (excluding Hyderabad, which is entirely 
urban), 1094 Mandals and 21,943 Gram Panchayats in the State. 
*The Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution lists 29 subjects to be handled 
by the Panchayat bodies. These are agriculture and agricultural extension, 
implementation of land reforms and land improvement schemes, minor 
irrigation, social forestry, fisheries, education at primary and middle levels, 
and women and children's uplift The 73rd Amendment of the 
Constitution that provided more autonomy for PRIs was passed more 
than a decade ago, but a lack of political will in some Indian states 
undermined the effectiveness of PRIs and the process of decentralisation. 
9 The fact is that the AP government passed the AP Panchayat Raj Act in 
1994 but only transferred 16 functions out of 29 subjects to the Gram 
Panchayats. In the aspect of devolution of powers, the performance of 
PRIs in AP is much poorer than that of Kamataka, Kerala and West 
Bengal (see Reddy 2003). Less important functions have been transferred 
to local bodies. The Panchayats in AP have no finanrial autonomy either in 
raising finanrial resources or in deciding on the allocation of funds across 
different sectors. The allocations to different activities are generally 
decided by the state or central agencies. The AP Act does not provide the 
provision for the constitution of a District Level Planning Committee. 
1 0 One could find as many as 11 types of SHGs. They are: 1) WUAs 
(10,292 in number with 80 million members) for irrigation management; 
2) Watershed Committees (5,410 in number covering 0.12 million 
members) for water and soil conservation practices; 3) VSSs (6602 in 
number with 1.3 million members) to protect forest resources; 4) 
DWCRA Committees (0.36 million in number with a base of five million 
members), 5) DWCUA committees (5408 in number with 
62000members): 6) CMEY groups (28,630 in number with 0.8million 
members); 7) Vidhya (education) Cornrnittees (61,871 in number with 
1.2rnil]ion members); 8) Mothers Committees (40,000 in number with 
0.25million members); 9) Village Tribal Developmental Committees 
(8,200 in number with 0.16mulion members, 10) Health Committees 
(1595 in number with 9000members); and 11) Janmabhoomi Habitation 
Committees (40,000 in number with 0.2million members). 
1 1 The powerful traditional Panchayats began to decline in power after the 
Muslim conquest of India, But they did not fully die out and were still 
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functioning when the British conquered India many centuries later. The 
role of the traditional panchayat changed in the 19 * century when the 
extension of the apparatus of the modern state reached to the remotest 
villages. The new court system set up by British, removed settlement of 
village disputes from the competence of the Panchayats. The government 
officials took the revenue and police functions of the villages. As a result 
an alternative system of local self-government under British rule was 
established (see Srinivasan 1956). After the independence there has been a 
renewed interest in the rehabilitation of the villages and empowerment of 
panchayats (www.panchayats.org/dnrm_reports.htm). 
1 2 I came across a WUA leader complaining against the Panchayat 
President. Interestingly both of them belong to the same village and TDP 
party. The complaint is that the Panchayat President dominates the WUA 
President and interferes in the WUA management 
1 3 I refer to one of the first policies of N.T. Rama Rao, the late Chief 
Minister of AP. He changed the system of 'Panchayat Samitis into much 
smaller unit of administration called Mandate. As a result 330 Panchayat 
Samitis were reorganized into 1104 Mandal Parisbads. With the tripling in 
number there are more positions to contest Irrespective of his political 
motives, the policy resulted in further decentralisation of power. Similarly 
the policy of reservation system for the Panchayat positions has further 
created vital opportunities for the sorio-economically and politically 
weaker sections and women to acquire these positions once only 
dominated by powerful elite groups. 
1 4 The word caste derives from the Portuguese casta, meaning breed, race, 
or kind. Among the Indian terms that are sometimes translated as caste 
are Varna, Jati, Biradri, and Samqj. All of these terms refer to ranked 
groups of various sizes and breadth. Varna, or color, actually refers to 
large divisions of the society. The four main divisions are Brahmin, 
Kshatriya, Vaisbya and Sudra (see Srinivas 1952,1962; Kothari 1970). 
1 3 Caste is the defining feature of the village. MN.Srinivas argued that 
inspite of the hierarchical nature of castes and sub-castes, the village 
existed as a community beyond the caste system (see Dumont 1980; 
Srinivas 1962,1996). 
1 6 The system of caste that divides the village society horizontally can 
extend far beyond the confines of any single village. Consequently a 
village is never socially isolated Its ties are coextensive with its caste 
relationships. Caste loyalties are strong and hence influence local and 
national politics. 
1 7 The Reddis are spread in all three regions of the state. They represent 
about 8-10 percent of the total population of the state. The Kammas, who 
are about 4-5 percent of the population are mostly concentrated in the 
Krishna and Godavari delta and are considerable in number in Nellore, 
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Chittoor, Ananthapur and K h a m m a m districts. The Velamas constitute 1-
2 percent of the population and are as wealthy as the Reddis and the 
Kamaas. They are concentrated mainly in Karimnagar and Khammam 
districts in Telangana region and in the northern coastal districts of AP. 
The Kapu category amounts to 10-12 percent of the population and is 
found in Coastal Andhra. 
1 8 AP is one of the main States in India with a large concentration of 
scheduled castes and tribes. The state has about 8 percent of the total 
scheduled caste population of the country. There are about 59 types of 
scheduled castes in the State, representing approximately 16 percent of 
the state's population. AP incorporates about 33 tribes, which form about 
7 percent of the State's population. Together they form a sizable vote base 
influencing local and the state politics. 
1 9 Since 1990s the political parties to come to power, relied primarily on 
Backward Classes support often in alliance with Dalits and Muslims. 
Janata Dal governments in Bihar and Karnataka are excellent examples of 
this strategy. 
2 0 The rainfall of Andhra Pradesh is influenced by both the southwest and 
northeast monsoons. The normal annual rainfall of the state is 925mm. 
The southwest monsoon (June to September) accounts for about 
70percent of the rainfall followed by northeast monsoon (Oct-Dec) 
accounting for 20 percent The remaining 10 percent of the rainfall is 
received during the winter and summer months. 
2 1 Farmer suicides have been reported for over seven years in the state. It 
was reported that over 300 farmers took their lives during May and June 
2004. (see Palagummi Sainath in The Hindu daily dated 22.06.2004). Other 
similar reports in The Hindu dated June 15 and 22 in 2003 highlight the 
crisis. Forty-one cases of su icide were reported in Anantapur district alone 
between September and November 2000 (see Frontline, Volume 18, Issue 
8,2001) It is estimated that 644 farmers committed suicide across three of 
Maharashtra's six regions between January 2001 and December 2004 (see 
Frontline, volume 22, issue 14, 2005). The causes of suicides reported by 
research studies are: repeated crop failure, inability to meet the rising cost 
of cultivation, and indebtedness. 
2 2 The TDP government policy on supply of power for agriculture was 
criticised by the WUA members and leaders. The government has 
committed to supply 9hours of non-stop power supply but it has failed to 
do so. If there is a supply it is always at odd hours and not suitable for the 
farmers. For example the power is provided for agricultural purposes at 
11pm in the night and stays till 8am in the morning. It goes on and off in 
between. Each time the power goes on or off the farmer had to be there 
physically to start the motor, meaning the farmer had to spend the whole 
night awake if he (women do not go in the night as a general practice) 
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wants to irrigate the land " I f the farmer is the backbone of the country 
then why these antifarmer policies," questions the WUA President of 
Kesavapuram and farmer members during a discussion. 
2 3 The Neeruganti axe involved in water distribution especially under tanks 
with paddy cultivation. They implement rotation schedules and plug the 
leakages. Against the labour the Neeruganti receives an agreed share of 
produce from the farmer. The institution is under pressure and eroding 
because of the shifting of traditional authority over irrigation management 
from these institutions to the Irrigation Department Under the current 
irrigation reforms in the state, the management roles of irrigation 
department are shifted to the elected WU As. 
2 4 The experience of managing lift schemes, however, is not encouraging 
in the state. During the last three-and-a-half decades, the AP Government 
has constructed 1,068 lift irrigation schemes investing about Rs. 
1230million. However, despite the huge investment, the performance of 
such scheme has been dismal. The State Government, decided to hand 
over Lift Irrigation Scheme to the beneficiary farmers in 1995. It was 
assumed that the farmers would be happy to take over the system 
However, in contrary to the expectations, in some places the farmers did 
not come forward to take over the schemes. In other places where the 
schemes were handed over, the system became either completely defunct 
or worked at less than optimal levels (source: Davuluri et aL 2002). 
5 
5.11ntroduction 
The Government o f India emphasised the creation o f new 
irrigation infrastructure as a policy from its independence in 1947 
till the 1970s. Indian irrigation engineers favoured construction o f 
new irrigation projects with technical inputs, rather than the 
maintenance o f existing projects. A World Bank report states that 
'poor quality o f project design and planning are big problems, but 
poor operation and maintenance is a bigger one' (World Bank 
1994:86 cf Svendsen and Huppert 2000) 
In section 5.2 I provide a brief discussion on the maintenance 
crisis. Section 5.3 discusses the pattern o f budget allocations and 
irrigation potential achieved and utilised in the state during the pre-
reform period. In section 5.4 I present a brief analysis o f the 
practices o f operation and maintenance (O&M) during pre and 
pos t reform periods. In section 5.4 I analyse in detail the policy 
prescriptions and actual practices in the field In the last section 5.6, 
I conclude that the policy objectives are contested in the process. 
The W U A leaders and irrigation bureaucracy emerged as important 
actors and defended their own interests through network building 
and policy contestation 
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An Arena of Policy Contestation 
Silently watching the canal system heading towards a collapse would he nothing 
short of an economic crime 
Ashok Gukti, Ruth Meinzen-Dick and K.V Raju (1999) 
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5.2 Maintenance Crisis 
Huppert et al (2003) argue that the irrigation sector is facing a 
serious maintenance crisis. Hydraulic infrastructure in many 
irrigation schemes, especially in South Asia, much o f it constructed 
in 196CS and 1970's, is deteriorating rapidly. The usual reaction to 
neglect o f maintenance has been a pattern o f "build-neglect-
rebuild" which, in the wake o f widespread budgetary constraints, 
cannot be an option for the future (2003:5). Irrigation agencies 
have few incentives to embark on maintenance activities as funds 
for maintenance are scarce and engineers do not perceive 
maintenance to be a 'glamorous job'. Farmers see maintenance to 
be an obligation o f the owner o f the infrastructure, the state and 
have no incentive to engage in i t Svendson and Huppert describe 
this practice appropriately as 'incentive dead lock' in maintenance 
provision for irrigation (see Svendsen and Huppert 2000: 52-53). 
In addition to the above mentioned problem, the larger part o f 
the maintenance budget is often diverted to cover salaries o f the 
irrigation staff leaving meagre amounts for maintenance. In the 
case o f A P , wages consume about half o f the state's total income... 
[Irrigation] staff costs consumed the bulk o f allocations received 
from the Treasury for irrigation operation and maintenance 
(O&M) . In the more distant past the ratio o f staff costs to actual 
operating expenses was said to be around 1:4. By the mid 1990s it 
was closer to 1:1 (Svendsen and Huppert 2000: 12,18). Given this 
scenario, maintenance in the irrigation sector should have received 
a higher attention than it receives at present Donors seem not to 
be very concerned about the maintenance question, since they do 
not finance maintenance budgets. Skutsch (1998) states the reasons 
for this paradox as the lack o f incentives for the different 
stakeholders to engage in maintenance efforts. 1 
The popular I M T / P I M discourse in India and elsewhere is that 
the turnover o f irrigation operation and maintenance works to 
W U A s will achieve quality o f water distribution, low costs o f 
irrigation to farmers and governments, and transparent and 
efficient water u s e 2 (see Uphoff 1986; Sengupta 1991; Mitra 1992; 
Vermillion and Garces-Restrepo 1996 ,1998 ; Levine et al 1998). A s 
a precondition, the researchers and practitioners argued that the 
irrigation structures should be fully repaired prior to or after the 
irrigation management transfer to the user associations (see 
Johnson et al 1995; Geijer et al 1996; Meinzen-Dick et al 1997; 
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VerxnillioQ 1997). In the case o f A P , the formation o f WUAs took 
place before the rehabilitation o f irrigation structures. The W U A s 
were expected to take up the rehabilitation works with the initial 
funding provided by the government T h e reform programme 
emphasised rehabilitation o f exi sting irrigation infrastructure and 
maintenance to address the deferred maintenance. 3 
Discussing the irrigation reform effort in A P , Svendsen and 
Huppert (2000) write in the preface o f their report that the policy 
makers and senior civil servants are attempting to overturn 100 
years o f authoritarian management by transferring control o f 
irrigation system water delivery and maintenance services to 
organised groups o f farmers (italics mine). I discuss in this chapter, 
whether W U A s could organise and control maintenance o f 
irrigation infrastructure. The assumption is that the regular 
maintenance o f structures by WUAs would lead to better 
management o f irrigation systems and ultimately achieving 
improvements in water regulation and distribution. The underlying 
policy rationale is to increase water use efficiency through ensuring 
reliable water supplies to users. 
Huppert et aL (2003) suggest, "maintenance needs to be 
perceived as a process where multiple actors have to invest money, 
time, physical and mental effort, attention and other suitable 
resources in order to generate the desired result provision o f high 
quality maintenance services. We must recognize that there are 
multiple contexts that require multiple strategies i f maintenance 
interventions are to be successful" (Huppert e t aL 2003:20). 
Though the authors recognise these issues, such discussion 
ultimately suggested apolitical theories to address the i s sues . 4 
Devolution o f O & M activities to W U A s is another important 
element o f A P irrigation reforms. I explicitly recognise the actors 
and their interests, politics and power relations during the process 
o f implementation. I discuss in this chapter the policy objectives 
and the actual practices o f implementation o f rehabilitation and 
maintenance activities (irrigation works) at the local l e v e l 3 1 use the 
concept of negotiation and treat irrigation works as an arena, where 
different actors interacted with each other and used multiple 
strategies to defend their interests. 
The irrigation reform policy content suggests that the 
programmes were designed to secure widest participation o f water 
users and irrigation bureaucrats in the state. T o achieve this, more 
powers were accorded to irrigation bureaucrats by the A c t For 
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example, the Assistant Engineers who are designated as competent 
authorities for W U A can now sanction budgets up to Rs. 50,000 
and supervise irrigation works. They did not have these budgetary 
powers during the pre-reform period (see chapter 8). Government 
reports stated that impressive targets were achieved in terms o f 
number o f irrigation works carried out by the WUAs . Huge 
budgets were spent through the W U A s in the initial years o f 
reform implementation 6 . Irrigation structures were rehabilitated 
and maintenance works were carried out in the entire state 
irrigation network However, my interest in this chapter is to 
untangle the irrigation works and maintenance implementation 
process, rather than assessing the targets and outcome. T o put it 
briefly the focus is not on how much but how the allocated budgets 
were spent and who made decisions. 
5.3 Trends in Irrigation Expenditure 
The state government from the funds made available by aid 
agencies mosdy financed the irrigation works under the reform 
programme. Even prior to the reform programme, huge budgets 
were spent as the state policy prioritised irrigation sector. 
Theoretically, productive utilisation o f funds ensures quality and 
users' participation in decirion-making leading to sustainability o f 
irrigation infrastructure. 
T h e irrigation sector in the state continued to attract a major share 
o f state budget resources (see Table 5.1). However, over the years 
there is a declining trend from 31.11 percent in 1994-95 to 18.73 
percent in 1998-99. But this does not mean that the quantum of 
funds allocated to irrigation and flood control actually decreased. 7 
Under Irrigation and Flood control it is the Major and Medium 
irrigation that receives the lion share o f the b u d g e t The current 
pattern o f public expenditure shows there was very little money left 
after interest payments and staff expenditure for actual irrigation 
works . 8 Reddy (2003) indicates that more emphasis is placed on 
new projects rather than maintaining the old systems (2003:1182). 
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T A B L E 5.1: Pattern of state budget expenditure on different sectors 
Name of tie Sector 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
Agriculture& Allied Services 219 269 3.59 4.82 4.12 
Rural Development 7.53 6.83 10.68 5.26 7.82 
Energy 25.59 2935 27.10 23.16 16.04 
Social Services 1933 18.70 20.81 24.11 28.66 
Irrigation & Flood Control 31.11 22.74 2Z59 2146 18.73 
1 Major & Medium Irrigation 24S9 18.94 1S.35 17.79 1428 
2Minor Irrigation 2.73 2.75 3J7 3.00 333 
3.Command Area Development 1.12 0J6 0.36 0.19 0.18 
4. Flood Control & Drainage 237 0.69 0J1 0.48 0.74 
Note: The figures are in percentage to the total Stare budget expenditure 
Source: Different reports from Finance and Planning Department and Directorate 
of Economics and Statistics, Hyderabad 
Irrigation potential created and budget allocations 
The total irrigation potential (LP) created under major, medium and 
minor irrigation increased to 4.96mha by the end o f the eighth plan 
period (1992-97) from the end o f first five-year plan (1951-56), 
reporting an increase o f 4.8 times. 
The budget spent during the eighth plan period alone was as 
high as Rs. 22,653 rmllions, Le. 38 percent o f the total budget spent 
in the state. I f we calculate the IP created and budgets spent; the 
cost o f per hectare o f LP created worked out as high as Rs . 566,325 
under major and medium irrigation and Rs.46,725 under minor 
irrigation. 
I f we see the irrigation performance o f all the five-year plans (Le. 
first to eight plan period) it is clear that 91 percent o f total 
irrigation budget was spent on major and medium irrigation. 
However the contribution o f this sector in creation o f irrigation 
potential was only 61.4 per cent of the total IP created in the state. 
Whereas, minor irrigation sector contributed to 38.6 percent o f the 
irrigation potential with only 9 percent o f the total budget spent 
(see Table 5.2). It shows the evidence o f the conventional bias 
towards the major and medium irrigation sector. Despite the 
enhanced emphasis on major and medium irrigation, the area under 
irrigation has not shown any improvements. 
TABLE 5.2: Profile o f A P plan expenditure and Irrigation Potential Created 
Major & Medium Minor Total 
Plan Period Budget LP created Cost/ha Budget . LP created Cost/ha Budget LP maud Cost Iba 
Pre-PIan Period (1951) - 1 3 3 - 1 3 7 - 2.7 
First Plan(1951-56) 375 0.08 4688 35 0.03 1167 410 0.1 4100 
Second Plan (1956-61) 574 0.18 3189 44 0.02 2200 618 0 2 3090 
Third Plan (1961-66) 915 0 3 7 2473 186 0.05 3720 1101 0.42 2621 
Three Annual Plans (1966-69) 609 0.08 7613 108 0.04 2700 717 0.12 5975 
Fourth Plan (1969-74) 1,187 0.19 6247 182 0.06 3033 1369 0.25 5476 
Fifth Plan (1974-78) 2691 0.21 12814 388 0.09 4311 3079 0 3 1 9932 
Two Annual Plans (1978-80) 2577 0.15 17180 238 0.06 3967 2815 0.21 13405 
Sixth Plan (1980-85) 7296 0.31 23535 411 0.08 5138 7707 0 3 9 19762 
Seventh Plan (1985-90) 13064 0.09 145156 1314 0.07 18771 14378 0.16 89863 
Annual Plan (1990-91) 2828 0.01 282800 478 0.01 47800 3305 0.02 165250 
Annual Plan (1991-92) 3339 0.01 333900 486 0.01 48600 3825 0.02 191250 
Total 35455 3.0 11818 3869 1.88 2058 39324 4.88 8058 
Ei^ i th Plan 1992-1997) 22653 0.04 566325 1,869 0.04 46725 24522 0.08 306525 
Grand Total 
58108 
(91%) 
3.05 
(61.4%) 
19052 
5738 
(9%) 
1.92 
(38.6) 
2989 63846 
(100%) 
4.97 
(100%) 
12872 
Note: The above figures do not include expenditure on CADA up to the end of the Seventh Plan. The budget allocations are in 
million rupees and the irrigation potential (IP) created showed in million hectares. 
Source. Eighth Five-Year Plan (1990-95), AP-F&P (PLG) Department, Volume 11, and October 1990 (adapted &om Peter 2002). 
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Redely (2003) shows that in 1994-95 Le. pre P I M period, the 
expenditure on irrigation works was the major component o f total 
expenditure. The burden o f debt servicing started going up after 
1994-95, shows the signs o f increased debt leading to lower level o f 
spending on O & M . Except in the year 1998-99, the expenditure on 
O & M is below R s 300 per hectare. A study funded by DFTD 
reported that the A P government is forced to borrow more money 
to repay the old debts rather than utilising it for productive 
purposes (DFTD 2001). F rom the above evidence, it is clear that 
the pattern o f budget expenditure did not match with the LP 
created. In addition there are distortions in the way funds are 
utilised. This pattern provides us the context in which irrigation 
reforms are implemented. In the following section I briefly present 
the formal arrangements made under the reform policy. 
5.4 Operation and Maintenance 
Irrigation systems are subject to deterioration and damage in the 
course o f time. Maintenance activities can be classified into four 
categories on the basis o f the periodicity o f occurrence o f damage 
or deterioration. They are preventive, regular, incidental and 
deferred maintenance activities. 9 The more the regular maintenance 
works are being postponed, the higher the deferred maintenance 
costs. The W U A s are also expected to maintain reserve funds to 
repair unexpected breaches and seepage works. N o w I discuss 
briefly about the maintenance o f irrigation structures during the 
pre-reform period in the state 
Maintenance in the pre-reform period 
T h e maintenance activities o f major and medium irrigation systems 
are mainly carried out by the Irrigation Department in the state. 
T h e Irrigation & C A D department using standardised procedures 
provide water delivery and maintenance services. The Minor 
Irrigation and Panchayati Raj departments manage the minor 
irrigation and tank systems. In addition local institutions were also 
involved in management o f tank systems in some villages. The 
maintenance activities were essentially carried out using the 
hierarchical administrative structure o f I & C A D department The 
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Budget Allocations 
T h e irrigation staff in the field research area during the discussions 
claimed that funds allotted for maintenance activities during the 
pre-reform period were very low, resulting in disrepair and defunct 
irrigation structures. Prior to 1975-76, the norm fixed for 
maintenance allowance was Rs . lO/ha o f irrigated area, out o f 
which Rs. 5 were establishment costs and Rs .2 .5/ha non-
permanent staff charges. A s per the Sixth Finance Commission, 
from the year 1976-77, the maintenance norm increased to 
Rs .25/ha for utilised potential in the country. The engineers 
claimed that the allotted budgets as per these norms were way 
below the required funds. In the 1990s the allocations for 
maintenance were increased to Rs. 100/ha. These rates were a 
uniform flat rate in the entire state. This amounted to only about 
33 percent o f Rs .300/ha average recommended by 10th Finance 
Commission (1997) for major and medium irrigation schemes. The 
argument was that the fund allocation was not even sufficient to 
cover staff wages, which required about Rs .200/ha. 
Irrigation and Command Area Development Department 
In the State, I & C A D D has staff o f about 55,000 in the entire state, 
(of whom about 12,000 are engineers, and about 40 percent are 
office staff), responsible for both developing and managing major 
and medium irrigation canal projects including 12,294 large tanks 
(Svendsen and Huppert 2000:17). The rising wage and salary bills 
o f I & C A D D accounted for an increasing share in the irrigation 
b u d g e t Staff costs consumed bulk o f allocation received from the 
treasury for irrigation operation and maintenance (Svendsen and 
Huppert 2003:26). A s a result, the budget available for maintenance 
works was far below what, was required. Highly constrained 
finances thus led to the absence o f even basic levels o f 
maintenance on canals, drains and structures. The priority for 
department involved in maintenance followed the 
contracting/tender system to carry out maintenance and 
rehabilitation works. 
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maintenance was done at the level o f main canal and head works. 
This resulted in the neglect o f secondary and ternary canals. 
During the discussions with irrigation staff references were 
made regarding the political interference in allocating contracts and 
budgets for irrigation works. Politically affiliated contractors were 
successful in securing irrigation work contracts. These practices 
influenced the quality o f irrigation works. The discussions with 
retired irrigation staff based in Hyderabad shows similar 
observations. Maintenance budgets became a source o f 
appropriation for different actors. O n the condition o f anonymity a 
retired irrigation bureaucrat staff acknowledged the pilferage o f 
funds in the process, leading to delay and low quality o f works. 
There was no role for farmers in irrigation maintenance during this 
period. 
Maintenance under Reforms 
T h e A P F M I S Act o f 1997 states, "scientific and systematic 
development and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure is 
considered best possible through WUAs. These organisations have 
to be given an effective role in the management and maintenance 
o f the irrigation system for effective and reliable supply and 
distribution o f water". Accordingly the government embarked on a 
policy to involve the W U A s in taking up the operation and 
maintenance ( O & M ) ; and repair and rehabilitation (R&R) works. 
The rationale is that involvement o f users in decision-making 
and actual repair works would lead to 'owning' o f the irrigation 
system. I quote a senior bureaucrat who was involved with the 
reform programme, I n this large agricultural state, irrigation 
management has been revolutionised by transferring responsibility for 
O & M o f irrigation schemes to groups o f farmers' (Peter 2002, 
italics mine). It is apparent that the government placed a high 
emphasis on the rehabilitation and maintenance o f the systems 
through elected WUAs. 
The irrigation reform policy in A P aims to achieve a physically, 
financially and institutionally sustainable irrigation sector. The 
different activities under the policy designed are to support O & M , 
improved irrigation services to users, higher yields from irrigated 
agriculture; strengthening W U A s and measures to achieve full cost 
recovery (worid Bank 1997). FoDcrwing the enactment o f A P F M I S 
Act in March 1997, in the month o f June representatives for the 
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W U A s were democratically elected. O n 8 t h August 1997, the 
government issued an order, allowing the W U A s to use 
government provided corpus funds for immediate operation and 
maintenance works. The W U A s could use this fund before the 
actual funds were released to avoid delays. 1 0 This act o f the 
government showed its willingness to implement irrigation works 
with a high priority. The funds were allotted on a per acre basis to 
W U A s uniformly across the state. 1 1 
The W U A s could take up works Eke ordinary repairs such as 
desilting, weed removal, embankment repairs, revetment, repairs o f 
shutters, masonry, lining, clearing, oiling o f screw gearing shutters, 
painting o f hoists and gates and emergent breach closing works. 
T h e deferred maintenance works such as construction o f sluices, 
drops, regulators and measuring devices, and the rehabilitation and 
modernisation o f the system would be carried out by the Irrigation 
Department as per the departmental procedures. 
The first maintenance and rehabilitation program was 
implemented from May to July 1998 . 1 2 According to the 
government records more than 22,000 works 1 3 were taken up by 
W U A s and completed by 3 1 « March 1999. In the year 1999-2000, 
about 49,000 works worth Rs.4 billion were taken up at the state 
level This shows the availability o f funding and the magnitude and 
scale o f rehabilitation activities carried out during the initial years o f 
the reform programme in the state. 
The Policy direction 
T h e policy assumption is that the health o f the irrigation 
infrastructure would be improved by participation o f users through 
timely maintenance activities. In the case o f A P most funds and 
attention went into this element The transfer o f irrigation 
rehabilitation and maintenance activities 1 4 to the W U A s is an 
important element o f the reform and used as a strategy to 
strengthen the WUAs . The direct involvement o f W U A s in 
implementation o f irrigation works and users' participation in the 
decision-making is expected to result in enhancing the quality o f 
works. It was also expected by the policy that better maintenance 
activities would lead to improved water distribution and hence 
increased production. A s a result, farmers will pay water cess 
without default The resources raised can be used to fund 
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maintenance activities instead o f depending on the government 
budgets. T o achieve this, the A P F M I S Act, under Rule no 19 states 
a detailed procedure to implement irrigation works. The 
procedures involved a series o f s teps : 1 5 
1. Prior to the commencement of every crop season ie . Kbarif and 
Rabi, the WUA managing committee and Competent Authority (the 
irrigation department) together shall undertake a walk through 
(transect walk all along the canals) exercise to assess the condition 
of the system, 
Z The WUA shall inspect each and every hydraulic structure and 
record its status. 
3. Identify list of needs and prepare the list of priority of works to 
betaken. 
4. The Competent Authority will prepare estimates for works. 
5. Assess financial resources available Le. government budgets, 
internal WUA resources and other sources if any. 
6. Meeting of WUA Managing Committee to. finalise priority list 
Aclministrative approval shall be recorded in the register of 
administrative approvals (Form IV with the WUA). 
7. Technical clearance by the Competent Authority. 
8. Preparation of memorandum of understanding between the 
WUA and Irrigation Department 
9. Publication of works to be taken up and approval by the WUA 
general body. 
10. Sanction of 40 percent of the total estimate as advance to the 
WUA 11.Works sub-committee formed by the WUA to supervise 
the quality of works (section 1 lo f the APFMIS Act). 
1Z Measurement of work and record of field measurement book is 
maintained by the Competent Authority. 
13. The quality control wing of the irrigation department will carry 
quality clearance or checks. 
14. Convene general body meeting when works are in progress, so 
that the members participate and contribute their voluntary labour 
and report any deviations in the performance of the works. 
15. Social audit by the members of the WUA It includes 
publication of completed works at the office of the WUA and Gram 
Panchqyat office. 
16. Release remaining 60 percent of the budget by the department 
through cheque. Forty percent of the remaining budget will be paid 
after the completion of 50 percent estimated work The remaining 
twenty percent of the budget will be paid after completion of the 
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total work. At each stage the payment is only being made on the 
basis of the certificate issued by the Competent Authority. 
5.5The Process and Politics of Implementation 
In this section, I show that the implementation process o f 
irrigation works was not participatory as visualised by the reform 
policy. The implementing irrigation bureaucrats, W U A leaders and 
the political executive controlled i t I observed that the W U A 
leaders and the department bureaucrats did not focus on facilitating 
users' participation in implementing works rather they tried to 
protect their own interests. 
T o understand the politics o f implementation, I closely studied 
the utilisation o f funds. I analyse the actions and arguments o f 
participating actors. I discuss the users' role in decision-making and 
rent seeking practices. The analysis is based on activities like 
maintenance plan, utilisation o f funds, users' participation and 
different roles played by participating actors. By doing so, I aim to 
show the engagement o f actors with the policy and draw 
conclusions for the policy process. 
Maintenance Plan 
I found that W U A s in the study area did not have or prepared a 
maintenance plan. Such a plan is essential to carry out irrigation 
works. A maintenance plan describes the need and scope o f the 
maintenance activities to be carried out by W U A and Irrigation 
Depar tment T h e W U A leaders claimed that 'the Irrigation 
Department neither insisted nor assisted in preparing such plans'. 
The irrigation staff argued, 'what is the use o f making such plans 
•when we do not know the quantum of funds available'. The reason 
for such statements was that both the department staff and W U A 
leaders waited for government orders to be released with the details 
o f budgets in the year 2002-03. 
I noticed the change in the work environment in the department 
after the government made the budget announcements in the 
month o f April that year. The department geared up and W U A 
presidents made frequent visits to the office. Discussions were held 
in the office premises and work estimates were prepared. Many 
provisions o f the Act were not followed. 
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In D C 1 4 , only two out o f nine W U A s took any initiative to 
conduct a meeting to obtain the managing committee approval . 1 6 
B y the end o f May, proposals were finalised and the memorandum 
o f understandings were signed between the W U A s and the 
Irrigation Department The W U A presidents waited for the release 
o f a 40 percent advance budget from the Irrigation Department to 
start the work. The W U A s and the department staff waited for the 
government announcements than preparing for the works (e-g. 
preparation o f maintenance plan) to b e carried o u t This was 
because none o f the W U A s had reserve funds. In the process 
crucial time was l o s t The works were expected to be completed 
before the monsoon started in June. T h e time lost hampered the 
process o f implementation and the quality o f works. T h e actual 
works took place only from mid J u n e to the end o f July. This 
allowed hardly two months to complete the works since by mid o f 
August the main canal in the study area is scheduled to be open. 
A s stated by the A P F M I S Act, walk through surveys need to be 
conducted and works are to be prioritised in the month o f January. 
T h e competent authority from the Irrigation Department should 
prepare the estimates by end o f February and in the month o f 
March the W U A General Body meeting should be conducted. In 
this meeting the financial expenditure for the completed year and 
the maintenance proposals for the following year should be 
discussed. Additional resources, i f required, should be raised in 
Apr i l These are formal prescriptions. However, the actual practice 
was different 
In actual practice there is lack o f planning and dependence on 
government budgets to implement activities. Instead o f waiting for 
the budget, the W U A s could have prioritised the works to be taken 
up and could have raised users' contributions in addition to the 
government funding. This would have provided necessary time to 
implement maintenance activities. Why did W U A leaders and 
irrigation staff wait for the government budgets? What has been 
the role o f users in maintenance activities? T o answer these 
questions, below I analysed the funds utilisation by the W U A s in 
the study area. 
het Madhira-kanaal. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien welke relaties er bestaan tussen de 
organisatie van de irrigatie en locale vormen van sociale organisatie. 
De hoofdstukken 5, 6, 7 en 8 zijn gebaseerd op empirisch veldonderzoek en analyse; 
tezamen geven deze hoofdstukken een antwoord op de belangrijkste onderzoeksvraag. 
Hoofdstuk 5 rieht zieh op de eerste arena van hervorming: de irrigatiewerken. Dit 
hoofdstuk analyseert het proces van uitvoering van de fysieke werken (operatie en 
onderhoud; kleinere herstelwerkzaamheden) na de introduetie van PLM in de deelstaat, 
alsmede de rol van de belangrijkste actoren in het meebepalen van de uitkomst van het 
proces. Hoofdstuk 6 gaat over de tweede arena van beheer: de expansie van het 
geirrigeerde oppervlak. Dit hoofdstuk concentreert zieh op de overheidsclaim met 
betrekking tot het dichten van de kloof tussen irrigeerbaar en geirrigeerd oppervlak. 
Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt de derde arena van de hervormingen: gezamenlijke inspectie en 
inning van heffingen (Joint azmoish). Het hoofdstuk onderzoekt de rol en partieipatie 
van de Departementen van Irrigatie, Financien en Landbouw, en van de WUA in een 
nieuw proces dat tot stand werd gebracht onder de hervormingen. In dit proces wordt 
het areaal dat in een plantseizoen irrigatiewater ontvangt gezamenlijk vastgesteld. 
Hoofdstuk 8 keert terug naar de kwestie van de sociaal-economische inbedding en de 
invloed hiervan op de hervormingen, met nadruk op het domein van de bureaucratie en 
de rol van de irrigatiebureaucraten, met name de veldstaf. Het concluderende hoofdstuk 
9 geeft een samenvatting van de belangrijkste bevindingen van dit onderzoek. Na 2002 
hebben nog vele veranderingen plaatsgevonden in de irrigatiesector. De Naidu-regering, 
die de hervormingen introdueeerde, heeft de verkiezingen van WUAs, nadat deze hun 
eerste termijn hadden uitgediend, opgeschort. In 2004 kwam een regering van de 
Congrespartij aan de macht. Als gevolg hiervan kwamen er diverse veranderingen in de 
koers van het hervonriingsbeleid. In een körte epiloog besteed ik aandacht aan deze 
veranderingen. 
Deze dissertatie laat zien hoe hervormingsbeleid wordt ge'interpreteerd en veranderd 
door de bij het proces betrokken actoren. In het begin werd het hervormingsbeleid 
heimelijk tegengewerkt door irrigatiebureaucraten op de midden- en lagere niveaus. Zij 
begrepen dat het programma zieh ten doel Steide hun macht te decentraliseren en 
beheersactiviteiten over te dragen aan de WUAs. Tijdens het proces sloten deze 
bureaucraten allianties met vertegenwoordigers van de WUA en locale leiders, en 
controleerden daarmee de arena's van hervorming van het waterbeheer. Lagere 
bureaucraten hadden succes in hun lobbyactiviteiten gericht op hogere ambtenaren en 
de regering, en behielden op die manier hun Status in de irrigatiehierarchie. De 
irrigatiebureaucratie wist tijdens het proces meer technische en financiele macht te 
krijgen en behield daarmee haar greep op irrigatiebeheer en processen van 
besluitvorrning. In deze Studie laat ik dan ook zien dat, in tegenstelling tot wat vaak 
wordt aangenomen, PIM in Andhra Pradesh niet leidde tot partieipatief beheer van 
irrigatie maar juist bijdroeg aan het behoud en de versterking van de gevestigde 
belangen van actoren in dit proces. 
Sammenvatting 
Samenvatting 
Deze dissertatie behandelt het proces van opkomst van en politiek rond het 
hervormingsbeleid gericht op participatief waterbeheer (Participatory Irrigation 
Management; hierna PIM) in de Indiase deelstaat Andhra Pradesh. De heivormingen 
staan bekend als het ' A P (Andhra Pradhesh)-model' van irrigatiehervorming. Het model 
wordt gesteund door externe donorinstituties als de Wereldbank. In korte tijd wekte het 
PIM-programma van Andhra Pradesh ook grote internationale belangstelling. Het werd 
gezien als een succesvol model, vooral vanwege de aanwezige politieke wil en 
juridisch-administratieve steun, alsmede vanwege de 'big bang'-benadering van 
uitvoering ervan. Hierdoor heeft het programma zowel het denken over als het beleid 
met betrekking tot irrigatiebeheer in andere deelstaten van India en ook in andere landen 
beïnvloed. 
Deze Studie onderzoekt het beleidsproces rond het PLM-programma, dat sinds 1997 in 
Andhra Pradesh wordt uitgevoerd. Doel van de Studie is om de aard en dynamiek van 
het beleidsproces beter te begrijpen, met name de rol van diverse actoren 
watergebruikers, watergebruikersorganisaties (WUAs), politici en irrigatiebureaucraten 
- en de wijze waarop deze actoren invloed uitoefenen op beleid, handelingsopties en 
uitkomsten. Met deze Studie hoop ik een bijdrage te leveren aan het debat over 
hervormingsbeleid in het algemeen en over hervormingen van het irrigatiebeleid in 
Andhra Pradesh in het bijzonder. 
Deze dissertatie is het product van intensief veldonderzoek, uitgevoerd tussen maart 
2001 en juni 2002, met aanvullende veldbezoeken in de période tussen 2002 en 2004. 
Daarbij profiteerde ik ook van eerder onderzoek naar PIM, uitgevoerd voor het Gujarat 
Institute of Development Research in 1999 en 2000. De eerste fase was een 
verkennende survey van WUAs in de deelstaat en een gedetailleerde Studie van WUAs 
die werden opgericht in het gebied dat wordt geïrrigeerd door het Madhira-kanaal onder 
de irrigatie-subdivisies Kalium en Madhira. Ik heb Studie verricht naar de uitkomsten 
van de strijd rond het hervormingsbeleid in een aantal cruciale arena's van het 
irrigatiewaterbeheer: irrigatiewerken, expansie van het geïrrigeerd oppervlak, en 
schatting van de hefüngen uit irrigatie (ter plaatse joint azmoish genoemd) in het gebied 
dat valt onder genoemd kanaal. Daarbij legde ik de nadruk op de dagelijkse bemoeienis 
van WUA-leiders en vertegenwoordigers van de irrigatiebureaucratie op midden- en 
hoger niveau met de beleidsuitvoering 'in het veld'. De tweede fase van het veldwerk 
richtte zieh vooral op de beleidsactoren in de hoofdstad van de deelstaat. 
Deze dissertatie bestaat uit negen hoofdstukken en een epiloog. Na het introducerende 
hoofdstuk presenteer ik in hoofdstuk 2 het theoretisch-conceptuele kader voor de 
analyse. De hierop volgende empirische hoofdstukken behandelen de belangrijkste 
vormen van beleidsuitvoering en daaraan gerelateerde arena's in het beleidsproces van 
waterbeheer. Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de opkomst van het PEVI-beleid in Andhra Pradesh. 
Hoofdstuk 4 introdueeert de details van irrigatie en sociale organisatie in het gebied van 
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Utilisation o f funds 
T h e funds for irrigation works were allocated uniformly to all 
WUAs across the state on the basis o f their command area. 
However over a period o f time the volume o f funds for minimum 
rehabilitation works released to W U A s decreased to one fourth in 
2000-01 compared to previous years (see Table 5.3). The remaining 
o f this section explores reasons for this decline. 
TABLE 5.3: Funds allocation to WUAs for Minimum Rehabilitation works 
(Rs/ha) 
Year WUA DC PC 
1998-1999 247 247 123.50 
1999-2000 247 123.50 61.75 
2000-2001 61.8 24.70 24.70 
Total 555.80 395.20 209.95 
Note: N o funds were made available during 1997-98 for irrigation works. 
The irrigation department spent the funds allotted to Project Committees in 
absence of the committee 
Source. Discussion with D.E .E of KaSuru irrigation Sub-division, June 2001. 
During the year 1998-99 funds for both rehabilitation and 
maintenance were released. In April 1998, the government released 
a total grant o f Rs.1,064.7 million to W U A s at the rate o f Rs . 
247 /ha for the total localised command o f approximately 4.4 
million hectares. 1 7 During 1999-2000 the focus o f works was 
entirely on minimum rehabilitation o f irrigation structures. 
However, in the following year the allocations for minimum 
rehabilitation works also decreased. According to the government 
policy 2000-2001, the WUAs were expected to meet the costs o f 
regular maintenance works from internal resources and from the 
share o f cess collection that they receive from the concerned 
Revenue Departments. 
Although the government allotted uniform funds on the basis o f 
command area to all WUAs , not all the W U A s could utilise the 
available b u d g e t Only a few W U A s in the study area made full use 
o f the minimum rehabilitation funds in 1998-99. S o m e WUAs 
could utilise only part o f the fund, as they could not complete the 
required quantum of works (see Table 5.4). 
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TABLE 5.4: Pattern of funds utilisation by WUAs in MBC in DC14 and 
DC15 
WUA Command 
(ha) 
O&M Minima m RebabiBtath 
ßs) 
m (MR) 
(Rs) 
DC14 1998-99 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 
169 2214 172820 733519 436489 111451 
170 1497 307451 NC 290473 76039 
171 1631 79548 NC 255459 46221 
172a 1491 84691 NC 245268 72446 
172b 1199 24000 NC 130738 38632 
173 1803 NC NC 163093 66905 
174 2549 117114 592120 474079 105142 
175 2447 232695 NC 451865 74446 
176 2309 87169 140506 433711 101980 
Total 17,140 11,05,488 28,81,175 6,93,262 
DC15 
177 2214 232695 NC 260750 . 77139 
178 3010 • 285678 NC 411052 146826 
179 1651 105768 NC 291836 52141 
180 2035 205894 NC 364334 48623 
181 1951 186400 NC 269953 47281 
182 1906 247772 NC 301460 75030 
183 2610 284713 NC 460788 100676 
184 2535 232975 NC 472660 114442 
185 2457 207382 41048 473211 101100 
Total 20369 19,89,277 33,06,044 7,63,258 
Noie: NC-Not carded out 
Source. Individual WUAs and Irrigation sub-division records 
The fund utilisation pattern o f W U A s shows that during the 
initial years about 35 percent o f the funds were spent on earth 
works, clearing jungle weeds and removal o f silt from the canals. 
The remaining 65 percent was spent on repairs o f irrigation 
structures Le. sluice gates, culverts and other small structures. This 
expenditure pattern raised the question o f why more budgets were 
spent on irrigation structure rehabilitation than on maintenance 
works. 
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Funds for Works 
I observed the implementation o f works during the months o f May 
to July 2001-200Z T h e discussions with the W U A representatives 
reveal that the interest to take up the works decreased with the 
decline o f funds made available to the W U A s in subsequent years. 
T h e W U A tried to defend by giving reasons like non-cooperation 
from members. They even tried to prove that their inability to 
carryout works was due to many external factors, which are not in 
their control 
During the discussions I observed that the W U A presidents 
were unhappy that the funds made available to them were 
insufficient They complained that the O & M funds were provided 
only for the first two years. They criticised that the delays in cess 
remittance from the Revenue Department did not allow them to 
carry out the works as planned. T h e W U A leaders argued that i f the 
W U A share o f revenues were made available by the end o f April 
every year, they could have carried out the maintenance works 
according to the priority. The tail end W U A presidents expressed 
reluctance to take up the works because the funds were too httle to 
take up any rehabilitation w o r k They argued that mos t o f the 
irrigation infrastructure in their jurisdiction was in poor condition. 
T h e quantity o f work in the tail end was large compared to the 
head reach W U A s and hence more funds were needed. The general 
claim from the W U A leaders was that the government did not allot 
required funds. T h e government announced R s . l 3 5 0 / h a but only 
about Rs . 550 /ha altogether was received by the W U A s . 1 8 The 
leaders also claimed that the irrigation staff spent huge budgets 
through contracting in the absence o f Project Cornmittees. 
The local irrigation staff expressed their difficulties in motivating 
the W U A leaders to take up the activities. According to them in the 
absence o f funds, they could not persuade the W U A leaders to take 
up the works. A s a result the government intervened and issued 
orders that the competent authorities should encourage the W U A s 
to take up the works in the year 2000-2001. These orders imply 
that the top down pressure on the irrigation staff to implement 
irrigation works through WUAs. It also shows the target-oriented 
approach o f policy implementation. During the field work I 
observed that in some cases the W U A presidents carried out the 
works just to maintain their working relation with the concerned 
department officials (see Box 5.1). In some cases the competent 
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authority took initiative and used their supervisory powers to 
implement the irrigation works. I conclude that many W U A leaders 
have less interest in implementation o f works in case o f lower 
budgets. In the study area there were no initiatives evident from 
W U A leaders to mobilise users' contribution to implement 
irrigation works. In addition discussions with users showed that 
majority o f them were not aware o f their role in W U A and also did 
not expressed interest in participation. 1 9 
B o x 5.1 Punyapurarn Major 
The president of WUA 169 on Punyapurarn major took the initiative 
to carry out some work at the request of the concerned competent 
authority. The president of WUA171 on the same major canal 
resisted taking up any activities. WUA171 could not utilise the 
budget of Rs.97,000 available for the year 2000-01. At the initiative 
of the concerned competent authority, another member of the 
WUA carried out works to the tune of Rs.46,000. The. president 
claimed that his WUA did not receive any cess returns for the year 
and hence the funds available were too low compared to the 
previous year. He stated that there is no point of spending the 
amount whatever is available for the sake of i t The Government 
should give WUAs the freedom to decide. The budgets allotted to 
the WUA should remain with i t The government should provide 
autonomy for WUAs in decision-ma king. Though the president did 
not want to carry out the works, the concerned competent authority 
mobilised another member of the WUA and some work has been 
carried out The WUA president was not interested because of the 
low amount of funds and the competent irrigation officer wanted to 
spend whatever budget available. 
In this process, the government could not mobilise and ensure 
participation o f users though the policy talks about i t In addition 
the lack o f institutional co-ordination led to the failure o f 
implementation o f works as visualised by the policy. In the 
following section, I discuss the rationale o f budget allocations, as 
W U A leaders argued that the funds allocation is not justified. 
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Is budget allocation rational? 
In this section I show that the policy o f uniform budget allocation 
has some inherent flaws. I present the case o f three W U A s formed 
under Punyapuram major and their performance o f works to 
support my argument. Punyapuram major canal originates at the 
head reaches o f the Madhira branch canal (see Figure 5.1). I found 
that the needs o f the W U A s even on a single secondary canal are 
different 
The length o f the major is 15.3km, The three WUAs (169,170 
and 171) formed represent the head, middle and tail reach o f the 
major canal The jurisdiction o f WUA169 was demarcated from k m 
0 to 7, WUA170 represented from km 7 to 10 and the jurisdiction 
o f WUA170 starts from 10 to 15.3km, All three W U A s reported 
that the funds were spent on O & M activities like desilting, scrub 
clearance, removal o f jungle on the canal banks and strengthening 
o f canal bunds. 
Pattern o f Funds Utilisation 
I found that only WUA169 located in head-reach could make use 
o f the minimum rehabilitation grants in the year 1998-99. Many 
other W U A s in Kalluru sub-division could not complete the 
administrative procedures in time and hence could not implement 
rehabilitation works in 1998-99. In the following years the other 
W U A s were able to procure and spend budgets on rehabilitation 
activities (see Table 5.5). 
TABLE 5.5: Irrigation stmctures and budget allocation (in Rs.) 
Command Total length Direct 
j 
O&M funds Minimum Rehabilitation 
WUA Area Minora -Sub nrin er Pipes 
(No.) 
UtiBsed Funds Utilised 
ßa) eanatsfJkm) (No.) 1998-99 1998-99 19994)0 20004)1 
169 2214 17.15 5 4 172,820 733319 436,489 111,451 
170 1497 16.80 4 1 307,451 nil 290,473 76,039 
171 1631 13.41 6 0 7 9 3 4 8 nil 255,459 46,221 
Source: Section office, WUA records, Kalluru Irrigation Subdivision. 
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Figure 5.1 Line Diagram of Punyapuram Major 
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In the three W U A s the number o f irrigation structures that need 
to be maintained varies from 5 to 9 each. Therefore, the 
infrastructural maintenance needs and funds required are not the 
same. The command area under each W U A is different, so they 
received different levels o f funding. T h e WUA169 and W U A 1 7 0 
have more or less the same length o f canal (minors and sub-
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minors) under their jurisdictions. Since WUA169 has a bigger 
command area than WUA170, it received more funding. F r o m the 
analysis it is clear that, fund allocation on the basis o f command 
size is not rational when there are major differences in the length 
o f canals and infrastructure to maintain. 2 0 
The command size does not necessarily reflect maintenance 
needs. The tail end infrastructure was neglected previously and was 
in need o f more funds to invest to bring them back to their original 
state. In this case, the tail end WUA171 received less funding 
compared to the WUA169 though the need for rehabilitation funds 
were high. 
The present policy o f allocating funds on the basis o f command 
size, rather on the basis o f real requirements needs to be closely 
studied. One can argue that the works that are carried out in the 
head reach WUA169 would be useful in pushing more water to the 
downstream. In that way the downstream W U A also benefits. I 
would not agree with this argument because it is not always true 
that the works in the head reach always beneficial to the 
downstream WUAs. For example in the case o f Punyapuram 
major, the tail end WUA171 continues to experience water 
scarcities. One needs to look at the type o f work that is carried out. 
The point I am trying to analyse is the rationality and outcome o f 
allocation o f budgets on the basis o f command size. O f course, for 
the government it is easy to allocate funds administratively on the 
basis o f command area, but some priority allocation and pooling o f 
resources at secondary level would indeed make more sense. I 
further explain this argument. 
I observed the pattern o f fund utilisation among studied WUAs. 
WUA169 spent about Rs.0.91 million on rehabilitation and 
maintenance work in the year 1998-99. According to the president, 
the total budget was spent for manual work. According to the 
departmental estimate, the work created eleven thousand working 
days. 2 1 In the following year, the manual works were replaced by 
constructing structures. Hence, ninety percent o f the budget was 
spent on materials and about ten percent only on wage labour. 
Government has allowed using machines to carry out the 
earthwork, which further reduced the human labour component 
The W U A representatives also opted for using machines rather 
than labour. They claimed that, if they involve labour they would 
not be able to complete the work within the short time available to 
them. 
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This evidence suggests that the policy o f uniform allocation o f 
funds to W U A s has limitations. The W U A leaders gave more 
emphasis on irrigation works compared to other activities o f the 
WUA. Second, it led to a kind o f comparison among W U A s Le. the 
higher the W U A command, more the budgets and hence, the 
chance to manage huge funds. Some o f the leaders shared that i f 
the government funding continues to be on the basis o f command 
size then there will be intense competition for the positions in the 
W U A s having larger commands. I also observed that more the 
budgets available with a W U A , more frequent the interactions 
between the competent authority and the W U A President In 
addition, the process o f works implementation raises questions on 
the consultation process, livelihood creation and opportunities to 
W U A strengthening. 
My analysis o f the three W U A s on Punyapuram major and their 
pattern o f utilisation o f funds suggest that uniform funding on the 
basis o f command area does not match with the different 
maintenance requirement o f the WUAs . The infrastructure 
assessment o f the three associations shows that there are 
differences in the scale o f irrigation infrastructure to be managed 
and maintained in each o f these associations. For better 
management o f the major canal network, co-ordination among the 
W U A s is a prerequisite. In the following section, I further explain 
how the W U A leaders used and resisted the government policy 
related to implementation o f works. 
T h e alliance 
Compared to earlier years, the implementation o f irrigation works 
became more complicated in 2001-02. The W U A leaders and 
irrigation staff did not show much interest in carrying out the 
works. There may be many reasons but here, I discuss three 
important reasons. The first, the change in availability o f funds for 
irrigation works. Second, the W U A s were expected to meet their 
O & M expenditure from the share o f the cess collection. The 
revenue department delayed in depositing the share o f cess 
collection in W U A accounts. Third, the government was not ready 
to pay the 40 per cent o f the estimated budget as an advance to the 
WUAs . In addition, the government asked the W U A s to deposit 
the 15 per cent contribution collected from the users. 
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There were discussions between the W U A leaders and the 
concerned irrigation competent authorities on the possible ways to 
carry out the irrigation works. T h e leaders openly shared that they 
were unable and unwilling to raise the contribution from the water 
users . 2 2 The leaders were very reluctant to stress users' contribution 
as it was their last year in the W U A office and elections were to be 
held in the near future. Therefore, it is clear that they did not want 
to displease the members by asking them to contribute. 2 3 I argue 
that by not motivating users to contribute, the W U A presidents 
want to be in a safe position. Firstiy, they remain popular and 
secondly, are not questioned by members. In the process , the 
policy objectives are not met but the individual interests are 
safeguarded. 
I tried to understand users' contribution in W U A s during the 
past years Le. 1998-2000. The discussions with users show that they 
were neither asked to pay nor mobilised to participate. In this 
context, the W U A s found two ways to solve the issue o f lack o f 
users' contribution. The W U A leaders from Nidanapuram major 
shared that the competent authorities do understand their 
problems. There is a symbiotic relationship established between the 
irrigation staff and W U A leaders. F o r example, users' contribution 
is mandatory and should be recorded in the records to release the 
government budget to the WUAs. In mos t WUAs, the president 
(himself) deposited the money in the name o f users' contribution 
and carried out the works. The irrigation staff knew the fact but 
cooperated by recording it as the users' contribution. N o w the 
question is how the money that is deposited in the name o f users' 
contribution is retrieved and paid b a c k Again, the irrigation staff 
helped in escalating the estimated costs. In some cases the money 
was later adjusted by increasing the total volume o f the work done 
by the person on behalf o f the W U A . A n engineer argued that the 
adjustment was done to convince the W U A leaders to carry out the 
works. 
I observed another practice to record the mandatory users' 
contribution. In the records, a certain part o f work is shown as 
shramadan (voluntary contribution o f work) by the users, as this is 
approved under the Act. However, in later years the volume o f 
work decreased, as the budgets available declined. In this situation, 
helping W U A leaders by increasing the volume o f work became 
difficult for the irrigation staff. A s a result, interest in taking up 
works dirninished and W U A leaders resisted taking up the works. 
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A s a result, the government changed its policy. It made 
arrangements to release twenty five percent costs o f the work 
estimate as a mobilisation advance by deducting the fifteen percent 
users' contribution. A few W U A leaders responded positively to 
this new arrangement 
The WUA presidents on M B C were very critical regarding the 
frequent changes in the Government orders. They claim that the 
government allocations for M R and O & M works differed from 
year to year. In 1998-99 the government sanctioned Rs 23 per 
cubic meter. In the following year the government fixed Rs.16.24 
per cubic meter o f work. The department deducted the 15 percent 
o f local contribution and paid R s 13.50 per cubic meter to the 
WUAs . Since they could not raise the users' contribution they 
executed the irrigation works within Rs l3 .50 in that year. They 
further said that they have to manage expenses that cannot be 
accounted within the same budgets. For example, the expenses 
made for the food and drinks during the officer's vis i t It further 
reduced the budget for the actual work. Though the A P F M I S Act 
empowers W U A s to raise alternative resources, the evidence 
suggests that the W U A s have become largely government 
dependent and funding driven. They did not find alternative ways 
to raise resources recmired for irrigation works. 
The criticism that 'rent seeking practices among the irrigation 
staff exist* gathered some evidence from the personal alliances built 
between the irrigation staff and W U A leaders. In fact this is 
unavoidable when the Act provides the power to approve the 
works carried by the W U A s to the competent authority. In the 
process, the policy objective o f promoting users' participation in 
irrigation works and enhancing quality o f service was defeated. In 
the absence o f accountability at W U A level, a president-competent 
authority nexus can easily occur. O n the basis o f field evidence, I 
see that there are no indications o f creating self-governance 
mechanisms in W U A s in the study area. 
Bureaucratic control 
T h e competent authorities managed to delay the process o f bill 
payments to the users' associations though they favoured W U A 
leaders while carrying out works. W U A leaders shared this as a 
problem during individual discussions on the process o f works. 
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T h e reason for such delays in the past is not only administrative 
sluggishness but the expectation o f a rent in exchange. The 
following example shows how the state government intervened to 
curtail this practice. T h e government sent a memo dated 9 t h July 
1998 to all Chief Engineers and Superintending Engineers stating: 
It has come to the notice of the government that funds for works 
executed by WUAs under O&M and MR have not been paid to 
them Only, the first instalment has been released, that too in some 
cases with great difficulty. This is a very serious matter and the 
Government will rake very stem action against the officials who do 
not act with promptitude in the release of funds for the works 
already done...this is most urgent The Chief Minister will be 
reviewing this on 1 6 * July and information has to be obtained from 
all districts without fail (Memo No. 28019/ APERP/ 98-1 dated 
9.7.1998). 
Another, Government memo no 3 9 3 4 6 / A P E R P / 9 8 - 2 dated 22 
December 1998, issued by Mr. Dinesh Kumar, Ex-Officio 
Secretary, issued on the same date stipulates that the Executive 
Engineers (EE) o f the division concerned shall ensure that all final 
bills o f W U A s and D C s shall be settled on top priority with in the 
next two weeks. 
The above government memos shows the determination o f the 
state government to implement the irrigation reform policy and 
make irrigation bureaucracy function according to the rules. A t the 
same time the government played a supervisory role for the 
bureaucracy. This led to interdependency between the field level 
bureaucrats and W U A leaders and in the process resulted into a 
win-win situation. In the following section, I further analyse the 
enhanced powers o f irrigation bureaucrats in the arena o f irrigation 
works under reform policy. 
Enhanced powers 
T h e objective o f the reform is to reduce the role o f the Irrigation 
Department and transfer the functions to WUAs . In practice, the 
A P F M I S Act enhanced and legitimised the powers o f irrigation 
bureaucrats to supervise, monitor, and provide technical and 
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financial clearances for the activities carried out by the W U A s . 2 4 
The irrigation bureaucrats were empowered: 
1) To sanction higher volume of work estimates and budgets than 
they have in the pre-reform period (see Table 5.6). The lower level 
engineers did not enjoy any financial powers in the pre-reform 
period An Assistant Engineer can now approve works worth 
50,000 rupees. 
2) To supervise that no alteration or change is made in the irrigation 
system, with reference to the approved hydraulic particulars. 
3) To accord technical clearance to maintenance works as per 
powers delegated according to the Act 
4) To record the measurements for the work done and recommend 
the bills for payments. These provisions were aimed to reduce the 
time to procure administrative sanctions and increase work 
efficiency of the department 
The government issued special orders and enhanced the powers 
o f the Executive Engineer and Supermtending Engineer to accord 
technical sanction to plan works up to Rs.4 million and Rs.10 
million respectively in cases o f emergency. The Act also delegates 
the powers o f the Commissioner o f Tenders to the concerned 
Chief Engineers to finalise tenders for plan works up to Rs 10 
millions. The I & C A D D is also permitted to appoint suitable 
engineers as project administrators with delegated powers (upto the 
level o f Chief Engineer) to ensure speedy execution of works. 
TABLE 5.6 Competent authority and financial powers 
Rank of the Competent Authority Finai tool powers for approval (in Rs) 
Assistant Executive Engineer (AE.E) Up to 50,000 
Deputy Executive Engineer (D.E.E) 50,000 to 1,00,000 
Executive Engineer (E.E) Up to 1 minion25 
Superintending Engineer (S.E) 1-4 million 
T h e irrigation bureaucrats have effectively utilised the provisions o f 
the Act (see Chapter 8). The devolution o f powers stated in the 
policy did not lead to substantial changes in bureaucratic 
procedures. I observed delays in the payments to W U A s as a 
mechanism to seek rent The government had to intervene to make 
sure that the payments to W U A s will be done in time. 
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The irrigation department has continued to function in a 
hierarchical way. A s a result there are delays within the department 
to clear or sanction proposals and funds. The competent 
authorities argued that the delays in payments to W U A s are not 
only due to the hierarchy o f their department but also due to the 
Pay and Accounts office. 2 6 I came across incidents when a 
competent authority and the concerned W U A president visited the 
Pay and Accounts office to speed up the process o f bill payments 
to the W U A against the works implemented. This process confirms 
that reforms in one government department may not lead to 
desired results, as functioning o f government departments are 
interlinked. 
Users ' Participation 
T h e field evidence 2001-02 reveals that neither the W U A leaders 
nor the competent authority provide adequate attention to involve 
users in implementation o f irrigation works. The higher-level state 
bureaucrats guided the whole exercise from the state cap i t a l 2 7 The 
Irrigation Department played a more active role than the local 
W U A s in implementing the state reform policy. In the process the 
users were excluded. Discussions with W U A members showed that 
the majority o f them were not aware o f importance o f their role in 
the implementation o f irrigation works. O n some occasions, users 
who attended meetings reported that neither they were asked to 
contribute their labour nor budgets declared for the works carried 
o u t W e only knew that there would be some repairs in our canals,' 
said farmers o f Dendukuru WUA184. The W U A members from 
Gosaveedu and Laxmipuram villages in WUA171 shared that the 
meetings were held to fulfil a legal requirement, rather than being 
an effort to seek their involvement to participate in the works. 
F rom the evidence, I conclude that at the end o f four years o f the 
reforms, the W U A Presidents replaced the earlier contractors but 
the old practices remain unchanged. The government emphasis was 
clearly on achieving the set targets. T h e focus was on spending the 
budgets rather than on creating an environment for users to 
participate. 
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Manipulation o f irrigation structures 
T h e reform policy objective is to facilitate users' participation in 
decision-making process resulting ownership o f irrigation 
structures. In the above sections, the field evidence showed that 
users were not consulted and were left out in the process. A s a 
result, users did not show the ownership o f infrastructure as 
visualised by the policy. During the field study I came across 
incidents o f manipulation o f irrigation structures. In this section, I 
discuss incidents that took place on Punyapuram and Utukuru 
majors. The cases suggest that the W U A s failed to regulate the 
users' practices. Thus, the manoeuvring o f irrigation structures 
continued. 
Payaput Village 
During a group discussion with farmers in Payapur village, the 
issue o f a newly constructed channel in the first reach o f 
Punyapuram major came up. The farmer members criticised the 
digging o f the new channel by the WUA169. According to them 
the W U A president will be most benefited because o f the new 
channel, as this would serve 'water to the mango plantation and rice 
plots that belong to the W U A president and his kin. In my next 
visit to the W U A president, I discussed and tried to understand the 
reasons for the construction o f the new channeL During the 
discussion Mr. Kotaiah, the president o f WUA169 referring to the 
construction o f new channel shared, 
Some farmers have misunderstood me regarding the construction 
of the channel, as he was one among the users. The decision for 
construction of a new channel (similar size of a sub minor) was 
approved by majority of the users in the general body of WUA 
conducted in 2001. He explained that the farmers who are 
criticising him used to manipulate the first cross regulator on 
Punyapuram major. They used to push more water into the off-take 
located just above the regulator. As a result there were conflicts 
between the farmers below the regulator and the farmers below the 
off take. The downstream farmers used to block the off-take with 
stones and other material. To solve this problem the particular off-
take was shifted further upstream of the regulator and a new 
channel was dug. The farmers below the old off-take were not 
happy with this and criticise me (Field notes, February 2002). 
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After hsterring to the farmers and W U A president, I discussed with 
the concerned competent authority to know more details about the 
process. His opinion was also the same as the W U A president I 
asked him, "whether digging a new channel was the right solution 
to address the off-take tampering or not?" "May be not, but 
decided by the W U A , " replied the officer. In this case the 
provisions o f the Act was used to dig a new channel (though there 
was resistance), at the same time failed to implement other 
provisions o f the A c t that promote users' participation. 
Construction of irrigation drop structure 
The second account is about the construction o f a drop structure 
on the Punyapuram major. The work was completed in 2001. In 
GovindapalH village, the farmers objected the construction o f the 
drop structure on the pretext that it would reduce the flow to their 
fields. Irrespective o f their objection, the construction o f the drop 
took place by a few W U A members on behalf o f the WUA. The 
farmers, who had objected, tampered the newly constructed 
structure. The person who constructed the drop approached the 
Irrigation Department to file a case against them. However, the 
department did not file a case and suggested that the W U A should 
take up this issue. T h e W U A neither filed a police case nor fined 
the farmers who were involved in tampering. When I enquired 
about it with the W U A president, he was o f the opinion that the 
tempering o f the drop structure has political reasons rather than 
technical reasons o f water supply. The person who constructed the 
drop belongs to another political party than the person who 
tampered the structure and has some old problems. Thus the drop 
structure became a means to express the dissatisfaction. This case 
shows how irrigation structures become signposts o f personal 
conflicts. The ultimate result is that the scarce W U A resources are 
wasted. T h e structure had to be repaired again and again by using 
W U A funds. 
Rangambanjar Subminior 
The third example on Punyapuram major is about an 
encroachment In the tail reach o f the Rangambanjar sub-rninor, a 
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farmer from Rangambanjar village owns a plot o f Tha. The plot is 
divided into two parts as the sub-minor passes through the plot 
according to the original design. In practice the farmer encroached 
on the sub-minor and leveled i t The farmer has developed a 
mango orchard on this plot. During the discussions, I came to 
know that the other tail end farmers made representations to the 
Irrigation Department but nothing has happened. The farmers 
could not do anything as it happened long before the formation o f 
WUAs . Their complaints never got the serious attention o f either 
the Irrigation Department or the Revenue Depar tment claims 
Krishnayya a resident o f Nutankallu village, who owns a small plot 
under the sub-minor. 
After formation o f W U A s in the year 1997, the W U A 1 6 9 carried 
out O & M works in its command area. A s a result, water started 
flowing into this sub-minor in the year 1999-2000. The hope o f 
receiving water increased once again among tail-end farmers. 
About twenty farmers from Nutankallu village own small plots 
under this sub-minor. But due to the encroachment o f the part o f 
the minor, water in the sub-minor would not reach their plots. 
Instead o f taking up the issue o f encroachment with the W U A , the 
farmers made an alternative plan. 
A s an alternative plan, the Nutankallu village farmers lobbied for 
a separate sluice from the Purryapuram major to the existing 
Nutankallu minor. The farmers secured a recommendation from 
the local M L A in 2001. At that time the main road construction 
was going on. The farmers raised contributions and bought cement 
pipes. They could influence the road contractor and laid the pipes 
under the road with his help. The pipes were connected to the 
Nutankallu minor. The construction o f a new sluice on the Major 
canal to divert water through the newly laid pipes into the old 
minor is yet to be done. The farmers tried pressurised the 
department to sanction the new sluice structure. I made an enquiry 
with the farmers regarding the reason for discussing the matter 
direcdy with Irrigation Department than discussing the issue in the 
W U A meetings. Their answer to my query is that once the 
Irrigation Department is positive they can easily pass a resolution 
in the WUA. The department told them to wait till the end o f the 
2001 rabi season to avoid protests from the downstream farmers. 
T h e point is that the W U A and its members did not question the 
farmer who encroached the minor, but mobilized other ways and 
sources to build additional irrigation structures. 
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Utukuru Major 
T h e farmers lost their Khorif crop in 2001 due to scarcity o f water 
in M B C . A s a result, there was an increased demand for water 
during the Rabi season. O n 7 t h December 2001, irrigation staff 
from Madhira irrigation sub-division lowered the position o f the 
main shutter o f Utukuru major to supply water to other major 
canals downstream. Farmers objected this action o f the 
department T h e following day, farmers from the middle and tail 
reach o f Utukuru major tried to tamper with the shutter. I noticed 
that the president o f WUA170 was also present while farmers were 
negotiating with the department staff to lift the shutter. The 
discussions took place for a long time. Finally a decision was made 
to lift the shutter after two days i e . on 1 0 * December. The 
president o f the W U A who -was present there did not intervene in 
the negotiations. When I asked him about his laissez-faire role, he 
replied that in this case he could neither stop farmers nor influence 
the department officials. In spite o f the agreement between the 
department and farmers, few other farmers tampered with a drop 
structure at 16km of M B C (upstream o f Utukuru major) on 9 t h 
December. It took about ten days to repair the structure. The 
estimated cost was about one hundred thousand rupees. 
During the Rabi season I observed repeated incidents o f 
tampering irrigation structures to procure water. The expected co-
ordination among the WUAs to share the available water in M B C 
was not visible. It was evident in some cases that the farmers do 
not have confidence in their W U A as an organisation. In some 
cases the W U A leaders are part o f such tampering attempts. The 
Distributary Committees also did not take interest in addressing 
this issue. The irrigation staff claimed that unrecorded incidents o f 
tampering increased after the formation o f the WUAs. The reason 
according to them was that there was no fear o f departmental 
action and punishments. There is no record available to study the 
tampering cases because many o f them were never reported 
officially.2 8 
It was evident from the above cases that the formal 
arrangements were amended and adjusted in actual 
implementation. There was no effort to prepare a maintenance 
plan and funds were utilized mosdy for rehabilitation works. The 
W U A failed to raise internal resources and W U A leaders and 
irrigation staff did not facilitate the users' participation in works 
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process. In the foflowing section I discuss discourse at the level o f 
W U A leaders regarding the lack o f human resources to manage the 
irrigation works and other W U A activities effidently. I present a 
summary o f formal arrangements according to the Act and actual 
practices in field in Table 5.7. 
Human Resources 
In addition to decreased levels o f funds, the W U A leaders in the 
study area put forward another argument about lack o f human 
resources that has resulted inefficient functioning o f WUAs. 
According to the A P F M I S Act (under rule no 28), W U A is 
expected to maintain about ten types o f records and the records 
shall be opened for information to members . 2 9 I did not found 
even a single W U A in the study area that maintained all the records 
prescribed by the A c t When I asked about maintenance o f records, 
the W U A presidents stated : 
Our position is honorary and not paid The government cannot 
expect us to maintain all these registers by ourselves. To maintain 
these records the government should provide a person on full time 
basis from the department or empower the WUA to appoint a 
person on payment basis. In absence of these arrangements, it 
would be very difficult to maintain all the records. 
In absence o f right documentation o f W U A activities o f 
previous years with W U A , discussions with the W U A users and 
leaders became the main source of information to understand the 
functioning o f the W U A s during the initial reform period. 
I tried to find out the reasons for not maintaining the prescribed 
records. Absence o f work delegation within the W U A was one o f 
the reasons. Many W U A presidents seem not to •want to delegate 
activities to other T C members in the WUA. The reason could be 
that the Presidents wanted to control W U A activities. Hence, in the 
absence o f active participation o f T C members and various other 
committees, maintaining these records by a W U A would be not 
practical It shows that many activities o f the WUA were centred 
on the W U A president The discussions with T C members confirm 
that they were not encouraged to participate in W U A activities. 
TABLE 5.7: Analysis of Irrigation works under pre and post IMT scenario 
Activity Pre IMT The IMT PoBçy Prescription The Practice 
Identification 
of works & 
pdontisation 
of works 
By the irrigation 
department, political 
influence and choice 
of the department 
staff 
WUA conduct walk through surrey to 
identify maintenance needs. Prioririsation of 
the works by the Managing Committee and 
provide administrative approval Technical 
clearance by the Competent Authority (CIA). 
The choice of tie location is decided by the WUA 
leaders (mainly represented by WUA president) and the 
concerned competent authority. In some cases local 
politicians influenced the choice. 
Preparation of CA will prepare the 
estimates estimates, which are 
approved by higher 
level officers 
Notification Local news papers 
and display of Department Notice 
works boards 
Execution of 
works 
By the ID through 
contractors or 
nomination 
Preparation of estimates by the CA, 
estimates are submitted to the WUA 
WUA notifies the works in the WUA office, 
Panchayat office and important centres of the 
village like the market yard 
WUA visualised as a corporate body. The 
president of the WUA signs a MoU with the 
irrigation department The WUA 
representatives cannot take up the works on 
their personal name. 
The estimation of works is only conducted after the 
government announcement of funds made available to 
the WUAs, resulting in loss of time. 
No such practices are evident The works finalised will be 
noted in the minutes book and in some cases informed 
to the TC members and other users informally. Lack of 
publicity observed regarding the works to be taken up 
and about completed works. 
The time taken to complete works has come down. In 
practice, WUA leaders in the name of a third person are 
taking up works. The users are not encouraged to take up 
the works on the grounds that they do not have enough 
resources to invest and skills in carrying out works. The 
CA did not show any resistance to this practice. 
Table 5.7 Continued 
Costs of 
works 
Tender system, insurance 
costs, escalation costs and 
variation costs 
WUA carry out the works on the basis of 
estimated rates by the Government No other 
hidden costs are expected. 
Cost of works are escalated about 15-20 percent to 
meet the voluntary contribution and other costs. 
Record of 
works 
By the department staff, 
usually by the lower cadre 
C A of the WUA, records the measurement 
details in Measurement Book The works sub 
committee ratifies the quality and approves 
payments to be made. 
CA will record the pre and final measurements. 
Delays reported in recording the work Rent seeking 
practices are evident due to continuation of old 
practices. 
Quality of 
works 
The higher officials in the 
department inspect, in 
addition quality control 
officers further check the 
quality and volume of 
works recorded 
WUA supervises quality. Conduct Social 
Audit to ensure quality and transparency in 
WUA activities. 
The department officers supervise and have control 
over ensuring the quality of works. 
Users have not participated actively in the process. 
Concept of Social Audit does not receive much 
priority. 
Transparency 
and user 
participation 
The records are with 
department and not easily 
accessible to outsiders for 
verification 
Records should be made available and for 
verification to any member by paying a small 
fee to the WUA. 
In many cases the records are with the CA. There is 
no evidence that records are actually verified by the 
users. 
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I conclude that the human resources available within the W U A 
were not utilised to achieve common objectives o f the association. 
T h e reason is that the W U A president sees T C members as a threat 
to his/her position. I further provide an example on how the W U A 
leaders depended on external agencies to complete the financial 
accounts. 
At the end o f the financial year, in March 2002, there was 
pressure from the government on W U A s to submit the audited 
accounts. A s a response the W U A s from the study area hired the 
services o f a chartered accountancy company to complete the 
financial accounts and procedures. The company employees 
travelled from Vijayawada city to Kafluru (Le. about four hours by 
bus) and stayed for about two weeks. They prepared the books and 
audited accounts o f the W U A s to meet the official requirements. 
Individual W U A s paid for the services at the rate o f thousand 
rupees per year to procure an audited statement The irrigation sub-
division office offered facilities like tables, computers and 
accommodation for the company. I knew at least a few T C 
members and local people working in agriculture co-operative 
banks who could deliver the same services, i f they were requested 
or paid by the WUA. The incident shows that the W U A leadership 
does not want to share information about financial transactions 
with other W U A members. T h e W U A leaders did not follow the 
rules prescribed in the Act, but found other ways to meet the legal 
requirements, with the help o f irrigation staff. 
In addition, there was no emphasis from the department to 
ensure the participation o f the committee members in W U A 
activities. These evidences indicate that the W U A s could not 
implement irrigation works in a participatory manner. In the 
reform environment, personal networks between W U A leaders and 
the irrigation staff were established. With the enhanced powers and 
through networking, the irrigation staff could retain their control in 
implementation o f irrigation works . 3 0 
5.6 Conclusion 
The field evidence shows that the policy objective o f better 
maintenance o f irrigation infrastructure through users' participation 
was not achieved. The policy was obstructed, mended and 
contested in the process. The W U A , while implementing irrigation 
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works neither focus much on generating full participation o f users 
nor try to generate ownership feeling o f the system among the 
users as emphasised by the A c t There was an excessive emphasis 
on achieving quantitative results by the state politicians and higher 
bureaucrats. A s a result the reform programme became target 
oriented, rather than need-based and user-driven. This fact is 
resonated with the field level irrigation staff 
The W U A leaders did not create favourable conditions to 
mobilise users' involvement in decision-making and physical labour 
contribution during canal repairs. In the process, the W U A s failed 
to perform as autonomous bodies as visualised by the policy. A s a 
result, the role o f the WUA, especially that o f W U A president -was 
reduced to implement works in a contract fashion than his 
expected role as W U A leader. 
T h e W U A leaders failed to raise internal resources to meet even 
a part o f the maintenance requirements. They rather depended 
excessively on government funds. Interest in taking up irrigation 
works decreased with the decline in government funding. In the 
process , irrigation staff could retain their control using enhanced 
powers and through building personal networks with W U A leaders. 
The evidence o f continuation o f past practices o f bureaucracy, 
political aspirations o f the W U A leaders and lack o f users' 
participation offer insights into how reform policy is contested by 
participating ac tors 3 1 . A s a result, the A P reform still remains stuck 
in the old forms and procedures, despite the new institutional 
arrangements advocated through the A c t 
The policy relevance o f this chapter is that, reforming irrigation 
system management is not only a question o f providing financial 
resources and incentives for WUAs , but it requires addressing the 
issues o f control over resources and participation in decision-
making processes as wel l 
Notes 
1 Political parties in power prefer new projects to extend their vote base 
and to benefit from the huge construction contracts that are involved. See 
Wade 1982,1985 and Ramamurthy 1995 for a detailed work on this issue. 
2 For reviews" of PIM impact studies discussing critical factors for success 
of PTM reforms, see Vermillion 1997,2000; Svendsen et aL 1997. 
3 Maintenance is the set of services which slows the deterioration of a 
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facility, whether caused by use or aging, sustaining its capacity to provide a 
specified level of valued goods or service (Svendsen and Huppert 2003: 
29). Deferred maintenance can be described as the maintenance activities 
that are pending or delayed until a later period Le. deferred to the future. 
There is general agreement amongst irrigation experts that deferred 
maintenance is one of the most important determinants of performance 
deficits in irrigation. The higher the deferred maintenance, the larger the 
rehabilitation needs. 
4 Huppert et al (2000) suggest, using this approach one can 'enter the 
realm of theories on exchange relationships and incentive structures-
potentially including topics of institutional economics like contract theory, 
property rights theory, principal- agent- theory and theories on collective 
action' (2003:53). The authors argue that irrigation works should be 
treated both as a technical activity and a service provision, aimed at 
keeping irrigation infrastructure in good condition and at a desired 
performance capacity. 
5 I recognise the difference between rehabilitation and maintenance 
activities. As a practice large budgets are spent on construction and 
rehabilitation activities while. comparatively smaller budgets and less 
attention is paid to operation and maintenance activities. Maintenance 
activities tend to be postponed Maintenance activities do not attract 
external budgets, as Donors seem not to be very concerned about 
maintenance question, since they do not finance maintenance budgets (see 
Svendsen and Huppert 2000). But there is a linkage between these two 
separate but often interlinked activities. The AP reform programme 
focused both on minimum rehabilitation and maintenance activities with 
varying focus. Hence I decided to present the issues related to both 
rehabilitation and maintenance activities in a single chapter and refer to 
them as irrigation works. 
6 The APERP-irrigation component is basically designed as a WLIA 
support programme. Hence the farmers' organisations themselves 
undertook the minimum rehabilitation works with respect to irrigation 
schemes. To rehabilitate and modernize the existing irrigation systems, the 
state government obtained financial assistance (Rs.148145 million) from 
the Wodd Bank under the APERP (Irrigation Component) to achieve the 
following objective of placing the irrigation sector on a sustainable basis 
through: i) Involvement of farmers in irrigation management, u) Cost 
Recovery, in) Reversing the decline in irrigated area, iv) Improvement of 
irrigated agriculture productivity, v) Strengthened cost recovery for 
operation and maintenance and vi) Expansion of effectively irrigated areas 
in existing systems (Raju and Sharma 2003:7). 
7 In the year 1994-95, a total of Rs. 7,632.9 million was allocated to 
irrigation and flood control That is 31.11 per cent of the total state plan 
expenditure of Rs. 24,534.7 million. Similarly in 1998-99 a total of Rs. 
9,314.90 million were spent for irrigation and flood control Le. 18.73 
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percent of state plan expenditure of Rs. 49,719.74 millions. 
8 The debt semcing accounted for about 50 percent of the total 
expenditure on major and medium irrigation. Break down of plan and 
non-plan expenditure shows that the entire interest burden is put in the 
non-plan (Reddy 2003). In addition staff costs accounted for 50 percent 
of the expenditure under the head of irrigation works (Le. construction, 
repairs etc). As a result, only about 30 percent of the total budget was 
actually available for irrigation works (Reddy 2003a, 2003b). 
9 Preventive maintenance involves timely efforts to prevent damage to 
structures. Regular maintenance (regular and ongoing activities) needed to 
maintain the system The activities are repetitive in nature and carried out 
before each season. Regular maintenance works include lining, modifying 
outlets or creating new ones and construction of new structures in order 
to rehabilitate and improve the system The third type is breakdown or 
incidental maintenance caused by canal breaches, cyclones and floods, 
leading to major repairs. The costs for this category are high The longer 
the work is delayed, the higher the costs. The WUAs are expected to 
maintain a 'reserve fund' to meet these unexpected high costs. The fourth, 
deferred maintenance activities are those that got accumulated over years. 
1 0 The rules under APFMIS Act, 1997 were still under consideration of 
the government at that time. Permission to use corpus funds made 
possible through the government order dated 12.8.1997 no 994, issued by 
I&CADD (CAD TV) by C.S.Rao, Principal Secretary to the Government 
1 1 Mr. ChVeeraiah, retired S.E shared that it was on the suggestion of Mr. 
K, Sriramakrishna, advisor to the Government that a Committee of 
Senior Engineers was constituted to evolve a formula on the per acre 
grant to be fixed The suggestion was made to provide more flexibility to 
WUAs so that they could decide the priorities and take up the works. The 
procedures for undertaking maintenance grants also needed to be 
simplified dispensing with the need for following technical sanctions 
resulting in delay (Personal communication). 
1 2 With the assistance from the World Bank Rsl.181 billion were provided 
in 1998 for minimum rehabilitation works. 
1 3 Of the 17,869 works taken up by WUAs across the state, 2496 works 
were executed by DCs and 2522 works by the I&CADD through tenders 
and contracts. 
1 4 Maintenance refers to low-level expenditure on operation and 
maintenance activities. Funds are provided initially for the maintenance 
works for WUAs by the state. The WUAs are empowered to raise internal 
and external resources to pay for the maintenance charges. For example 
according to the Act, the WUAs are entitled to receive a share from the 
revenue (cess) collected from their jurisdiction. 
1 5 I prepared these steps on the basis of various Government Orders and 
APFMIS Act of 1997, GOAP. 
1 6 To my surprise the meeting in one WUA ended with seeking signatures 
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in the book where the decisions/minutes of the meeting were written 
before the meeting was actually held. The book was sent to the managing 
committee members who were absent in the meeting for their signatures. 
1 7 Government order Ms N o 64 dated OZMay 1998 
1 8 J . Raymond Peter, L A S , speaking at the occasion of Fifth International 
Seminar on PIM reported, "Rs. 600 Crores (6 billion rupees) Wodd Bank 
loan to improve 3.45 million ha under APERP as a minimum of Rs 
1,350/ha was progressing smoothly". He also announced that out of 13 
lakh acres (0.53mha) to be bridged in the tail end areas 10 lakh acres (0.4 
mha) was covered during the previous two years at a cost of Rs.400 crores 
(Le.4 billion rupees). The remaining 121,457 ha would be covered in the 
next three years, when the project would come to an end" (source: my 
own participation in the workshop and the Press note dated 15 December 
1999 in Decern Chronicle daily newspaper). 
1 9 The most common view stated by the farmers was that there was no 
need for us to pay the contribution when the Government is providing 
funds for irrigation works. They also stated, 'we do not know about the 
funds and how they are being spent. Eventhough we do not contribute. 
Our WUA President is able to get the works done. We never paid any 
contribution and hence we never questioned the details of the works 
done'. To provide another evidence, the GEDR-IWMI study documents 
that out of 359WUA member households interviewed in AP, only 21 
households ie. 5.8 percent reported that they had participated in R&R 
work (see Parthasarathy etal 2001). 
2 0 I do not know the rationale behind the government's d ecision to reduce 
the size of the WUA to a t n s m m i i m of 2500 acres (1012ha) under the 
major and medium irrigation projects, by amending the APFMIS Act in 
2003. As a result the number of WUAs on a single canal increased The 
total number of WUAs in the state also increased. See Chapter 10 for 
detailed discussion. 
2 1 As per the department, 2.5 cubic meters earthwork can be done per 
person and Rsa.21.50 will be paid per cubic meter work 
2 2 1 refer to a similar observation from Daram Sammakka, an active WUA 
president of Ellabotharam from Telangana Region. She shared during an 
interview conducted in 1999 that the collection of 15percent as farmer 
contribution was very difficult to achieve because no farmers are willing 
to spend for irrigation works on the top of the water cess that they are 
being paid to the government 
2 3 The majority of the WUA leaders expressed that raising contributions 
from water users makes them unpopular. They stated, 'as elected 
members we could not afford to do that It is the department duty to 
collect the fees. If we insist on the issue of contribution from the 
members, their participation in the WUA meetings would even be lower*. 
It can be concluded that majority of WUA leaders do not want to be 
involved in seeking users' contributions. In Chapter 7, I further discuss 
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the politics of cess collection and the role of WUA leaders. 
2 4 Irrigation bureaucracies in the Philippines, Indonesia and Mexico could 
successfully maintain the construction orientation and the flow of funds 
for those activities even under reforms (see Mollinga and Bolding 2004). 
2 5 Earlier the upper limit for the approval for the E E was Rs.500,000. 
This was amended by the Government memo no 9490/Cod/98-l dated 
20.8.1998, issued in concurrence of Fin. Pig. (PW) Dept vide their U.O 
No. 2130/F6 (l)/98 dated.313.98. 
2 6 To understand bureaucratic corrupt practices see Myrdal (1968; 1990). 
He pointed out that corrupt officials may instead of speeding up, actually 
cause administrative delays in order to attract more bribes. Myrdal saw the 
roots of corruption in developing regions such as South Ask in the 
remnants of the traditions of pre-modern societies, where presents, 
tribute and other social obligations were a customary and normal part of 
social networks (also see Shleifer and Vishny 1993). 
2 7 Commenting on the process, the competent authority on Nidanapuram 
major shares that there was an attempt at thorough monitoring from the 
government but at a distance. The Chief Minister conducted 
vidéoconférences each week with higher-level bureaucrats to monitor the 
progress of the works undertaken. In addition it was evident from the 
secondary sources that the government released several orders in time to 
expedite the implementation of works. From the discussions with the 
implementing irrigation bureaucrats at local level it was dear that they 
were working under pressure. 
2 8 Farmers block the keyholes of the shutters and regulators with iron and 
other material so as to obstruct the operation. In some cases, the iron rod 
that connects to the shaft below is bent so that it will be difficult to close 
the shutter. In many cases bending the shutter plates was found making 
them difficult to operate in the slot Breaking the concrete around the iron 
base makes the shutter operation impossible. 
2 9 This rule was amended (through a G.O Ms. N o 21 issued on 30 t h Jan 
1999) and an additional three registers were added. Currently a WUA 
should maintain the following registers: l.Inventory Register (Form I), 2. 
Register for vacant lands and buildings (Form IT), 3. Register for Income 
on miscellaneous property (Form lTi), 4. Register of Machinery ( Form 
TV), 5.Membership Register: Both with voting Rights and without voting 
rights, details of command Localised/Non-localised and area cultivated ( 
Form V), 6. Water flow Register: Canal gauge details (Form VI), 7. 
Sanctions Register: Administrative and Technical Sanctions and Payment 
details (Form VIT), 8. Cash Register: Cash Book details (Form VIII), 9. 
Special fee and Tax collection Register (Form IX), 10. Minutes Register: 
General Body and Managing Committee meetings (Form X) and 11. 
Separate register for Committees (Form XA). 
3 0 The contractor system reappeared to carry out irrigation works in the 
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year 2002-2003, as the five-year term of the WUAs was completed in June 
200Z The irrigation department direcdy implemented the irrigation works 
by calling tenders and through contracting system. The irrigation 
department in some places made a request to the Gram Pancbqyat to pass a 
resolution to take up the work in the functional absence of the users' 
associations to avoid allegations of corruption. 
3 1 During my revisits to MBC in 2003 and 2004, I observed that in the 
subdivision, the irrigation works are being carried out on the basis of 
tender and contract system in absence of functional WUAs after July 
2002. The system of contracting existed before the WUA were formed in 
1997 in the state. In absence of the functional WUAs, the MoU is 
between the irrigation department and the contractor. The concerned 
irrigation officer will put a signature on the MoU on behalf of the 
department as well as for the WUA. The rationale is that the contracts 
were given with the consent of the WUAs. I found that no irrigation 
works were taken up at the WUA level in Kalluru sub-division earmarked 
for the 2002-03 financial year. However, Project Committee works were 
carried out on the main canal and the branch canal by means of the tender 
system. As a result the irrigation officers were busy supervising the works 
during 2004 summer. The WUA leaders strongly opposed this move but 
could not stop i t There was no sign of resistance from irrigation 
bureaucracy for not activating the WUAs by the state. The whole 
atmosphere in the irrigation offices seemed as if nothing has happened in 
the last five years. 
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•Jn the last five years, three yean me suffered with drought Because of our 
concentration we spent nearly 9,500 crom in irrigation. Thereby we developed 
nearly [ImilBon] acres of additional qyacut and [1.8 million] acres of gap 
qyacut... 
Chief Minister, N.Chandrababu Naidu (2003)1 
6.11ntroduction 
A critical justification for reforms was improved water supply in 
irrigation systems generally not operating at full supply. In this 
chapter I analyse the claims made in terms o f irrigation expansion 
by the state government 
Earlier studies conducted in irrigation described the problems o f 
data collection by different agencies, lack o f standard formats, lack 
o f systematic collection practices and inconsistency, inaccuracy and 
under-use o f data (see Vaidyanathan 1999, Rawal 2001 , Guilmoto 
2002). Apart from some o f these limitations, in the case o f A P , I 
argue that irrigation has been used for political gains at the state 
level Also there are evidences for manipulation o f data at different 
levels to protect individual interests: for instance, bureaucrats tried 
to protect their career related interests and political executives used 
the data to justify their policies. 
In the first section, I discuss the practices followed in data 
reporting at irrigation subdivision level In the next section, I 
analyse the data at different levels o f irrigation organisation. On the 
basis o f evidence I show how the government claims do not match 
the published data. I further present an analysis o f water 
distribution practices in the study area. The observations are 
further validated by interviews with individual farmers who own 
irrigated plots in head, middle and tail reaches o f the major canals. 
In the last section, I conclude that the politicians made exaggerated 
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claims to construct a myth o f irrigation expansion to legitimise the 
reform policy. This behaviour can be explained by the fact that the 
reforms are funded by external aid agencies. The political leaders 
seek legitimacy for their regime and like to showcase the 
effectiveness o f their policies. 
6.2 The Claims 
T h e state government claimed that during the period 1998-2000, 
more than 290,000 ha o f 'gap command' was bridged as a result o f 
irrigation reforms in the state 2 (GoAP 2000). The Chief Minister 
Mr. Naidu and Minister for Major and Medium irrigation made 
statements regarding the irrigation reform achievements in the 
press and electronic media at various occasions. Though there are 
variations in the figures, the intention was to describe government 
achievements and reform results. According to a statement by the 
Irrigation Minister for Major and Medium irrigation in 1998: 
The maximum gap in irrigation potential bridged was in [the] SRSP 
project, where the irrigation potential created was 659,000 acres 
[266,802ha]. Average area irrigated during past three years was 
115,000 acres [46,559ha] and ayacut transplanted in the current year 
was 366,000 acres [148,178ha]. Next came the Nizamsagar project 
with gap bridged being 74,000 acres, irrigation potential created 
being 23,000 acres. A total of 17,000 acres of ayacut was bridged 
under the Vamsadhara project and about 50,000 acres [20,243 ha] 
under NSPLC and 53,000 acres [21,458 ha] under NSPRC. 
(conversion to hectares mine, Tie Hindu, December 16,1998). 
In another statement in 1999, the Minister for major and medium 
irrigation declared that 'the state has a command gap o f 15 lakh 
acres [607,288 ha]. Out o f it, a total o f 207,288ha o f cc^nmand 
(about one third o f the existing gap) has been brought under 
cultivation, as a result o f better maintenance work during the initial 
years o f reform period (Tie Hindu, March 15, 1999). I f these 
statements are correct, substantial changes should be evident in 
terms o f irrigation expansion, better water distribution practices 
and water use resulting in increased production and labour 
opportunities in the command area. 
The reports by the Irrigation Department show that 2,025ha o f 
148 Tie Politics qfPoEcy 
gap command were bridged under the M B C during 1998-1999. 
When I looked at both the oral and published claims, I expected 
clear evidence o f the expansion in M B C command area. I assumed 
a spread o f newly irrigated plots, reduction o f gap command and 
improved water distribution practices. I expected this in view o f 
the focus on the infrastructure rehabilitation embarked upon under 
the reform policy. In contrast, I could neither find the newly 
irrigated plots based on published statistics, nor the Irrigation 
Department staff help m e in locating the plots under the M B C 
command area. 
I was eager at the start o f my fieldwork to visit the 'newly 
irrigated' plots under M B C command and discuss with the 
concerned farmers. I thought it would give me a good start to 
understand the tangible results o f the reform. Therefore, I first 
tried to locate the plots that were reported as newly irrigated as a 
result o f reforms. I approached the assistant engineers who are 
designated as competent authorities o f Madhira irrigation 
subdivision in J u n e 2001 to help m e in locating these newly 
irrigated plots. I did not receive any help initially. I thought it was 
due to resistance or apprehension regarding my research. Later I 
found that there were differences o f understanding among the 
engineers, when they discuss about the expansion or bridging the 
gap command. T h e engineers were not sure about the expansion 
and could not demarcate the plots that can be claimed as newly 
irrigated. 
These experiences were disturbing to me but led m e to ask 
further questions. Why are the engineers not able to demarcate the 
plots? Is it because the expansion does not exist at all or because 
they failed to record it? What are the practices o f recording? Who 
are all involved in reporting or recording? T o start with I tried to 
analyse the data on expansion produced by Irrigation and Revenue 
Departments. It was difficult to get access to these data, which 
were guarded as a precious source o f information. 
6.3 Gap Ayacut: Extent and Meaning 
The gap between the irrigation potential created 3 and utilised is 
increasing despite the massive investments in the sector (GoAP 
1996). While explaining the gap command area in the state by 1996, 
Raju and Sharma (2003) describe, 'despite massive investments in 
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tiie irrigation sector, the irrigated area has shown a declining trend 
in several major commands, due to insufficient allocations for the 
maintenance o f irrigation schemes, poor cost recovery o f •water 
charges, limited user involvement, low cruality o f agriculture e t c , 
resulting in a gap ayacut o f 1.18 million acres' i.e. about half million 
ha in the state (Raju and Sharma 2003:5; also see Peter 2001). T h e 
performance o f existing irrigation systems in the state particularly 
in major and medium irrigation schemes raised serious concerns 
for politicians and planners. 
Researchers and agencies have interpreted the extent o f gap 
command area differently (see G o A P 1995; Jairath 2001; Raju 
2001 ; Peter 2001 ; Reddy 2003). The differences in reporting or 
defining the gap are due to use o f various definitions •while 
referring to gap command area. 
The A P government in its action plan for completion o f 
irrigation projects declares that the total irrigation potential created 
(LPC) in the state till 1995 is 6.4 mha. The report states that only 
4.3 mha i.e. 6 7 % o f LPC has been utilised, leaving a gap o f 2.1 mha 
Le. 33 percent (GoAP 1995). 
Reddy (2003) reports that the gap between capacity created and 
actual utilization increased from 23.5 percent in 1950-51, to 46.2 
percent in 1991-92 and 56.4 percent in 1995-96 for major and 
medium irrigation projects. 
Jairath (2001:15) reports that only 2.84 mha out o f an irrigation 
potential o f 4.8 mha under major and medium projects is being 
irrigated, reflecting a gap o f 1.96 mh t e . 59.2 percent 
K.V. Raju in his paper reports that the ultimate irrigation 
potential f rom all sources in the state is estimated to be 9.5 m ha. It 
includes 7 3 0 m ha from surface water and 2.20 m ha from 
groundwater (Raju 2001 :4 ) . 
Raymond Peter reports in his case study (2001) that over the 
years, the state has been able to create an irrigation potential o f 
4.84mha through 15 major irrigation projects, 75 medium irrigation 
projects, and approximately 12,264 tanks (2001:5). The gap 
between the irrigated potential area created and the actual 
utilization, popularly known as the 'gap area' has been estimated at 
about one half million hectares 4 (Peter 2001:9). 
The Bureau o f Economics and Statistics reported that the total 
area irrigated in the state is 5.75 mha, whereas the Ministry o f 
Irrigation and C A D reports it as 4.84mha (Peter 2001:1). 
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Defining Gap 
According to the discussions with irrigation staff in Kalluru 
division, the term 'gap command area' is interpreted differently 
while using it. A n assistant engineer defined the gap as 'the 
difference between the localised command and actual area 
irrigated'. A n executive engineer referred the gap as the difference 
between the irrigation potential created and utilised. 
Another senior irrigation bureaucrat in the chief engineer office 
told m e that the claims made regarding the gap command area 
bridged in the state could be understood in two ways. One can 
define or describe the gap with reference to the Andhra Pradesh 
Economic Restructuring Project (APERP) schemes. According to 
this explanation, the bridged gap is defined as the area that was not 
receiving irrigation water for the localised area but started receiving 
water after implementation o f A P E R P works. Few others while 
referring to gap command might refer to 'deferred command 
development' after the introduction o f irrigation reform in 1997. 
According to a junior engineer at Tekulapalli irrigation circle 
office, the common definition that is used to describe the gap 
command area is the gap between the irrigation potential created 
and irrigation potential utilised. The gap command will be higher in 
case the irrigation potential created is larger than the utilisation. In 
addition other factors like rainfall and water use practices 
determine the gap. This suggests that the gap command area is not 
constant but changes from time to time.5 
While talking about gap, engineers also refer to the 'planning 
gap' . The difference in the available water in the project and what is 
actually required to serve the entire command determines the 
planning gap. F o r example in the case o f Nagarjunasagar Left 
command area, the estimated planning gap is 38 percent Le. the 
water allocated for the project being 3,735 M C M , while the 
requirement for the planned crops stands at 5,550 M C M . 6 Hence 
one needs to be clear while referring to or describing about gap. 
In addition to use o f various definitions, there are differences in 
reporting practices o f the gap command between the revenue and 
the irrigation departments. The irrigation and revenue departments 
collect data related to extent o f area received irrigation and type o f 
crops grown. The data is collected outiet wise by irrigation 
department, whereas the revenue data is based on the village as a 
unit The Irrigation Department reports a plot as irrigated even if it 
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receives one wetting or irrigation, whereas the Revenue 
Department considers a plot irrigated only when it receives the 
required number o f waterings as mentioned in the government 
documents. The Luskar and work inspector report whether and 
how many times a plot received irrigation to the assistant engineer 
in Irrigation Department Under the revenue system the Talqyari or 
village assistants collect the information from the farmers and 
reports to the Village Secretary regarding the irrigated plots 
belonging to the village. 
I will show below that the discrepancy in data reporting 
practices leads not only to inconsistency but also gave room for 
manipulation o f the data by participating individuals and 
departments. 
6.4 Data Collection 
I discuss first the actual practices o f data collection and reporting at 
irrigation subdivision level. In the Irrigation Department the 
Luskar helps the Work Inspector in recording the plots that 
received irrigation in each season. O n the basis o f feedback 
received from the Luskars and from the physical verification o f 
plots, the Work Inspector prepares a weekly report regarding the 
type o f crop and plots that received irrigation. The report is 
submitted to the assistant engineer, who prepares weekly report on 
the extent o f area that received irrigation and crops sown and 
submits to the Deputy Executive Engineer ( D E E ) together with 
the future requirement o f the water supply. The D E E submits the 
reports to the E E , and the data are pooled at the division level and 
sent to the circle level. The data from all the irrigation circles are 
collected at the system level at the Chief Engineer's office. F rom 
there the data is supplied in abstracted form to higher bureaucrats 
and other ministerial offices in the government 
Data Collection at Local Level 
Observation and discussions with Luskars in the study area show 
that they do not have ayacut maps with them. Hence they 
expressed some degree o f difficulty to identify the plots that are 
non-localised or illegal The Work Inspector is expected to fill a 12-
column format that shows the details o f name o f the pipe, survey 
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number o f the plot, type o f crop and number o f wettings received. 
The W U A jurisdiction maps were prepared in consultation with 
the Revenue Department when the P I M program was introduced. 
These m a p s 7 were given to the WUA. T h e W U A s were also 
expected to maintain their own records with details o f type o f crop 
sown in each plot and number o f wettings received During my 
fieldwork period, I did not observe many work inspectors filling 
the forms in accordance with the norms. Similarly, the W U A 
representatives did not show any interest in recording the plots that 
did or did not receive irrigation. 
I followed the Luskars on Punyapuram major to understand 
h o w they identify and report localised and non-localised plots. O n 
each major canal two or three Luskars are appointed I asked them 
how they identify the plots in absence o f maps with survey 
numbers. The answer to my question was, <we do it on the basis o f 
experience'. I observed that they knew their jurisdiction by the 
length o f the major canal and the minor canals. Many o f them have 
been working on the same major canal for more than five years. A s 
a result each Luskar knew by heart the details about the farmers 
and their holdings under each pipe oudet or minor canal in their 
respective jurisdictions. The farmers also knew not only the 
concerned Luskar (in charge o f their pipe oudet under which their 
plots receive irrigation) but also other Luskars on the major canal. 
In the course o f their job, the Luskars build a social network with 
the farmers in the command area. It is due to their nature o f work. 
Their position in the irrigation hierarchy gives them an important 
role in the irrigation management Mr. Srinu, the Luskar on 
Nidanapuram major stated that 
It is easy to identify the plots that did not receive irrigation since the 
farmers who did not receive water will complain. On the basis we 
calculate (number of acres) the extent of command left without 
irrigation water. We are very much familiar with the information 
regarding the number of farmers and the extent of their land 
ownership under each pipe outlet On the basis of this knowledge, 
we report to our higher officials (field work notes 2002). 
Though the Luskar is an important link in the chain, they often 
possess a lower level o f education. Some Luskars are employed 
from 1970s and have problems with reading and writing. In this 
process, the chance o f misrepresentation or manipulation o f data is 
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higher. I further explain the factors that influenced the data 
recording practices. The point is that lack o f education, none use o f 
formats and oral-reporting practices reduces the accuracy o f data 
and the scope for manipulation is greater. 
The study o f collection and reporting practices o f irrigation data 
raised further questions on the accuracy o f the state level claims 
regarding the gap command area that was bridged under the 
reform period. T o understand further, I present an analysis o f 
secondary data that was available at different levels o f the irrigation 
department 
6.4 Analysis of Secondary Irrigation Data 
Any given set o f data reflects the choices o f individuals and 
institutions with the power to make decisions regarding the tools, 
methods and variables to be included during data collection and 
analysis. Irrigation data in A P is o f no exception to this general 
rule. In this section, I analyse irrigation data available at different 
levels. I made an analysis o f data sets available at state, irrigation 
project, circle, division and sub-division levels. The objective is to 
understand the process o f data collection and examine the making 
o f irrigation data as a social process. 
State level analysis 
The government claims reported in the printed media 8 declare that 
the gap command area bridged under major irrigation was about 
202,429ha in 1998-99 and was 80,971ha in 1999-2000 (The Hindu, 
1998,1999) . 
A power point presentation by C V S K Sharma, Secretary 
(irrigation) G o A P and J . Raymond Peter, Executive Director, 
LNPLM at a World Bank organised Water Week (2003) reported 
10.076 lakh ha [1.008 mha] o f gap command bridged in the state. 9 
In contrast, the data published by a government agency for this 
same period does not match with the claims by bureaucrats and 
politicians (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 suggest that there is a slight increase in the total area 
irrigated by canals 1 0 from 1.537 mha in 1997-98 to 1.634 mha in 
1998-99. Further there is no increase in the year 1999-2000. Based 
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on these statistics, the gap command area o f 97,000 ha bridged 
during 1998-99 and remained same in the following year. I f this is 
fact, how to account for the much larger figures for gap bridged as 
claimed by politicians and bureaucrats in the state? 
I f we consider all sources at the state level instead o f major 
irrigation alone, the aggregate data show that the total irrigated area 
is not constant. It slighdy increased in 1998-99 compared to 1997-
98 but again decreased in the following year. The contribution o f 
canals to total irrigation development was 39percent in 1997-98, 
and decreased to 36percent in 1998-99. There was a slight increase 
from 36 to 37.3percent in 1999-00. The pattern suggests that even 
after the introduction o f the reforms, canal irrigation has not 
contributed much to the total irrigation development in the state. I f 
that is so, I question the basis o f government claims regarding the 
expansion. I made an analysis o f the data at the Nagarjunasagar 
system level to find out whether there have been any 
improvements in terms o f gap command area bridged at the system 
level. 
TABLE 6.1: Irrigation command area development by source (million ha) 
Year Canals Tanks Dugs/ells Tube wells Others Total 
96-97 1.629(37.1) 0.844(19.2) 0.99(22.5) 0.74(16.8) 0.194(4.4) 4.395(100) 
97-98 1.537(39.0) 0.562(14.2) 0.90(22.8) 0.77(193) 0.168(43) 3.944(100) 
98-99 1.634(36.0) 0.810(17.8) 0.98(21.6) 0.92(203) 0.198(4.4) 4.539(100) 
99-00 1.634(373) 0.652(14.9) 0.90(20.5) 1.00(22.8) 0.198(4.5) 4.384(100) 
00-01 1.649(36.4) 0.727(16.1) 1.00(22.1) 0.95(21.0) 0.198(4.4) 4.528(100) 
01-02 1.563(36.9) 0.567(13.4) 1.00(23.6) 0.93(21.9) 0.180(4.2) 4.238(100) 
Note: Percentage in parenthesis 
Source. Compiled from Economic Survey, 2000-2001, Planning Department, 
GoAP and Sagu Need Sangaham, Monthly Magazine, No 5, December 2003-
April 2004, WALAMTARI, GoAP. 
System level data analysis 
Under the N S L C command, the government declared that a total 
o f 20,242ha in 1998-99 and 16,194 ha in 1999-2000 i.e. a total o f 
36,436ha o f gap command was bridged. 1 1 Table 6.2 presents the 
data o f N S L C . The data do not present evidence o f irrigation 
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expansion to confirm the claims made by the state. The data shows 
that 124,800ha o f additional area were irrigated in 1998-99 as 
compared to 1997-98. F o r the same years i f we consider only the 
Kbarif season (Wet and Irrigated Dry) the increase is 9,520ha but 
not 20,242ha as claimed. The data suggests that the pattern o f 
irrigation development has been uneven. Let us further consider 
only the wet crop in the Kbarif season: the increase is 14,390ha. 
Sirriilady the claims m a d e for 1999-2000 also do not match with the 
system level published data. In 1999-2000 the total area irrigated 
decreased compared to 1998-99. 
The contradictions between the political claims and N S L C 
system level published data suggest the evidence for use o f data for 
political gains at the state level and also helped in the release o f 
funds to Irrigation Depar tment I further analyse the irrigation data 
to identify whether there has been any irrigation expansion or gap 
command bridged at lower level irrigation units. 
TABLE 6.2: Cormnand development under NSLC (*000ha) 
Year 
Wet 
Kbarf 
ID Total Wet 
Rabi 
LD Total 
Kbarif + Rt 
Wet LD 
ibi 
Total 
96-97 161.4 1513 3127 70.7 20.1 90.8 2321 171.4 403.5 
97-98 159.0 155.0 314.0 2 0 51.0 53.0 161.0 206.0 367.0 
98-99 173.4 150.1 323.5 125.1 43.2 1683 298.5 1933 491.8 
99-00 191.0 169.6 360.6 7.7 91.1 98.8 198.7 260.7 459.4 
Source. Profile on Nagarjuna Sagar Project, Office of Chief Engineer, Hill Colony. 
Tekulapalli Circle data 
A n irrigation circle is a second-level irrigation administrative uni t 
The N S L C command is divided into three irrigation circles. I 
studied Tekulapalli irrigation circle as the research site falls under 
this circle. The data from this circle suggest, that there has been an 
increase in irrigation potential created from 1996-97 (192^74ha) to 
202,832ha 1999-2000. However, there have been differences in 
total irrigation potential utilised resulting in a gap command area. 
The gap decreased to 19,048 ha inl998-99 from 34,183 ha in 
1997-98. The gap further decreased to 16,887 ha in 1999-2000 ( see 
table 6.3). This pattern at the Circle level clearly showed that there 
have been improvements in terms o f bridging the gap command 
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TABLE 6.3: Circle Level Data (1996- 2000) in ha 
Year 
Wet 
LP created 
LD 
1 
Total Wet 
LPutHtsee 
LD r 
Total 
Gap 
Total 
96-97 68413 123962 192374 59169 102708 161877 30497 
97-98 68413 126710 195123 56180 104760 160940 34183 
98-99 68413 132560 200973 64723 117202 181925 19048 
99-00 68413 134419 202832 69113 116832 185945 16887 
Source. TekolapaTJi circle office, Khammam 
Rainfall Pattern 
T h e rainfall pattern in this area and the state shows that there was a 
rainfall deficit in the years 1997-1998 and 1999-2000 except in 
K h a m m a m (see Table 6.4). In this case the reduction in the extent 
o f reduction o f the gap command achieved in 1999-2000 needs 
further scrutiny. 
TABLE 6.4: Rainfall Pattern in NSP left canal command (in mm) 
District/State Normal rainfall 1996-97 1997-98 
1998-99 1999-2000 
Nalgonda 742 792(+) 627(-) 875(+) 504(-) 
Khammam 1045 1213(+) 898(-) 1243(+) 1086(+) 
Krishna 1029 1217(+) 869(-) 1232(+) 8230 
AJ* state 925 tuo(+) 815(.) 1128(+) 771(-) 
Source. Compiled from various statistical abstracts, Directorate of Economics and 
Statistics, Andhra Pradesh. 
District level analysis 
Table 6.5 below shows that a gap command exists in all three 
districts. The district level data indicates that 1) there has been a 
gap between irrigation potential created and utilised in wet 
irrigation in all the districts except in K h a m m a m during 1998-99 
but cxmttadictory -with the system level results. T o understand 
further I analysed district level data and rainfall patterns. 
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and 1999-2000. Irrigation dry cxdttvation is recorded in Nalgonda. 
The district level data showed that the extent o f gap command 
area changed from year to year. The changes in cropping pattern 
also influenced the extent o f gap. F o r example, Nalgonda district 
being in the head reaches o f the canal shows increase in irrigation 
water used for irrigated dry crops. 
The results suggest that while discussing gap command, one 
should be clear in using the point i e . year o f reference. The gap can 
be described with reference to the previous year's results o f an 
irrigation project or refer to total irrigation potential created and 
utilised. Since there would always be a gap between the irrigation 
potential created and utilised, the government claims should refer 
to the documented progress between two subsequent years. I 
further present an analysis at the irrigation subdivis ion/WUA level. 
TABLE 6.5: Pattern of Command development in Tekulapally Circle (inha) 
Distria 
Year 
Wet 
LP created 
LD Total Wet 
LP utilised 
LD Total 
Gap 
96-97 8196 m 8196 5432 690 6123 2073 
97-98 8196 Nil 8196 6104 1134 7238 958 
Z 98-99 8196 Nfl 8196 6183 1779 7961 235 
99-00 8196 N a 8196 6106 1801 7907 289 
c 
96-97 51119 49639 100758 47318 37393 84711 16047 
C 
c 97-98 51119 49639 100758 45369 35938 81307 19451 
c 
Û 
98-99 51119 49913 101032 52728 36459 89186 11846 
99-00 51119 49988 101107 55464 37297 92762 8345 
96-97 9098 74322 83420 6419 64624 71043 12377 
J 97-98 9098 77071 86169 4707 67688 72395 13774 
98-99 9098 82647 91744 5813 78843 84655 7079 
99-00 9098 84430 93528 7542 77734 85277 8251 
Note: The Gap is calculated from the total IP created - IP Utilised 
Source. NSP Circle office Khammam & Irrigation Division Office, Kalluru. 
Irrigation subdivision/WLTA level data analysis 
Kalluru irrigation division comprises four sub-divisions: Tallada, 
Tiruvuru, Kalluru, and Madhira. A s I discussed earlier, the main 
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share o f the M B C command falls under Kalluru and Madhira and 
the remaining in Tiruvuru sub-cUvisions. 1 2 According to the 
irrigation records o f 2001-02, the total localised command o f M B C 
is shown as 38,259ha in irrigation records. Out o f this 16,822ha o f 
wet and 21,437ha o f irrigated dry are designated as the localised 
cropping pattern. In addition, the extension o f M B C represents a 
localised command o f 20,378ha in Nidanapuram major. T h e 
Kalluru subdivision represents high levels o f wet irrigation and 
located in the head reaches o f the M B C . Hence, I assumed that the 
additional area or bridging o f the gap command reported in the 
irrigation reports would logically be found in Madhira irrigation 
subdivision as its command is located in the tail reaches o f M B C . 
Madhira Irrigation sub-division 
The Madhira irrigation sub-division was delineated into nine 
WUAs. The total localized command has been declared to be 
20,378ha. The data available from the department shows a gap o f 
4,238ha, 608ha and l ,541ha in 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000 
respectively (see Table 6.6 and 6.7a). This means that no irrigation 
expansion took place but the gap differed year to year. The 
fluctuation was possibly linked to rainfall variation and crop choice. 
O n paper the gap seems to be reduced from 4,238ha to l ,541ha at 
the sub-division level Below I further made an analysis to compare 
the trend at W U A leveL 
Out o f the nine W U A s in Madhira irrigation sub-division, only 
the W U A s located in the head reaches o f Utukuru and Madhira 
major canals registered some additional or illegal command 
development The area that received irrigation outside the localised 
command is known as additional or illegal command. W U A s 177 
and WUA178 are located in the head and middle reach o f the 
Utukuru major and WUA180 is located in the head reach o f the 
Madhira major. While considering the illegal command 
development, the head reach W U A s showed reduced gap 
compared to irrigated potential created and utilised. For example 
under Utukuru major the illegal command 'was reported as high as 
366ha in l?97-98(dry year) and 767ha in 1998-99 (a good year) 
compared to 6884 ha o f localised command (Tables 6.7a & 6.7 b). 
I have tried to locate these plots, which were reported as 
irrigation received outside the localised area. A s I mentioned before 
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the department staff could not show m e these plots either. I 
conclude that it is easy for the staff to report area as irrigated out-
side the localised command. It is logical to show this kind o f 
pattern in the head-reach WUAs , as we tend to believe these 
farmers appropriate more water. The W U A s l 7 7 , WUA178 and 
W U A 1 8 0 are head-reach W U A s o f Utukuru and Madhira majors, 
but these majors are not located at the head reaches o f M B C but in 
the middle reach. The question is whether one should include 
illegal area irrigated while defining gap command. I found that 
some irrigation staff does include this while reporting for example 
the tail reach staff This provides us evidence that different people 
define gap in their own way to protect their actions and interests. 
T h e pattern also raises question on the performance o f the WUAs . 
Why did W U A s fail to check the illegal irrigation in their command 
areas? 1 3 I further discuss possible reasons for the manipulation o f 
data or politics o f using data at state and local levels. 
F rom the secondary data analysis at different levels (state, 
system, irrigation circle, division, subdivision/WUA) it can be 
concluded, first, that there is no single pattern o f gap bridged but 
that this, altered with different levels o f irrigation units. The system 
level data shows that there has been an increase in the gap 
command in 1999-2000 compared to 1998-99. In contrast, the 
Tekulapaali irrigation circle data shows that there has been 
improvement The W U A level data confirms that the gap 
command •was greater in the year 1999-2000. 
Earlier evidence is available that the increase in irrigated area in a 
few cases is due to the improved reporting practices rather than the 
actual improvement o f the area irrigated. Jairath (2000) in her 
research documented that the extent o f additional area is first, 
overstated, since areas where water barely touches also get counted 
as irrigated areas in addition to rainfed areas in canal commands 
where in fact water does not reach at al l MLsreporting o f area 
irrigated has been widely prevalent It is possible that this recording 
o f area irrigated has increased o f late. T h e increase in area irrigated 
as reported in official statistics is thus partly a reflection o f 
increased reporting and not actual increase (2000:11-12). 
T A B L E 6.6: Command area development 1998-99 and 1999-2000 in Madhira irrigation sub-division (ha per WUA) 
No. 
WUA 
Localised Command 
1998-1999 
Wet ID 
\Area 
Total(l) 
Localised and Illegal t 
1998-1999 
Wet ID 
wmmand 
Total (2) 
Gap 
command 
(1-2) 
Localised and Illegal i 
1999-2000 
Wet ID 
"Ottiffiand 
Total(3) 
Gap 
command 
(1-3) 
177 581 1633 2214 972 1556 2528 +314 992 1600 2592 +378 
178 982 2037 3019 304 2818 3122 +103 273 2794 3067 +48 
179 765 886 1651 87 1540 1627 -24 162 1382 1544 -107 
180 722 1313 2035 449 1612 2061 +26 537 1686 2223 +188 
181 1255 696 1951 40 1769 1809 -142 27 1595 1622 -329 
182 650 1256 1906 473 1280 1753 -153 569 1257 1826 -80 
183 1681 929 2610 438 1904 2342 -268 517 2034 2551 -59 
184 1601 934 2535 13 2305 2318 -217 0 1774 1774 -761 
185 1981 476 2457 112 2098 2210 -247 0 1638 1638 -819 
Total 10218 10160 20378 2888 16882 19770 -608 3077 15760 18837 -1541 
Source: Compiled from sub-division records and WUA records, Madhira irrigation sub-division office, Khammam District 
Note: Sign (+) refers to additional command development and sign (-) refers to the gap command with respect to the localised command 
TABLE 6.7a: Command development in Madhira sub-division 1997-98 by major canal (ha) 
Nam of 
Mid QT8Û 
Command de. vekpment 
Gap 
Total Major 
tsed Comma Within locaU nation Outside Ima Bsatàn lotat develop 
Wet ID Total(1) Wet LD Total Wet ZD Total Wet LD Totap) (1-2) 
Utukuru 
Madhira 
N. Puratn 
Total 
2328 
1977 
5913 
10218 
4556 
2009 
3595 
10160 
6884 
3986 
9508 
20378 
625 
302 
209 
1136 
5674 
3124 
5753 
14551 
6299 
3426 
5962 
15687 
314 
0 
0 
314 
52 
16 
0 
68 
366 
16 
0 
382 
939 5797 
302 3140 
209 5753 
1450 14690 
6736 
3442 
5962 
16140 
-148 
-544 
-3546 
-4238 
Table 6.7b: Command development in Madhira sub-division 1998-99 by major canal (ha) 
Name of 
Load fidarvu 
Command det lebpment Gap 
Major tsed Comma With in localisation Out side localisation total devetopn 18ttt Total 
Wet ID TotaI(1) Wet ID Total Wet ZD Total Wet LD Total(2) (1-2) 
Utukuru 
Madhira 
N.Puram 
Total 
2328 
1977 
5913 
10218 
4556 
2009 
3595 
10160 
6884 
3986 
9508 
20378 
1025 
489 
1036 
2550 
5485 
3236 
7429 
16150 
6510 
3725 
8465 
18700 
338 
0 
0 
338 
429 
145 
158 
732 
767 
145 
158 
1070 
1363 5914 
489 3381 
1036 7587 
2888 16882 
7277 
3870 
8623 
19770 
+ 393 
-116 
-885 
-608 
Source: Compiled from WUA records and Madhira irrigation sub division office records 
Sign (+) refers to additional command development and sign (-) refers to the gap command with respect to the localized command 
162 Tbs PoEtics of Pokey 
The reported increase in area irrigated therefore, has to be 
interpreted with caution. Reddy and Reddy (2003) report that, our 
discussions with some W U A members revealed that the formation 
o f W U A s helped in taking water to tail-end areas. Beyond this they 
achieved litde. They [WTJAs] could not even reduce the 
underreporting o f area irrigated' (2003:1185). They further stated 
that their discussions with the irrigation department officials and 
other experts in the field revealed that the decline in canal irrigation 
could be due to underreporting o f area, as there were no 
breakdowns in any o f the ongoing projects. The problem o f 
underreporting was expected to be nullified with the advent o f 
WUAs . The latest data (1999-2000) do not indicate any correction 
in this regard. However, it is felt that the correction would, at the 
most , give a picture o f stagnation in the area under canal irrigation 
rather than resulting in an increase' (2003:1188-89). 
6.5 Water Distribution 
In this section, I discuss day-to-day water distribution practices in 
the study area. The rationale is that efficient water distribution 
practices do influence irrigation expansion. I analyse whether there 
have been improvements in water distribution and use. I f so, it 
would be plausible the reform process may actually have caused the 
reduction o f gap area. 
A n interesting part o f the fieldwork was to observe day-to-day 
practices o f water distribution and strategies adopted by the 
Irrigation Department staff, W U A and farmers. The analysis made 
in the first part o f the chapter referred to the government claims 
m a d e during 1998-2000. The analysis in this section is based on 
fieldwork conducted in 2001-2002. Interestingly, the state claims o f 
irrigation expansion are not explicit in the later years Le. after 2000 
o f the reform programme. I am aware that here I am referring to 
two different time periods. I believe that the understanding o f 
water distribution practices under the later years o f reform period 
could provide us with further evidence on irrigation expansion 
claims made by the state. I f there would have been improved 
practices they would logically based on learning from the earlier 
years. 
The Myth of Expansion 
Water Distribution Practice 
163 
Water distribution and supply was primarily under control o f the 
irrigation department before introduction o f reforms. The PLM 
policy transfers the responsibility o f water distribution to WUAs . 
With the government-sanctioned budgets, the W U A s carried out 
minimum rehabilitation and maintenance works. The practical 
outcome o f these repairs was improved •water flows initially but not 
sustained in later years. 
The Kharif crop failed in this area due to the monsoon failure in 
2001. The pressure on the scarce water increased during the month 
o f November, as the Rabi crops also needed a wetting. T h e water 
distribution became a test for the W U A s and irrigation department 
Local farmers demanded water and their resistance was visible 
through their demonstrations, demanding •water for their plots. The 
mounting pressure on the higher irrigation staff especially on the 
Executive and Deputy Executive Engineers to supply water to the 
tail reaches was visible through telephone calls and office letters 
asking for detailed information. The situation demanded a strict 
monitoring. 
T o address the situation, I thought there would be an 
operational plan to follow. T o my surprise there was no such plan 
on paper. When asked, the Deputy executive engineer told m e that 
it is difficult to prepare a plan as they were not sure o f supplies. 
T h e best way to face the situation is an effective controlling. I saw 
him doing what he told (see B o x 6.1). T h e visits o f W U A leaders 
and local political leaders to the irrigation offices increased. 
Everyone talked about water scarcity and wanted their share o f 
water to their fields. 
The tail end farmers o f Kesavapuram on Punyapuram major and 
o f Kambampadu and Chilukuru on Nidanapuram major claimed 
that their situation has not changed since introduction o f WUAs . 
The farmers stated that they used to spend a lot o f time and money 
on canal gasti (canal watch by private people) to bring water from 
the head reaches to their tail-end plots. The W U A s could not 
implement an operation plan. A s a result, the gap command has 
remained in the tail reaches o f tertiary canals on M B C . In absence 
o f water sharing rules, the tail-end farmers continued to be 
deprived o f their legitimate share o f water (see Box 6.1). I conclude 
that the practices o f water distribution in the local area remained 
the same. 
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B O X 6.1: Water distribution at night 
It was a cold winter night of November. I made a request to join the 
Deputy executive engineer on a night patroL He agreed readily. We left 
the Kalluru camp office by se ven in the night On the way an old Luskar 
joined us. We reached the zero km point of the MBC within fifteen 
minutes by Jeep. The Engineer instructed the Luskar to completely 
close the first sluice. It appeared to me that the engineer was determined 
to push water to tail-end The jeep driver and I had to help the Luskar 
to dose the gate since the Luskar did not have the right tools to dose 
the sluice. 
The head reach farmers usually do not give attention to the water 
levds in their canals during nights. They know that they have access to 
water without much hassle. After dosing the sluice we headed towards 
the Madhira subdivision. At the site of Mustikuntla Major located at 
14.54km a group of farmers were sitting in a make-shift tent The 
engineer got down and inspected the sluice readings. He suggested that 
the shutters should be lowered as more water was being discharged than 
required The farmers objected to operate the gates. Most of them were 
drunk and in a hostile mood The engineer asked for the WUA 
president The farmers replied that their WUA president was not hdpful 
and hence they needed to come to the canal for water. The engineer 
tried to convince the farmers by saying that he would tell their WUA 
President 
Then he gave instructions to the Luskar to lower the sluice gates and 
got into the vebide. It was eleven o'dock in night and we further 
proceeded downstream. We reached Gosaveedu minor located at the 
36km of the MBC, but the Luskar on duty was not found. He might 
have thought his higher officer would never make a visit in that cold 
night Again I hdped the old Luskar who was accompanying us to dose 
the gates. The old Luskar murmured about the difficulty he might face 
the next morning from his absentee colleague. 
Box 6.1 Continued 
We crossed the railway line after Madhira around 3am. I saw a number 
of water engines kept on the bank of the empty canal at 47km. Farmers 
were sleeping next to their engines, probably in the hope of some water. 
The long pipe from the engine ended with a foot valve laid in the small 
ditch made by digging the canal bed. It seemed to me the standing chilli 
and cotton plots needed at least a watering immediatdy in order to 
survive. 
Since there was not enough water to operate the sluices, farmers 
were allowed to pump water from the canal directly to their plots. 
Farmers spent money for fuel, to rent engines, and for the long plastic 
pipes to transport water to the plots. 
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By the time we leached Kambampadu village at the tail reaches of 
Nidanapuram major, the sun already started rising in the east The 
presence of engineer on the canal at that time created a hope among the 
farmers. When we entered into Kambampadu village, the driver drove 
the jeep into a farmer's courtyard The family offered us hot water to 
brash our teeth. An aroma of warm tea filled the air along with a hope 
for water in the canal] The engineer told the group of farmers gathered 
that they would receive water in the canal in about three hours. The 
water would be enough to run their water engines for few hours. I 
agreed with him if there would be no blocks in the canal by the farmers 
upstream of Kambampadu. The further tail end villages (VAnnavaram 
and Chilukuru) of the major lost their hopes to receive water even for a 
single wetting. 
Source: Field notes dated November 21,2001 
I conclude that WUAs have not taken up water distribution 
functions. In the absence o f functional W U A the access to water is 
influenced by push and pull factors. A s a result there were no 
improvements in 'water distribution and user practices. I discuss 
water distribution practices in a major canal o f M B C to further 
illustrate the arguments. 
Punyapuram Major 
The Punyapuram major canal originates in the head reach o f 
M B C and is the first major canal within half a kilometre from the 
zero point o f the M B C . The gap command o f 997ha out o f 5022ha 
o f localised command reported i.e. about 20percent o f the total 
command o f the major in 2001-2002. The A P F M I S Act empowers 
W U A s to prepare and implement a Warabandi schedule for each 
irrigation season consistent with the operational plan and water 1 
budgeting, based upon the entitlement, area, and soil and cropping 
pattern. 1 4 Instead o f framing rules for water distribution among 
themselves, I observed W U A leaders on this major and other 
approached irrigation department staff for their water distribution 
requirements. A s I discussed earlier, the absence o f internal rule 
making influenced the water distribution negatively. In the process 
the irrigation staff continued to control water distribution activity. 
In absence o f institutional rules access to water is negotiated and 
contested. The Punyapuram major canal is not an isolated case. I 
observed similar issues in other major canals located on M B C . 
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6.6 Reasons for Data Manipulation 
F r o m the above analysis it was cleat that there were problems with 
irrigation data collection, recording and usage. In this section, I 
discuss the possible reasons for data manipulation. They are 
departmental practices, official rules, external pressures and 
changes in localisation pattern. 
Departmental Practices 
A s I discussed earlier, the Luskar, who is at the lowest level in the 
department, is responsible for reporting and recording water 
discharges on a daily basis. The Luskar receives instructions from 
the concerned assistant engineer or higher level officers regarding 
the discharge levels to be maintained. The Luskars note down the 
discharge levels in the reading book by counting the scale drawn on 
the sidewall (the staff board) at the mouth o f the sluice. 1 5 In times 
o f scarcity the Luskars are asked to record readings every two 
hours. I explain the discharge data here as it relates to cropping 
data. 
During the course o f field work I came across occasions -when 
Luskars on M B C reported low discharges in the book. I 
understood that the low reporting happens with the consent o f the 
higher officer and in a few cases without What prompts the 
Irrigation staff to do so? The pipe oudet is designed to deliver a 
particular discharge o f water. That is what it says on paper. 
However, the pipe size and design discharge are proportional to 
the extent o f the command to be irrigated under the pipe oude t By 
reporting low levels o f discharge, the unaccounted •water in the 
canal is exchanged for economic or other incentives provided by 
those farmers who seek (more) water for their plots. One can ask 
why recording o f lower discharges would be necessary for 
extracting payments for extra water. I t is mandatory for the 
irrigation staff to show that the amount o f water discharged in a 
canal and the extent o f crop that is grown. In this case if you draw 
more water and report less water, the un- accounted water can be 
exchanged. 
I f the Luskar wants to favour particular group o f farmers, he 
does that by either closing or opening up the gates o f a particular 
sluice(s) so that the favoured farmers receives more water or an 
additional wetting to what they are entided to. Often such favours 
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axe done not by a single Luskar but with an understanding among 
the implementing staff. A s a cross checking mechanism the higher 
irrigation officers inspect canal discharges. In the event o f an 
inspection the higher official makes a signature and date and time 
are also noted down. I observed that manipulating data is one such 
system among others used in favouring an individual farmer or 
group o f farmers. 
Official Rules 
The second reason to manipulate the data stems from the presence 
o f official rules. The assistant engineers in the study area stated that 
that they are responsible for explaining on paper to their higher 
officials the volume o f water received and area irrigated. This 
practice according to the staff is to assess the staff performance. 
T h e calculation is done on the basis o f the irrigation duty 1 6 and it 
varies with the type o f soil For example in Telangana region, the 
duty is calculated that, with one cusec 1 7 o f water 26 ha o f wet 
paddy crop or 56 ha o f irrigated dry crop can be irrigated. 1 8 A n 
assistant engineer on Nidanapuram major shares that: 
A lot of water goes unaccounted for due to the illegal tapping 
practices and canal losses. But finally it is the assistant engineer at 
the local level who has to answer. The engineer concluded that to 
avoid official explanations, the water discharge and extent of 
irrigated area figures are to be adjusted. If we want to report 
accurately, we will ultimately end up in preparing explanations. So 
we do not want to take that risk alone It is a known fact in the 
department that there is a need for some kind of adjustments. 
T o avoid implications o f official rules, the implementing staff 
found ways to cope. I f more water was discharged and less area 
actually irrigated, the staff try to compensate by reporting illegal 
command development. Reporting lower discharges helps in two 
•ways. First, unaccounted water can be exchanged for monetary 
gains. Second, there would be no need for exaggeration o f 
command. However these practices also depend on the location o f 
work o f the staff. A head reach staff member is likely to report less 
discharges and tail end staff tries to exaggerate the area that 
received irrigation. 1 9 
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External Pressures 
The third reason for manipulation o f data is external pressures 
from political representatives and higher officials in the 
government This pressure for results is not only evident in the 
irrigation department but in other government line departments. 2 0 
I came across an incident when an assistant engineer in Madhira 
subdivision went on leave (stating medical reasons) during the peak 
water distribution period in 2002. H e belonged to Muslim 
community (a minor community in this area) and wanted to avoid 
the local politicians who would bring requests regarding water 
distribution 2 1 . His colleagues commented that the engineer went 
on leave to avoid both official and the expected political pressures. 
I do not have direct evidence o f political pressure but it is a known 
fact that if engineers listen to political or other unofficial requests 
for additional water, they cannot but adjust the data on water 
supply. 
The Chandrababu Naidu government introduced many formats 
and performance appraisals. During discussions, the implementing 
staff repeatedly stated that they have to spend a lot o f their time in 
their offices, to fill and submit the forms supplied by the 
government The government's emphasis on performance 
indicators, incentives linked with performances in the absence o f 
consistent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms resulted in 
manipulation o f data by the irrigation staff In addition to these 
problems the records o f the Revenue and Irrigation Departments 
are difficult to compare. The records do not mention other sources 
o f irrigation for example by bore wells drilled in the localised area. 
T h e irrigation staff involved does not record the quality o f 
irrigation water supplied as it was not mandatory (see Jairath 1999). 
Changes in Localisation Pattern 
The fourth reason for the manipulation o f data is change in the 
pattern o f localisation. The canal commands were designed 
normally for wet irrigation at the tail reaches (if the soil type suits) 
and irrigated dry crops at the head reaches o f the canals. However 
the current practice is reversed. The localisation pattern remains 
the same but it is not followed. The farmers at the head reach 
continue to prefer wet irrigation and as a consequence irrigated dry 
crops are cultivated in the tail end areas. The political compulsions 
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o f favouring a certain group o f farmers could not solve the issue o f 
unequal water distribution but allowed the practice. With the 
increase in wet irrigation (especially in head reaches) water 
consumption has increased. For example, Lingala major on M B C 
designed for 104 ha o f wet which has increased to 514 ha (five 
times increment) and the area under irrigated dry crops decreased 
to 50 ha from designed 511 to 50 ha Le. ten times decrease. 
6.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have analysed the government's claims with 
regard to irrigation expansion achieved during the reform period. 
T h e state level claims in terms o f irrigation expansion by bridging 
the gap command area do not show evidence at local level I 
argue that the government claims at state level are exaggerated. 
This chapter suggest that Mr. Naidu's government that 
introduced irrigation reforms seem to use the irrigation data 
politically to seek consent for its policies. The political executive 
made strategic use o f government administrative power and 
procedures to portray success . 2 2 
The field evidence suggests that there is inconsistency in 
reporting the data. The data was also manipulated to safeguard the 
interests o f staff involved. There is insufficient evidence o f 
improved water distribution practices in the study area. 
The changes in the gap should be attributed to many factors like 
the changes in rainfall, water levels in the reservoirs, water 
distribution practices, changes in cropping pattern and farmer 
preferences. We cannot associate the gap bridged to reforms alone 
as claimed by the sate politicians and bureaucrats. 
The field evidence suggests the need for critically looking at the 
published data. The mismatch between the published data and 
claims made by the political executive suggests the scope for social 
construction o f data. 
I conclude that the ruling government and the bureaucracy 
tried to construct a popular perception that reform policies have 
yielded g o o d results. Based on the field evidence, I argue that 
there is a need for further investigation o f these popular 
constructs as the irrigation expansion and/or bridging the gap 
narratives tend to serve a certain political agenda. 
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Notes 
1 Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu speaking about his government 
efforts claims that 0.41 million ha of additional command and 0.73 million 
ha of gap command was created, thanks to the implementation of reform 
policies. A compact disk casting his speech in English on his government 
achievements was released and circulated through India Today magazine 
as an impact feature. The CD is titled Andbra Pradesh Government 
Presentation: Fulfilling Aspirations. The write up in the CD in the irrigation 
section claims that the government of AP is implementing a 
comprehensive and aggressive irrigation policy. Under the section fact file, 
it is stated that 0.50 million ha new irrigation potential has been created 
Also the majority of the new irrigation potential created is in the backward 
areas of the state. 
2 The claim was that in 1998-99 year 207,288 ha and in 1999-2000 an 
additional 83,147 ha of gap command was bridged under major irrigation 
projects in the state (source: www.apirrigation.com). 
3 There are different views existing on estimation of irrigation potential. It 
has been a difficult methodological problem, There is at present.no 
agreement among engineers and other academics on the most appropriate 
method of estimation or appropriate values of parameters (for example, 
water duties) that are used in the calculation of irrigation potential As a 
result, the estimates of irrigation potential made by different official 
agencies and scholars continue to differ widely. For example to assess the 
irrigation potential some use a river basin runoff approach and few use 
the rainfall pattern. Also one use computer based programmes like arc-
Info to define the geographical computation units, which are 
homogeneous regarding average rainfall, potential evapo-transpiration, 
cropping pattern (calendar, intensity) and varying irrigation efficiency to 
calculate irrigation potential of a system The estimation methods vary and 
different estimations are sometimes available for the same country 
depending on the factors considered ie . resources, techniques, economic 
criteria and the environment See Dhawan (1993) and Vaidyananthan 
(1999) for a discussion of problems of estimating irrigation potential in 
Tnrliq. 
4 However, in the same paper the author states in a table that irrigation 
potential created under major and medium is 3.05mha and 1.92mha under 
minor irrigation i.e. a total of 4.97mha in the state (Peter 2001: 6). 
5 There are four major gaps to be bridged in the irrigation sector. They 
are (a) irrigation efficiency gap (b) area gap (c) soil fertility gap and (d) 
productivity, gap. Out of these four gaps highest attention is being paid to 
bridging the area gap (Hanumantha Ra o 2002). Area gap can be d efined as 
the gap between the irrigation potential created by a project and the actual 
irrigation done. The gap is reported by whom 20-40% in case of major 
projects in the state. 
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6 The 'Commission of Irrigation Utilization' of the GoAP in its report 
1982 said that the planning gap occurs due to adoption of over-optimistic 
and unrealistic duties, inadequate water allowance, under estimation of 
seepage and other losses, over estimation of dependable yields, etc' 
(sourcerwwwiwmLcgiar.org/propoor/files/ADB_Proj ect/Project%20Re 
porte/Summary_Report_Part_2.pdf). In addition the lack of realism in 
duties may explain why ther e is always undemtilisation/ a gap. 
7 The maps are not to scale and does not show plot wise information. But 
these maps are useful to identify the boundaries of each TC member 
within the WUA. These maps show the boundary of the WUA with 
details of minors and sub minors within the jurisdiction of the WUA. 
8 The print media reports can be taken as a claim made by the 
government/politicians as it serves as the main source of information for 
common citizens about government activities. Print and electronic media 
play an important role in forming and reflecting public opinion In the 
case of AP, the Chief Minister Naidu is known for extensive use of 
information communication technology as bis style of governance. The 
Hindu Newspapers states that ^ayalalifhaa (Chief Minister of 
neighbouring state Tamil Nadu) could benefit by studying the media 
management skills of her counterpart neighbour Mr. Naidu in whose 
image-building, apart from bis undoubted dynamism and initiative, media 
management has certainly played a positive role' (The Hindu, March 12, 
2002 titled 'Aroma holds many ace s - will she use them wisely?0). 
9 See http://woddbankgroup.org/watean/waterweelt2003/Presentations 
/Session%2018%20-%20Water%20Users%20Assodations/Irrigation 
RefoimsinAndhraPradesh.pdf 
1 0 At the country level, the growth of area irrigated by canals has slowed 
down from the 1980s. It was because available surface water resources are 
exploited and the cost of creating new stmctures to create additional 
irrigation potential has dramatically gone up (see Svendsen 1991). 
1 1 Source: www.apirrigation.com The government statement does not 
specify the crop season under which the expansion or bridging of the gap 
command has been achieved 
1 2 Madhira Branch Canal (MBC) is extended as Nidanapuram major canal 
from 31km to 54km. According to the Assistant Engineer from Madhira 
subdivision, the extension of branch canal took place with the help of 
external loan money. 
1 3 Illegal command is the command, which is outside the localised 
command I observed that irrigation engineers sometimes refer to illegal 
command as additional command served by the irrigation water. I think it 
is to account for the water consumed by these plots outside the 
localisation. In some cases the area under illegal cultivation is more than 
commonly expected For example according to a newspaper statement, 
illegal paddy is grown in neady 3.45 lakh ha in the command area of 
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Upper Krishna Project(UKP) in Kamataka state. This figure has been 
admitted by the UKP Irrigation Consultative Comrnittee (ICQ source: 
Decam Herald dated August 19, 2005. 
1 4 Preparation of water budgeting is generally the job of an Assistant 
Engineer. This involves preparation of a water demand statement by pipe 
outlet; taking into account the crop water requirement per minor and 
major ranals; irrigation efficiency and transmission losses in the 
conveyance system. Assessing the daily flow requirements of each outlet 
had to be carried out With the introduction of the reform and APFMTS 
Act, the water budgeting function now mainly falls under the WUA 
responsibility. The reality is that neither the irrigation department nor the 
WUA wanted to prepare and implement the budget plan. They claim that 
in absence of assured water supply there is no relevance of such plan. 
1 5 Though there are various methods available to determine the discharge, 
in the study area there were flow measuring structures (weirs, gates and 
flumes) used for the measurement of discharges. On tertiary canals 
offtake (OT) structures are used commonly. Drop structures and cross 
regulators are found on the secondary canals. 
1 6 Irrigation allowance is a term that expresses the allocation of water 
(expressed as a discharge rate) per unit of cultivated land Duty is the 
amount of land to be irrigated with a unit discharge. 
1 7 The basic unit to measure the flow of water is 'cusec' which means a 
quantity of one cubic foot of water flowing in one second or commonly 
6.24 gallons or 28.3 litres of water per second. 
1 8 In Coastal Andhra one cusec of water is meant to irrigate 70 acres of 
wet (28.3 ha) or 140 acres (56.7ha) of irrigated dry crop. Whereas for the 
Telangana region 64 acres of wet irrigation duty suggested. This duty 
cannot be achieved in the NSP Left Canal. This is a contour system The 
lining was not done in the entire canal and there are breaches and other 
seepage losses. Hence achieving the designed duty is difficult shares C h 
Veeraiah who served as a S.E on NSP left canal. He argues that the 
calculation of amount of water discharged in a canal and area irrigated do 
not work as the type of soil plays an important role. He further explains 
that supplying irrigation to the tail reaches cannot be achieved with 
normal allocations provided on the basis of irrigation duty. In the past 
there were supplementation divisions with a mandate of irrigating the tail 
reach areas with additional or supplemental canal 'water supplies. In 
absence of such supervision providing irrigation to tail reaches has 
become difficult (Source: Discussion held with C h Veeraiah, retired S.E, 
on 10* Feb 2002). Mr. Veeraiah's argument can be understood as a 
technical excuse for poor management. The inability to spread scarcity 
proportionally is not explained by it as the design of the system includes 
scarcity. Even if the duties were realistic there was a distribution of 
scarcity problem 
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1 9 Usually the exaggeration of irrigated area by a staff takes place by 
reporting area with crops grown like red gram, green gram, fodder or 
groundnut for which water cess is not collected. This is to avoid 
difficulties from the WUA or Revenue staff, in the event that actual Joint 
Azmoish takes place. 
2 0 Referring to the pressure they are under the engineers told me an 
incident of the death of a higher level Engineer. The Engineer died due to 
a heart attack incidentally after he participated in a teleconference. They 
connect this incident to the cornments/ orders of the Chief Minister 
made on the performance of the Engineer during a teleconference. 
According to my informants this put the engineer under tremendous 
pressure that eventually led to a heart attack. 
2 1 The reason for mentioning the staff as a Muslim is because the religion 
and caste also might play a role. The other two Assistant Engineers in the 
same subdivision belong to Chowdary community. The caste affiliations 
do play role in the local water management 
2 2 The use of data for political gains by the ruling Naidu led TDP 
government reminds us the concept of manufacturing consent for TDP 
regime (also see Mooij 2005). Herman and Chomsky (1994) used the 
concept of manufacturing consent which highlighted the role of the media 
and public institutions in the United States in manufacturing consent on 
national issues. Their work described how support is mobilised for special 
interests that dominate the state and private activity (c£ Mehta, 2001). She 
shows how the Gujarat state has manufactured the dominant perception of 
water in the name of Narmada Project as the single solution). The 
motivation for Mr. Naidu and his bureaucrat advisers to showcase the 
government doing great things (to the outside world notably to the Wodd 
Bank, DFTD and to the urban middle class of AP) could be to legitimatise 
the reform policies that were introduced and also seek public support for 
the government actions. 
7 
Joint A.%ffloish 
An Arena of Imgation Revenue Generation 
If the WUAs function as the Government anticipates, the revenue recovery trill 
go up from 64 percent to 95 percent and tire area under irrigation by more than 
3 percent a year. 
J . Raymond Peter, Additional Secretary (Irrigation) GoAP 
7.1 Introduction 
The system o f land revenue or tax collection has played an 
important role as an institution in the economic performance o f 
the governments. While the Nagarjunasagar system is a post 
independence project, the land revenue system in the area served 
derives from the practices used across the state •with older 
antecedents. 
Historically, Kautilya's Arthshastra mentions about revenue 
functions as well as irrigation water use in India. 1 Initially, land and 
later irrigation was the major source o f revenue for all governments 
o f India, including the British. The Indian land policy manifested 
through two different administrative regimes namely the Mughal 
System and the British Indian administrative system. 
In this chapter, I discuss in detail the history o f Joint Astptoish, 
the policy objectives o f Joint Azmoish under the reform 
programme and process o f implementation in the state o f AP. I 
show how Joint Azmoish has been neglected and contested by 
different actors during implementation. I argue t h a t . the 
participating government line departments could maintain their 
interests by not cooperating with each other in the process . 
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The Joint Azmoish is a joint supervision o f survey o f irrigated 
command area in a hydraulic unit. It is a joint survey conducted by 
the representatives o f the W U A , departmental staff members o f 
irrigation, revenue and agriculture to agree and report irrigated area 
and type o f crop. T h e activities o f each participating department 
are joindy coordinated and are complimentary. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 7 .1 ,1 present an 
analysis o f Mughal and British land tenure systems. In section 7.2,1 
discuss the evolution o f Joint Azmoish in India, Section 7.3, is 
about the changes in land and water polices in the m o d e m Andhra 
Pradesh. The discussion on the past practices is important as they 
influence the current practices. In section 7.4, I discuss the new 
policy o f Jo int Azmoish stated under the irrigation management 
reform programme. Section 7.5 is about the process and politics o f 
Jo int Azmoish implementation at the local leveLThe interpretations 
o f field data are presented. 
The chapter shows evidence that the nature o f Jo int Azmoish 
practice is rooted in the past practices. Various participating 
agencies viewed it differently and their interests shaped the final 
policy outcome. The chapter concludes in section 7.6 with a 
summary o f findings. 
7.2 Evolution of Joint Azmoish 
In this section, I briefly present the Mughal and British land tenure 
systems with special focus on British irrigation policies to present 
the evolution o f Jo int Azmoish system. Canal historians like Stone 
(1985) argued that the current irrigation institutional functioning 
derives from its origin in the colonial per iod Understanding this 
process is important to conceptualise the present practices. 
During the period o f Mughal rule in 16th and 17th centuries, 
land revenue was collected by non-hereditary, transferable state 
officials. 2 Hasan (2000:31) observes that the Mughal Empire was 
basically dependent on cooperation and support o f the ^amindars o f 
three categories-the chieftain (some o f them were rajas), the 
intermediary, and the primary non-cultivating spmindar. These 
intermediaries were between the Mughal ruler and the cultivating 
peasants. 3 Their principal duty was to submit the full revenue 
returns, to maintain law and order through their troops, to keep 
ferries and irrigation works in g o o d order, and to ensure that 
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assessments were reasonably made and œmplaints properly 
attended. In return they got a percentage o f the revenue collected 
and other perquisites. They played a very important political, 
administrative and economic role (ibid: 29, cited from Choudhary 
2000). The land revenue system implemented by TodarMal during 
the Mughal Emperor Akbar's regime can be traced as the possible 
beginning o f systematic efforts to manage the land. Deshpande 
describes that the Todar Mai method had incorporated measurement, 
classification and fixation o f rent as its main components 
(Deshpande 2003:155). 
By the end o f 181*1 century, British rule was firmly established in 
India. By 1841, the land cess constituted 60 percent o f total British 
government revenue. This proportion decreased over time as the 
British developed additional tax resources. Land revenue and its 
collection was the most important issue in policy debates during 
this period (Banerjee and Iyer 2005). Banerjee and Iyer argue that, 
the system for land revenue collection established by the British 
one hundred and fifty years ago or more continues to have an 
effect, long after it was abolished (Ibid :1191). 
Land tenure systems 
T h e British Empire in India lasted for nearly two hundred years. 
T h e British gained political control over the m o d e m states o f 
Bengal and Bihar (formerly Bengal Presidency) after they won the 
batdes o f Plassey in 1757 and Buxar in 1764. The British were 
formally granted revenue collection rights in these areas in 1765 by 
the titular Mughal Emperor . By 1860, the British were the major 
political power in India. 4 Bagchi (1982) writes that: 
The British kept most of the basic features of the Mughal land 
revenue system but raised the proportion of the produce collected 
as revenue enormously. The Mughals had assessed land revenue on 
the area actually cultivated, whereas the British assessed land revenue 
on the basis of the amount of land a person was entitled to cultivate. 
The Mughals had calculated the revenue in cash, but often collected 
in kind The British calculated the revenue in cash and collected in 
cash. In terms of tax exaction, the British proved much harsher 
than the earlier Mughal rulers (1982:79-83). 
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The British introduced the Zamindari and Muttadari systems o f land 
tenure in 1765 in Bengal Presidency, thereby setting up the basis for 
an ongoing conflict between peasants and landlords. However, the 
colonial state directly collected the land revenue from the cultivator 
called ryotwari system in its Bombay and Madias Presidencies, 
thereby avoiding this particular source o f internecine [mutually 
destructive] conflict In North-West provinces and Punjab the 
village based land revenue system named Mahalwari was adopted in 
which village bodies joindy owned the land and were responsible 
for the payment o f land revenue to the British government Bagchi 
argues that all these systems had the common characteristic o f 
making land an alienable commodity without creating full private 
property in it, and providing a large surplus in the hands o f the 
British rulers with very little expenditure in recompense. These 
systems endured, with little modification, throughout the British 
period (Bagchi 1982: 81). 
In the present Andhra Pradesh, different land tenure systems were 
observed as it was ruled both by the Nizams and the British. The 
agency areas o f Andhra region (forming part o f British India) had 
distinct land tenure systems called Muttodar or Mahalwari systems. 
T h e schedule or tribal villages under Telangana under former 
Hyderabad State were part o f Jagirs, Iaras, or Makthas. The tenant 
farmers under the feudal land tenure system suffered as the 
landholders had the right to evict a tenant i f someone offered a 
higher rent Tribal tenants were the worst effected in this system. 5 
Zamindari and ryotwari systems o f land tenure 
Historians o f early British administration in India have traditionally 
focused their attention upon the ryotwari and spmindari systems o f 
revenue assessment and collection (see Rabitoy 1975:529). In the 
1790s some orderliness was introduced into the revenue system 
and administration by the reforms o f Comwallis. The zamindar 
land class found their patron in Lord Comwallis, who installed 
them in power in Bengal in 1793. Comwallis, a Whig aristocrat 
himself, was convinced that the stabilizing influence o f a great 
landed aristocracy was an indispensable condition or order and 
prosperity (Tvfetcalf 1962: 295). According to Patel (1969), the 
British thought that the spmindari system would create a loyal force 
that would help them in consolidating the empire. However, they 
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found that the revenue flow was not upto their expectations. 
Zamindars under reported the actual cultivated land and hence 
siphoned off a share o f agricultural revenue. This led to the 
introduction o f the ryotwari system in Madras Presidency that was 
based on the full survey and assessment o f cultivable land. This 
system gave better revenue and hence was replicated in Bombay 
Presidency in 1851 (Patel 1969:20 cited from Prakash 2005). 
The introduction o f the ryotwari system •was a result o f Sir 
Thomas Munro's belief that the ryotwari system would increase the 
agricultural productivity as cultivators would be less subject to 
exploitation by landlords. Sir Munro travelled to London and 
managed to convince the Court o f Directors o f the Ea s t India 
Company o f the merits o f the ryotwari system (see Mukherjee 1962). 
The Board o f Revenue came to favour the ryotwari system as they 
did not like the %amindari system because o f the proliferation o f 
intermediaries. A s a result, the ryotwari system was introduced in the 
Madras Presidency. Similarly, Lord Elphinstone the then Governor 
o f Bombay Presidency was introduced the same system Metcalf 
states that there was Munro's legacy o f paternal solicitude for the 
peasant, 'which became the avowed creed o f many District Officers 
(Metcalf 1962:295). The main principle underlying a ryotwari system 
is that there would be a direct link between the state and farmer or 
cultivator. In these areas, an extensive cadastral survey o f the land 
was done and a detailed record-of-rights was prepared, which 
served as the legal title to the land for the cultivator. 
After the 1857 Mutiny, the ryotwari tenure policy was subject to 
changes. The events o f the Mutiny called this peasant theory into 
question for the first time. The British felt that having large 
number o f landlords (rajas, spmindars and takkdars) on their side 
would be politically advantageous. A s a - result the ryotwari policy 
was reversed. Several landlords whose land had been taken away 
under the village based settlements had the land given back to 
them. In 1859 they were declared to have a permanent, hereditary 
and transferable property right (Banerjee and Iyer 2005:1196). In 
some areas, the British favoured the landlord system (like in Bengal 
Presidency) as the system was in existence before the British. It 'was 
also administratively feasible as it did not demand many state 
resources. It would be costiy to change the system and hence the 
Landlord system survived. Some others argued that the ideology 
and economic doctrines that time, favoured changes in British 
policies (see Guha 1963). 
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System of'water cess collection 
Canal irrigation in India is said to have been practised along with 
lift irrigation during the Mauryan Empire that was established after 
the Magadhan Empire (Le.600B.C). D a m s were constructed and 
embankments also were in use. People or communities had to pay 
tax for irrigating their plots. Rangarajan documents that: 
Different types of taxes were collected from the cultivators 
depending on the nature of irrigation. The taxes fixed in the 
Mauryan times for taking water works built by the king were one 
fifth of the produce if manually transported; one fourth in case 
carried by bullocks; and one third when lifted by mechanisms into 
channels. The tax rate was one fourth of produce for taking water 
from natural reservoirs like rivers, lakes, tanks and springs. 
Exemptions from payment of water rates were granted for building 
or improving irrigation facilities. Exemption was given for 5 years 
for new tanks and embankments, 4 years for renovating ruined or 
abandoned water works, and 3 years for clearing water works over-
grown with weeds (Rangarajan 1987: 231-232). 
The British's interest in development o f irrigation in India had 
many dimensions. In the 1840s, Arthur Cotton argued successfully 
that crop production could be advanced by state irrigation 
investments that would pay for themselves with higher taxes on 
Many scholars have pointed out that the British poEcies o f land 
revenue are influenced by choices o f British individual 
adrninistrators, political events, trial and error, date o f conquest and 
presence o f a landlord class even before the British regime ( see 
Mukherjee 1962; Ray and Ray 1975; Banerjee and Iyer 2005). 
Rabitoy argues that the reality o f land revenue administration, in 
the Bombay Presidency was not systematic but administrative 
expediency. T h e preoccupation with increased land revenue 
necessitated, at all levels o f the adrninistration, an expedient 
approach to administrative policy (Rabitoy 1975:530,545). I 
conclude that from the historical evidence that the British land 
revenue policy that lasted 150 years was a resilient product o f 
economic changes, political ideologies and pressures o f population 
growth, which led to a complete change o f land tenure system in 
India. 
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m o r e productive land. After the failure o f private funded irrigation 
projects, the colonial Government in 1866, decided to construct 
large irrigation projects with the finance raised from public loans. 
S o m e scholars observed that the interest in development o f 
irrigation projects in India was mainly to address the great famines 
during the 1870s and tackle political resistance. Others have argued 
that protection against famine as an objective, was little more than 
window dressing for the real surplus extraction (see Whitcombe 
1972, cited from Mollinga 2003). Stone (1984) argued that canal 
irrigation was an important instrument o f colonial rule. Bouman et 
al argued that natural resource management policies during the 
colonial period were driven by the objective o f securing control 
over both natural resources and local communities. Proprietary 
rights over natural resources enabled the colonial state to extract 
remote from land, forests, and water as well as to regulate community 
use o f natural resources' (Baumann etal2003: 3 italics mine). 
The Ea s t India Company in the beginning, undertook the work 
o f the revival o f the irrigation systems o f Delhi and Tanjor with a 
consideration that the interests o f charity (protection against 
drought/famine insurance) and the interests o f commerce (profit) 
could happily be seen to coincide' (Whitcombe 1982). A s a result 
protective irrigation' projects were designed to supply small 
quantities o f water to a large number o f acres. 6 T h e protective 
policy was linked with many dimensions like famine prevention, 
revenue stability, the settling o f unruly tribes, expansion o f 
cultivation, extended cultivation practices, and political stability 
(Mollinga 2003). 
The British wanted to sell irrigation water to farmers to earn 
back the revenues and recover the investments made (Wallach 
1985). The only 'way to do so was to supply "water for crops like 
paddy and sugarcane, for which farmers were always willing to pay. 
T h e British, therefore, allowed substantial irrigation at the head 
ends o f the irrigation systems they had built for famine relief The 
British might have thought that when drought returned, the canals 
would revert to their fundamental purpose. In practice, this did not 
happen. The other question that worried the British when they 
embarked on the delta works (designed by Arthur Cotton) was 
whether the farmers would agree to buy irrigation water, as they 
practiced rain-fed paddy cultivation. 
The British government also feared that cane growers without a 
secure supply o f water would abandon the land i f they were denied 
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water during a drought (see Wallach 1985). These practices show 
evidence o f the dual nature o f the British irrigation policies. 7 There 
were incidents o f protests by cultivators resisting the taxation o f 
governments during pre, colonial and post colonial periods. 
Evidence is available in contemporary literature and inscriptions 
showing that 'taxation very often pressed oppressively on people ' 8 
(Altekarl972:283 cited from Choudharay 2000).The British enacted 
different legislation to implement irrigation works and collection o f 
revenue. The Irrigation Act o f 1865 empowered imposition o f 
penalty. According to Section 1 (b) o f the Irrigation Cess A c t 
Whenever water from any such river, stream, channel, tank or 
work, by direct flow or percolation or by indirect flow, percolation 
or drainage from or through adjoining land, irrigates land under 
cultivation, or flows into a reservoir and thereafter ... and in the 
opinion of the Revenue Officer empowered to charge water-cess, 
subject to the control of the Collector and the Board of Revenue,... 
it shall be lawful for the State Government...[to] prescribe the rules 
under which, and the rates at which, such water-cess shall be levied, 
and alter or amend the same from time to time (Saravanan 
2001:301). 
The British enacted different Acts over time to administer 
irrigation and revenue collection. 9 The British charged an irrigation 
service fee o f R s 5 per acre for farmers in the Krishna Delta who 
signed by March to take the water for the coming season. Perhaps 
the most obvious way tried to enforce regulations was through 
penalties. Farmers who failed to sign up by then, but still took 
water were charged twice that much (see Wallach 1984). There are 
different rules to levy fines or penalties in Maharashtra, Kamataka 
and Andhra Pradesh, but these are largely ineffective. Wallach 
(2004) argued that 
Today, although light irrigation makes economic sense and there 
are plenty of customers for canal water, the old preference for wet 
crops still prevails, for cultural as well as economic reasons. The 
governments] seems powerless to check the excessive headend 
diversions that those crops require. The situation is all the more 
frustrating because it could have been avoided by designing projects 
that farmers wanted and administrators could manage. The British 
could not stop to ask the farmers if a proposed scheme was sound; 
nor, a tragedy of colonialism, would farmers have dared to respond 
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honestly if they had The irrigation problem in South India today is 
therefore a story rooted in the psychology of colonialism, and in its 
history may lie the seed of its solution, an appreciation of the need 
to consult the people who are the intended beneficiaries of these 
projects (Wallach 2004:2). 
First generation irrigation reforms 
The British formulated irrigation reforms that were introduced in 
the Krishna Basin to address the problem o f canal irrigation. T h e 
Indian engineer Mokshagundam Visveswaraya 1 0 suggested two 
ways to address irrigation distribution issues. One way was 
construction o f small service areas with heavy irrigation. The 
British did not accept this idea. Second, he suggested a 'block 
system' o f irrigation in 1901. The land was divided into four parts 
and each part is grown homogenously. Only one fourth part o f the 
field is assured with irrigation. This system became the comer 
stone for the sugar cane revolution in the state o f Maharashtra. The 
block system o f irrigation with many modifications is practiced 
even today in some South Indian states. 
The World Bank, in 1976 approved three major loans for 
irrigation development in Andhra Pradesh to improve the 
performance o f its irrigation systems. 1 1 The focus o f the reform 
was to ensure full water delivery to designed discharges at the 
oudet level and also to introduce rotational water deliveries. The 
programme aimed to supply a fixed volume o f water supply to each 
farmer in the command leaving the choice o f the crop to the owner 
o f the p l o t The Government o f Andhra Pradesh created the 
C A D A to implement integrated water management functions. 
There was much emphasis on the technology (hardware) part o f 
the irrigation systems. The emphasis on revenue returns from 
irrigation projects continued in the successive policy documents. 
However, the need for the institutional (software) strengthening 
was prioritised. Later in the 1980s the Warabandhi (proportional 
distribution over oudets by maintaining full supply levels in 
distributay canals by systematic on and off rotation o f these canals) 
system • o f water distribution was followed in all Indian canal 
irrigation sys tems 1 2 (see Malhotra 1982 for a technical perspective 
and for a theoretical explanation Jayaraman (1980) and Jurriens and 
Mollinga 1996). 
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Irrigation works and cess 
183 
In spite o f the policy focus on system improvements, the irrigation 
systems continued to be in poor condition due to inadequate and 
inefficient maintenance and operation works. T h e systems 
accounted for much less irrigated command than originally 
designed. In spite o f lower cess collections, the governments 
continued to fund operation and maintenance activities. T h e funds 
allotted were meagre to meet the full requirements. 1 3 The 
performance o f cess collection was not optimistic. T h e figures 
suggest that the revenue generated is much less than the principal 
capital invested in building the irrigation systems. The revenue 
generated through cess collections is not even enough to meet the 
maintenance costs o f the systems, leaving aside recovering the 
capital costs invested. 
Vaidyanathan (1999) argues for the country as a whole that, it is 
the poor service o f irrigation that led to the poor payment o f water 
charges. For example, water availability -was never a problem of the 
headreach farmers. B u t these farmers too do not pay the water cess 
often, due to the weak collection mechanisms. The Revenue 
Department is empowered to collect irrigation revenues and 
irrigation water supply by the irrigation Department T o achieve 
better results, Joint Asgnaisb o f irrigated commands by both 
Revenue and Irrigation Departments was introduced. The 
emphasis on collection o f irrigation cess is much more visible in 
the irrigation reform program that was introduced in Andhra 
Pradesh since 1997. 
7.3 Changes in Wand and Water Policies in Andhra Pradesh 
Under the constitution o f independent India, states were granted 
the power to enact land and water reforms. This is why the Indian 
legislation on agrarian reforms comprises far more than 100 laws. 
However, we can categorise them in to three major areas: abolition 
o f intermediaries in 1951, tenancy reforms and ceilings for landed 
property. 1 4 In this section, I discuss the recent organisational and 
policy changes that took place in the Andhra Pradesh in the land 
and water sectors. Coupled with historical practices, these changes 
influence the current Joint Azmoish practices. 
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In 1982, the Telugudesam party (TDP) was founded by N . T R a m a 
R a o and came in to power in 1983. After corning to power, N .T . 
Rama Rao became the Chief Minister o f the state and introduced 
many populist policies. In 1984, the N . T J l a m a r a o led T D P 
government introduced a popular policy that exempted farmers 
irrigating dry crops from paying the "water cess. His government 
also waived the land cess. 
Government order N o 33 dated 10th January 1984, together with 
earlier government order 6(1) of 1967, declares that the farmers 
who are cultivating their lands 'without any source of irrigation' 
(meaning rain fed cultivation) whether wet or dry, are exempted 
from paying the land cess. The order further stipulates that land 
cultivated for the purpose of wet crops using irrigation need to pay 
only the water cess, not the land cess. This means the land cess is 
completely abolished in the state. 
T h e Revenue Department is empowered to collect the water 
cess. In the past at the village level, the Karanam or Talon' was 
assigned with the duty o f cess collection. The Village 
Administrative Officer (VAO) position, introduced by the T D P 
government, replaced the traditional Karanam. It was the Karanam 
who maintained the village land records before the appointment o f 
the Village Administrative Officer. The Village Assistant named 
Talayari was responsible for collecting the irrigated area details. T h e 
dates for cess payments are declared by a process called tarn tarn 
(drum beating in village streets) in the village. 
A s a move to decentralise the government administration, the 
T D P government introduced changes in 1987, to the three-tiered 
system (village panchayat at the first, the block at the second and 
the district at the third level) o f local self-government that was 
introduced in 1957. The basic three-tier format remained 
unchanged but the block panchayats have been abolished and the 
Mandal Parishad introduced. 1 5 In the mid 1990s the system 
underwent some more changes under the Chandrababu Naidu 
government 
Changes under N.T.Rama Rao Government 
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Changes during Chandrababu Naidu government 
Mr. Naidu became the Chief Minister o f Andhra Pradesh in 1995 
and introduced many reforms. The three tiered system o f 
Panchayat Raj governance in the state received some bureaucratic 
modifications and led to changes in the organisational structure o f 
the Revenue Depar tment 
The concept o f Gram Sachivalay (village secretariat) was 
introduced. The newly introduced Panchayat Secretary (PS) post as 
the head o f the village secretariat replaced the Village 
Administrative Officer (VAO) The P S is a permanent executive at 
the Panchayat Secretariat level that came into existence in the entire 
state on 1 s t o f January, 2002. The idea o f a 'village panchayat 
secretariat' is similar to that o f a 'State secretariat' located in the 
State's cap i ta l 1 6 The PS is assigned with ten types o f functions 1 7 
and sixty-three types o f responsibilities, but the scale o f operations 
was limited to one G r a m Panchayat (see Vijay K u m a r and 
Sudhakar2003) . 
The Panchayat Secretaries, like in the case o f V A O s were not 
under the supervision o f the Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO) but 
are answerable to the Mandal Development Officer (MDO) . This 
policy o f the state is criticised by the revenue officers as a move to 
reduce the powers o f the Mandal Revenue Officers, who enjoyed 
judicial powers at Mandal level The Andhra Pradesh Revenue 
Service Association (APRSA) resisted the government's policy and 
claimed that government deliberately reduced their powers . 1 8 The 
Naidu government did not yield to their resistance and the policy 
was implemented. 
The new system has been criticised by members o f other 
members o f the civil society as it has been imposed and dilutes the 
autonomy o f the Panchayats. The multiple functions assigned to 
the secretaries make them direct subordinates to the Revenue and 
Mandal Parishad officials, who are prone to interfere in the affairs 
o f the village administration. 
Results o f Policy changes 
The land revenue policy was abolished in 1984, but the collection 
o f irrigation cess continued. It was during 1996 that the water 
charges were tripled under the Chandrababu Naidu government 
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My discussions with revenue bureaucrats in the fieldwork area 
suggest that the changes in land and water policies resulted in lower 
cess collection in the state. They argued that the 'waiving o f land 
cess policy has de-linked the notion o f maintaining land ownership 
through payment o f land cess to the government The farmers 
were willing to pay the land cess, compared to the water cess, to 
ensure their ownership o f the land. They believe that their 
ownership rights to the land are secured when they paid the cess. 
T h e belief is that paying tax secures land rights. The value o f this 
belief or practice can be understood, when the owner o f the land 
pays the cess by him/her self, even though the land is given for 
tenancy. In this context, the policy changes have resulted in a 
change o f attitude o f the farmers. 
The Kalluru mandal revenue officials explained to m e that the 
changes in the land tax policy reinforced the informal nature o f 
land registration/transaction practices especially in Telangana 
region. 1 9 Land transactions between buyer and seller are taking 
place informally in the presence o f community leaders, avoiding the 
government land registrar office. 2 0 The agreements were written on 
government stamp papers o f a certain denomination. Often 1000 
rupees bond paper was used for the purpose . 2 1 Since the land 
transactions are not registered with the government office the 
buyer and seller do not pay the tax money or stamp duty to the 
government The transactions also will not appear in the land 
registrar office records. A s an alternative arrangement to secure the 
ownership rights, the buyer makes sure that his /her name will be 
included in the Adangal or Pahani 2 2 register at the village level A s a 
result the state is losing some o f its revenue from the land 
registrations. The actual practices show how users' practices were 
regulated and embedded by the land and water policies. The 
changes in the local level administration further restricted access to 
the revenue data. 
7.4 The Joint Asgnoish in Reform Policy 
In the past the state government depended on the local revenue 
administration for collection o f different types o f revenues. 2 3 A s 
explained above under the Naidu government changes were 
introduced in the revenue administration, to ensure better cess 
collection in the state. The Joint Azmoish policy aimed to address 
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the issue o f poor collection o f irrigation cess and low recovery rates 
through better service delivery. The government has legitimised the 
participation o f W U A s in the process o f J A through the A P F M I S 
A c t In this section, I present briefly three important government 
initiatives: revised water charges, institutional linkages and revenue 
sharing, which are designed and implemented for effective 
implementation o f Joint Azmoish process in the state. 
Revised Water Charges 
T h e irrigation experts in the state claim that until the 1950s, the 
irrigation sector used to be financially profitable. Revenues from 
water charges levied on beneficiary farmers were larger than 
government expenditure on operation and maintenance. Over time 
this situation has eroded and changed. The water charges, fixed in 
the 1950s, continued for many years. These charges were barely 
sufficient to pay the salaries o f employees (initially taken on 
contract but made permanent later) let alone the capital costs. The 
under funding o f O & M activities in turn, is attributed to inadequate 
cost recovery and there are various views on fixing the water price 
in the country . 2 4 
The water rates have remained unchanged for long periods in 
Andhra Pradesh, 2 5 A s part o f the reforms the water charges were 
tripled in 1996 in the state (see Table 7.1). 
TABLE 7.1 Changes in the water charges in A.P (1989-1996) 
Ratesoj'water cessm pastandpresent (in Rs per ba) 
Nature of Crop 
Major and Mi 
Pre-revised 
iditim Irrigation 
Revisedv.ef 
Maori 
Pre-revised 
Irrigation 
Revised ».e.f 
1.7.1989 1.7.1996 1.7.1989 1.7.1996 
First or Single Wet crop 150 500 100 250 
Second & Third Wet crop 150 375 100 250 
First crop Irrigated Dry 100 250 50 150 
Second &Thiid I D crop 100 250 50 150 
Dufasssal crop 300 825 200 825 
Aquaculture 0 1250 0 1250 
Note: 1. Du fas sal crop: is a long duration crop also annual crop harvested two 
times in a crop calendar, Z w e i = with effect from 
Source: Irrigation sector: A fjrm«l Note 1996, Government of Andhra Pradesh 
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The Government o f A P constituted the Water Charges Review 
Committee (WCRC) on December 8, 1997, providing a permanent 
body (by Government Order No.225) for annual review o f the 
O & M costs and to ensure that water rates are adjusted on a regular 
basis to cover full c o s t s 2 6 . Subsequently, the threefold increase in 
water charges was ratified in April 1997. T h e increase in water 
charges initially was seen as 'anti-farmer' and met with resistance 
from farmer groups, and opposition political parties in the state. 
Institutional linkages 
Under the reform policy, the Joint Azmoish has multiple 
objectives. The policy legitimises the participation o f W U A s in the 
J A process. In 1999, the government issued order no 610, 
empowering the W U A s to participate in the Joint Azmoish 
process. Participation o f the Irrigation, Revenue and Agriculture 
departments and the W U A s in Joint Azmoish was made 
mandatory. It was expected by the policy makers that the 
participation o f W U A s in the process o f J A would ensure correct 
reporting practices o f the irrigated area leading to a higher rate o f 
cess collection. The participation o f W U A s is also seen as an 
opportunity to forge linkages between the participating agencies in 
irrigated agriculture. The right to participate will empower the 
associations to participate in making o f irrigation management 
decisions. 
The policy envisages that the concerned staff members o f the 
Revenue, Irrigation and Agriculture Departments and the W U A 
representatives together makes a walk-through survey in the 
designated command o f the W U A at the end o f each Kharif and 
Rabi crop season. After the survey, the extent o f command that 
received irrigation, types o f crops grown in the W U A command 
area are determined. Based on the survey results, the Revenue 
Department collect water cess from the farmers in the command 
villages. T h e W U A is expected to facilitate the collection process. 
T h e share o f cess collection will be debited to the W U A bank 
account by the Mandal Revenue officials. 
T o facilitate the process, the government fixed a particular, 
month to conduct the Joint Azmoish. Through Letter N o . 
60426/Lr .2 /99- l dated 27 August 1999, the Government notified 
that the Joint Azmoish exercise had to be conducted for the Kharif 
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crop in the month o f September and for the Rabi crop in the 
month o f February without any delays. T h e policy also states that 
W U A s be involved in collection o f water cess. The association shall 
keep its share o f revenue out o f the total collected cess. The rest 
will be deposited in the government treasury. Incentives for W U A s 
to perform better were also considered. T o further strengthen 
W U A participation and ensure the process o f Jo int Azmoish, the 
government issued order number 155, which is described as 
follows: 
The assessment of the irrigation department will be taken into 
consideration and the water users association will do joint 
assessment The user association will prepare the estimation of 
irrigated acreage in its jurisdiction with the help of irrigation 
department and submits to the Revenue department for the 
collection of the cess. If the Revenue department needs some 
clarifications it can ask for the explanation regarding the reported 
acreage to the WUA. 
Revenue Sharing 
T h e government o f A P issued an order in February 2001 , regarding 
the allocation o f revenue sharing. Revenue sharing between the 
state government and W U A s was expected to lead to economic 
sustainability o f the latter and less burden on state resources. The 
revenue in major irrigation systems is shared in a proportion o f 
50:25:10:10:05 i.e. to the State (irrigation department), WUA, 
Distributary Committee (DC) , Project Committee (PC) and Gram 
Panchayat respectively (see Table 7.2). 
TABLE 7.2: Cess collection across irrigation systems (199 7) 
Let/el Major Medium Minor 
Water Cos short per Ha in Rs 500 (100) 500 (100) 250 (100) 
State/Irrigation Department 250(50) 250 (50) Nil 
WUA 125(25) 150 (30) 225(90) 
Distributory Committee(DQ 50 (10) NoD.C NoD.C 
Project Committee (PC) 50(10) • 75(15) NoP.C 
Gram Panchayat (GP) 25(5) 25(5) 25(10) 
Note, figures in parenthesis are percentages 
190 Tbe Politics qfPoBcy 
The shares o f funds are transferred to the associations by the 
Revenue department. The users associations are expected to use 
the share o f funds received to meet their O & M costs. They can 
also raise extra resources and in the process become self 
independent The policy o f revenue sharing between the 
government and the W U A is an important step to sustain the 
W U A activities. The Joint Azmoish has given due importance 
under the overall reform policy. However, it was resisted during 
implementation by different actors. I discuss the process in detail in 
the following section. 
7.5 Tbe Politics of Implementation 
The implementation o f Joint Azmoish faced constraints at the field 
level I discuss how participating bureaucracies, W U A leaders and 
individual water users experienced the policy. A m o n g the 
participating departments especially the Revenue Department did 
not show interest in the policy. The reason could be that the J A is a 
threat to their traditional power o f collecting cess from users 
directly. The Agricultural Department acted in a laissez-faire 
manner. The Irrigation Department showed interest but tried to 
control the process. The majority o f WUAs did not play an 
important role and were less interested to motivate users to pay the 
cess. 
The Revenue Department is empowered to collect the cess and 
also perform land-related registrations. The revenue bureaucracy 
enjoys a special status within the bureaucratic hierarchy and has 
wide discretion powers over the dispensation o f benefits or 
allocation o f public sanctions. When the Naidu government 
wanted to transfer the power to collect the cess to W U A s , the 
revenue bureaucracy tried to resist the policy. Their dislike towards 
the policy is due to the fear o f loss o f power and economic 
incentives. 
Conflicting Interests 
In the studied villages I observed differences between reported 
irrigation and revenue statistics. The Irrigation Department 
accounts for the water released in a particular canal It counts a plot 
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as irrigated, even if it receives few wettings. In contrast, the 
Revenue Department, which maintains the records on village basis, 
only counts a plot i f it receives full irrigation (see chapter 6). The 
different practices adapted by the departments lead to differences 
in J A results. T o explain further, I discuss the case o f W U A 183 
under Nidanapuram major canal (see Table 7.3). 
TABLE 7.3: WUA183, Madhira MandaL Kbammam District 
Village 
Irrig, 
Wet 
- , — -— : 
tiion statistics (in ha) 
ID Total 
Revs 
Wet 
nue statist 
ID 
its (in ha) 
Total 
Siddmenigudem 81 280 361 73 33 106 
Nagavarappadu 46 180 226 34 43 77 
Maroni 144 502 645 82 90 172 
Ambarupeta 12 157 169 NA 12 12 
Dendukutu 81 410 491 NA 49 49 
Illendulapadu 85 96 181 NA 33 33 
Nidanapuram 24 290 314 10 23 32 
Madhira 12 140 152 NA NA NA 
Total 485 2055 2540 199 281 480 
Source: Irrigation and Revenue Department (Proforma 1 and 3) 2000-2001 
Note: Assistant Engineer, Madhira irrigation sub division, O & M section 
no: 3 and Mandai Revenue Officer, Madhira signed this statement 
(Proforma), on 25 April 2001. 
The secondary evidence shows that there is a huge difference in 
Irrigation Department and Revenue Department reported statistics. 
The actual localised command o f W U A 183 is 2810 ha, out o f 
which 2540 ha falls into Madhira Mandal and the rest under 
another MandaL According to the Irrigation Department they 
achieved 100 percent irrigation o f the W U A 183 command in 
Madhira MandaL T h e revenue figures shows only one fifth o f what 
the Irrigation Department reported. The Revenue Department 
maintains the land records. The statistics reported by the Revenue 
Department are finally considered by the Bureau o f Statistics, 
which publishes the reports for and on behalf o f the state 
government 
The fact remains that there exists a huge gap. Why are these 
clifferences not addressed? Are they impossible to address? I argue 
that the participating departments do not want to solve the 
clifferences, so that they can continue to defend their interests. The 
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specific interests o f the departments influence their practices (see 
chapter 6). 
T o achieve the J A objectives, the W U A needs to play an active 
role and be and vigilant It is not sufficient i f the W U A only 
participates in the J A but also must encourage users to pay the cess 
without defaults. However, many W U A leaders do not want to 
insist on cess payment. According to them if they insist users to 
pay they will b e less popular and lose chances o f winning in the 
next elections. In the study area I found neither interest nor 
participation o f Agriculture Department in the Joint Azmoish 
process. 
Role o f W U A in cess collection 
T h e role o f the W U A is crucial in both activities o f J A and cess 
collection. I found that only a few W U A s have registered a higher 
percentage o f Jo int Azmoish and in others a huge gap exists 
between the localised command and J A figures. 
F o r example, W U A 173 registered 99 percent o f Jo int Azmoish 
in 2001-02. Whereas, there was no W U A president for 173, as the 
election for the position o f President was withheld due to court the 
litigation. In the absence o f a President, the W U A activities were 
supervised by the Distributary Committee President W U A 171 
was located at the tail end o f Punyapuram major. It showed a huge 
difference between the localised and the Joint Azmoish figures. 
Only 26 percent o f the localised command was reported as 
irrigated. In W U A 172B, the Joint Azmoish was reported as more 
than the localised command (see Table 7.4). 
When compared the levels o f J A reported were higher in 
Kalluru irrigation sub division (which is in head reaches) compared 
to W U A s in Madhira irrigation sub division, within the Madhira 
irrigation sub-division, WUAs 177 ,178 and 179 which were located 
in the head, middle and tail o f the Utukuru major canal-only 
showed 44, 31 and 11 percent o f irrigated area under Joint 
Azmoish respectively. Whereas W U A s 180 and 181 on Madhira 
major canal showed 96 and 92 percent respectively. The tail end 
W U A s on Nidanapuram major W U A s reported lower rates o f J A . 
What does this pattern suggest? 
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TABLE 7.4: Cess Collection in Kalluru and Madhira Irrigation Sub-division 
(2001-2002) 
WUA 
CCA Joint 
'mentt 
Cess demand Collection 
Percentage 
ha Aspioisb AleJoint Aspta shin million Kr 
Kalluru I rtigati ion Subdivision (DC 14) 
169 2214 1963 89 0.94 0.44 47 
170 1497 858 57 0.41 0.28 68 
171 1631 422 26 0.19 0.12 64 
172A 1491 1330 89 0.60 0.25 42 
172B 1199 1307 109 0.59 0.23 39 
173 1803 1784 99 0.86 035 41 
174 2549 2434 95 1.17 0.54 46 
175 2447 1670 68 0.77 037 48 
176 2309 1922 83 0.84 0.27 32 
Madhira I rrigat ion Subdivision (DC 15) 
177 2106 917 44 0.40 0.15 38 
178 2942 910 31 030 0.14 48 
179 1546 168 11 0.04 0.01 19 
180 2019 1940 96 0.40 0.20 50 
181 1985 1830 92 0.06 0.02 41 
182 2040 1906 93 0.62 0.12 19 
183 2810 480 17 0.17 0.10 46 
184 2535 320 13 0.08 0.03 43 
185 2459 170 7 0.04 0.01 29 
Source: Discussion with WUA leaders and Kalluru and Madhira irrigation sub-
division records up to 2032002 
I also tried to understand the correlation between the J A and 
cess collected during the year 2001-2002. The assumption is that i f 
J A is properly conducted it would lead better to cess collection. 
While analysing, I did not find any correlation. For example, W U A s 
180,181 and 182 reported more than 90 percent o f J A but only 50, 
41 and 19 percent in terms o f cess collection. 
Discussions with the three W U A presidents suggest that they 
were not in favour o f cess collection and also did not actively 
participate in the J A . In this case, all three WUAs are supervised by 
the same competent authority. The discussions with him suggest 
that he paid extra attention to monitoring and at the same time 
argued with the concerned Revenue colleagues to report the 
correct figures. That is the reason for the higher percentage o f J A 
figures. However, the assistant engineer said that he could not 
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ensute the cess collection as it was not within his powers. Cess 
collection can only be improved if the W U A s take an interest in J A 
and cess collection. H e claims that W U A leaders are not interested 
in either J A or in cess collection. 
I assume that the better results o f J A recorded in few W U A s 
were due to the active participation o f W U A leaders and /or 
irrigation competent authorities. At the same time the W U A s 
which recorded better J A showed poor performance in terms o f 
cess collection (see Table 7.5 and 7.6). That means better J A does 
not necessarily lead to better collection o f water cess. I f the better 
results o f J A are attributed to the participation o f WUAs , why did 
they fail in ensuring cess collection? 
The irrigation bureaucrats who took an interest in J A could not 
show the same in cess collection as it is not their mandate. They are 
not responsible to explain the reasons for the low rate o f cess 
collections. The W U A leaders also felt enforcing cess payment as a 
threat to their leadership. Some o f the W U A s leaders stated that 
they could not be involved in the cess collection because they 
cannot ensure the water supply. The Revenue department acted on 
its own. A s a result the provisions o f the Act could not be utilised 
by the WUAs . This leads us to ask whether users participated and 
are willing to pay the cess irrespective o f W U A leaders', irrigation 
and revenue bureaucrats interests. Theoretically, i f they were 
satisfied with the irrigation services, they should be willing and pay 
the cess. 
Are farmers willing to pay? 
The farmers' willingness to pay the cess is direcdy proportional to 
the services provided by the W U A . 2 7 The farmers' responses 
(across the head, middle and tail reaches) show that they are willing 
to pay the revised water cess i f they receive g o o d service. T o 
present an example.* 
The farmers from Korlagudem village in WUA 172A located at the 
head reach, and Kesavapuram farmers in WUA 171 located on the 
tail reaches of Punyapuram major expressed alike that they will pay 
the cess to WUA in advance, if the WUA provides water supply at 
the right time and in the right quantities. In the fanners' words, we 
are producing 30-35 bags of paddy per acre in Kbarif season with 
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uncertain water availability. One bag (75-80kg) of paddy costs Rs 
400 even under the lowest market price. If there would be assured 
water supply, we can produce up to 40-45 bags. We are ready to 
pay one bag of paddy or its cost to the association. 
The farmers are even willing to pay double the current water 
cess Le. Rs 500 per ha o f wet crop i f water supply is assured. They 
believe that, with the assurance o f water in time in the right 
quantities, total production per acre can be increased with the same 
amount o f labour input They repeatedly stressed that they are 
ready to pay one bag o f paddy per acre (2.5 bags for ha) to the 
association or to the government in advance o f the season. 
The W U A Presidents also confirm that, if water supply is 
assured in time and quantity, they would ensure the collection o f 
water cess from the farmers. They blame the water supply as 
erratic, and unreliable. They did not reflect on their role and lack o f 
cooperation between W U A leaders in water supply, but argue that 
supplying water is controlled by the Irrigation Depar tment 
Land use pattern and Records 
In the study area, I observed that the land records were not 
updated according to the changes in land use pattern. In some 
cases, the area under irrigation is over reported and in other under 
reported. I discuss the case o f I ingala and Yerraboinapally villages 
in KaHuru irrigation sub-division. 
The villages o f I ingala and Yerraboinapally were represented in 
Yerraboinapally revenue village. They were declared as two 
separate Gram Panchayats in 1995 according to the villagers. As a 
result, the land records need to be updated village wise as they now 
represent separate Panchayats. The fact is that the records are yet 
to be updated. The total land available for cultivation in these two 
villages is identified as 1200 ha. The irrigated land falls under 
jurisdictions o f W U A s 174 and 175. Out o f 1200 ha, it was 
reported that a total o f 283 ha in 1998-1999, 324 ha in 1999-2000 
and 371 ha in 2000-2001 were irrigated through canal water. It was 
reported that about 197 ha were irrigated by tank irrigation in all 
these years. About 405 ha o f irrigated dry crops receive irrigation. I 
thought there would be a gap or plots that did not received 
irrigation or cultivated. The villagers told m e that they do not have 
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any such plots that are not used. The records show that there was a 
gap-
O n the basis o f discussions with villagers and the Panchayat 
Secretary, I conclude that there have been changes in land use, but 
not recorded. S o m e o f the cultivable land was converted in to 
house plots; brick kilns and used for non-agricultural purposes, 
'which are not accounted for in the revenue records. A s a result, 
there has always been a gap between the situation on the ground 
and the official records. The questions that arise from this are: 
Why did the Panchayat Secretary fail to update the records? Why 
has not there been enough focus on updating the records? Why did 
W U A s not address this issue? 
Gopaladevaboinapally village 
I discuss the case o f Gopaladevaboinapally village in Kalluru 
Mandal to show why and how the differences in reporting serve 
the interests o f participating actors. According to revenue records, 
Gopaladevaboinapally village holds 216 ha out o f which 211 ha is 
recorded as irrigated dry. Discussions with farmers suggest that 
about half o f the command area that belongs to the village is under 
wet paddy cultivation. The Irrigation Department records o f 2001-
2002, show that 130 ha were irrigated under Lingala and 
Gopaladevaboinapalli minors. My field survey for 2002 Kbarif 
season under Lingala and Gopaladevaboinapalli minors shows 
about eighty percent wet irrigation as the area fall the under head 
reach o f the Madhira branch canaL The point here is that the 
Revenue Department continues to record most part o f the land as 
irrigated dry. The Irrigation department records at least half o f the 
area as irrigated. The villagers' statements and my own field data 
suggest that about eighty percent o f the area receives irrigation. 
F rom the above villages cases I derive the evidence that even 
after introduction o f the J A there were no attempts to match the 
data sets and collection practices. More importantly, there was no 
coordination among the Irrigation, Revenue, Agriculture and W U A 
representatives. In both the cases, the role o f W U A is not visible. 
When I discussed this issue with the W U A leaders, they have 
agreed that they could enforce neither the provisions o f A P F M I S 
Act (with the government staff) nor the participating bureaucrats to 
take an interest in i t The leaders also claimed that the size o f the 
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Name of the WUA  J 
jocaUsed Comma 
0>a) 
nd No of 
Villages 
No of 
Mandals 
No of 
Districts 
177 CK-kondum 2107 1 2 1 
178Utukutu 2943 8 2 2 
179 Smp-ifarn 1547 7 1 1 
180 Penugolanu-I 2020 5 1 1 
181 Maturu-1 1985 6 1 1 
182 Penugolanu-II 2040 5 1 1 
183 Maturu-n 2815 8 1 1 
184Dendukutu 2536 9 2 1 
185 Meenavolu 2460 7 3 2 
Source: Records of WUA in Madbira irrigation sub division, Madhira. 
In contrast, my discussions with the T C members illustrate that 
they are interested in participating the Joint Azmoish, but were 
never encouraged by their W U A Presidents or department staff. 
Many o f them reported that they never knew that they could 
participate in the Joint Azmoish. That suggests majority o f the 
W U A s did not allow them to co-ordinate the Joint Azmoish 
process. 
Size Argument 
During the discussions most o f the W U A leaders agreed that they 
failed to conduct the Joint Azmoish process . The main reasons that 
they gave are: the scale o f the W U A and the lack o f co-operation 
from the revenue officials. Since the command o f the W U A falls in 
to more than one village, the W U A has to work with many revenue 
officials to complete the J A process. It is further complicated if the 
W U A command falls under more than one revenue Mandal and 
District (see Table 7.5). 
The W U A leaders on M B C claimed that the bureaucracy is not 
willing to accept them as partners in the J A process. The W U A 
leaders further complain that the results o f J A would have been 
more positive i f the Territorial Cornmittee (TQ members o f the 
W U A took an active role in the Joint Azmoish. Some o f the W U A 
Presidents shared that they do not have time and also they cannot 
motivate farmers to pay the cess. 
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W U A Presidents were neither interested in participating nor 
wanted the T C members to participate. 
The Competent Authority view 
I discuss in this section how the competent authorities viewed their 
role in conducting the Joint Azmoish. They also put forward the 
size argument I analyse the case o f Punyapuram major in Kalluru 
irrigation sub division. Under the Punyapuram major canal, three 
water users associations have been formed. The total length o f the 
major canal is 15 km. The total localised command o f the major is 
4,701ha. About twenty revenue villages fall under the command o f 
major canalThe competent authority (assistant engineer) supervises 
these three WUAs , assisted by two Work Inspectors (one post was 
vacant at that time) and seven Luskars. According to the 
departmental guidelines, one Luskar is provided for every 600 ha to 
assist in day-to-day irrigation management 
A competent authority from Kalluru irrigation subdivision 
claimed that in order to conduct the Joint Azmoish two times in a 
year (that is after Kharif and Rabi crops) he had to work out a plan 
to work with as many as twenty Panchayat Secretaries and leaders 
from three WUAs. According to the engineer, it was not feasible 
for him to follow the procedures instructed by the government 
orders due to the number o f villages and time available to complete 
the process. The engineer shared that he cannot participate in all 
the joint inspections/surveys but delegates subordinates (that is 
Work Inspector) to participate in the survey. H e claims that the J A 
is only feasible if W U A s take an active role in the process. With 
this view, every one seems to point to others for the failure o f the 
J A process. In the flowing I analyse the basis for these claims. 
The Practices 
The Work Inspector (Wl) o f the Irrigation Department prepares a 
statement every week using the information provided by Luskars 
o n the type o f crop sown and extent o f area irrigated. I observed 
that the Luskars report every day regarding the water supply under 
each oudet in their jurisdiction. I did not see them using any format 
or maps with survey numbers. I would say the data process is more 
on the basis o f experience and estimations. The Work Inspector 
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compiles the information outlet wise and submits this to the 
competent authority. In the case o f Punyapuram, the Work 
Inspector did not have statistics o f detailed irrigated plots with him. 
T h e competent authority (in this case the assistant engineer) in turn 
put those numbers in a format and submitted the report to the 
Deputy Executive Engineer. The data compiled at irrigation sub 
division level are then submitted to the Executive Engineer who 
heads the irrigation division. Then the data goes up in the 
hierarchy. This same data becomes the basis for the Joint Azmoish. 
The mandatory involvement o f W U A s in the Joint Azmoish has 
further added a new dimension to the reporting practices. In 
present practice, both irrigation and revenue staff prepare their 
records separately. Instead o f making a physical survey (Joint 
Azmoish) on an agreed date, a meeting is held in the village 
secretary's office-cum residence to finalise already prepared 
statements. A final list emerges out o f the negotiation between the 
parties. The list prepared by the revenue staff is taken as final after 
a few adjustments. The rule o f thumb to decide the total irrigated 
area is the rainfall pattern in a particular year. I f the rainfall was 
better than the preceding year, the irrigated area is reported as 
increased by 10 to 15 percent In case o f low rainfall, the figures 
will be adjusted accordingly. Then the record (proforma) is sent to 
the concerned WCJA president through the Luskar to get a 
signature on i t Once the W U A President signed on the prepared 
report, the Joint Azmoish is formally completed. This process 
suggests that the physical verification o f plots in each season by the 
members o f participating agencies is amended in the process by 
securing consent o f the participating actors. Whereas, i f even a 
single actor denies the consent, the results could be different 
Case ofRapigudem WUA 
The total localised command o f Rajugudem W U A no 174 is 2,550 
ha. The W U A jurisdiction covers eight revenue villages falling 
under two revenue Mandals in two different districts. About 526 ha 
falls under Kalluru Mandal (Khammam District), and the rest o f 
the command falls under Tiruvuru Mandal (Krishna District). The 
W U A president reported that the association had received R s 
100,000 as its share o f cess from the Tiruvuru MandaL The money 
was credited in the bank account o f the association in two 
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instalments in May and August 2001. The W U A did not receive 
any amount from K h a m m a m Revenue Mandal office for the same 
year. 
The W U A president said that he tried his best to coordinate 
with eight village secretaries, so that J A could be undertaken after 
the Kbarif crop in 2002. According to him, he failed to reach 
consensus among the officers. Coordinating and finalising the 
dates, which are basic to carry out the J A , proved to be difficult 
T h e W U A president questioned that " I am not aware whether I am 
empowered to call for a joint survey or n o t I f the representatives 
o f the participating agency failed to report what rights does the 
W U A has to finalize the survey". A s a result, the W U A could not 
carry out a Joint Azmoish as suggested by the A c t 
According to the Act, joint signature(s) are obligatory. T h e 
revenue officials from Tiruvuru approached the W U A president 
for his signature on the format already prepared. The President 
refused to put his signature on the statement. Instead, he asked for 
the plot numbers that did not receive canal water so that he could 
verify the plots. H e believed that there was underreporting. After 
further negotiation, the revenue officials o f Tiruvuru had to 
increase the final figure. Whereas, according to the W U A President 
the Kalluru revenue officials neither approached him nor asked for 
his signature. The President shared that 
Due to my efforts out of 2549 ba of localised command of the 
WUA, 2434 ha (Le. 95%) was shown as the Joint Azmoish figure. 
However I could not enforce the farmers to pay the full cess. 
Regarding fund transfer also I took a special interest I had to go 
and meet personally the concerned Mandal revenue officials to 
speed up the process of funds transfer to the association bank 
account but could not succeed much. 
What can be concluded from the field observations? The size 
argument that is put forward by W U A leaders and participating 
bureaucrats is not convincing. I f the T C members are encouraged 
to participate it would be quite possible for the W U A to implement 
the J A Decentralisation o f responsibilities and powers are within 
the W U A is much needed. A s t h e . Panchayat Secretary is 
responsible for a single village it should not be a problem for 
him/her to participate. In case o f the competent irrigation 
authority (along with the subordinate staff), it should be possible 
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though he had to supervise about 20 villages as he would not have 
any other administrative work during that time. I could not analyse 
the reasons for the lack o f participation o f agriculture department 
staff as they were not available to discuss. The field evidence shows 
that the formal policy got subverted during local practices that are 
guided by actor interests. 
Role o f Panchayat Secretary 
A s a result o f the policy changes in January 2002 at the village 
administration level, the villages under the Madhira branch canal 
received newly appointed Panchayat Secretaries. In some cases the 
old V A O s were reappointed as Panchayat Secretaries. The changes 
initially were not conducive for implementation o f J A in the state. 
T h e changes affected cess collection because many Panchayat 
Secretaries did not have prior experience in dealing with land and 
revenue issues. 
The discussions with the newly appointed Panchayat Secretaries 
showed that they were new to the system and were expected to 
carry out multiple activities. They were neither enthusiastic nor 
clear about their role in the J A process. The V A O s who were re-
appointed as Panchayat Secretaries told m e that the W U A s will not 
be able to do the job o f cess collection (as policy wanted), as 
farmers will not pay to the WUA. The new secretaries claim that 
the W U A is not 'powerful' like the Revenue Department The 
secretaries knew about the A P F M I S Act but not read i t These 
remarks show the attitude o f the revenue bureaucracy towards the 
W U A and its role in the J A and cess collection. 
Politics o f cess collection 
In this section, I further discuss the possible linkages between 
the mechanism of cess collection and the reforms that were 
introduced in the Revenue Department Though there were 
organisational changes at village level, the Revenue Department is 
still arguably the most powerful department in the government 
administration. The department enjoys a historical monopoly over 
management o f natural resources like land and water at village 
level Land is a crucial asset for food production and a key factor 
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for livelihood security. The department derives its power from the 
management o f land resources and related information that it 
maintains. The revenue bureaucrats at village level maintain 
interpersonal relationships with the elite farmers and local 
politicians. A s a result they play an important role in the village 
governance and politics. 
In the absence o f active role by the W U A leaders, past practices 
o f cess collection continued. A s expected by the policy, no visible 
increase in the rate o f collection has been achieved. A t the same 
time, the organisational reforms in revenue administration caused 
confusion and further delays. In addition, the farmers are not 
willing to pay cess and continue to default either with the 
cooperation o f the local revenue staff or in expectation o f waiver 
(maß) o f the cess by the ruling governments. 
The village-level revenue staff, during the discussions expressed 
that, in years o f g o o d rainfall and harvest farmers do not hesitate to 
pay the irrigation cess. In a bad year they wait and expect the 
government to declare a cess holiday. According to the rules, a 
farmer is allowed to pay a certain amount, (usually more than half 
o f the total amount to be paid in a year) and can obtain a receipt 
from the officer. The rest o f the cess money will be carded over to 
the next year as balance to be paid. In mos t cases the farmers keep 
some portion o f the cess as a debt in expectation o f the 
government to write off their cess debts. This is locally called as 
maß (no need to pay the existing debt to the government). I argue 
that this particular user practice is an outcome shaped by the past 
government populist policies under different regimes. The 
governments tried to write off the debts in order seek farmers' 
support and enhance the vote base in rural pockets o f the state. 
The revenue staff told me that, under the Revenue Acts, still the 
failure to pay the cess could lead to prosecution. Targets were fixed 
for the village revenue staff to collect the cess. They, in t u m report 
to the Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO). The M R O , in turn, reports 
to the District Collector. The total revenue collection reported 
from a district could illustrate the performance o f the Collector. 
Hence there is a pressure from the District administration for 
higher revenue collections. The pressure translates from the top 
administration to the village level revenue staff T o meet the targets 
o f cess collection the Panchayat Secretary (VAO in the past) 
depends on big farmers. That provides a bargaining opportunity 
for the big farmers. 
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The Kalluru revenue officer during a discussion snared that 
there were occasions when V A O s paid the cess from their own 
pockets to meet the targets and later they collected these from the 
farmers. It was dear to me from the discussions that the 
underreporting o f irrigated area by the Revenue Department, is 
mainly to meet the unaccounted expenses incurred by the lower-
level revenue bureaucracy. In the words o f one revenue official: 
'these practices are an open fact, known to everyone and continued 
right from British time'. 
In addition, the records were not updated and common formats 
were not followed. In revenue records, the lands which were 
recorded as uplands continue to exist as uplands. In practice some 
o f them have been levelled by the farmers and receive irrigation 
water. These plots are still recorded as 'non-irrigated' providing a 
scope for manipulation. The changes in the land use pattern are not 
recorded in the revenue records. For example, if a farmer had to 
pay for x acres o f wet crop, in the record it will be shown as x-a 
acres o f wet crop. The difference between x and x-a will not be 
charged and the benefit is shared between the farmer and the 
revenue official (see Jairath 2001). During drought situations, 2 8 
there will be no pressure from the government and cess collection 
is not carried o u t During these years, head reach farmers who 
might receive some water, also get the benefit o f exemption. 2 9 
The cess collection varied from year to year. The evidence on 
low rates o f cess collection was not only specific to my fidd 
research area, but also exists in other parts o f the state. 3 0 Another 
aspect that I could not analyse was the administrative costs o f 
water cess collection. My guess is that, at present, the 
administrative costs to collect the cess are higher than the cess 
collected by the revenue bureaucracy. The performance o f cess 
collection is not only influenced by physical factors like acute water 
shortages and drought but also institutional and political factors. 
T h e process o f J A and cess collection reflects the interests o f the 
partidpating actors and pol ides o f the ruling governments. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The current practices o f cess collection and payments are very 
much rooted in past pol ides ; and social relations and recent 
reforms have not been able to transform them. Understanding the 
204 The PoBtics efPoBcy 
pattern o f cess collection requires an analysis o f data series as the 
dues from the previous year are brought over to the next year. 
Hence the point that needs to be distinguished is whether the 
number o f users paying the cess has increased or, whether just a 
few users are paying the full cess. 
Increasing the water charge prices is not the solution in the 
absence o f assured supplies. The reform programme could not 
address suffitientiy these two mterliriked issues t e . assurance o f 
water delivery and cess payment 
T h e field evidence show that the rate o f cess collection has not 
improved even after introduction o f J A under the reform. The 
majority o f the W U A leaders did not show interest in the cess 
collection for their own political reasons. Though a few o f the 
W U A presidents were interested in J A , the partidpating 
bureaucrats were not interested in facilitating the process . 3 1 The 
degree o f control over the process by the W U A s was also limited. 
The partidpating bureaucrats and departments have been able t o 
continue their earlier practices and defend their interests by not 
partidpating in the process. There seems to be a common 
understanding between the officials and their practices, and none 
o f them have taken any initiative to improve the process. A s a 
result they continued to use different formats to report the 
command statistics, and hence the problem o f under reporting 
continued. 
I conclude that a host o f institutional and political factors 
influenced the implementation o f Jo int Azmoish and subsequendy 
the cess collection in the state. The J A policy is highly prescriptive. 
T h e policy prescribed the rules and expected farmers, irrigation and 
revenue bureaucrats to follow the instructions and procedures. The 
government assumed that the W U A s would function actively and 
that cess collection would increase in the state. It shows the 'policy 
as prescription approach'. However, the implementation o f J A 
confirms that the actors tried to continue their practices and 
interests rather than following the rules prescribed by the policy. 
This implies that actors play an important role in the policy process 
by generating their own ideas and practices. In this case, the 
powerful actors Eke the Revenue Department influence the 
direction o f the poEcy. In the following chapter, I discuss 
bureaucrades as important actors in the reform policy process. 
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1 See Katttiiya: Tie Artbasbastra (1992) Penguin Books: India. 
2 Emperor Akbar during 1556-1605 implemented radical reforms. He 
replaced the payment of taxes in kind by a monetary tax which was no 
longer fixed as a share of the actual but rather of the average yield Thus, 
it was not calculated according to the yield, but according to the area 
sown, and the cropping risk was shifted to the cultivators (Kuhnen 1982: 
59). The system known as Mansabdari system disappeared with the decline 
of Mughal power in the eady 18* century. The officials and others 
grabbed power where they could and became de facto hereditary land 
lords and petty chiefs in their local areas (see Baner jee and Iyer 2005). 
3 For a detailed discussion see Siddiqui (1989). 
4 In 1765, the office of 'dewan' for Bengal, Otissa, and Bihar, namely the 
financial sovereignty for these areas, was assigned to the [East India] 
Company with the concession for levying taxes in exchange for a global 
sum of Rs. 2.6 million per annum After sometime of experimentation, in 
1793, Lord Comwallis' Permanent Settlement brought a final regulation 
of the procedure for levying taxes, which led to decisive changes in land 
tenure (Kuhnen 1982:60,61). 
5 Changes in land tenure occurred in this region under the stewardship of 
a brilliant Prime Minister, Sir Salar Jung, who held office from 1853 to 
1883. Salar Jung abolished the farming out of land revenue collection to 
money lenders, placed government servants on salaries, and established a 
government treasury. To disengage government from the control of local 
money-lenders and court nobles, he brought in administrators from 
North India. But after his death, the core of the regime disintegrated into 
stalemated factional conflict (Elliott 1974:29). 
6 Mollinga (2003) discusses three different meanings for the concept of 
protective irrigation. 1. as a general term denoting insurance against 
drought and famine by irrigation Z as a finance-administrative class of 
works in colonial irrigation policy and 3. as a specific type of ir ligation. 
T o provide another example, the British declared the Kurnool-Cuddapah 
(K-C) canal project as a financial catastrophe. The government faced a 
dilemma, when the local farmers were eager to lease project land provided 
they could grow sugarcane with perennial irrigation. The British engineers 
allowed wet cropping at the head reaches. It did raise some revenue to the 
government in contrast to the objectives for which the project had been 
built The Inspector General of Agriculture described the results to the 
Irrigation Commission of 1901-03. The project, he said, had created a 
'class of speculative landholders' that had been largely benefited by a 
project that did nothing for most of the farmers it was meant to serve. 
The pattern of dominance of wet crops at the head and tail end 
deprivation became a familiar phenomenon. 
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8 King Lalitaditya of Kashmir is stated to have suggested to his successors 
to 'tax the agriculturists so heavily that they should have with them corn 
just sufficient for the current year'. Under King Sankaravarmani of that 
kingdom, it is said that 'the taxation was so heavy that people were left 
only with air to live upon'. There are records saying that the agriculturists 
of some villages in Tanjore district |in present Tamil Nadu state] gave up 
all cultivation as a protest against heavy taxation (see Altekar 1972). 
Several revolts occurred in northern India. Imposition of uniform revenue 
rate in Bhakkar in 1575-76 increased the oppression of peasants. As a 
result the Mangcha tribe revolted and killed the tax gatherers, though they 
were defeated later and expelled from their land. The Damodar Canal Tax 
Movement occurred in the late 1930s in Bengal The Bengal Development 
Act 1935 created a serious popular discontent in the canal areas of the 
river Damodar due to charging of an irrigation levy (for a detailed 
discussion see Choudhary 2000). 
9 For example: in the northern region, the Northern Indian Canal and 
Drainage Act, 1873, amended from time to time, governs the States of 
Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. The western region 
(Gujarat and Maharashtra) is governed by the Bombay Irrigation Act, 
1879. In the eastern region, the Bengal Irrigation Act, 1896 was applied in 
West Bengal and Bihar. Within the Madras Presidency, the Madras 
Irrigation Cess (Amendment) Act, 1900; the Madras Irrigation (Voluntary 
Cess) Act, 1942; the Madras Irrigation Works (Repairs, Improvement and 
Construction) Act, 1943 and the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Irrigation 
Cess Act, 1865 (Act VLT of 1865). 
1 0 Mokshagundam Visveswaraya, popularly known as Sir M.V, was bom 
in 1860. In 1883, at the age of 23, he stood first in engineering in Mumbai 
and started his career as an Assistant Engineer at Mumbai, Public Works 
Department During 1901 he introduced the Block irrigation system 
After his retirement, he rose to become the Dewan of Mysore (1912-
1918). During 1919-1959 he served the Indian Government in various 
advisory capacities. In 1955, in recognition of his services to national 
development and for the cause of engineering, he was honoured by 
presentation of Bharat Ratna, the co untry's highest award 
1 1 Prior to funding AP irrigation reform programme under AP-III, the 
Wodd Bank financed projects include: Pochampad Irrigation Project; 
Godavari Barrage; Andhra Pradesh Irrigation and Command Area 
Development Composite (AP-1) and Second Andhra Pradesh Irrigation 
(AP-II). The National Water Management Project financed by the Bank 
included an A P component to demonstrate improved network designs in 
six medium schemes. To this list AP-III Irrigation is added with a loan 
commitment of U.S $325 million and the irrigation component of APERP 
(source: Centre for Environment Concerns (NGO) Reports). 
1 2 Originally applied in colonial India through tie Northern India Canal and 
Drainage Act of 1873, the laws and infrastructure of Warabandi remain in 
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place in the Punjab Province of Pakistan, and in India, in the states of 
Punjab and Hatyana, and parts of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. The 
system is designed to provide a rationed and equitable service fin 
proportion to landholding) to all farmers under conditions of extreme 
water scarcity (see Perry and Narayanamurthy 1998) 
1 3 These issues and concerns were recognised in many policy documents 
like the Irrigation Utilisation Commission Report of 1912, the Irrigation 
Commission Report of 1972 and the National Water Policy documents of 
1987 and 200Z The national policy envisages farmer involvement in 
management, particularly in water distribution, system maintenance and 
collection of -water charges. Pant (1986) argues that the term 'farmer 
participation' has been replaced by 'farmer organisation' in irrigation 
policy discussions on the assumption that participation results from 
effective farmer organizations. Hence the policy efforts were directed 
more towards the formation of -water users associations. 
1 4 Land reform measures have been in operation in India for more than 
four decades. Research results show the insignificant results particularly 
with regard to the redistribute objective of land reforms. The reasons 
could be that those who formulated the policies" were either themselves 
landlords or their representatives. The dominant landed groups began to 
infiltrate through political defection whichever political party was in 
power in their respective states. Once entered in to ruling party, it is easy 
for these groups to resort to pressure tactics in order to delay the effective 
implementation of the stringent land reform measures (see Thimmaiah 
and Aziz 1983). 
1 5 The 1986 Act, introduced by the NTR government, provided for 
greater decentralisation by creating a larger number of smaller mandals 
(sub-district administeative units). In the history of Panchayati Raj 
legislation, the introduction of this Act can be described as a move to 
further decentralisation of government administration, TbeAndbra Pradesh 
Mandala Prqja Parishads (MPP), Zilk Prqja Patisbads (ZPPJ and Zilla Prana&ka 
Abhimtdbi Sameeksha Act, 1986 abolished 330 panchayat samitis and 
created 1104 mandal praja parishads in their place. The mandal praja 
parishad was created for a group of villages with a population of thirty-
five to fifty thousand. 
1 6 The system was introduced by Chandra Babu Naidu government 
through G.O.Ms.No.369 dated 12 December 2001, issued by the 
Panchayat Raj and Rural Development (MDLI1) Department, 
Government of Andhra Pradesh. The earlier changes to the revenue 
administration /system were also by the same party but by the (late) 
N.T.Ramana Rao. This system was already in vogue in Indian states like 
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat 
1 7 The functions are: Community welfare and development, Policing, 
Mandal parishad, Office, Coordination, Motivation, Revenue, Self-help 
groups, Election and Miscellaneous functions. 
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1 8 The Association got a permanent membership to the State Joint Staff 
Council only in 2004. Government Order no 347 issued in October 2004 
(under the Congress government) enables leaders of the association to 
represent problems of the employees and also attend the meeting of the 
council ( source: The Hindu, October 27,2004) 
1 9 The Chief Minister N.T.Rama Rao also introduced another popular 
land policy Le. a crash programme of assignment of lands to tribal under 
the name Telugu Girijana Magani Samaradhana (TGMS). The policy was 
launched in 1986. Additional revenue and survey staff were sanctioned for 
this purpose. TGMS was viewed as a good policy intervention of the 
Government to promote the tribal development by minimizing the 
conflicts and to increase the productivity of the land. These records are 
known as Ramanna records in the tribal villages. The tribals used to 
demand for these records in the local Mandal revenue offices as they 
provide details of land ownership. 
2 0 Registration is carried out at the office of the Sub-Registrar of 
Assurances. In AP there are 387 Sub-Registrar offices that register 
approximately 1.2 million documents per year. Registration to document 
changes in ownership and transactions involving immovable property is 
governed by the Indian Stamp Act of 1899. Deeds of various kinds are 
required by law to be written on stamp paper of prescribed value. Certain 
transactions require a fixed duty. The lack of transparency in property 
valuation under the old system resulted in a flourishing business of 
brokers and middlemen leading to corruption. T o address the corruption 
computerised counters have been introduced in 200 locations across the 
state (source: wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/egov/cardcs.htm). 
2 1 The revenue officer of Kalluru told me that for every one lakh value of 
asset the buyer has to pay about seven thousand rupees as stamp duty to 
the government 
2 2 Pahani or Adangal is a register, which shows the details of the land and 
the name of the cultivator. This register is maintained by the Panchayat 
Secretary. The names of the persons who are cultivating a piece of land 
with in the village jurisdiction are recorded and need to be updated every 
year. The register does not show the ownership of the person who is 
cultivating the plot But farmers attached a certain value to this register 
when I discussed about the practices. The discussions with tenant farmers 
reveal that this record is often not accurate. For example if a plot of land 
was given for tenancy the name of the tenant should be recorded in the 
column provided in the register. But the actual practice is that the owner 
of the land would bribe or provide other incentives to the village secretary 
and see that his/her name will be registered in the register rather the 
tenant name. The fear is that if the tenant name is entered in the register 
for seven consecutive years the owner will lose the ownership of the land 
Due to these practices the tenant's rights are overlooked. 
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2 3 The State is defined as an organised political community -with its 
apparatus of government There are different level of understanding while 
using the terms like state, government, property, ownership, rights and 
duties. To simplify in the Indian context, the 'state' has three organs, the 
legislature, judiciary and the government The term state is hieing confused 
to mean government A nation is some thing organic or natural, but a 
state is conventional ( source: The Advanced Learner's Dictionary of 
current English) 
2 4 A pre-requisite for fixing any water rate is that the water supply to each 
farmer should not only be adequate but also dependable and timely. It has 
been opined by experts that the irrigation water rates should be (a) on 
crop basis, (b) within the paying capacity of the farmer, irrespective of the 
capital investment, (c) differentiated with regard to the category of 
irrigation projects. However, different authorities have suggested 
different criteria for fixing irrigation water charges. These are indicated 
briefly: Irrigation Commission, 1972: The water rate should range between 
five to twelve per cent of the gross income of the farmer, the upper limit 
being twelve per cent It should be within the paying capacity of the 
farmer and should aim at full Utilisation of the available supply; 
Vaidyanathan Committee 1992: The level of cost recovery to be aimed at, in 
the first phase, should at least cover the O&M costs and one per cent 
interest on capital employed The National Commission for Integrated Water 
Resources Development Plan 1999: The water rate should cover the operation 
and maintenance cost plus one per cent of the agricultural income. The 
10A Finance Commission: Irrigation water rate receipts should not only cover 
the operation and maintenance cost but should also cover one per cent 
per annum of the capital investment (source: Revenue Reforms 
Commission, final report, Feb 2004, Government of Karnataka). A full 
fledged monograph on water rates was published in 1988 by the Central 
Water Commission entitled Irrigation Water Rates. For further 
discussions see Prasad and Rao 1991 and Rao 2000. 
2 5 The Ninth Finance Commission recommended an O&M allocation of 
Rs 324 per ha for 1990-95. Actual allocation in AP was only Rs 75 per ha 
in 1990-92. 
2 6 The Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department as Chairman and 
Secretary, Irrigation (CADA) as Convener will head the Review 
Committee. The G.O states there will be 15 members drawn from the 
other government departments including one consultant appointed by the 
government and three nominees from the Apex committee as members. 
The Chief Minister chairs the Apex committee. 
2 7 This relationship may not be true always. As a contingent evaluation 
method it is a good argument, yet can be calibrated with capacity to pay 
issues probably using land size as a proxy. I could not carry out this 
exercise. 
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2 8 According to the Irrigation Commission of India (1972) all districts 
with a normal annual rainfall of 750 mm or less, which experience 25 
percent deficiency of rainfall in at least 20 per cent of the years observed, 
are considered as drought-prone districts. A waiver or reduction on 
charges can be declared From the districts thus identified, those districts 
with assured net irrigation intensity of more than 30 percent are excluded 
from the drought-prone areas. Subsequent modifications by the central 
government have led to 11 districts in Andhra Pradesh being classified as 
drought-prone and 1 district as desert-prone ( source: Chapter 9, Report 
of the Commission on Farmers' Welfare 2005, Government of Andhra 
Pradesh.Source:http://www.macroscan .com/pol/ apr05 / pdf/Fufl_Report 
_ Commission_ Farmer_AP.pdf. 
2 9 A research study done by Jairath (2001) reports that in Mkyakguda 
Revenue Mandal, Nalgonda District (the head reach of Nagatjunasagar 
Left canal, Zone I, Telangana Region) there is a total balance due of more 
than 20.3 millions rupees. The actual cess collection (between 1 July 1998 
to 15 May 1999) was only 4.5 million ie . 5 percent of the total collection. 
The year 1998-99 was a good rainfall year and the Miryalaguda Mandal 
falls in the head reaches of the NSP left canaL Hence, one cannot 
attribute the rainfall as a reason for low rates of cess collection. 
3 0 Another field research study found that due to modernization of the 
K-C canal works, the department was not able to provide water in Rabi 
season. However, the departmental records showed that out of l.llakh 
hectares of CCA under K-C canal, the department was able to provide 
water to 89,474 hectares of Wet and ID cultivation in 2000-2001. The cess 
demand and collection showed that only 2.31 million rupees were 
collected out of a cess demand of 37.55 millions in the year 2000-01, and 
2.2 million were collected as cess out of the demand of 32.7 million. The 
rate of cess collection in these two years was about only 6.1 percent and 
6.6 respectively. The study was conducted by conducted by Dr. Jasveen 
Jairath, Mr. Balaraju Nikku and Mr. Srinivas Sajja in June 2003 and 
supported by SadWATERs, Hyderabad, and Andhra Pradesh. 
3 1 During my revisits to MBC, I came to know that the Joint Azmoish did 
not took place for the year 2003-04 as the government declared a crop 
holiday and thus the collection of cess was cancelled 
8 
Public Duties and Social Settings 
...Tim mas some resistance to tins change coming from within the 
Government-tie Irrigation Department They bad got used to the exercise of 
power and Eke anyone else mere reluctant to give it up.. .if irrigation has to be 
maintained, our institutional structures and relationships have to change. 
Chief Minister N. Chandra Babu Naidu 1 
8.11ntroduction 
The use o f the term 'bureaucracy' has often been taken to imply a 
rigid red-tape bound organisation 2 (Ham and Hill 1985:147). A 
bureaucrat is defined as an official perceived as being overly 
concerned with procedural correctness. In this chapter, for the 
purpose o f the analysis, I use bureaucracy not as a normative 
concept but as an analytical concept 
The earlier studies on Andhra Pradesh irrigation reform initially 
focused on the reform approach, implementation and politics (see 
Parthasarathy 1998; Jairath 1999; Venkateswarulu 1999; Raju 2001; 
Mollinga 2002; Reddy 2002). The specific role o f the irrigation 
bureaucracy and its engagement with the policy process has not 
been focused on. This chapter aims to contribute to the 
understanding o f bureaucracy and its role in the A P irrigation 
reform policy and programme. 
In this chapter, I discuss how irrigation bureaucrats tried to 
follow official rules but were unaccountable at the same time to 
achieve the policy goals. I analyse in detail the day-to-day 
engagement o f especially the middle and lower-level irrigation 
bureaucrats with the reform policy. I discuss the changes that the 
reform policy aimed to bring about in the irrigation agency, and 
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how the bureaucracy responded to these policy changes. I was 
interested to understand: how much resistance or opposition could 
these bureaucrats mobilise prior to implement the various rules o f 
the reform policy? 
I try to show h o w the bureaucratic engagement with reform 
policy took place and shaped the policy process. In other words: 
how has the reform policy been viewed, altered and shaped by the 
irrigation bureaucracy and vice versa? I especially focus on how 
lower level bureaucrats responded and adapted to new roles, and 
how much their actions mattered in the policy process. H o w did 
the irrigation bureaucracy engage with a reform policy that 
explicidy aimed at the decentralisation o f its powers? In answering 
these questions, I try to expand the analysis beyond rent seeking 
behaviour 3 o f the canal irrigation bureaucrats and study their 
actions at different levels in the policy space. 
The chapter is organised in four sections. 4 After this 
introductory section, in section 8.2, I elaborate the nature o f the 
Indian bureaucracy, especially the irrigation bureaucracy. In 
section 8.3,1 discuss the individual and collective resistance by the 
bureaucrats to different policy provisions. I analyse interests, 
actions and motivations o f the irrigation bureaucrats and show how 
their actions have influenced the policy processes. T o analyse 
perceptions and actions at different levels o f bureaucracy, 
interviews were conducted with a few senior bureaucrats (Involved 
in policy formulation, monitoring and based in the state capital) 
and with middle and lower-level bureaucrats who are involved in 
implementation at local level. 5 In the concluding section, I present 
the results o f the analysis and implications for the policy process . 
8.2 Bureaucracy and Policy 
Freedman (1976) argues that there is rarely a single rational policy. 
There are also the genuine problems o f substantive policy. Policy 
by its very nature can look very messy even without the 
complications introduced by self interested and scheming 
bureaucrats. Bureaucratic politics are not, therefore, a necessary, let 
alone a sufficient, condition for policy incoherence (Freedman 
1976: 438). Scholars like Egeberg advanced the understanding o f 
bureaucratic choices or decision making through studying 
bureaucratic structures. Egeberg concludes that most students o f 
Bureaucracy and Irrigation Reform 213 
public administration seem to have focused on behaviour and 
attitudes without relating them expEcidy to bureaucratic structure 
(Egeberg 1999:167). In the current research, I have addressed this 
observation in some measure by studying bureaucrats in different 
hierarchical positions and their engagement with the reform policy. 
Post Colonial Indian bureaucracy 
T h e Indian bureaucracy o f today functions in a context different 
from that o f the colonial bureaucracy. Anant and Mitra analyse that 
that during the post-Independent era, there was a stupendous 
growth in administrative law (delegated legislation) between 1965 
and 1985. This considerably enhanced the power o f the 
bureaucracy on the presumption that higher growth in productivity 
would be possible through growth o f a strong administration. The 
bureaucracy at the same time has to .work with the political 
executive (Anant and Mitra 1998: 34). Hence it is crucial for us to 
understand how politicians and bureaucrats interact 
Bhalerao writes that 'the bureaucracy has to function under 
democratic political leadership. T h e cabinets, legislatures, political 
parties and pressure groups based democratic politics provide the 
framework o f purposes, goals and resources within which the 
bureaucracy has to operate'(l973:62). There is considerable 
literature focusing on the many facets o f relationship between 
bureaucrats and politicians (see Kothari and Roy 1969). It is also 
evident from the literature that the states still need bureaucracies. 
The common observation in this literature is that both the political 
executive and bureaucrats seek to protect and strengthen their 
power. While, doing so, on some occasions they accrjmmodate 
each others interests resulting in a politician-bureaucrat nexus. 
Research evidence is available that the Indian administration shows 
a trend towards politicisation o f administration and its involvement 
in political parties. These phenomena will have a crucial implication 
on the policy process. In the academic Eterature, there is also much 
discussion on bureaucratic behaviour, personalities and culture. 6 
Researchers Eke Tendler (1997) showed that state programmes 
can effectively provide good services to citizens under certain 
conditions. G o o d governance emerged partly because government 
bureaucracy and their subordinates were committed to make their 
work visible and successful Factors Eke motivation, work 
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environment, incentives and job satisfaction influence the 
functioning o f the bureaucracy. These factors increase the success 
o f a programme and their absence may severely affect a 
programme. She argues that policy programmes should not only be 
guided by the need to create accountable public bureaucrats, but 
should be concerned about how to motivate the bureaucrats, so 
that they will be committed to their jobs . Bureaucracy is not a 
homogenous organisation. Within the structure the lower level 
bureaucrats were often ignored in the policy formulation. However, 
their working conditions and views about the policy influence the 
implementation (see I ip sky 1980; Oorthurzen 2003; Makwarimba 
and Vincent 2004). 
Canal Bureaucracy 
T h e Indian canal bureaucracy has enjoyed much power even under 
post-colonial times. The irrigation sector has been monopolised by 
public sector state irrigation departments. The irrigation 
bureaucracy gained control over management o f irrigation systems, 
and management practices were changed to suit the convenience o f 
the irrigation bureaucracy (see Sengupta 1997). In a similar vein 
Wade (1982) documents that: 
Canal officials, on the other hand, have great discretionary power: 
they allocate big money for maintenance contracts; they are 
responsible for rationing a valuable input between competing users, 
who have (officially) to pay much less than they would be prepared 
to pay for it rather than go without; and the officials make decisions 
•which impinge heavily on the political prospects of politicians and 
on the economic well being of local communities. 
A report o f W o d d Bank and Government of India reports that 
'the irrigation departments are generally viewed as centralised, 
bureaucratic, isolated, and financially dependent on state 
government funds. The departments are not accountable to the 
end beneficiaries i.e. the farmers. Their emphasis tends to be on 
system construction rather than operation and maintenance o f 
existing projects' (Wodd Bank & G O I 1999). Experiences from 
other parts o f the w o d d have shown that there is a point beyond 
which government bureaucracies become an impediment, rather 
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than an mstrument for successful implementation o f reform 
programmes. 
Evidence is available that in countries like Pakistan and 
Indonesia, the irrigation bureaucracies were successful in 
neutralising the reform efforts that were undertaken (Merrey et al 
forthcoming). Rap et al 2004 showed the crucial role o f irrigation 
bureaucracy in Mexican irrigation reforms. They argued that in the 
process not only the organisation o f irrigation management was 
changed, but in the bargain the water bureaucracy also regained lost 
autonomy. In the following section, I show the interface or 
engagement between the irrigation bureaucracy and reform policy 
in the state o f Andhra Pradesh. 
8.3 Reform Policies at the Bureaucratic Interface 
In the preceding chapters, I showed how middle level bureaucrats 
retained control over irrigation works and Joint Azmoish (see 
Chapters 5 and 7). I showed in chapter 6, how the W U A s lost an 
opportunity to gain control over the water distribution. In this 
section, I explain how the bureaucrats individually and collectively 
negotiated, bargained and aligned with the reform policy. 7 The 
irrigation bureaucrats retained their traditional control over 
different activities o f irrigation management by using their 
technical, managerial skills and bureaucratic power collectively (see 
Table 8.1).The engagement o f the bureaucracy as a collective is 
evident in the form of lobbying for additional powers, resistance to 
government orders and challenging the state orders. In the 
following, I discuss the collective resistance or actions o f the 
bureaucrats while engaging with the policy. 
Public Consultations 
The government issued a white paper on irrigation that was 
followed by a three-fold increase o f water charges in August 1996 
(see chapter7). T o determine a suitable framework for increasing 
farmer participation, a series o f public consultations were 
conducted throughout the state in most major irrigation commands 
(see Peter 2001). The objective o f the public consultations was to 
share the contents o f the draft reform policy and elicit public 
T A B L E 8.1: Policy prescription and actual practice 
Activities Pre reform practice Reform period (expected roles) Actual practice 
Operation and 
Maintenance 
I & CAD department with 
assistance of field 
functionaries 
WU As/DCs with assistance of competent 
authorities (CA)/ Irrigation Department (I.D) 
Operation is still with I.D. WUAs and DCs involved in 
maintenance with funds provided by the state. 
Distribution of 
Water 
Department up to the 
oudet level 
WUAs in assistance with TC members and users Major role played by the LD. Structures and control measures still under the operation of the LD 
Cropping 
pattern 
According to the 
Localisation Freedom of crop choice 
Localization is not relevant and practised. WUAs do not have a 
say in crop choice. Individual farmers can decide crop. 
Execution of 
works 
By ID through tenders/ 
contractor 
WUA as a corporate body (rule 12 of the APFMIS 
ace). Transparency by displaying financial details at 
different locations in ayacut villages. 
Contractorship is still evident and total transparency has not been 
achieved. 
Minimum 
rehabilitation 
works 
I & CAD department with 
limited grants @ Rs 100 
per ha. 
WUAs and DCs. No power to alter or interfere 
designed hydraulic particulars. The CA: prepares 
estimates & sanctions administrative approval. 
President or T C members of WUAs felt that the works have to 
be carried out by them only hence the works are carried out by 
them in the name of the WUA. 
Collection 
of water cess 
RD & ID prepare separate 
crop demand lists. 
Underreporting of ayacut 
Joint Azmoish with ID, WUAs and RD and 
Agricultural Department (AD). The WUA can levy 
additional water fee. 
The RD collects cess. ID prepares crop demand list WUA 
participation discouraged. Delays in transfer of share of cess to 
WUAs. 
Conflict 
resolution 
Irrigation department (ID) 
and Revenue department 
(RD) 
WUA holds right to take action on any offence by 
users (under rule 23 of the APFMIS act). On 
conviction violator be punished with imprisonment 
up to 2 years or fine up to Rs 5000 or both 
Evidence that users (most of the cases) depend upon the village 
elders and/or Revenue Department(RD) and sometimes go to 
the police 
Audit of funds 
Auditors of the 
Department Social audit by the members of the WUA 
WUAs conducted social audits, but failed to submit audited 
accounts. 
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opinion. F o r the purpose the government hired retired senior 
irrigation bureaucrats as consultants in June 1996. T h e lured 
consultants conducted meetings with farmers and irrigation staff at 
the irrigation circle and division levels, and provided feedback to 
the government Initially, the consultations met with severe 
cynicism and indifference from both farmers and agency staff 
(Peter 2001). 
In contrast to the senior level bureaucrats view 8 , the discussions 
with irrigation bureaucrats at the irrigation circle and division level 
suggest that the consultation meetings did not yield the expected 
results. They stated that the meetings were conducted as typical 
government meetings because the hired consultants were senior 
retired engineers. T h e middle and lower level bureaucrats' stated 
that drey were not consulted, or aware o f government intentions. 
They saw these consultation meetings as a source o f information 
and to understand the government's reform policies. 
The lower bureaucrats or the frontline workers expressed during 
the discussions that they found it difficult to justify their role and 
functions in irrigation management once the PLM programme was 
initiated. They felt that their functions had been transferred to the 
WUAs . Before the introduction o f PLM, they enjoyed the status o f 
being water providers and a source o f information to the farmers. 
They also served as an important link between the farmers and the 
Irrigation Depar tment However, under the new institutional 
arrangements with improved access o f W U A members to higher 
officials in the department, the frontline workers felt as i f they lost 
their importance and power. 
A farmer member who attended the K h a m m a m consultation 
meeting confirms the above view. H e shared with m e that only big 
farmers were invited for these consultation meetings. Since he was 
involved in canal water distribution in the past, he had a chance to 
participate. H e said he was also active member o f the ruling 
political party. 9 
In addition to these consultation meetings, the statements o f the 
Chief Minister regarding the reform programme, publicised widely 
in press and electronic media, served as the main source o f 
information. I conclude that the meetings were only useful to 
inform about the government plans, .but not for seeking 
suggestions from farmers and the irrigation staff at middle and 
lower levels. The real problem lay not in whether or how many, but 
in the process o f conducting consultation meetings. 
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Increased water charges 
Opposit ion regarding the increase o f water charges by the 
government was evident from farmers and political parties, also 
from the street level irrigation bureaucrats. These bureaucrats used 
the information strategically to raise public opinion against the 
government policy. I found that the Work Inspectors and Luskars 
(the street level bureaucrats) took special interest in disseminating 
the government policy o f increased water charges in the command 
villages. I tried to understand what factors made them actively 
share government policy information. Why were the lower level 
bureaucrats interested in disseminating information regarding the 
increase o f water charges? Were they not in support o f the 
government decision, in which they did not participate or 
consulted? What could have been their interest? 
The discussions with Luskars show that they were not in 
support o f the reform and expressed many doubts about its 
implementation. I interpret their actions as hidden resistance 
towards the overall reform policy. 
The farmers resisted the policy and were supported by 
opposition political parties in the state. Responding to the 
resistance, the government first reduced the proposed water cess 
from Rs 875 to Rs 625 per hectare wet cultivation. The issue was 
further discussed in the State Legislative Assembly during the 1997 
Budget sess ion. 1 0 Finally the cess was fixed as R s 500 per ha in the 
case o f the first single wet crop. The Government tried to justify 
the threefold increase o f water charges on the basis o f the feedback 
received from the consultation meetings conducted across the 
state. T h e economic rationale was that a farmer would b e able to 
pay the new cess because it is equivalent to the price o f a single bag 
C70kg) o f paddy. 
The Luskars are seen as the government representatives in the 
command villages. They act as a source o f government (policy) 
information and opinion makers in the irrigation context The 
nature o f their work and their relationship with the farmers gave 
them the opportunity to share policy information. In this case, by 
sharing the new policy information, the lower level irrigation 
bureaucrats have tried to influence the farmers' opinion. I conclude 
that the actions o f these bureaucrats as a strategic move or function 
o f their resistance towards the reform policy. 
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In this section I discussed how the bureaucrats as a pressure group 
resisted government policy collectively when the state wanted to 
shift the position o f the lower level bureaucrats from the Irrigation 
Department to water users associations. Middle level bureaucrats 
have resisted the government orders to provide additional 
supervision at the district level 
The Cose of Luskars 
In 1998, the Government directed that the services o f W i s and 
Luskars should be utilised by the Irrigation Department to assist 
farmers' organisations (WUAs) in their respective areas o f 
operation for the discharge o f their functions under the A P F M I S 
A c t F o r the purpose, the concerned Chief Engineer was requested 
to redeploy the work between the existing Wis and Luskars in such 
a manner as to make available the services of .one or more Luskars 
for each WUA. The Government also proposed another rule 
regarding the method o f payment 1 1 : 
Payment of salary to Luskars shall be made subject to the 
furnishing of a certificate by the concerned farmers' organisation 
President that they had attended to their duties during the month 
(GoRtNo.338 Dated 1Z10.1998). 
T h e government order further stipulates that "the concerned Chief 
Engineer shall complete the process o f reallocation o f the above 
personnel to the farmers' organisations and furnish details to the 
government through the Engineer-in-chief by 30fh o f October 
1998 positively". In the case o f resistance, the government gave 
them three choices: 1.Voluntary retirement scheme; 2. Work 
according to government instructions and 3. Punishment o f erring 
staff by government The order says that the competent authority 
o f a users association shall forward such certificates to the drawing 
officer to enable Luskars to draw their salary. However, the staff 
shall be under the administrative control o f the competent 
authority only. According to a D C President, even before the 
present government order, the W U A leaders demanded that the 
W U A would be provided with additional manpower to carry out its 
activities: 
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Twenty-five WUA Presidents passed a resolution in August 1997, 
immediately after they got elected to the office at Kadam, specifying 
that Luskars should work under WUAs and meet the managing 
committee members regularly. They also made a request to the 
Deputy Executive Engineer of the area to release the salaries of the 
Luskars based on their recommendation or a certificate issued for 
the respective month. Howev er the Luskars opposed the idea. 1 2 
T h e Luskars opposed the government orders and W U A leaders' 
demands. W e are accountable to the government but not to the 
W U A s " i s a common statement given by Work Inspectors (Wis) 
and Luskars. According to the president o f the Luskars union at 
Kalluru division office, there were about 3,500 Luskars working 
with the Irrigation Department in the state by the year 2002. The 
union president stated that 
The government gave three options to us to choose from in case 
we are not willing to work under WUAs. We see the government 
move as a blow to our self-respect We are enjoying our status as 
government employees and receiving respect in society. We 
will lose our respect if we work under the WUAs. We are ready to 
lose our jobs but not respect by working under the associations. 
The Luskars and Work Inspectors represented by their unions 
sought justice and filed a legal case in the state High Court against 
the Government They have succeeded in getting a stay order from 
the court A s a result the Government order o f handing over the 
Luskars and Wis to the W U A has not been implemented. T h e 
government has been unable to vacate the stay and implement the 
order. 
According to the union representative their lobby received 
support from their higher-level officers too. The engineers' 
association opposed the transfer o f roles and responsibilities o f 
Luskars to WUAs . The Luskars union president concluded that, 
'the officers supported us, because they do not want to lose us to 
W U A presidents. We have been used to do the personal work o f 
the officers. S o they cannot afford to lose us'. The case suggests 
that the Luskars do not want to lose their identity by working for 
the WUAs, but do not take it seriously to work for their higher 
officials even outside their job description. The end result was that, 
the lower level bureaucrats could mobilise their resources and 
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networks to defend their status and interests against the 
government policy. In the following section, I discuss the collective 
resistance by middle level bureaucrats. 
Resistance to Additional supervision 
The government wanted to appoint the Supermtendending 
Engineer (SE) cadre senior irrigation bureaucrats as PLM co-
ordinators and Consultants at the district level The idea was that 
the additional positions would strengthen the implementation o f 
PLM activities at the district level The move o f the government 
was cleverly resisted by the permanent staff. 
PIM co-ordinator 
Senior and middle level bureaucrats did not like the idea o f being a 
PLM co-ordinator as became dear from discussions with them. 
They saw these newly created positions as additional supervision 
that would create hierarchical problems within the department But 
they could not stop the government from appointing the co-
ordinators. They waited for an opportunity. When the government 
asked them to provide feedback on the usefulness o f the 
Coordinator position, they voted against i t A bureaucrat in-charge 
o f the rninor irrigation circle stated that many o f his colleagues 
provided negative feedback H e claimed that 'these new posts o f 
co-ordinators were created not with the objective to strengthen the 
ongoing PLM activities, but to promote a few sdected senior 
officials in the department The state found a solution to 
accommodate them'. 
I had a discussion with the PLM co-ordinator based in 
Tekulapalli irrigation office for K h a m m a m district H e complained 
that the government created these positions but did not provide 
dear rules, powers and resources at their disposal Hence their job 
is restricted to participation in review meetings h d d by the district 
collector and to the occasional site supervision visits. 
District Consultants and Resource Teams 
In addition to the PLM co-ordinators, the government appointed 
retired engineers from the department (rank o f Chief Engineer) as 
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district consultants in 2000 to provide additional inputs to the PLM 
programme implementation. They were expected to provide 
technical advice and guidance on PLM related issues to the tegular 
irrigation staff o f the major, medium and minor irrigation 
department Discussions with the regular staff about the need and 
assistance they had received from the consultants revealed that 
these posts created problems in delivering their duties. The 
consultants often wanted to force their ideas rather than provide 
advice. In an internal opinion survey conducted by the 
government, the regular staff voted for the removal o f PLM 
coordinators and the external consultants. 
These preferences o f the regular bureaucrats in both the cases o f 
PLM coordinator and District consultants, clearly suggest that, they 
did not want to have additional supervision. 1 3 They visualised the 
additional positions as competition to their power and decision-
making. B y collectively providing negative feed back against the 
government initiatives, they could resist the government policy. In 
another incident in July 1999, the bureaucrats opposed the 
government policies in the form of a pen down strike. They made a 
protest against the death o f the Chief Engineer, allegedly because 
o f the work pressure and due to the Chief Minister's remarks in a 
video conference with state level officers. The engineer felt a loss 
o f self-respect due to the remarks by the Chief Minister. 
Another similar example was the non-functional resource teams. 
Resource teams were constituted in the year 1999 by C A D A at the 
district level and made responsible for imparting training to the 
W U A members. Many officers were deputed from the Irrigation, 
Revenue and Agriculture Departments to constitute the teams. 
Teams were constituted and members were trained at 
W A L A M T A R I in various aspects o f institutional building and 
water management However, the results were not encouraging as 
the resource team members either lacked interest or were not 
motivated to deliver the job requirements. A s a result, the capacity 
building o f W U A members suffered. The government idea o f 
capacity building through training o f W U A members was not 
fulfilled. 
Transfers 
The power to transfer can be understood as a political resource 
used by politicians and higher-level bureaucrats. At times these 
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decisions can also be forced and changed. I describe below how 
the frontline workers resisted the transfer orders from their higher 
officer. 
The Luskars usually stay long in one place because transfers for 
class IV employees are not common. In the study area, I found a 
few Luskars serving in the same place for more than five years. In 
the process they established relationships with the local farmers 
and influential leaders in the command villages. I asked them how 
they could stay in the same place for so many years. They are aware 
that this practice is not allowed according to the rules o f the 
department They stressed that they do not get involved in corrupt 
practices. Here they referred to the higher officers. They agreed 
that from the big farmers they get some produce during the harvest 
season, which they do not demand. Sometimes they share the 
produce with their higher officials. Also they do some personal 
jobs for the higher officials. Through these interactions there a 
personal relationship is built in addition to the professional 
hierarchy. The relationship that the Luskars maintain with the local 
powerful leaders also helps them to be posted in the same place for 
many years. 
Responding to complaints by the water users during the Rabi 
2001 season, the D . E o f Kalluru sub-division wanted to transfer 
the Luskars within the sub-division to prevent unofficial water 
supplies. The proposal to change their work places was strongly 
resisted by the Luskars. They managed to bring pressure on the 
D . E with the help o f (in this case) W U A leaders, and the proposal 
was withdrawn. A s Lipsky suggests, the very position o f the 
Luskars might have provided them with the space to manoeuvre 
the decisions and protect their interests. H e further argues that 
The decisions of street level bureaucrats, the routines they establish 
and the devices they invent to cope up with uncertainties and work 
pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out. The 
public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top-
floor suites of high ranking administrators, because in important 
ways it is actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters 
of street level workers (Lipsky 1980). 
I will provide further examples. The government policy o f zero 
recruitment and retirement o f the staff resulted in increased 
number o f vacant positions in the irrigation department In the 
case o f Kalluru Division office, only two out o f six executive 
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engineers posted over time, served as regular charge. Others only 
worked in the capacity as in-charge or additional charge capacity. I 
was informed that only an influential officer would get a regular 
p o s t F r o m my material it becomes evident that transfers within the 
division were favoured. 
In the case o f a vacancy o f a Deputy Executive Engineer ( D E E ) 
position, one o f the serving D E E will be given an additional charge 
o f another irrigation sub division until a regular D E E is appointed. 
These additional charge positions are sought after as they enlarge 
the scope for additional income and power. The relationship that 
the D E E maintains with the E E and higher officials matters in 
securing an additional position. Simflady, the Assistant Engineers 
prefer sub-divisions that will have a chance for implementing a 
high volume o f irrigation works. For example, Tallada sub-division 
in Kalluru division has a main canal command in addition to 
majors and minors. That means this sub-division gets more funds 
for works related to main canaL T h e working relationship o f the 
A E with a D E and E E matters . in securing such a favoured 
position. 
In the literature the common suggestion to prevent corruption 
and work related favouritisms is regular transfers o f bureaucrats 1 4 
(see Wade 1985; Zwart 1994). I have not found frequent transfers 
in my study area. 1 5 F r o m the field material, I conclude that the 
Luskars on the M B C tried to prevent any transfer decision by their 
higher official. The D E tried to procure an additional charge o f 
irrigation sub-division, and the A E tried to get a transfer for 
another sub-division with prospects o f more irrigation works. All 
o f them mobilised their personal, social, professional and political 
resources to meet their interests. In the process they also 
established devices to cope with the pressures that come with these 
favours. The understanding o f the process o f transfers gives us 
insights into the networks that were mobilised while resisting or 
forwarding a particular policy decision. 
The irrigation bureaucrats at the division and sub-division level 
raised different arguments to support their actions. They mobilised 
different discourses to legitimise their styles o f functioning. In the 
following section, I discuss rent seeking and users capacity to 
manage the irrigation systems. A n in-depth analysis o f these 
arguments is useful to understand further the bureaucratic 
engagement with the policy. 
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Justifying Rent Seeking 
In many studies corruption is Ested among the problems o f India's 
bureaucracy. Robert Wade made an important contribution to 
understand systematic patterns o f corruption in an Indian state (see 
Wade 1985). Wade argues that it is in the institutionalised circuit o f 
transactions in which bureaucracy appropriates money from cEents 
as well as from the state treasury. It shares this money with higher-
level ranks within the bureaucracy and poEtieians. Together with 
his earEer writing on the subject we can understand fairly well the 
rent seeking practices in the irrigation sector (see Wade 1982a; 
1982b). Wade's work on the irrigation administration indicates the 
nature and scope o f earning opportunities for bureaucrats through 
illegal means. 
Jagannathan (1986) analyses that the earning opportunities in 
public agencies exist because they serve relatively large populations. 
A s a result, the services offered by these institutions are constantly 
facing excess demand despite being designed to offer universal and 
free pubEc services. Officials who control access to such scarce 
economic goods (for example scarce irrigation water) will have 
several rent seeking opportunities. H e proposes that corruption is 
the perpetuation o f informal property rights in bureaucratic 
systems (1986:131). 
Renger and Wolff (2000) propose poEtical and economic 
approaches to understand rent seeking behaviour and process. 
According to them rent seeking constitutes a form o f poEtical 
behaviour which can be described as lobbying superior regulatory 
bodies to gamer rent. Rent seeking is also an economic form o f 
behaviour which aims at avoiding competitive or market pressure 
in order to bring about price distortions in one's own interest in the 
poEtical sphere for the purpose o f earning rent (2000:7). They also 
describe that rent seeking is a process, describing the variety o f 
interactions between seekers and rent providers. Pritzl (1997) 
argues that rent seeking can be described as corruption at the point 
where poEtieians and bureaucrats specifically exploit their current 
opportunities to manipulate the existing institutional framework so 
that in future it serves their private interests (cited from Renger and 
Wolff 2000). 
It was not surprising to m e to know the fact that additional 
sources o f income or favours in kind are sought, created and 
exploited by irrigation bureaucracy. T h e interesting point was the 
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ways in which the bureaucrats saw and justify rent seeking 
practices. It was expected that the formation o f WUAs under the 
reform poEcy would lead to transfer o f certain irrigation activities 
and powers from irrigation departments to WUAs. A s a result the 
rent seeking practices would need to b e addressed. In real practice 
the rent seeking practices have continued, i f not at the same scale. I 
came across in my field study area many bureaucrats who were not 
shy about discussing rent seeking practices. They argued that lack 
o f budgets, peer pressure, departmental practices, lack o f incentives 
and external pressures forced them to become involved in rent 
seeking practices. A t the same time the bureaucrats tried to 
legitimise their actions. A n Assistant Engineer who completed 
fifteen years o f service in the department said: 
We do not have a single rupee budget even to buy a white sheet of 
paper for the office work As an Assistant Engineer, it costs me at 
least one thousand rupees per month to meet office expenses. 
Sometimes the contractors or the WUA representatives buy 
required stationery. In addition to the office expenses, unaccounted 
costs like contributions, donations and expenditure during the visits 
of higher officials and political representatives have to be met by 
the lower level staff. How will we meet these expenses? Adding to 
these, the travel allowances are not being paid regularly. Nothing 
has been changed after the introduction of PIM. If this is the case 
how can one expect regular supervision and monitoring of the canal 
systems by the staff? These practices are as old as the department 
and no one dares to swim against them (Interview dated 5 * April 
2003). 
The lower-level bureaucrats claimed that they are forced to work 
extra hours, manipulate the water delivery schedules and are 
subjected to poEtical pressures. The middle level bureaucrats 
portray lack o f essential budgets as the cause o f for rent seeking. In 
addition, a similar attitude o f higher-level bureaucrats induces the 
lower level to continue the practice. Some o f the younger staff 
shared that they are forced to accept these practices due to peer 
pressure and the threat o f isolation and victimisation. Many of 
them defended themselves in interviews by arguing that in these 
work conditions accepting additional money (rent in economic 
terms) for their work is a legitimate action, A deputy executive 
engineer from a major irrigation system in the Rayalaseema Region 
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stated the following in a discussion with him at the divisional 
office: 
We had 'canal phones' in the past (till 1980s) to pass on the 
important information about canals to the respective offices. Today 
with the advent of modem technology we have neither canal 
phones nor funds to communicate. Today the sub-division offices 
do not have telephones. Wireless technology is only available for 
certain projects that are funded by external funding agencies. The 
vehicles are not in good condition due to the meagre maintenance 
funds. The officers in charge of vehicles bad to spend their own 
money in advance to run these vehicles. Whenever there is a 
budget, the expenditure incurred may be reimbursed. There is no 
assurance when these bills will be sanctioned. Hence we depend on 
other sources to meet these expenses. The section and sub-
divisional offices are ill-equipped and computerisation of these 
office administrations may take another ten years (field notes, June 
2003). 
It is difficult to draw conclusions for me regarding rent seeking 
from these observations and firsthand discussions that I had with 
bureaucrats in different irrigation systems. But what stuck me is the 
degree o f openness in discussing the issue o f rent seeking which 
•was otherwise treated as a sensitive issue. Most o f the bureaucrats, 
especially the implementing staff, were very forthright while 
discussing i t Bach case and individual action is different from the 
other, with the result that it is very difficult to generalise. 
On the basis o f the material it seems to me absolutely true if I 
argue that rent seeking practices exist in spite o f the government's 
policy checks and measures. The purpose o f the argument here is 
to provide evidence on how these practices are viewed and 
maintained by the bureaucrats. This seems to be a common issue 
and yet a complex element o f the bureaucratic functioning. During 
my field research duration I got in touch with middle level 
bureaucrats who are well articulated with the language o f the 
reform policy. They did not hesitate to face researchers, journalists, 
and consultants to discuss about issues like rent seeking and their 
roles after introduction o f reforms. The openness o f the 
bureaucrats raises new questions: what factors made them to be so 
open? Were they equally open even before reforms were 
introduced? Is it because o f the fact that the W U A leaders are also 
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involved in irrigation works that the bureaucrats do not shy away 
from discussing these issues? 
What can we conclude from the perspective of rent seeking 
discussed in the beginning? It is clear that by constructing 
crmvincing arguments the bureaucrats are trying to legitimise their 
practices. In this case rent seeking of bureaucrats shows their 
political behaviour. Rather than seeing it as problem, the 
bureaucrats are trying to defend their rent seeking culture as a 
legitimate economic or rational behaviour. But for sure, the 
behaviour and attitude will have implication for policy 
implementation. 
Innovation and Recognition 
In this section I discuss how the middle-level bureaucracy saw the 
reform policy in terms of opportunities for innovation and 
recognition for their work. The understanding tells us how these 
bureaucrats visualised the policy and their expectations from it A 
middle level bureaucrat who was in fact very optimistic about the 
reform programme stated that 
Reforms did not offer an opportunity to correct the system designs. 
N o amount of supervision or transfer of duties to WUAs can 
improve the system management when basic design issues are not 
solved. Nagarjuna Sagar Project's (NSP) planning and design of the 
canal systems was based on the method of continuous flow 
throughout the crop period The canals don't allow any flexibility in 
supply of water. Physical controls like cross regulators for 
regulating the discharges of canal water are found inadequate. The 
carrying capacities of the canals are also found inadequate with the 
existing cropping pattern in the second zone of the NSP left main 
canaL The canal system is designed to support the cultivation of 
Kharif crops, where Rabi cultivation has increased in the command, 
leading to water shortages. The localisation process was not 
scientifically carried out Large areas that consist of porous soils 
have been localised for wet cultivation. N o separate outlets or 
canals to irrigate dry designated plots exist Head reach farmers 
appropriated more water to grow a wet crop while water is released 
for an irrigated dry crop. In many places the farmers dig the field 
channels to suit their individual needs. Due to the irregular 
channels, introducing and implementing a rotation scheme is not an 
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easy and viable task for the irrigation staff. Because of these design 
complexities we are not able to deliver the services. The higher-
level officers knew these problems very well in the field They also 
cannot do much because the government is not in a position to 
change the designs. The lower-level engineers are those who design 
and seek approval from their superiors. The hierarchical structure 
of authority of the Irrigation Department does not create an 
incentive for innovativeness; it does create a strong bias to keep to 
standard designs. The same practices continued even after 
introduction of reforms. There is no other option left for us except 
follow the rules as part of our job (field notes, March 2002). 
F rom the above narration it is clear that the engineer from 
Madhira irrigation sub-division is making a case for the inability to 
innovate in his day-to-day -work The engineer articulated the need 
for design corrections in the system designs and the limited scope 
for doing the same. H e seems to be more interested in invention 
than adaptation (see MoDinga 2003). 
The middle level bureaucrats stated that they spent most o f their 
time in preparing proposals and filling survey forms and formats 
introduced as part o f the reform programme by the government. In 
addition they were expected to facilitate W U A meetings and 
supervise the maintenance works implemented by t h e m They 
claimed that die channel o f communication was top-down even 
after introduction of reforms. They shared that together with W U A 
representatives they ended up in implementing the Government 
Orders rather than coming up with locally specific solutions. 
The implementing bureaucrats saw the reform policy as 
characterised by a top down approach, which limited the scope and 
opportunity for innovation. They claimed that there is no 
recognition and incentive for their work. They critically evaluated 
the reform objectives and expressed their doubts over achieving 
the stated objectives. In the process they also raised questions 
regarding the capacity o f users' organisations to mange the systems. 
Questioning the users' capacity 
T h e irrigation bureaucrats in general subscribe to the usefulness o f 
the PLM programme but raised questions regarding the capacity o f 
the farmers' organisations. They argued that the elected WUAs 
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would not be able to manage the systems i f the irrigation 
bureaucrats restrict themselves to an advisory role as per the policy 
prescriptions. In their opinion the W U A representatives do not 
have a clear understanding about their roles under the A c t T h e 
competent authorities stated: 
The WUA leaders are politically elected and they want the irrigation 
staff to work for them It is difficult to work with them because 
most of the WUA representatives lack clarity on their wdividual 
powers and responsibilities. Many of the WUA leaders have spent 
money to get elected. The leaders placed requests to help them out 
in earning back the election expenditure. As a result we were in a 
difficult position to execute the works. 
What can we derive from these claims? The majority view of the 
implementing bureaucrats is that the elected leaders o f the W U A 
are not motivated to do . the W U A activities voluntarily but are 
corrupt and politically motivated. T h e leaders want to earn back the" 
money spent for getting elected. The bureaucrats tried to put all the 
blame on the W U A leaders by not including themselves in the 
process. About two thirds o f the irrigation bureaucrats in the study 
area opined that political interference has increased since the 
introduction o f W U A s in canal management The W U A 
representatives demanded more water to their respective W U A 
territories instead o f sharing with downstream W U A s according to 
the rules. 
The bureaucrats articulated that the participation o f the farmers 
is advisable below the oudet rather than in the entire system. They 
argue that without the help o f the Department, the users' 
organisations cannot manage the entire system These claims by the 
bureaucracy clearly show that it sees the W U A s at the receiving 
end. Against these arguments, I do not come across any plan or 
initiative by bureaucrats to strengthen W U A s in the study area. It is 
clear that the bureaucrats have tried to follow government orders 
(Le. are rule bound), but at the same time found ways to alienate 
themselves from sharing the powers and strengthening the user 
organisations (I.e. are unaccountable). 
I also interviewed retired irrigation bureaucrats to seek their 
views. The majority held the view that user associations cannot 
manage the entire systems, especially in the major irrigation 
projects. During an interview a retired senior engineer suggested a 
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Acquiring more powers 
The higher-level bureaucracy played an important role during 
policy formulation and implementation. It was involved in drafting 
different policy papers (with the help o f external consultants and 
Worid Bank), preparation o f the A P F M I S Act, and its 
implementation. They did not see the reforms as a threat, but as an 
opportunity to advance their careers. They were instrumental in 
implementing government orders through their sub-ordinate 
middle and lower level staff. I believe that their careful and active 
participation gave them the opportunity and space to safeguard 
personal as well as departmental interests, right from policy 
formulation onwards. 
The middle and lower level bureaucrats saw reforms as a threat 
to their jobs during the early years o f implementation. They soon 
found ways to engage with the day-to-day policy implementation. 
In the process, they devised mechanisms to protect their interests. 
B y the end o f the first five years' term they were confident to deal 
with the policy that aimed to decentralise irrigation management In 
the course o f time, as I have shown in this chapter and the 
preceding ones, the irrigation bureaucracy aligned with other 
judicial mix o f farmers, other water user representatives (industry, 
and electricity) and the department heads for system level 
management There should be no elections for the WLJAs. 
Principles from the traditional system o f Kalva pedda (community 
leader nominated by the community) can be replicated. These 
views suggest that the bureaucracy prefer community based water 
management at lower level keeping their power at the higher levels. 
Bo th regular and retired bureaucrats seem to have similar views 
about the role and capacity o f W U A s to manage irrigation systems. 
It is also clear that the bureaucrats do not want to accept the 
W U A s as partner institutions and work with them to achieve policy 
objectives. Rather, they tried to show W U A leaders are politically 
motivated and not having the technical and managerial skills to 
manage the irrigation systems. F r o m the material evidence, I argue 
that the irrigation bureaucracy as a collective agency tried to 
construct a narrative that WUAs are weak and cannot manage 
systems. In the process, the bureaucrats tried to construct a 
positive image o f their respective roles. 
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actors, constructed arguments to legitimise their actions and 
successfully engaged with the policy. 
T h e A P F M I S Act was further amended through the 
Government Ordinance 9 o f 2002. The W U A representatives 
resisted the amendments and claimed that the irrigation 
bureaucracy pushed these amendments against the interests o f the 
Users Associat ions. 1 6 The President o f the 14 t h Distributary 
Committee stated that 'the irrigation staff will now have more 
control on the day-to-day functioning o f the WUAs, once the 
amendments come into force'. The D C President and W U A 
leaders in the sub-division viewed the amendments as a threat to 
the autonomy o f the W U A (whatever litde was left) and argued 
that the WUAs cannot function as an autonomous corporate body 
as visualised by the reform policy. They foresaw that it would affect 
the participatory spirit o f the programme. The leaders did not agree 
to the amendments made to the Act and argued that they were 
never consulted by the Irrigation Department or government in 
making these amendments. 
What does it suggest? What processes helped the bureaucrats to 
overcome their fears? The arguments o f W U A leaders and 
Irrigation staff suggest that there is mistrust between them. Both 
irrigation staff and W U A leaders contested over the policy and 
tried to gain control over the management o f irrigation resources. 
In the process they mediated with other policy actors and 
influenced its actual implementation. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter's main purpose was to provide empirical evidence and 
contribute ideas that might help improve the understanding o f 
bureaucratic behaviour and aspirations. It shows that policy 
decisions are important but ultimately the success or failure o f a 
policy is shaped in the implementation process. The A P case 
showed that great deal o f policy is in fact made, or modified, in the 
implementation process . 
The middle and lower level irrigation bureaucrats played a 
crucial role in the implementation but were largely left out in the 
policy formulation process. The reliance o f the highest political 
executive on the higher-level bureaucracy also helped these 
bureaucrats to steer and influence the policy. The Chief Minister 
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Chandra B a b u Naidu's reliance on the bureaucratic machinery for 
advice, information and decision-making, more than the party 
leaders and elected representatives, became a source o f agony 
among the latter (see Suri 2001). I conclude that the irrigation 
bureaucracy has cleveriy used its positions o f authority individually 
and collectively to safeguard its interests. 
Different bureaucrats viewed the reform differently. It was 
viewed positively and seen as a necessary step only by higher-level 
bureaucrats. They perhaps did not see reforms as a threat to their 
jobs, but an opportunity to improve their career chances. Going 
down the irrigation hierarchy, resistance to the reform increased. 
T h e middle level bureaucrats saw the reforms as a loss o f power 
and an additional work burden without any incentives and rewards. 
The front-line bureaucrats visualised reforms as a threat to their 
jobs and social status, and a loss o f additional income. The A P 
reform programme did not recognise the role o f middle and lower 
level bureaucrats as policy mediators and hence failed to provide 
them with required motivation and space to participate. 
A t the local level, the lower-level bureaucrats played a variety o f 
roles in implementation o f the policy. They played the role o f 
communicators, opinion makers, and a strong workers union to 
resist particular government policies which they see not in their 
favour. They also successfully used their alliances with higher-level 
bureaucrats, local political leaders and with members o f water users 
associations to protect their professional interests. Lipsky's work 
(1980) provides evidence that the lower-level bureaucrats are very 
important as they transform the policies in actual field situations. 
A s lower bureaucrats they perform the role o f linking the state 
(policy) and users (policy beneficiaries). This particular location o f 
work gives them a space to manoeuvre. 
The Luskars were still responsible for operating (opening and 
closing) the sluices. Through this space they could favour selected 
farmers with additional quantities o f water supply. They could use 
their alliances to resist the orders from their higher officials and 
also the state. I conclude that in this process o f hierarchical 
subordination, the lower-level irrigation bureaucracy has 
successfully coped with the pressures, and negotiated within the 
reform policy space to protect their interests. 
The middle-level bureaucrats ( D E and A E ) , who acted as 
competent authorities, restricted themselves to the implementation 
o f the government orders. There were limited communication 
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channels 01 space for them to share their experiences and 
knowledge gained during policy implementation. Since these 
bureaucrats were not consulted from the beginning they envisage 
the reform programme as top-down and do not identify with the 
P I M policy in the state. Their actions towards the programme 
cleariy show that they are not motivated at all as they do not see 
any direct benefits to them. 
T h e A P irrigation reform programme aimed to reform the 
irrigation agency. It also expected attitudinal changes among the 
bureaucrats while implementing the P I M programme. The 
bureaucracy is not as neutral as theory would suggest In contrast, 
the bureaucracy used its newly acquired legal and financial powers 
and retained its traditional control over irrigation activities. At 
various levels it also aligned with powerful leaders. A s a result, 
W U A functioning was very much tailored and dependent on the 
decisions o f the bureaucrats. The policy objective o f reforming 
bureaucracy to become user-centred was finally not achieved. 
The A P evidence suggests that the presence o f a reform policy, 
legislation and formation o f W U A s does not necessarily lead to 
accountability relationships between the bureaucracy and users. By 
and large, the policy process is driven by the state and its 
bureaucratic arm rather than by user stakeholders. 
T h e A P experience suggests that a bureaucracy that supports a 
reform programme does not necessarily change its attitudes and 
reorient itself towards participatory methods. In the absence o f 
rewards, incentives and punishments, the rent and position seeking 
alliances o f bureaucrats will stand in the way o f transparent 
functioning and effective policy implementation. 
A s Weber discussed, an institution served by a bureaucracy will 
outperform its competitors, and prevail in the struggle for survival: 
bureaucracy has spread and continues to spread because o f its 
survival value for social institutions. T h e A P irrigation reform 
policy only aimed at shrinking the size o f irrigation bureaucracy 
rather revitalising i t I conclude that we need to find innovative 
ways for making effective and committed irrigation bureaucracy in 
order to achieve reform goals. 
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'Excerpt from the Chief Minister Mr. Chandrababu Naidu inaugural 
speech at the fourth National Conference on Participatory Irrigation 
Management held on 19* January, 1999 at the National Institute of Rural 
development, Hyderabad. 
2 Encarta Dictionary defines bureaucracy as an administrative system, 
especially in a government, that divides work into specific categories 
carried out by special departments of non-elected officials. The 
bureaucracy is a group of well-trained people, expected to exert a 'rational' 
influence on the entire decision making process. Bureaucracy is rule 
conducted from a desk or office. "Bureau' (French, borrowed into 
German) is desk or by extension an office. Bureaucracy, for a number of 
scholars, implies something more than a complex and rigid organisation. 
3 Rent seeking practices in canal irrigation are well documented Wade 
(1982) shows how the system of administrative and political corruption is 
institutionalised in canal irrigation in South India. Moore (1989) discusses 
rent seeking analysis in his paper published in Wodd Development He 
tries to show how public irrigation policy is adversely affected by 
'organised private interests using official positions to skew public policy in 
their favour". Repetto (1986) examines the practices of governments and 
international agencies in monitoring public irrigation systems. He argues 
that the lack of commercial principles in the financing of Third Wodd 
irrigation leads to the gross misuse of public resources. He shows how 
these public resources are diverted to private ends. He further argues that 
the misguided economic incentives cost governments huge sums and 
distort investment decisions, while encouraging environmental abuse and 
wasting natural resources. Moore recognises the concept of power in 
understanding the organizations, but Repetto seems ignore this concept 
4 This chapter was greatly benefited by participation in a training 
workshop conducted by Prof. James Manor from IDS, U.K. I presented 
the preliminary findings in another Policy Processes workshop, organised 
by the Centre for Economics and Social Studies (CESS) Feb 27- 01 March 
2003. I acknowledge the small grant provided to carry out further field 
research, I thank the participants of the workshop for their suggestions 
and grateful to Dr. Jos Mooij and Prof. Parthasarathy for their critical 
comments. 
5 I had the opportunity to interview 7 senior level S.E cadre bureaucrats 
(at Erramanju, WALAMTARI, NSP Hyderabad camp office, K-C canal, 
S.E Minor Irrigation Circle office at Warangal and a retired S.E based in 
Hyderabad) 5 middle level E.E and D.E.E cadre at Tekulapalli Circle 
office and Kalluru Division office and 12 A.Es, WI and Luskars and from 
Tallada, Kalluru and Madhira irrigation subdivision offices. To conduct 
the interviews I adopted a guided interview approach. The interviews are 
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conducted in the irrigation office environment /premises. I followed a 
semi-structured format with open ended questions and in-depth probes. 
The chapter benefited from the conversational interviews carried out in 
addition with the implementing irrigation bureaucrats during the study 
period 
6 Theorists like Weber, Merton and Marx seek to explain how rigid 
behaviour develops in complex organisations (see Weber 1947; Merton 
1957; Marx 1957). 
7 For the purpose of analysis I divide the irrigation bureaucracy into three 
levels on the basis of their roles and functions. The highest level by virtue 
of their rank, have the opportunity for involvement in policy issues. The 
highest level includes the civil servants (IAS officers) who head the 
irrigation department, the Engineer in Chief (ENC) and Chief Engineers 
(CE). The middle level bureaucrats supervise and implement the policies 
and report to the higher authorities. They include the Superintending 
Engineers (SE), Executive Engineers (EE), Deputy Executive Engineers 
(DEE) and the Assistant Executive Engineers (ARE). The middle level 
bureaucrats are involved in the day-to-day management of the irrigation 
systems and enjoy a lower degree of autonomy in taking policy decisions. 
The lower-level bureaucrats are the Work Inspectors (WI) and the 
Luskats, who do not hold a technical engineering degree. They implement 
orders of their superiors and act as a link between the department and the 
users on a day-to-day basis. They maintain close contacts with water users 
and community leaders in the village. 
8 Here I quote Raymond Peter, a senior IAS officer, involved with the 
irrigation reform programme in the initial years. He writes in his paper 
'the objective of the government was to understand the viewpoints of all 
concerned Therefore, participation in the public consultations was not 
restricted to farmers, but also included politicians, political parties, 
researchers, and the press. In AP, this was perhaps the first attempt by the 
government to seek out the viewpoints of beneficiaries and the parties 
likely to be affected The consultations have enabled the government to 
steer the reform process in a transparent manner (see Peter 2001). 
9 Mr. Chandrasekar told me that the meeting was useful for him, as he 
came to know more details about the ruling TDP government policy. He 
shared this information with other important leaders in the village and 
showed his interest to become a representative of the WUA. He said (with 
a smile) that he could prepare himself to contest in the WUA elections 
conducted a few months later. This is an isolated example to argue that 
the consultation meetings did not serve the real purpose of consultation. 
But the example suggests the nature of consultation meetings which are 
shown as a symbol of participatory efforts. 
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1 0 The Water Charges Amendment Act of 1997 was passed in the 
Assembly the day before the APFMIS Act 1997. The acts were passed on 
April 16 and 17,1997 respectively. 
1 1 GoRtNo.338 Dated 12.10.1998, regarding assistance to water user 
association, distributary committees, project committees in the command 
areas of major and medium projects by Luskars- orders- issued signed by 
P.K, AgarwaL Principal Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh The 
orders (G.O no 337 and 338) clearly stated that all Work Inspectors and 
Luskars working in the area of operation of a farmers organisation shall 
be accountable to that farmers organisation namely a water user 
association, a distributary committee or a project committee. 
1 2 Personal communication with Y.Rama Mohana Reddy, D.C. President, 
Anantapur. 
1 3 Similar behaviour is evident in bureaucrats in western countries like the 
UK. For example, political appointees as advisers in successive U K 
governments were regarded by the permanent civil service with iH-
disguised hostility and even contempt (see Wilson and Barker 2003). 
1 4 Wade (1985) argued that the reason why the Indian state is not better at 
promoting development is to an important degree because of the 
corruption-transfer mechanism and its effects on bureaucratic initiative. 
Transfers are not just a small point of administrative mechanics. They are 
the very centres of the system of bureaucratic surplus extraction. Zwart 
(1994) analyses that transfers are one of the oldest and most lasting 
components of the personnel policy of Indian authorities. Transfers serve 
different goals. They are old and tested mstruments used by the Moguls 
and British to control the administration. 
1 5 Mr. Raju served as full time E E from 2.7.97 to 31.7.2000. He got 
promoted as S E Minor Irrigation Circle. Subsequent to him Tallada 
Krishna Murthy, KRadha Krishnaih and K L Soman served as additional 
charge for shorter periods. Meaning they performed as D E of an 
irrigation sub division and also performed E E duties of the Kalluru 
Division. After him N.G.K. Murthy headed the division office from 
7.1.2002 and retired on 31.10.2003 as in-charge EE . Mr. Koteseara Rao, 
D E E of Tiruvum sub-division was given additional charge till 4.0Z2005. 
Another E E was posted as in-charge E.E for the division from 
04.02.2005. The difference between an additional and in-charge is that the 
additional charge is not a full promotion. The in-charge E.E will enjoy the 
same benefits (Le. powers, scale of pay and perks). Due to problems 
within the government promotion lists, these officers were posted as an 
in-charge E E , rather regular EEs , shared the Senior Assistant in Kalluru 
Division office. 
1 6 On 2 4 * November 1998, the bill for amendments to APFMIS Act was 
introduced in the A.P Legislative assembly. Ordinance 7 of 1998 was 
repealed after the introduction of ordinance 9 of 2002 The biU came for 
discussion in the assembly sessions during March 2003. 
9 
The ewe responsibility of those who deal in public pokey-elected officials, administrators, 
pokey analysts- is not to discover as objectively as possible what people want for 
themselves and then to determine and implement the best means of satisfying these 
wants. It is also to provide the public with alternative visions of what is desirable and 
possible, to stimulate deliberation about them, provoke a re-examination of premises 
and values, and thus to broaden the range of potential responses and deepen society's 
understanding of itself. 
Robert B. Reich (1988) The Power of PubSc Ideas. 
9.1 Introduction 
Throughout the research period while discussing with irrigation 
engineers and other staff members in the field and at the central 
offices, the common question that I had to answer many times was 
'are you an engineer'? The non-engineering community did not ask 
m e the same question, but assumed that I was an engineer. O n 
many occasions I clarified that I was trained in both social work 
and planning and interested in policy issues. I can assume what a 
difference it would have made if my answer were *Yesl I am an 
engineer'. The curiosity to know my professional background and 
make a judgement on me was genuine. But that shows the strong 
affinity to the traditional disciplinary sciences and the need for 
mterdisciplinary research. 
This research was motivated by what Guha (2003:1122) calls the 
criterion o f relevance (influencing policy or correcting the injustices 
o f history) and a desire to understand the interplay o f complex 
social, technological and political systems in irrigation management 
Irrigation development continues to be emphasised by Indian 
governments though many ills were attached to i t Irrigation as a 
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source o f food production and security continues to be subject o f 
development discussions. During the pos t independence period, 
irrigation policies continued to support the protective type o f 
irrigation, particulariy in South India. T h e Nagarjunasagar irrigation 
system in which this research took place shows forms o f protective 
irrigation and localisation. The irrigation reform policies that were 
introduced in the state in 1997 aimed to achieve efficiency, equity 
and productivity. This context made it possible to investigate the 
process when a reform policy is superimposed upon a protective 
type o f irrigation sys tem 
In this concluding chapter, I summarise the empirical findings 
and arguments made in the preceding chapters o f the b o o k I 
provide a summary answer to the main research question in the 
third section. H o w is irrigation reform manifested and contested 
on the ground? H o w are irrigation reform policy choices and 
outcomes contested and mediated by different actors, organisations 
and political institutions? What are the implications in terms o f 
system rehabilitation, water distribution, and srotainability of-water 
user associations o f Madhira branch canal under the 
Nagarjunasagar left main bank canal irrigation system in the state 
o f Andhra Pradesh? In the concluding section, I present the 
themes for further research. 
9.2 Theoretical Framework 
In this book, using a policy contestation model, I have shown how 
different actors contested the irrigation reform policy in Andhra 
Pradesh, The chapters provide evidence o f differences in policy 
outcomes at the local level as compared to original policy 
objectives. The framework builds upon the bureaucratic interests 
and state politics approach (bureaucracy and state alignment) used 
in this research. This approach recognises that the bureaucracy has 
limitations in implementing a policy. I t includes the role o f state 
and other actors' interests in shaping a policy. 
Unlike the bureaucratic politics approach, the present approach 
treats bureaucrats as not necessarily rational actors but important 
policy actors, who interact and bargain with other actors to pursue 
their own interests. By doing so, the narrow focus o f bureaucratic 
politics has been broadened to cover other aspects o f the 
bureaucracy and its engagement with policy. This modified 
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approach provided the opportunity to study different policy actors 
and their interactions among themselves and with others, and their 
ways and means o f contestation and bargaining strategies with each 
other, thereby producing a particular policy outcome. 
9,3 Arenas of Contestation 
In this section I answer the main research question. I discussed the 
policy contestation by different actors in irrigation reform in 
Andhra Pradesh. I investigated the roles and actions o f policy 
actors in different irrigation arenas and their contestation with the 
policy. The strikes, claims and protests o f irrigators as W U A 
members at the canal sites and before the irrigation offices, as well 
as the acts o f politicians in support o f irrigators and bureaucratic 
alliances provided a prospect to study the process o f policy 
contestation. I discussed policy contestation in three irrigation 
management arenas: irrigation works (chapter 5), gap command 
and water distribution (chapter 6) and Joint Azmoish o f the 
command area o f W U A s under Madhira branch canal (chapter 7). 
Irrigation Works 
Irrigation works (maintenance and rehabilitation) are an important 
arena for policy contestation. Chapter 5 o f this book shows how 
irrigation bureaucrats, W U A leaders, politicians, contractors, and 
other elites have used the arena o f irrigation works to accumulate 
power and further their interests. In the process the middle-level 
irrigation bureaucrats could retain their control in the 
implementation o f works. The alliance between the W U A leaders 
and irrigation bureaucrats at the field level led to an alignment o f 
economic interests and influenced the process o f decision-making, 
resource allocation and priority o f irrigation works that were 
executed. The initial maintenance and rehabilitation (MR) works on 
the secondary and tertiary canals created a hope and impression 
that the irrigation system would soon function better than in the 
p a s t In contrast, the evidence shows that the majority o f W U A 
leaders saw irrigation works as a means to procure funds from the 
state, and as a source to earn back the money that had been spent 
during elections to the W U A office. 
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T h e irrigation bureaucracy retained its control, rather than 
transferring powers to the water user associations by means o f 
powers sanctioned by the A c t In the absence o f project 
committees, the contractor system was continued at the main canal 
level to carry out main canal irrigation works. T h e higher-level 
irrigation bureaucrats approved the budgets by calling for private 
tenders implemented through contractors. The users' participation 
in dedsion-making at this levd was absent T h e practice reinforced 
the conventional m o d d o f the politician-contractor-bureaucrat 
nexus. In addition, the manner in which the government delayed 
the formation o f project committees provides support to the 
argument that political and bureaucratic interests played a crucial 
role and influenced the policy. 
G a p command and Water Distribution 
Chapter 6 showed the contestation o f policy by different actors 
at different levels in the arena o f water distribution and 
development o f gap command area. The interference o f state and 
local l evd political leaders in canal management was apparent I 
showed how policy makers and irrigation bureaucrats systematically 
constructed a bridging the gap narrative to defend their policy actions 
by magnifying the reform results. The political executive made 
statements regarding the achievements o f the reforms in the 
dectronic media, press and public meetings in an attempt to 
mobilise public appreciation. However, the field evidence shows 
that the statements made by officials do not hold truth (chapter 6). 
The term "bridging the gap' is a relative term; while referring to 
it one has to compare to the previous situation. In the case o f A P 
the political executive has used the data deveriy. The construction 
o f the "bridging the gap narrative' was expliddy aimed at meeting 
the interests o f different actors. The political executive's multiple 
interests were to secure the popular vote base, further funding for 
their programs and to legitimise their government actions. It 
h d p e d senior bureaucrats in getting better career postings. The 
external funding agendes that financed the reform programme, by 
accepting these claims were perhaps interested in show casing the 
'Andhra P I M experiment' as a successful m o d e l 
The middle l evd irrigation bureaucracy continued to control 
water distribution. The Assistant Engineers who were designated as 
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competent authorities for the WUAs , assisted by subordinates 
(Work Inspectors and Luskars) could control the water distribution 
and supply at local level. They managed to execute the orders o f 
their higher officials regarding the water distribution schedules and 
pressures from the local politicians to supply good flows to their 
respective constituencies. They also managed the demands o f 
W U A leaders and influential farmers in the command area. Their 
location in the irrigation hierarchy has given them room to 
manoeuvre. A s a result they could defend their and others' 
interests. They behaved as important actors and engaged with the 
policy. A s a result o f these individual and group contestations in 
the water distribution arena, the policy objective o f ensuring equal 
access to irrigation water to the users was not achieved. 
Jo int Azmoish 
Revenue collection is another arena o f contestation. The policies o f 
reform visualised the role o f WUAs in the Joint Azmoish (JA) 
process as: an empowerment process o f WUAs; an economic 
incentive for W U A s to facilitate higher collection o f water charges 
and retain a share from the collections' and a tool to attain higher 
revenue for the state. The actual implementation o f J A shows that 
revenue and irrigation bureaucrats dominated the process. The 
W U A as an institution crafted through a legal act was unable to 
influence the functioning and practices o f the participating 
government departments. The evidence confirms that government 
bureaucracies (like Irrigation Department) have a better chance o f 
surviving and are likely to influence the contours o f the policy (see 
chapter 7). 
The power relations between irrigation department officials, 
W U A leaders and irrigation users are evident The A P F M I S Act 
sanctioned the irrigation users with the right to seek irrigation 
related information from the department T h e legal provisions have 
certainly increased the users' access to irrigation offices, but very 
few users could utilise t h e m Traditional systems o f information 
flow existed in the command villages. The new working 
relationships that emerged between the W U A leaders and the 
irrigation bureaucrats, especially at the field level, influenced the 
decision-making process o f the WUAs. T h e cooperation between 
the revenue and irrigation staff at local level hindered the J A 
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process. By not cooperating with, the W U A to conduct the Joint 
Azmoish they could serve the interests o f their respective 
departments. 
The irrigation and revenue bureaucracy, instead o f resisting the 
reforms that are aimed to decentralise power, managed to protect 
its interests by lobbying with the government and by forging new 
relationships with the new leadership (WUA leaders) that emerged. 
T h e irrigation bureaucracy had been very creative and resilient and 
networked with other actors to reinforce their relative power in the 
policy domain. T h e irrigation reform received bureaucratic support 
•when the bureaucracy understood that there were no threats to its 
position. 
Bureaucratic interest(s) 
In this study I tried to show how the irrigation reform policy 
manifests itself and became contested during implementation. I 
also discussed the relationships between policy makers (state) and 
recipients (located at village) through the prism o f policy. The 
analysis showed that different actors contest new policy, which 
becomes transformed in the process. The final outcome was 
different from what was stated in the policy documents. 
In chapter 8, I showed that there is no common shared 
objective among the irrigation hierarchies in resisting or promoting 
irrigation reform policy. This evidence tells us that we cannot treat 
the irrigation bureaucracy as a single entity that has unified goals. 
The chapter shows the engagement o f irrigation bureaucrats in 
political manoeuvres to protect their hierarchical interests. 
The irrigation reform policy process in Andhra Pradesh is a 
complex process in which diverse interests play a role. The A P case 
shows that reform policies supported by external funding and legal 
measures alone cannot bring desired changes. The political 
executive and bureaucratic arms o f the state have played a role in 
design and implementation, with funds provided by the bilateral 
agencies and available internal resources. Irrigation bureaucrats 
played an important role as intermediaries and they have exerted 
considerable power over the reform policy agenda. 
The analysis in the previous chapters show that neither the 
irrigation reform in A P was demanded by the irrigators (WUA 
members) , nor an outcome o f civil society advocacy. The 
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opposition political parties initially showed some resistance to the 
policy. They were left with no option but to agree to reform 
policies, when the ruling government was successful in showcasing 
the policy as farmer-friendly. Contestation among different actors 
certainly -was there in all stages. It was more evident during the 
policy implementation than at the formulation stage. 
T h e irrigation reform policy process in Andhra Pradesh is a 
function or combination o f conflict, co-operation, negotiation, 
lobbying and pursuing o f self-interests o f different actors. The 
empirical chapters in this book provide evidence o f how the 
individual and agency interests have been aligned and used to 
safeguard these interests. In the process the actors shaped the 
policy and influenced the implementation process. 
The reform policy aimed to bring new accountability o f 
relationships between the irrigation bureaucracy and users, and 
between state and users, by transferring the irrigation management 
responsibilities to the users' domain. The irrigation bureaucrats 
who ate engaged in the operation and maintenance o f irrigation 
systems saw shifting irrigation responsibilities to W U A s as a loss o f 
power. The higher-level irrigation bureaucracy seems to be 
reasonably successful in negotiating the status o f its roles. The 
lower-level irrigation bureaucracy did not resist the reform policy 
explicidy initially. Later, it could successfully lobby with the 
government through its associations and also used legal measures 
to defend its interests (see chapter 8). 
The irrigation bureaucracy showed a high degree o f resilience. 
Bureaucrats played multiple roles as alliance makers; self-interested 
individuals were bent on procuring favoured positions or as 
lobbyists, and hence played an active role in the policy process. 
They successfully interacted with local W U A leaders, users and 
political leaders, and lobbied with the state to protect their 
interests. These interactions proved an important factor that 
influences the policy outcome. Though the explicit objective o f the 
reform programme was to achieve more production and greater 
equity, the state continued to derive its powers from controlling the 
canal irrigation structures, property and management. It is dear 
that only certain management functions were transferred to WUAs . 
A s a result the W U A s could not partidpate in the process as equal 
partners. 
I hope the individual chapters in this book stimulate deliberation 
about salient aspects o f irrigation reform policy and programme 
Conclusions 245 
and collectively as a book provoke a re-examination o f policy 
processes. Thus , it can broaden our understanding and the range o f 
views on implementation o f a reform policy. 
9.4 Themes for Future Research 
Further research work on the conceptual elaboration o f politics of 
policy and policy as process perspectives 1 is most warranted as this 
study shows the value and benefit o f using such an approach. 
Second, bureaucrats as policy actors and the pohcy reforms and 
institutional functioning are a third area in which further research 
needed 
One o f the limitations o f the current study is that I could not 
focus on the functioning o f higher level bureaucrats based in the 
state capital and unravel their role in policy formulation and 
implementation. Understanding their roles and strategies would 
further reveal the course o f the policy process. The empirical 
chapters in this book showed that the irrigation bureaucrats in 
Andhra Pradesh are successful in retaining control over works and 
water distribution. The irrigation bureaucrats are bound to 
continue as key players in irrigation reform policies and systems 
management Hence their behaviour, factors o f resilience and their 
role in the policy process need to be studied in-depth. 
Understanding reform policy outcomes requires further 
understanding o f how bureaucrats mediate the policy process. 
A major input in policy process comes through public 
bureaucracies. Hence we need to know more about how 
bureaucracies are embedded in different societies. Further 
investigation in to bureaucratic professionalism, culture and 
identity o f irrigation agencies will provide insights in to how 
bureaucracies perform in a given policy space. 
Research studies in irrigation management mostly focused on 
policy prescriptions, models for desired end results, and provided 
policy recommendations. In this context the present study is an 
explicit attempt to document the processes o f policy. The findings 
o f this study and others (Mollinga and Bolding 2004) clearly show 
that irrigation reform policy models cannot simply be replicated 
Blindly adapting the so called 'success models ' is dangerous 
although they are appealing. 
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Research that can help to improve ways and methods o f policy 
design and institutional functioning is crucial Such focus needs to 
.go beyond the usual descriptive accounts o f institutions and 
prescriptive policy implementation methods. F o r example: what are 
the ways to make the PLM policy truly participatory' not only in 
documents but on the ground? What could be the suitable W U A 
and irrigation department structures to implement PLM policies? 
H o w to ensure inclusion o f water users and increase their role in 
the policy process? I hope these questions stimulate interest, 
provide further cues and new entry points for further research in 
irrigation reforms in the South Asia . 
Epilogue 
10.1 Introduction 
I revisited Madhira Branch. Canal in 2003 and 2004 with the 
purpose to update discussions on irrigation management activities 
in the study area and policy changes in irrigation. 
The five years' term o f the W U A s (elected in 1997) ended in July 
2002. The government did not conduct elections immediately but 
delayed the process . 1 The role and functioning o f W U A s was in 
dilemma as there were no clear rules from the government. The 
government had asked the competent authorities (Irrigation 
bureaucrats who were responsible o f the W U A s in the past) to act 
in the place o f the WUAs. A s a result the W U A s were paralysed. A 
few W U A leaders went to High Court against the state. Describing 
the status o f the W U A s during this period, I would say that they 
were in an uncertain state for about fifteen months. 
The elections for W U A s were conducted partially (Le. only in 13 
districts out o f 23 districts in the state) in October 2003 in the 
state. 2 Before the second round o f elections to W U A s , the 
A P F M I S act was amended. The state government endorsed as 
many as forty amendments to the A P F M I S act in one go in 2003. 
Under the amended A P F M I S act, the elections at all levels were 
not direct The territorial cornmittee members elect the president 
and vice president o f the WUA. A s a consequence o f the 
reorganisation o f W U A command size, the total number o f WUAs 
has increased to 10,933 from 10,292 in the state 
During my re-visits to the M B C I went to meet the W U A 
leaders. During discussions, I found them very disappointed about 
the government actions. Some o f the W U A leaders were even 
reluctant to talk about the W U A activities. Some o f them got 
elected to other political positions and were occupied with different 
issues and village politics. 3 The elections for WUAs in this area 
were not conducted even in 2003. The government did not give 
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any expKcit reasons for this. The W U A leaders I consulted raised 
objections to many o f the amendments made to the APFMLS a c t 4 
According to them they were not consulted and many o f the 
amendments made to the A P F M I S act o f 1997 were against the 
interests o f the W U A s and the spirit o f participatory irrigation 
management 
70_2 The Amendments 
In this section, I discuss briefly some o f the amendments made to 
A P F M I S act o f 1997 and present the views o f W U A leaders and 
irrigation bureaucrats from the study area. The bill for the 
amendments to the act was placed in the state legislative assembly 
for approval in March 2003 and was amended. 5 My purpose in 
doing so is to further discuss the role o f actors in policy changes 
and enhance the understanding o f policy processes in the irrigation 
sector in the state. 
Changes to W U A Structure 
T h e amendments to the A P F M I S Act o f 1997 led to many changes 
to the structure o f the W U A . The tenure o f the W U A office has 
been reduced to two years. The command size o f the W U A s 
formed under major irrigation was also reduced. According to the 
amended a c t 
the President and Vice-President of the managing committee of 
water users association shall, if not recalled or removed or 
disqualified by the provisions of the Act, be in office for a period of 
two years from the date of election or his/her tenure as member of 
territorial constituency which ever is earlier.' Section 3(2) declares 
that 'every water users area shall be divided into territorial 
constituencies which shall be six in minor irrigation (against the 
earlier maximum of four) and twelve in major and medium 
irrigation systems'. 
T h e W U A leaders interviewed expressed that they regarded 
reduction o f tenure o f the W U A office from five to two years as 
anti-democratic. According to them a term o f two years is not 
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sufficient for a W U A leader to do any meaningful w o r k It takes at 
least a year to understand the system details and official 
procedures. The amendment will lead to frequent leadership 
changes. T h e leader's argument is that in the absence o f experience, 
they will depend excessively on die Irrigation Department for 
decisions. I f that is the case the department will continue its control 
and monopoly over the irrigation system management 
The command size o f W U A s under major and medium 
irrigation systems has been reduced to a maximum of 1620 ha. One 
would have thought that as the size o f the W U A command 
decreased, the number o f T C members will also have decreased. 
However, under the amended Act the number o f T C members 
increased to twelve instead o f t e n for each W U A constituted. Each 
T C member now supervises or represents about 135 ha o f 
command in the WUA. A s a result, the number o f W U A s (under 
an irrigation subdivision) and the number o f T C members has 
increased. 
In the irrigation sub-division o f Kalluru the number o f WUAs 
has now increased from nine to eleven. The irrigation staff in the 
subdivision stated that the W U A commands have been re-defined 
according to the rules prescribed by the government With the 
increased number o f T C members in a W U A , new territorial maps 
with demarcated boundaries were prepared. In addition, voters' 
lists have been upgraded according to the new W U A boundaries. 
Both the W U A leaders and the irrigation bureaucrats hold the 
opinion that the changes will not improve irrigation management 
The W U A leaders did not like the idea that the W U A will now 
function as a continuous body simiW to that o f Rajyasabha in the 
central parliament. 6 According to them the increase in the number 
o f T C members will lead to increased competition within the W U A 
for financial resources to be spent in one's territorial constituency. 
A s a result, resource sharing and decision-making in W U A s may 
become politicised. A majority o f the field irrigation staff 
considered that the increase in the number o f W U A s and T C 
members will further complicate the decision making in irrigation 
management. 
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Creation o f new positions and Modes o f election 
Section 4 o f the amended Act introduces 'creation o f a new 
position, Le. the Vice President pos t in W U A with a view o f stand-
by arrangements'. In case o f death, resignation or recall o f W U A 
President, the Vice President can immediately act as a President 
There was no such provision in the past and in case o f vacancy the 
replacement was delayed. In addition the amendment empowered 
the Vice President to act as a joint signatory to operate the W U A 
bank account A s explained above the election for the post o f 
President and Vice President is not direct but elected by the T C 
members. 
T h e W U A leaders interviewed felt that the earlier rule o f direct 
election for the position o f President was g o o d and effective. In 
this case the President was answerable to all W U A members. In 
case o f indirect election, the President and Vice President are 
responsible to T C members rather than directly to the users. The 
leaders claim that the state government wants to weaken the 
importance o f the W U A President The creation o f post o f a Vice-
President is aimed at distributing the powers o f the President, argue 
the W U A leaders. 7 
The W U A leaders interviewed essentially argued that 'the higher 
bureaucrats and politicians deliberately amended the act in the 
name o f W U A representatives. N o w that the amendments are 
passed, the politicians and bureaucrats have succeeded in dividing 
the powers o f W U A President". F rom the view point o f W U A 
leaders, it is evident that there is disagreement and contestation o f 
policy by the participating actors. 
In contrast, the implementing bureaucracy during the 
discussions stated that the introduction o f the Vice-President 
position is rational They were also positive about the changes in 
the mode o f election. The changes in the act would result in 
sharing o f the W U A president"s duties, responsibilities and powers 
with the Vice-President and T C members. Hence the changes 
facilitate decentralised decision making in the W U A functioning. 
However, they also cautioned that the new arrangements would 
result in increased internal conflicts and poHtitisation o f W U A 
activities. 8 
My interpretation from the discussions is that the amendments 
to the Act were not endorsed by the W U A leaders. They felt that 
their powers were taken away. The objections they raised to some 
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extent sounded rather self interested. The rationale behind the 
introduction o f Vice-President could be mainly to address the 
criticism that the W U A s have become President centered. In the 
past it was evident that the T C members did not play an active role 
because decisions were usually taken by the W U A President in 
consultation with the irrigation staff. Under the new arrangement, 
the T C members elect the President and Vice-President and hence 
they might now play a more active role in W U A decision making 
process. 
In the past the powers to nominate a President for the W U A (in 
case o f a vacancy) by the concerned Distributary Committee (DC) 
President have led to political favouritism and affected negatively 
functioning o f the W U A With the introduction o f this amendment 
the power to ncmainate by the D C president ceased. The 
pessimistic view is that this move could be to balance the powers 
o f not only WUA-level leaders but the D C leaders. Reducing the 
tenure to two years and introduction o f vice-president/chairman 
position can be read as mechanisms to address the perceived 
political threat by these positions. The process o f amendments to 
the A P F M I S act and the consequent policy changes shows the 
negotiation o f different actors with the policy and its content 
Issue o f Recall 
The amendment related to recall was another amendment seriously 
contested by the W U A leaders. The A P F M I S act spells out reasons 
for disqualification o f candidates for/ from the W U A office. The 
Act provides W U A members with the 'right to recall' a President 
or member o f the managing committee 9 o f the W U A after one 
year on the basis o f their performance (APFMIS Art , Chapter LI, 
and Section 10). T w o thirds o f the general body members o f the 
W U A have to vote in favour o f recall The process should be 
supervised entirely by the W U A 
According to the amended Act, recalling a W U A President or 
Vice-President or a managing committee member (as the case may 
be) can be initiated by giving a written notice to the Competent 
Authority (engineering) o f the respective W U A signed by not less 
than one third o f the total number o f the members o f the W U A , 
who are entitled to vote. The W U A leaders criticise this provision 
as a clear move to transfer powers to the Competent Authorities. 
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They argue that earlier only the District Collector had the power to 
remove a W U A leader i f found guilty. T h e amended act states that 
N o notice of the motion to recall under this section shall be made 
•within one year (of the date of assumption of office by the person) 
against whom the motion was sought to move. If the motion is 
carried with the support of a majority of the members present and 
voting at a meeting of the general body specially convened for the 
purpose, the Competent Authority (engineering) shall by order remove him or 
her from office and the resulting vacancy shall be filled in the same 
manner as undedying vacancy( italics mine). 
Under the amended Act the power to remove has also been 
given to the competent authority. This will tilt the power balance 
between the Irrigation Department and the WUA. This provision 
to m e seems contradictory as the power to remove only rests with 
the competent authority (irrigation engineering), though competent 
authorities, are also to be drawn from the Agriculture sector. The 
W U A leaders pointed out that this provision is a clear indication 
that the Irrigation Department wants to control the W U A and does 
not want to share power with officers from other departments. 
Power to inspect W U A records 
Policy makers in the government at various occasions commented 
on the performance o f the WUAs in the state. They commented 
that in the last five years o f irrigation reform management, the 
instances o f corruption have increased rather than decreased. T o 
address this issue the provision to inspect the W U A records has 
been included, states a senior irrigation bureaucrat during an 
interview. According to him the section 28 o f the amended Act 
empowers the Commissioner to authorise an officer or officers to 
inspect the records o f the WUAs : 
Section 28 ( rule 2) of Chapter VTI of the amended Act states that " 
the books of accounts and other shall be open for information to 
the members of the farmers organisation and also for inspection to 
any officer or officers authorised by the Government or 
Commissioner, as may be prescribed". 
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The W U A leaders interviewed cleariy stated that this provision 
was never discussed in the meetings. The leaders agreed that in 
principle they do not object the particular provision as a step to 
achieve financial transparency. T h e leaders suggested that there 
should be a written request/complaint from the members o f the 
W U A to the Competent Authority up on which he or she can act 
and verify the records. This will provide legitimacy for the process 
Le. for the members who complain and officer who is to supervise. 
Otherwise, this provision will result in further bureaucratic control 
over the WUA. 
10.3 Concluding Remarks 
What do the irrigation reform policy processes add to our 
understanding policy, politics and change? The Andhra Pradesh 
case showed a distinct dynamics in the policy process. The field 
evidence shows that the evolution o f amendments to the A P F M I S 
Act was an outcome o f political priorities and bureaucratic choices, 
and only to some extent reflected the needs o f W U A leaders. 
The views o f W U A representatives and the irrigation 
bureaucracy regarding the amendments to the Act reflected their 
own interests. The process o f amendments to the Act under the 
Naidu-led T D P regime suggested that the government wanted to 
use participatory approaches but at the same time tried to control 
the process. Policy decisions are influenced by the priorities o f 
ruling political party, and the legal, bureaucratic and interests o f 
financial institutions. 
The A P case study confirms that in this case political leaders 
initiated a proposal for change, empowered technocratic teams to 
design reform programs and centralised power in the executive 
branch to facilitate decision-making (Grindle 1999). The demand 
for reforms in this case has not emerged from the users. 
I have showed how more recent macro-political compulsions 
have further reshaped the content o f the irrigation reform policy in 
Andhra Pradesh. The electoral calculations o f the local politicians 
and W U A leaders and bureaucratic interests appeared at the heart 
o f the reform policy and policy changes. 
Understanding policy contestation means better prediction o f 
the behaviour o f different policy actors and the strategic choices 
that they make in gaining access to and control over resources in 
different resource arenas. In this respect this book aims to link 
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theory and practice by contributing to the understanding o f 
irrigation reform policy processes in Andhra Pradesh. B y doing so 
this book has contributed to the ongoing efforts o f making 
politics' a legitimate topic on the agenda o f global irrigation 
management and reform discourse. I hope that these insights from 
the Andhra Pradesh irrigation reform process will provide insights 
in implementing participatory reform policies in other states o f 
India. 
Notes 
1 O n the reasons for delay, the Iirrigation Ministry states that 'the 
government is reviewing performance of WUAs against the objectives set 
for them It recognises that there are certain deficiencies in the working of 
WUAs. The Government decided to bring certain changes in WUA 
structure, rules and regulations. The objective is to craft simple and 
vibrant organisations with greater transparency, more accountability and 
self-management' (Eenadu, September 2002). 
2 A possible reason for the delay of WUA elections is the declined 
popularity of the ruling TDP government The TOP lost many seats in 
the elections held for the Panchayat Raj bodies in June-August 2001. The 
Congress surpassed the TDP in Telangana both in the number of ZPTC 
and the MPTC, while it came very close to the TDP in coastal Andhra 
and Rayalaseema (see Suri 2001). The ruling political party leaders must 
have wanted time to regain the popular vote base to win as many as WUA 
positions, 
3 The existence of WUAs further marginalised when the Chief Minister 
made an announcement in the state assembly. Mr. Naidu announced that 
the Panchayat bodies would be empowered to implement the Land, Water 
and Tree Act (Eenadu, 23rd March 2003). 
4 The state level workshop was held on 30 t h May 2002 at Hyderabad. The 
Irrigation Minister states that the workshop was held to review the 
progress achieved by WUAs and to elicit views of the WUA presidents on 
changes necessary for optimum benefits including amendment of the 
APFMIS Act (ww.Uonetcom/2002/05/31/stofles/2002053101691900Jitm). 
5 The first amendments to APFMIS act 1997 were brought by introducing 
a bill no 32 in the AP Legislative assembly on 2 4 * November 1998. The 
Ordinance 7 of 1998 repealed and second time the amendments were 
introduced through the ordinance of 9 of 2002. For more information 
visit FAOLEX database at URL http://faolex.fao.org/faolex. 
6 All the TC members for the WUA shall be elected at one time, out of 
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which one third (in the case of major irrigation the total of 12 TC 
members, out of twelve one third, Le. four members) of the members 
shall retire as soon as may be on the completion of two years, another one 
third members shall retire after completion of four years, and the 
remaining one third shall retire after completion of six years in office and 
their terms of retirement shall be decided by drawing of lots. The term of 
the office of all the TC members elected subsequent to the first election 
against the vacancies of retirement, as specified in sub section (3) of the 
Act shall be of six years if not recalled or removed or disqualified under 
the provisions of the Act In this way the WUA functions as a continuous 
body. 
7 Mr. Goutama Raju who elected as a President to the WUA office for the 
second term argued in his presentation at the workshop (titled Water and 
Farmers Network organised by Jala Spandana and WALAMTARI on 8th 
April 2004) that "the indirect elections call for unhealthy practices like 
horse-trading (purchase of TC member's vote) and will destabilise the 
WUA activities and functions. The Government is not concerned to 
entrust functions as envisaged in the original Act". 
8 The implementing irrigation staff in the study area shared that that the 
change in duration is welcome as it reduces complacency of the President 
and affords opportunity for more members to serve the association. They 
are of the view that the indirect elections to the top positions will reduce 
the scope for the monopolistic tendencies of the President These changes 
will result in the coUective responsibility of the TC members of the WUA 
functioning. The bureaucracy felt that conducting elections for every five 
years is a huge task for the government It costs huge money for the 
state's exchequer and administratively not feasible to continue. 
9 The general body or assembly of the WUA is composed of all members. 
The Management Committee is the executive body of the WUA, which is 
consists of one member elected by each of the Territorial Constituencies 
of the WUA. The T C members are elected by the TC user members in 
compliance with the arrangements prescribed by the Government 
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Summary 
This thesis studies the emergence, process and politics o f the 
Andhra Pradesh reform policy o f Participatory Irrigation 
Management (PLM). The reform has been labeled as the 'AP 
model' o f irrigation reforms and supported by external aid agencies 
like World B a n k W t h i n a short span o f time Andhra Pradesh's 
PLM programe has received internal attention. The program has 
been seen as a successful model because o f the political will and 
legal bureaucratic support it received and its big-bang approach to 
implementation. Consequentiy the reform program influenced the 
thinking on irrigation management policies in other states within 
India and abroad. 
This study investigates the process o f PLM policy implemented 
since 1997 in the state. The objective is to understand the nature 
and dynamics o f the policy process Le. the role of different actors 
such as water users, water users' association leaders, politicians, 
irrigation bureaucrats and their contestation o f policy and shaping 
o f courses o f action and outcomes. B y doing so the study aims to 
contribute to the general debate on reform policies and particulady 
irrigation reform policy in the state o f Andhra Pradesh. 
The thesis is a product o f intensive field work carried out from 
March 2001 to J u n e 2002 with additional field work visits at 
different intervals during 2002-2004. The research was also 
benefited by my earlier research work carried out Gujarat Institute 
o f Development Research on PLM in Andhra Pradesh during 1999-
2000. The first stage concerned a reconnaissance survey o f WUAs 
in the state and a detailed study o f W U A s formed on Madhira 
branch canal under Kalluru and Madhira irrigation sub-divisions. I 
studied the outcomes o f reform policy contestation in key arenas o f 
irrigation management namely, irrigation works, irrigation 
expansion fix. bridging the gap command) and irrigation revenue 
assessment (known as Joint Azmoish) in Madhira branch canal. I 
focused on the day-to-day engagement o f the W U A leaders and 
middle and lower level irrigation bureaucrats with the policy and 
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implementation, on the ground. The second stage o f field work 
focused on policy actors at the state capital 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters and an epilogue. After 
the introductory chapter, chapter 2 presents the conceptual 
framework used for the analysis. T h e subsequent empirical 
chapters set out to study the key means o f policy implementation 
and related irrigation management policy process arenas. Chapter 3 
discusses the emergence o f Participatory Irrigation Management 
(PLM) policy in the state o f Andhra Pradesh. Chapter 4 introduces 
the details o f the irrigation and social organisation o f Madhira 
Branch Canal (MBC). The Chapter shows how irrigation 
organisation linked with local social organisation. 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 are based on empirical analysis and 
together answer the main research question. Chapter 5 focuses on 
the first management arena o f reform studied o f irrigation works. I t 
analyses the process o f carrying out physical works (operation and 
maintenance and minimum rehabilitation works) after the 
introduction o f the PLM programme in the state, and the key actors 
reshaping outcomes. Chapter 6 focuses on the second irrigation 
management arena o f irrigation expansion and focuses in to 
government claims on bridging the gap command. Chapter 7 
discusses the third irrigation management arena o f reform in joint 
irrigation supervision and revenue collection (joint Azmoish) . It 
examines the role and participation o f the Irrigation, Revenue, 
Agriculture departments and the W U A in a new process created 
under the reforms through which the extent o f area that received 
canal irrigation in a crop season will be joindy finalised. Chapter 8 
returns to the issue o f socio-political embeddedness as it reshapes 
reforms, looking this time at the system-bureaucracy domain and 
irrigation bureaucrats, especially the field level staff Chapter 9 is 
the concluding chapter and summarises the key findings o f the 
research. Many changes have taken place in the irrigation sector 
after 2002. The Naidu government that introduced the irrigation 
reforms stalled the elections for W U A s after the completion o f 
their first term in the office. A Congress government came in to 
power in 2004. A s a result there were many changes in the course 
o f irrigation reform policy. I discuss these changes as a brief 
epilogue to the b o o k 
Summary 283 
This thesis show how reform policies are interpreted and 
reconstructed by the participating actors. Initially the reform 
policies were resisted covertly by middle and lower level o f 
irrigation bureaucrats. They understood that the programme aimed 
to decentralise their powers and transfer irrigation management 
activities to water users associations. In process these bureaucrats 
made alliances with W U A representatives and local leaders and 
controlled the irrigation management arenas. The lower level 
bureaucrats could successfully lobby with the higher officials and 
with government using legal measures and retained their status 
within the irrigation hierarchy. T h e irrigation bureaucracy gained 
more technical and financial powers in the process and retained 
their control in irrigation management and decision making 
processes. Hence I argue that, contrary to what is generally 
expected, PLM in Andhra Pradesh did not lead to participatory 
management o f irrigation resources, but served to preserve or 
strengthen the actors' interests. 
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